The Global Taiwan Brief Volume 2, Issue 10
Establishment vs. Anti-Establishment Square Off in KMT Chairmanship Election
By: Russell Hsiao
The NIDS China Security Report 2017: Change in Continuity – The Dynamics of the China-Taiwan Relationship
By: June Teufel Dreyer
US-Taiwan Citizen Exchange: Stable Connections in a Shifting International Arena
By: Oliver Thomas and Ross Busch
PLA Reform in 2017: Likely Directions and Implications for Taiwan
By: Joel Wuthnow
Establishment vs. Anti-Establishment Square Off in KMT Chairmanship Election
Russell Hsiao is the Executive Director of the Global Taiwan Institute and the Editor-in-Chief of the Global Taiwan Brief.
With only a little over two months left, the race for the chairmanship of the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) is heating up. On May 20, members of the Nationalist Party (http://www.kmt.org.tw/) will elect their seventh chairperson. Currently, six candidates have announced that they will be vying for the chairmanship position that will determine the course and perhaps likelihood of the Party’s recovery after the crushing 2016 presidential and legislative elections.
The incumbent helmswoman, Hung Shiu-chu (b. 1948, 洪秀柱), is hoping to retain her position as chairwoman, which will ostensibly pave the way for her return as the Party’s presidential candidate in 2020 (assuming a successful 2018 local elections). Yet, Hung’s ability to reclaim the chairmanship is being challenged by several candidates from the establishment wing of the KMT such as former Vice President Wu Den-yih (b. 1948, 吳敦義), current KMT Vice-Chairman Hau Lung-bin (b. 1952, 郝龍斌), former KMT Vice-Chairman Steve Chan (b. 1948, 詹啟賢), as well as outsider candidates such as businessman Han Kuo-yu (b. 1957, 韓國瑜), and Tina Pan (b. 1957, 潘維剛).
In quite uncharacteristic fashion, the widely contested chairmanship election in May seems to indicate a lack of unity within a Party that has traditionally been wary of airing its dirty laundry in public. The slide towards greater division did not begin in the aftermath of the 2016 election, but arguably as far back as after the 2014 local elections, when former President Ma Ying-jeou stepped down as chairman to take responsibility for the KMT’s poor showing. Without enough preparations made to groom new KMT leadership in the preceding years, the Party was essentially caught flat-footed when forced to adapt to a new political reality in the aftermath of the student-led Sunflower movements.
Madame Hung has been serving as the chairperson of the KMT since March 2016 after she won the Party’s provisional election following Eric Chu’s (b. 1961, 朱立倫) resignation. Chu resigned after he was defeated by Tsai Ing-wen in the 2016 presidential election. Although Hung was the Party’s first candidate for the 2016 presidential election, she was replaced after party heavyweights intervened at the 11th hour and party members voted “overwhelmingly” to replace her with Chu—widely considered a political rising star, but a reluctant presidential candidate—in a last-ditch effort to salvage the KMT’s chances to win the 2016 elections.
Steered on by her stalwart supporters, Hung obtained 56 percent of the votes in the provisional KMT chairperson election—besting her closest opponent by over 23 percent in a race comprised of no real substantial opposition. Around 139,558 eligible votes were counted, representing 41 percent of the total eligible votes. As of January 21, according to data released by the KMT, the Party had 899,668 members, of whom only 226,783 are reportedly eligible to vote in the chairperson election. The Party elite, reeling from the crushing loss of the 2016 presidential and legislative elections, were still in shock at the time of the provisional election. Representing the “deep blue” (深藍) wing of her party, Hung’s rise and continued leadership role portended a drift towards that end of the political spectrum as the new mainstream. A year after the 2016 elections, however, it appears that the Party establishment is attempting to regain control of the Party. It should be no surprise that the prevailing theme in all the candidates’ messages has been to emphasize the need for party unity.
The silhouette of what appears to be a new factional fault line in KMT politics has emerged following the 2016 elections. To be sure, the 2016 presidential election exposed the erosion in the reputation of the so-called establishment factions within the KMT, and the new candidates and their respective supporters shed light on the new factions, represented by establishment candidates and non-establishment candidates. While four of the candidates represent old heavyweights of the Party, two of the candidates are relatively new to the upper-echelons of the political scene.
In a race—which has all but begun except officially—with no clear frontrunner, it is interesting to note the results of an online poll conducted by Taiwan-based media outlet, ETToday, which has Han Kuo-yu and Hung Shiu-chu leading the pack in terms of favorites to become the next KMT chairperson, with 2,931 and 2,126 votes, respectively. While such online polls should be taken with a grain of salt, it would seem that the popularity of the two candidates, Han and Hung, is consistent with the anti-establishment sentiment that may be growing among the Party’s base. Whether their favorability to win the chairperson election represents an endorsement of the “deep blue“ political perspective remains to be seen.
As it stands now, there is not a clear favorite to win the chairmanship election. While there does not appear to be much substantive policy disagreement among the candidates, the shifting power center manifested in the leadership of the Party at the top will significantly influence the direction that the Party goes. At the very least, the election will lay down an important marker for the Party’s approach to the 2018 local elections and even perhaps serve as a preliminary contest for the nomination in the 2020 presidential election.
The main point: A year after the election, it appears that the KMT Party establishment is attempting to regain control of the Party. The chairmanship election will lay down an important marker for the Party’s approach to the 2018 local elections and even perhaps serve as a preliminary contest for the nomination in the 2020 presidential election.
The NIDS China Security Report 2017: Change in Continuity – The Dynamics of the China-Taiwan Relationship
Dr. June Teufel Dreyer is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami and is the author of the recently-published Middle Kingdom and Empire of the Rising Sun: Chinese Japanese Relations, Past and Present (Oxford University Press, 2016).
The National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), the core policy research arm of Japan’s Ministry of Defense, recently issued its annual China security report. Previous iterations had focused on topics related to the rising assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the modernization and expanded scope of activities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and related topics. This year’s report broke with past precedent by focusing on China and Taiwan. Having previously predicted that Japan-Taiwan relations would rebound from the nadir they had reached under the administration of Ma Ying-jeou, this author approached the report with great anticipation, and was disappointed.
The first chapter should have been titled, “Chinese-Taiwan relations from Beijing’s point of view,” but was not. The chapter’s author, Shinji Yamaguchi, repeatedly refers to “re”unification, the “re” not being in Chinese usage and moreover giving the misimpression that Taiwan was once a part of the PRC. In addition, to say that “the two sides arrived at the 1992 Consensus” (11) as a basis for conducting a government dialogue leaves the impression that an agreement was reached between the two sides rather than, as was the case, between two political parties, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). Non-KMT opponents of the talks, who were excluded from the discussions, attempted to demonstrate outside the meeting venue in Singapore, but were arrested by Singaporean police. Also crucially important but unmentioned by Yamaguchi is the fact that then-KMT official Su Chi (蘇起) later admitted he had fabricated the term without the knowledge of then-President Lee Teng-hui.
Yamaguchi’s analysis concentrates only on the top leadership, and overlooks how public opinion in Taiwan plays an important part in framing the policymakers’ choices. Yet another problem is that the author does not clarify what he means by “independence.” When he speaks of “the path to independence” (18), is this just the desire to remain autonomous from China to avoid provoking a kinetic response, or a formal declaration of de jure independence? What does it mean to say that Hu Jintao “blocked Taiwan’s independence”? (22). Then-President Chen Shui-bian had already pledged in his inaugural address not to declare independence as long as Beijing did not resort to the use of force.
Another interesting lacuna is in the narrative of the Taiwan Strait tension of 1995-1996, occasioned by Beijing’s anger over the United States allowing Lee to visit his alma mater, Cornell University, to receive its Distinguished Alumnus Award. This would have been the appropriate place to mention that anxiety over PLA war games directed against Taiwan and missile firings into the Taiwan Strait, as well as the nuclear weapons test from May 1995 to July 1996,[1] prompted the Japanese government to seek out, and receive, a closer security relationship with the United States. Included in these activities was a Japanese statement that it would aid in the defense of shuhen jitai (週辺事態) in the surrounding waters, prompting Beijing to demand, but not get, Tokyo’s assurance that this did not entail Japanese cooperation with the United States against an invasion of Taiwan.
Further, when mentioning Chen Shui-bian’s “more radical stance” as epitomized in his August 2002 statement that there was a separate country on either side of the Taiwan Strait —yibian yiguo （一邊一國)—it should have been mentioned that Chen was essentially restating his predecessor Lee Teng-hui’s pronouncement that the cross-Strait formulation should be state-to-state or at least “special state-to-state”—teshu guoyuguo (特殊國與國). Curiously, the section titled “The Xi Jinping Years: Stressing the 1992 Consensus,” which credits Xi with “the audacious step” of meeting with Ma Ying-jeou, does not mention that all Chinese television channels were blacked out when Ma began to speak. And that, where his photo appeared, the small Republic of China lapel pin Ma wore was blacked out, appearing instead as an odd discoloration on the lapel of his suit.
Happily, the remaining chapters, two of them by Momma Rira and one by the aforementioned Yamaguchi, are more straightforward. A couple of minor points: the split between Lee Teng-hui and James Soong was over more than Lee’s freezing the functions of the Taiwan provincial government (32), since Lee was trying to undercut the power of the more popular Soong in order the advance the electoral prospects of his chosen successor, Lien Chan. On page 46, it should be noted that President George W. Bush offered to sell a weapons package to Taiwan only after the collision between a US reconnaissance plane and a Chinese J-8 fighter, which occurred on April 1, 2001. While it may be true that there were no major problems between China and Taiwan while President Obama was in office, supporters of Taiwan’s continued autonomy would dispute the author Shinji Yamaguchi’s judgment that there were no remarkable developments during that time, instead believing that the many cross-Strait agreements contributed to an increased dependence of Taiwan on the PRC, eroding Taiwan’s fragile claims to sovereignty
The report should also have mentioned that the decline in the number of tourists from China that followed Tsai Ing-wen’s election in 2016 (58) was not widely mourned in Taiwan, though perhaps some tour operators might demur. Given the perceived rude behavior and poor manners of PRC tourists, many Taiwanese expressed relief at their diminished numbers. he nation’s tourism bureau has also made good progress in bringing in tourists from other countries.
Rira Momma’s section on the status of Taiwan’s military response provides a sober, and sobering analysis of the state of the country’s armed forces, and cites frequently-occurring scandals in the ranks, weakening military discipline, insufficient training for war, an inadequate sense of crisis, and an environment in which little emphasis is given to the question of why military forces fight (67). There is an unfortunate mistranslation on page 71: the Hsiung Feng III is a supersonic missile, not a hypersonic missile. Were it the latter, Taiwan would have achieved what the United States, China, and Russia are currently still trying to develop.
In conclusion, Rira notes that, since Xi Jinping’s government has not yet subjected Tsai Ing-wen to the kind of personal criticism it once directed at Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, and because Tsai is trying to avoid any actions that might trigger escalation, some leeway exists for negotiations. As a majority of Taiwanese voters have indicated that they favor maintaining the status quo, to either a formal declaration of independence or unification with China, the Tsai administration will likely adopt policies aimed at consolidating that position (82).
Despite the report’s evident efforts to avoid upsetting the PRC, Beijing’s reaction was predictably negative. The Chinese Foreign Ministry immediately sent a representative to the Japanese government, urging Tokyo “to be cautious in its words and deeds regarding Taiwan-related issues.” A particularly nettlesome point appears to have been the report’s tacit acceptance that Taiwan and China are two separate entities rather the former being an inalienable part of the latter, as Beijing insists in its own definition of the “One–China” policy.
The main point: The National Institute for Defense Studies’ (NIDS) 2017 annual China report broke with past precedent by focusing on China and Taiwan but was disappointing due to its number of assumptions favoring the PRC narrative of cross-Strait relations and a lack of nuance in its assessment of Taiwan’s domestic concerns.
[1] Richard Bush, The Perils of Proximity: China-Japan Security Relations (Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 17.
US-Taiwan Citizen Exchange: Stable Connections in a Shifting International Arena
By: Oliver Thomas and Ross Busch
Oliver Thomas is a recent alumnus of a State Department funded Fulbright Grant where he taught and conducted research on Kinmen, Taiwan. He currently works for the Foreign Policy Initiative’s Center for Military and Diplomatic History. He will pursue further study of politics and international relations at the University of Cambridge in the fall.
Ross Busch is a recent alumnus of a State Department funded Fulbright Grant where he taught English and conducted citizen interviews on Kinmen, Taiwan. He currently works as an international program liaison for Eckerd College and will be studying Public Policy & Management at the University of Glasgow in the fall.
Shifting policy agendas and perspectives on key global issues are inherent in all political transitions. The Trump administration is no different. While the fluctuations and shocks of high politics may grab headlines and influence political priorities, US-Taiwan relations find coherence, continuity, and stability in sectors often overlooked and underappreciated as diplomatic vehicles, such as citizen and student exchange programs. Although each year hundreds of scholars, students, business leaders, and military personnel travel between the US and Taiwan, many programs that orchestrate these exchange opportunities are currently threatened by President Trump’s proposed cuts to the State Department’s budget. Moreover, Taiwan currently faces American criticism on the grounds of exploiting migrant workers, many of whom are victims of domestic violence. Such worries surrounding the future of U.S-Taiwan relations are justified, but there are methods to help curb the uncertainty. Organic, people-to-people diplomacy should continue unobstructed in the form of bilateral exchange initiatives between Taiwan and the United States.
The informal nature of the US-Taiwan relationship necessitates creative communications strategies, which can serve as a galvanizing force to sustain unofficial relations. Programs such as Fulbright Taiwan, Education USA, the Huayu Scholarship, Mosaic Taiwan, and the International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP), pay dividends in that they ease the diplomatic and political constraints that Taiwan and the United States face. While the Huayu Scholarship and Mosaic Taiwan receive funding from the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, US-funded programs such as Fulbright Taiwan, Education USA, and the IVLP are vulnerable to potential budget cuts. Fulbright Taiwan has sponsored the exchange of over 1,300 US grantees and 1,600 Taiwanese grantees respectively; both Presidents Ma Ying-jeou and Chen Shui-bian are alumni of the IVLP, and Education USA has advised thousands of Taiwanese students regarding university studies in the United States. Grantees and exchange participants have returned to their home countries to pursue careers in foreign affairs, education, and public service, all with unique and powerful knowledge of American and Taiwanese societies. It is essential to the stability of US-Taiwan relations that these exchanges are not only supported, but strengthened.
These initiatives show that Taiwanese and American exchange participants adopt a wide array of roles of in order to build the organic relationships that political representatives cannot. They simultaneously serve as ambassadors and educators; as business and thought leaders. In many cases, participants and leaders use their experiences to contribute to the larger economic, entrepreneurial, and infrastructural goals of both nations. Dr. William Vocke, the Director of Fulbright Taiwan, has ardently supported international exchange by identifying that alumni of Taiwan’s program currently work in a variety of important institutions in Washington, such as the White House and Congressional Offices.
Emerging policy priorities could offer excellent opportunities for potential exchange, cooperation, and growth. For instance, President Tsai announced in 2016 her intention to revitalize Taiwan’s strategic industries and entrepreneurial resilience by creating an “Asian Silicon Valley” in Taoyuan City. Moreover, Thomas Debass, the Department of State’s Acting Representative for Global Partnerships, visited Taiwan during “Meet Taipei 2016,” a startup event taking place during Global Entrepreneurship Week, and explained that US and Southeast Asian partnerships would be key in its efforts to develop Taoyuan as a burgeoning tech hub. This is especially relevant to President Tsai Ying-wen’s nascent “New Southbound Policy” and for bolstering incentives to invest in Taiwan. In addition to technological innovation, the Tsai administration has also asked the Ministry of Economic Affairs to lead Taiwan’s transition to renewable energy. All three policy initiatives are excellent opportunities for the expansion of professional exchanges between the United States and Taiwan.
US and Taiwan officials are not just engaging in civilian bilateral exchange, they are also creating exchange opportunities with other nations. In 2012, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs collaborated with the East-West Center to found the Pacific Island Leadership Program, or PILP. PILP provides young leaders of Pacific Island nations the opportunity to participate in educational programs, both in Taipei and at the East-West Center in Hawaii. These programs foster leadership, educational, and cross-cultural development as citizens witness shared values, vibrant cultures, and in turn, develop a more granular understanding of their respective countries. Moreover, working together to craft such partnerships, enhances the cooperative abilities of US and Taiwanese partner institutions.
Though Tsai’s transit meetings must adhere to certain conventions in the discrete US-Taiwan relationship, scholars, teachers, and cultural ambassadors can facilitate these interactions in a more transparent, economic, and meaningful way. As Taiwan’s exports slowly increase after a rocky start to the Tsai presidency, the United States should continue to encourage educational and business exchanges to support Taiwan’s economic objectives. Moreover, scholarly and business communication fills the empty space between Washington and Taipei left unoccupied out of political necessity. Combined, they serve as a launchpad for Taiwanese and American human capital. Free from political constraints, members of civil society, such as scholars, teachers, and cultural ambassadors can facilitate a deepening of US-Taiwan relations while supporting the expansion of Taiwanese assets and of the investor pool. Rather than risk geopolitical confrontations with the People’s Republic of China, Taiwanese and American exchange programs operate in a diplomatic gray area that provides grantees with a unique responsibility.
Continued investment in citizen and educational exchange will serve to divert attention from the inherent ambiguities that plague state-to-state relations between the United State and Taiwan, due to their unofficial nature, and will lay the groundwork for Taiwan’s globalization. As Peter Navarro asserted, “Taiwan needs all the American help it can get integrating this island democracy into as many international organizations as possible.” The US-Taiwan partnership, through cultural and education programs, has both the potential to reaffirm diplomatic commitments and demonstrate the long run productivity of such undertakings. The Trump Administration should be careful not to disrupt the longstanding and beneficial nature of US-Taiwan exchange programs; doing so would only serve to cloud the waters of an already complex relationship with one of America’s key geopolitical allies.
The main point: Scholarly and cultural exchange programs between the US and Taiwan facilitate diplomatic and economic relations where official political exchanges are constrained by the lack of formal diplomatic relations. Leaders in Washington and Taipei should continue to push for such programs while recognizing their often-overlooked market and geostrategic benefits.
PLA Reform in 2017: Likely Directions and Implications for Taiwan
Joel Wuthnow is a research fellow in the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at the National Defense University (NDU). The views expressed in this essay are the author’s own and do not reflect the official policy or position of NDU, the Department of Defense, or the US government.
In 2016, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began its most ambitious and far-reaching cycle of reforms in the past 70 years. The key operational goal was to improve the PLA’s ability to carry out joint operations such as blockades, island landing operations, and joint firepower attacks (involving strikes launched from land-, air-, and sea-based platforms). The first tranche of the reforms, announced last year, took a step in this direction through several high-level structural changes, most notably by creating a permanent joint command and control system. Commanders of five new regionally-aligned theater commands will able to develop and deploy force packages from army, naval, air force, and conventional missile forces—a capability that proved elusive under the former Military Region system.
A second phase of Chinese military reforms, to be announced this year, will attempt to reduce the remaining obstacles to successful PLA joint operations. In part, this will mean putting the new joint command and control system into practice, such as by having theaters take the lead in joint training and peacetime operations (some of which continue to be led by the individual services). It will also mean additional structural and policy changes, including those in the following areas:
- Force Composition Changes. At present, PLA force structure is heavily skewed towards the ground forces (which account for approximately 70 percent of PLA end strength). The reforms this year will likely make deep cuts to the PLA ground forces, focusing especially on non-combat units and headquarters staff, while increasing the relative (and perhaps absolute) size of the navy, air force, and rocket forces. These changes will be carried out as part of a planned downsizing of the PLA from 2.3 to 2 million personnel, slated for completion by the end of this year.
- Army Force Structure Changes. Along with shrinking the ground forces, the PLA will also likely overhaul the army’s outdated force structure. At present, the army is still centered on 18 large-scale group armies, which primarily operate in fixed geographic areas. Changes could consolidate or eliminate group armies, while placing more attention on smaller, more deployable units such as brigades. Another beneficiary could be special operations forces, which currently only number around 20,000-30,000 personnel.
- More Joint Leadership. Historically, the PLA has had a ground force-centric leadership, with army officers occupying most senior command and staff billets. Personnel turnover ahead of the 19th Party Congress, which will be held this fall, will give the PLA an opportunity to advance more air force and naval officers into senior positions, especially in maritime-focused theaters. An early example was the promotion of North Sea Fleet commander Yuan Yubai to lead the Southern Theater Command, which is responsible for operations in the South China Sea.
- New Career Paths. A persistent weakness has been lack of officers qualified to conceive, plan, and lead joint operations. Reforms this year will likely address this problem by offering officers rotational assignments, in which they will gain “joint” experience at various points in their careers. The professional military education system will also undergo reforms to enhance schoolhouse and field training in joint operations, introducing these concepts earlier in an officer’s career.
- New Laws and Regulations. At a more general level, the PLA has struggled to establish and enforce laws and norms governing its personnel. Specific impediments have included corruption and a culture in which officers think that “their word is law.” In 2017, the PLA will likely take steps to address both problems, including continuing the anti-corruption campaign (which could focus on higher level officers and operational commanders, who have heretofore been excluded from the campaign), and introducing new regulations. One sign of progress in the latter area was the recent release of new guidelines governing auditing work.
A major question mark is the extent of potential resistance in the PLA to any or all of these efforts. Major force composition and structure changes impinge on what Xi Jinping and other Chinese reformers call “bureaucratic interests” (部門利益). The ground forces could be a particular obstacle to reform, as well as individual officers who might, as part of the force reduction, lose their jobs entirely or be forced to transfer to civilian roles in the PLA (with an inferior pension and lesser benefits). The personnel reshuffle could give Xi a chance to counter opponents, but might not be sufficient to stamp out resistance altogether. Another challenge could be discontent on the part of demobilized soldiers—recent veterans’ protests in Beijing suggest that prior efforts to compensate laid off personnel have not been entirely successful.
What do these changes mean for Taiwan?
First, stronger PLA joint operations capabilities could lead to increasing operational challenges for Taiwan and its outlying islands. For instance, the PLA could more easily conduct a blockade of Taiwan or seize the Penghu Islands (even though a full-scale amphibious invasion would continue to face major challenges). US forces might also encounter greater difficulties in intervening in a Taiwan crisis; in particular, the PLA could use joint firepower strikes to threaten regional bases from which US forces operate, such as those in Japan, or carrier strike groups. In these respects, planners need to consider upcoming PLA reforms in the context of ongoing improvements in Chinese power projection capabilities, such as stronger precision-guided missile and anti-surface warfare forces.
Second, new PLA capabilities could enhance China’s efforts to intimidate Taiwan, the United States, and others in the region considering closer ties with Taipei (such as Japan). Beijing could use new and improving military forces in a variety of ways to underscore concerns about the Tsai administration’s policies, including her refusal to endorse the 1992 Consensus, and closer Taiwan-US relations, as symbolized by the phone call between Tsai and then President-elect Trump. The PLA could, for instance, conduct joint exercises, missile tests, or combat patrols near Taiwan as a warning to Tsai. Depending on the circumstances, her reaction, and Washington’s decisions, could lead to another crisis on the scale of the 1995-19966 Taiwan Strait Crisis (though presumably Tsai would seek to avoid such an outcome).
None of this implies that the PLA will drastically improve its ability to threaten or coerce Taiwan overnight. Potential resistance in the PLA, along with the inherent difficulties of carrying out both a major force restructuring and a large-scale downsizing of the PLA, could mean that the operational effects of the reforms will not be fully apparent for years. Nevertheless, it is never too soon for Taipei and Washington to consider the implications of PLA reform on defensive operations, and how to improve military cooperation to counter increasing challenges. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, signed by President Obama in December 2016, calls for senior-level military exchanges in both Taiwan and the United States. One subject of those exchanges, if they occur, could be to discuss insights about PLA reform and modernization, and steps both sides can take, individually or in concert, to address attendant challenges.
The main point: 2017 will be a busy year for PLA reform. Key goals include rebalancing towards a greater focus on the navy and air force, restructuring the ground forces, and revising the personnel system to promote stronger joint operations capabilities. Taiwan needs to work, both individually and in concert with the United States, to mitigate the risks of a PLA that will be better organized, trained, and equipped to threaten the island’s safety.
