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Political Warfare Alert: China Using United Front Work Department to Conduct Espionage in Taiwan

On December 3, prosecutors in Tainan on the southern coast of Taiwan charged the chairman of the Workers Party (工黨, also known as the Labor Party), Cheng Chao-ming (鄭昭明), and his son, Lt. Col. Cheng Chih-wen (鄭智文), who previously served in the Missile Command of the Taiwan military for violating the country's National Security Act (國家安全法). The charges are associated with the two persons' activities that span over a decade in which the culprits were allegedly spying on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). While efforts by China to develop spy rings in Taiwan are nothing new—there have been many [high profile cases](#) in recent years—this case clearly reveals a method that China uses to conduct its espionage activities that was previously unknown or unclear at best. Indeed, the CCP appears to be using the United Front Work Department (UFWD), at least as a cover if not as an independent operational unit, to conduct [espionage activities](#) against its intelligence targets.

United Front is a tool for political warfare that involves the use of non-kinetic instruments to organize and mobilize non-CCP masses in pursuit of the Party's domestic and foreign policy objectives. According to a declassified [study](#) conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency, United Front is a “technique for controlling, mobilizing, and utilizing non-Communist masses.” Since the CCP was founded in 1921, the Party has used United Front as an organizing principle to establish a foothold among the masses, exploiting conflicts within society to undermine the influence of its adversaries, defeat warlords, gain support of the victims of Japanese aggression, and aid in the seizure of state power. After forming the PRC government in 1949, the CCP has [employed the United Front](#) to extend

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its control over non-Communist masses and to mobilize these masses to shore up its domestic legitimacy and undermine threats to state security. According to [Professor Anne Marie-Brady](#): “United Front activities incorporate working with groups and prominent individuals in society; information management and propaganda; and it has also frequently been a means of facilitating espionage.”

The Workers Party in Taiwan was established in 1987 and its founding chairman is Wang Yi-hsiung (王義雄). [Cheng](#) senior—the party’s current chairman—is the first leader of a political party in Taiwan to visit China in 1991 after the opening up of cross-strait relations in the 1980s. Cheng also [serves](#) as the chairman of the Taiwan Cross-Strait Relations Promotion Association (台灣兩岸關係促進會) and the vice chairman of Taiwan Hundred Surnames Cultural Exchange Association (台灣百姓文化交流協會). In April 1991, at the invitation of the [Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference](#) (CPPCC)—the highest level entity overseeing the CCP’s United Front system—Cheng [visited](#) China in his capacity as head of the Workers Party. In addition to these associations, Cheng also serves as the [chairman](#) of the Cheng Family Temple in Tainan (台南鄭氏家廟), which reportedly seeks to unite the Zheng Clan in Taiwan and abroad, and study the history of clan’s history in Taiwan.

The Taiwan Hundred Surnames Cultural Exchange Association co-organized the 10th annual Straits Hundred Surnames Forum (海峽百姓論壇) in 2018. The Forum started in 2008 during the first term of the previous Ma Ying-jeou administration. Held in Hsinchu, the event was co-organized with the China-based [Fujian Family Surname Research Association](#) (福建姓氏源流研究協會). Wu Rongyuan (吳榮元), the chairman of the Taiwan Hundred Surnames Cultural Exchange Association is also the current [chairman](#) of the Taiwan Labor Party (勞動黨)—not to be mistaken with Cheng’s Workers Party (工黨).

According to the Tainan prosecutor’s office, the father and his son, who was then a staff officer at the Combined Logistics Command of the ROC Ministry of Defense, were invited to travel to Japan in November 2009 (a year after the Hundred Surnames Forum began) at the request of a Chinese official who identified himself as an official from the Fujian provincial UFWD.

The Chinese official allegedly gave Lt. Col. Cheng \$1,000 in cash and paid for his flights. The meetings continued and in October 2010 the father and son travelled to Singapore to meet the UFWD official and others again. According to [Liberty Times](#), in these meetings, the UFWD official made reference to a “Beiping Model” (北平模式) that ostensibly referred to the strategy that the CCP used in 1949 to encourage the surrender and eventual defection of General Fu Zuoyi (傅作義) of the Nationalist Army, who commanded a strategic garrison around Beijing during the civil war, to give up the city to Communist forces without armed resistance.

After Lt. Col. Cheng retired from the Taiwan military in 2013, the Chinese agent again asked him to introduce active-duty Taiwan military officers; and, in December 2016, Lt. Col. Chen invited his friend, Lt. Col. Chen Sheng-yu from Taiwan’s military police command, to Malaysia and then to Vietnam (as recent as July 2018) to meet Li and his superiors. During the meeting, Lt. Col. Chen [reportedly](#) agreed to follow the “Beiping Model” and received \$10,000 in cash and other gifts. In February this year, Lt. Col. Cheng used a Chinese communication software to transfer the latest, presumably classified, military personnel appointments to the UFWD official.

In the preliminary analysis, it is plausible that United Front has an independent intelligence collection function given its control over and access to a vast array of exchange platforms and potential targets. It seems more likely, given capacity and capabilities issues of the UFWD, that it is being used as a cover for the other better equipped intelligence agencies, namely the Ministry of State Security (MSS) or the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In this particular case, given the apparent focus on military targets, it seems likely that the PLA General Political Department’s Liaison Department, which has been reorganized to the Central Military Commission Political Work Department, may be the primary operator of this agent.

The main point: A recent spy case reveals that the CCP is using the United Front Work Department, at least as a cover if not as a primary channel, to conduct espionage activities against its intelligence targets.

The Testcase of US-Taiwan Cooperation in South America: Paraguay

Since even before Tsai Ing-wen became president of Taiwan in May 2016, Beijing has broken off the so-called “diplomatic truce” between Taipei and Beijing and eventually poached seven of Taiwan’s [diplomatic partners](#) in less than four years. [1] Taiwan now only has 15 diplomatic partners from the 22 that the island-democracy had when Tsai was elected as president in January 2016. Nine of these remaining diplomatic partners are in Latin America and Caribbean, with only one ally in South America. The landlocked South American republic of Paraguay has maintained diplomatic ties with Taiwan since 1957—and its defense minister just recently [visited](#) Taiwan for a military exchange. Despite the apparent advancement of ties on the surface, Asunción has—for some time now—been on the fence about maintaining its longstanding diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

During the Ma Ying-jeou administration (2008–16), Taipei and Beijing reached a diplomatic détente. While Taipei did not gain any new diplomatic allies, Beijing [reportedly](#) refused offers of formal recognition from four countries with diplomatic relations with Taiwan: the Dominican Republic, Panama, Gambia—and Paraguay. It was probably only a matter of time before smaller nations would be captured by what former Costa Rican President Oscar Arias called “[elemental realism](#).” Three of four countries have since established diplomatic ties with Beijing since January 2016. Now, diplomats in Taipei worry in private that Paraguay may be the next to fall to Beijing’s advances. For its part, Taipei has been trying to shore up its formal ties with Paraguay with two [presidential visits](#) since May 2016 and President Mario Abdo Benitez’s [trip](#) to Taiwan in 2018 for the National Day celebrations. Paraguay Defense Minister Bernardino Soto Estigarribia just [visited](#) Taiwan in late November for military exchanges. These efforts by Taipei are being complemented by high-level attention paid by senior officials in the United States.

Daniel Erickson, a former Obama administration official, [observed](#): “Paraguay’s new president, Mario Abdo Benítez, who assumed office in August 2018, is part of a cluster of conservative leaders who have recently taken power across South America: Argentina’s Mauricio Macri, Chile’s Sebastián Piñera, Colombia’s Iván

Duque, and Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro. The Trump administration has taken this opportunity to beef up its regional policy messaging around combating leftist governments in the hemisphere.” Asunción is notably the only diplomatic ally of Taiwan in the group—although Bolsonaro is known to be favorably disposed to [enhancing](#) relations with Taiwan as well. In this context, it is noteworthy that Mike Pompeo made the first [visit](#) to Paraguay by a US secretary of state in 53 years in April 2019 and even more telling that Pompeo explicitly [praised](#) Paraguay for “standing up for their own interests and beliefs by supporting a democratic Taiwan.” This meeting was followed by a landmark meeting just held between President Donald Trump and President Mario Abdo Benitez in mid-December, in which the post-meeting [joint statement](#) stated:

“... the United States International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) will pursue providing finance to Jerovia Mount Sinai Medical Center, an internationally accredited 240-bed tertiary medical center in Asuncion, Paraguay. DFC will work with Taiwan to provide technical assistance and financing for the project.”

In a follow up [comment](#), Assistant Secretary of State Michael Kozak highlighted: “Paraguay continues to recognize democratic Taiwan & show leadership in the region.”



Reaffirming ties w/ [#Paraguay](#), [@POTUS](#) & [@MaritoAbdo](#) spoke about our commitment to democratic institutions, restoring democracy to [#Venezuela](#), & fighting terrorism financing. Paraguay continues to recognize democratic [#Taiwan](#) & show leadership in the region



4:44 PM · Dec 14, 2019 · Twitter Web App

As Erickson further [observed](#), “The country’s [Par-

aguay] strong pro-Taiwan stance puts it off-limits for Beijing. Hence Paraguay has no hope of qualifying for China's soft loans and Belt and Road infrastructure projects." To be sure, there are limitations to competing dollar to dollar with Beijing's deep pockets. Beyond bilateral or even trilateral avenues of cooperation, there are multilateral mechanisms such as the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) that could be leveraged to further enhance efforts to counter China's diplomatic offensive. In the RAND report "[Countering China's Efforts to Isolate Taiwan Diplomatically in Latin America and the Caribbean](#)" authored by Scott Harold, Lyle J. Morris, and Logan Ma, the authors make the case of utilizing Taiwan aid and assistance more effectively can help shore up Taiwan's diplomatic and international presence. As the authors stated:

"US officials favorably regard, and US policy supports, the continuation of Taiwan's diplomatic partnerships with countries in the LAC region. The United States seeks to promote this goal by cooperating on development and disaster relief with Taiwan through the GCTF and other avenues, as well as via direct indications of dissatisfaction with regional states if they break ties with Taipei."

Also, as [noted](#) by the American Institute in Taiwan, the de facto US embassy in Taiwan:

"Taiwan has world-class experts in a wide variety of fields and we want to share their knowledge and experience with the world! The United States, Taiwan, and Japan jointly administer the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF), which serves as a platform for Taiwan to share its expertise with partners around the world. Since we started the GCTF in 2015, we have conducted 22 workshops for over 450 people from 38 countries around the world on a variety of topics. The GCTF will grow even more in 2020!"

The vehicle has already established a precedent for hosting [GCTF forums](#) outside of Taiwan. On September 29, a GCTF forum on "International Austronesian Languages Revitalization Forum" was held in Palau with 10 participating countries. It is worth noting that Japan—a close ally of the United States—is now a coordinating partner of GCTF and Japanese Prime Min-

ister Shinzo Abe made a maiden [visit](#) to Asunción in December 2018. In the [readout](#) of the summit, "the two leaders exchanged views on regional affairs in Asia and Latin America, and shared the view that they will continue to collaborate closely."

The main point: While the United States and Taiwan are making concerted efforts to shore up the latter's formal ties with Paraguay, there are limits in terms of capacity and resources. Multilateral mechanisms such as GCTF may be leveraged to further enhance Taipei's ties with select diplomatic allies such as Paraguay.

[1] Gambia severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 2013 and Beijing only agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Banjul only in March 2016—two months after Tsai Ing-wen was elected president in the 2016 presidential election.

People-to-People Exchanges Under-score Deepening Ties between Taiwan and Japan

By: Robert D. Eldridge

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On November 18, a quiet and solemn ceremony took place on the Penghu Islands (澎湖), otherwise known as the Pescadores. The afternoon ceremony, which took place at a park across the bay in the capital city of Magong (馬公), was attended by approximately 35 people from Japan and 15 local residents and visitors from Kaohsiung and Taipei. The ceremony marked the 111th anniversary of the sinking of the *Matsushima* off Mako (today's Magong City, Penghu County, Republic of China), which killed more than 200 crew members. The sailors died when an explosion occurred in the ammunition magazine, causing the Imperial Japanese Navy cruiser to roll over onto her starboard side and sink stern-first.

The *Matsushima*, which was serving as a training vessel for the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy, had been anchored off Mako after returning from a long-distance navigational training cruise when the tragedy occurred. Among the dead were 33 midshipmen of the newly graduated 35th class of the IJNA. The incident itself, whose actual cause remains unknown, occurred on April 30, 1908. The ship, originally built by the Société Nouvelle des Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée naval shipyards at La Seyne-sur-Mer in France, was struck from the IJN list three months later on July 31 that year.

Later, a memorial was built in a park within the city that included the *Matsushima's* Canet gun, a breech-loading 320-mm weapon that could fire 450-kg armor piercing shells at an effective range of 8,700 yards, standing perpendicular in the center. Subsequently, the memorial was rebuilt and relocated across the bay to the south, near where the sinking had occurred, at the aforementioned park. It was at this latter memorial that the mid-November ceremony was held, which I had the privilege of attending. A Buddhist priest and nuns from Kaohsiung, as well as local believers and others, assisted, with Japanese guests coming from the Kyushu, Kansai, and Kanto areas of Japan. Among the delegation from Japan were former senior Self-Defense Force officers, including general and flag officers, and retired parliamentarians.

This was actually the second time such an event took place. The first one was held a year before, in the fall of 2018. At that time, being the first ever postwar joint ceremony, more than 100 Japanese and Taiwanese—and an American, me—participated. It was officiated by a Shintō priest from Nami-no-ue Gu (Shrine) in Naha. The ceremony included retired SDF officers and a parliamentarian-turned-university president.

As a friend of the Kyushu delegation (having traveled with it to the inauguration of President Tsai Ing-wen in May 2016), and a symbol of the growing security relationship between Taiwan, the United States, and Japan, I had the honor of participating as one of the guests of honor and given the opportunity to place an offering at the memorial during the Shintō ceremony in 2018 and the Buddhist ceremony in 2019. In both cases, many Taiwanese were also present. Indeed, every year in the postwar period, local residents conducted a ceremony

on behalf of the Japanese sailors in the absence of Japanese organizers.

In the prewar period, the Imperial Japanese Navy had conducted the ceremony, led by the famous admiral [Tōgo Heihachirō](#) at one point. However, the 2018 ceremony was the first time for Japanese to be in attendance in the postwar period. During the past seven decades, it has been the Taiwanese who kept the memory of the sailors alive. The feeling of closeness of the islanders toward Japan was very apparent during both visits.

People-to-People Relations Enhance Long-term Ties

We concluded both trips with trilateral security conferences held in Taipei in which the opportunities and challenges to closer military, political, diplomatic, and economic relations were discussed from many different angles. These public dialogues, conducted by experts with participation and comments by Japanese and Taiwanese citizens in attendance with a strong interest in deepening the respective bilateral relationships (Japan-Taiwan, Taiwan-US, US-Japan) and trilateral (US-Japan-Taiwan) one as well, have been both eye-opening as well as suggestive of the possibilities to come.

On the eve of another trip to Taipei in early December, I was dining with representatives from the Taiwanese Foreign Ministry in Japan when one of my hosts received a phone call and seemed very happy. After he hung up, he shared with me and the other guests (which included two Japanese academics and a businessman) that President Tsai had met earlier that day with Japanese students who were visiting the Presidential Office Building.

The youth were from Ehime Prefecture, on the island of Shikoku, which fell under this official's jurisdiction. He is responsible for cultural exchanges, which includes assisting with coordinating and promoting school trips to Taiwan. Some 60 high school students and 5 teachers from Matsuyama Jonan High School had traveled to Taiwan for four days beginning on December 2 and were at the Presidential Office Building when President Tsai stopped to talk with them for about ten minutes, took photos with the students, shook hands, talked about her interests and hobbies, and asked them if they had tried the famous tapioca milk tea.

I was very happy to have heard about this interaction, for several reasons, including recognizing the impact that President Tsai likely had on these young people. In particular, one can only imagine the influence that seeing and talking with a female head of state had on the self-image of the Japanese female students—that they can become whatever they want to be, including prime minister in Japan (which has yet to see a female premier). Indeed, she may have become a role model in leadership for both boys and girls in the group.

Sister-City Relationships Should be Leveraged

As an educator myself who loves to take my students on trips, I know the power that traveling has on opening students' minds. There are many similarities between Taiwan and Japan, but also numerous differences. The more Japanese young people and adults visit Taiwan, and Taiwanese visit Japan, the greater the mutual learning. For this reason, I am a big [promoter of sister-city relationships](#) and would like to see more between Japan and Taiwan. As I was completing this article, I spoke with the mayor of a large city in Osaka Prefecture and that very evening he was hosting a large delegation from Taiwan to discuss sister city ties and student exchanges.

According to a survey by Japan's Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, [332 Japanese high schools visited](#) Taiwan in Japanese Fiscal Year 2017. Overall, [approximately 2 million](#) Japanese visit Taiwan annually. The number of Taiwanese visiting Japan is even higher: 3.4 million. These numbers can be expected to increase particularly as Japanese-Korean relations continue to decline, and unrest in Hong Kong continues.

Related to travel, Taiwan and Japan rank high in mutual opinion polls, too. As I pointed out in an [op-ed](#) last year, Japanese have a high respect for Taiwan, with 66 percent feeling close to Taiwan, according to one poll, and 59 percent saying Taiwan is their favorite country in Asia. Similarly, Japan is, for Taiwanese, the country they most respect, as well as the country they most want to travel to and live in.

Political Relations Still Catching Up

Political relations, at least in Japan, have not developed as quickly as one might have hoped despite the above

trends. Although Prime Minister Abe Shinzo is by far the most pro-Taiwan of any recent Japanese leaders and likely any future one for some time to come, he has not seized the opportunities presented to him by the inaugurations of President Tsai and President Donald J. Trump in 2016 and 2017 respectively. He has missed opportunities to promote high level visits, a Japanese version of the US' 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, invite Taiwan to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or even pursue a separate bilateral free trade agreement.

Parliamentarian interactions, however, are robust as are economic ties. Japan sent a [200-person delegation](#), which included more than 30 members of Japan's National Diet, to participate in Taiwan's Double Ten Day celebrations in October. These relationships, however, have yet to move the large ship of government to properly catch the changing winds.

Taiwan's importance for the region, including Japan as well as the world, grows daily as China becomes more isolated and cracks down on Hong Kong and the populations of several ethnic minorities under Beijing's control. Next year, which will see presidential elections in both Taiwan and the United States, will be an important year for Taiwan and its relations with Japan and the United States. Let's hope that the Japanese government realizes what its people already do—that Taiwan is a very important country—for it, the region, and the world, and promotes even closer ties.

The main point: Against the backdrop of Beijing's increased bullying of its population and neighbors, Taiwan and Japan people-to-people ties are growing through warship ceremony, sister-city ties, as well as student and parliamentarian exchanges.

A Post-2020 Strategy for Countering CCP Political Warfare

By: J. Michael Cole

J. Michael Cole is a senior non-resident fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute.

Assuming current trends and barring any major controversy, polling indicate that there is a high likelihood

that incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) will prevail against her opponents, Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜) of the Kuomintang (KMT) and James Soong (宋楚瑜) of the People First Party (PFP) in the general elections on January 11 next year. Attendant to this outcome is the equally high likelihood that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Beijing will respond by further ramping up its political warfare activities against the democratic island-nation.

It will therefore be essential that the administration in Taipei respond accordingly to the challenge, by doing more to counter Beijing's machinations against Taiwan. More of the same—and according to some analysts, the Tsai government has not been doing enough to mitigate the threat in the past four years—will simply be insufficient. This article discusses some of the measures that should be adopted by the incoming government immediately after the elections in January and provides a few examples of areas where the CCP is expected to ramp up its political warfare efforts.

Beijing's Aims and Strategies

As discussed in an [earlier piece](#), the CCP's political warfare efforts are three-pronged: domestically, the visible component of such efforts (propaganda, disinformation, co-opted Taiwanese officials repeating CCP tropes) are aimed at a Chinese audience to demonstrate that the CCP's strategy toward Taiwan is yielding benefits. Externally, they seek to (a) win the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese by changing the narrative in the Taiwan Strait and abroad—this strategy also involves covert support for candidates whom the CCP believes are more amenable to its own interests through a process of co-optation and financial assistance; and (b) to undermine the cohesion of Taiwan's statehood, institutions, parties, politicians, civil society, and public support for democracy. The latter part of the CCP's overall political warfare strategy ultimately hopes to weaken the democratic "firewall" and Taiwanese nationalism that have denied it the goal of "peaceful unification" on terms that, we can expect, would largely be dictated by Beijing.

Although it is difficult to quantify the effects of political warfare on electoral outcomes (or other areas, for that matter), we can nevertheless conclude that it is easier for an external force to engage in such efforts to

influence elections at the sub-national rather than the national level. The CCP's focus on local city councilors, legislators, and borough chiefs in recent years, particularly those who are independents or outliers within their own parties, suggests that much of its strategy is aimed at such areas of Taiwan. A substantial number of those politicians, along with members of their families, have received preferential treatment for their business operations in China. To those activities we can also add ongoing efforts by pro-Beijing political parties, such as Chang An-le's (張安樂) China Unification Promotion Party (CUPP, 中華統一促進黨), the Taichung-based [Red Party Taiwan](#) (中國台灣紅黨 – 紅黨), and the Chinese Red Unification Party (中國紅色統一黨), to [recruit local Buddhist temples](#), [agriculture associations](#), and other local entities to their cause.

Despite making inroads among politicians who are willing to compromise themselves in return for favors from the CCP, it is hard to imagine that Beijing has succeeded in building sufficient momentum within Taiwan's body politics to turn things in its favor. Assuming that the Chinese officials in charge of political warfare understand that this is the case, we can therefore expect that much of future "sharp power" efforts aimed at Taiwan following the January elections will fall within the second category of its external efforts—i.e., activities that seek to erode and undermine Taiwan's ability to function as a state. As some experts have argued, continued efforts to sow discord and divisions through such operations could also be inherently part of efforts aimed at weakening the CCP's opponent ahead of kinetic—i.e., military—operations against the island. In other words, we should avoid making the mistake of looking at CCP political warfare as lying outside a continuum at the extreme of which lies use of force, and instead regard such operations as a component of a perpetual state of struggle that does not differentiate between peacetime and war. This certainly becomes more feasible should the CCP leadership conclude that political warfare efforts, added to various incentives and coercion, have failed to shape the environment in its favor and that the time has therefore come to resolve the matter through more direct action.

Taipei's Responses

Given the likelihood of escalation on the part of the CCP, it will be incumbent upon the new administration

that takes office on May 20, 2020, to respond to the challenge in commensurate fashion. Failure on Taipei's part to take additional corresponding measures—all within the parameters of democratic rules of the game, it goes without saying—will only ensure that the CCP succeeds in achieving its goals.

Before highlighting some of the areas where Taipei can and should respond, the ability of the DPP, on its own or within a coalition of likeminded parties, to retain a majority of seats at the Legislative Yuan, following the January elections would be an important factor in determining the viability of any new initiatives. The loss of a majority to the KMT or its own coalition, especially in light of some of the ostensibly pro-Beijing individuals who have been placed on the KMT's "safe list" for legislators at large, would certainly complicate the central government's ability to pass the necessary legislation to make countermeasures against CCP political warfare and foreign interference legitimate under the law. Many, albeit not all, of the added measures proposed below are contingent on the legislature's ability to pass such laws.

1. Increase budgets and personnel at the nation's top counterintelligence agencies, such as the National Security Bureau (NSB) and the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau (MJIB). Those two agencies have been tasked with countering the challenge of CCP interference and espionage under conditions that became infinitely more onerous during the Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) years (2008-2016), when various sectors of Taiwan's economy and society were opened up to Chinese investment and access. While this was happening, no commensurate efforts were made by the government to increase the state's ability to monitor, identify, track, mitigate, and counter the accrued risks.

2. Intelligence, law enforcement, and military officers must be exposed to greater internal security screening and accountability to prevent and deter recruitment/co-optation by the CCP. Recent revelations of involvement by recently retired top intelligence officers in [Master Chain Media \(大師鏈\)](#), a pro-Beijing media initiative launched late last year, are deeply troubling and could undermine public confidence in the state's ability to keep its secrets safe and counter CCP interference in Taiwan's affairs.

3. Increase intelligence sharing with counterparts worldwide. Tracking CCP political warfare is now a global affair, and Taiwan can both contribute to and benefit from official exchanges with intelligence agencies around the world. In cases where governments are wary of engaging Taiwan, the US intelligence community, in conjunction with Taiwan, should take the lead and create an appropriate platform for such quiet exchanges.

4. Taiwan should seize every opportunity to continue and increase its participation in multilateral fora on media literacy, cyber warfare, authoritarian influence, and national security writ large, whether at the official or unofficial—e.g., Track 1.5 or Track 2—level. This includes, but is not limited to, the Shangri-La Dialogue, the Munich Security Conference, the Raisina Dialogue, the Halifax International Security Forum, and several other multilateral initiatives. Taipei should also continue to support initiatives such as the Global Cooperation Training Framework (GCTF) with the United States and encourage other partners to join the initiative.

5. The state, corporate sector, and other potential benefactors must increase financial and institutional support for Taiwan's civil society and universities, where much of the essential research on CCP political warfare is being carried out. The severe underfunding from which this sector has suffered must end, and Taiwan cannot wait for external partners to provide what is well within the state's capacity to provide.

6. Dramatically increase public diplomacy and efforts to educate the Taiwanese public on the means and ends of CCP political warfare. This must involve the declassification of material collected by intelligence and law enforcement agencies while ensuring that sources and means of collection are protected. Working in conjunction with civil society, such efforts are necessary to dispel skepticism about CCP political warfare or the belief that the ruling government only discusses such matters following defeats at the polls. Taiwanese media should not passively await exposés in foreign media, such as the [recent news](#) coming from Australia involving Wang Liqiang (王立強), a suspected Chinese spy turned defector, before including discussions on such matters in their broadcasts. Greater efforts, moreover, must be made to encourage bipartisan sup-

port for such initiatives. Among other things, Taiwanese authorities should renew their efforts to reach out to overseas Taiwanese and Mandarin speakers. Recent budget cuts for the Overseas Community Affairs Council (OCAC, 中華民國僑務委員會) is the wrong way to approach the matter: more needs to be done to connect with overseas communities, not less, although more modern and appealing means to do so must be found. Failure to reach out is tantamount to abandoning those communities—and potential allies among them—to the CCP and its proxies overseas.

7. Public diplomacy to influence the narrative must also be accompanied by greater investment in public television, state-run Central News Agency (CNA), as well as Radio Taiwan International (RTI), possibly in conjunction with expanded global efforts by likeminded partners such as Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA).

8. Strengthen oversight and regulations of media, both traditional and “new,” and add appropriate enforcement for the sanctioning of outlets who generate or consciously spread disinformation. Although every effort should be made to encourage responsible journalism and editorial independence, such calls will fail to sway outlets whose principal aim isn’t journalism but rather political warfare under the cover of journalism. Sanctions should have sufficient bite to deter participants in disinformation, especially when those are known to be receiving heavy financial support from the CCP. In cases where clear CCP agency is involved, laws outside the purview of the media, such as foreign agent or foreign interference regulation, should become applicable.

9. Update regulations governing state-sponsored think tanks and institutions to permit employment, academic exchanges, and scholarships for foreign nationals with the necessary expertise to help Taiwan formulate an effective counter-influence strategy. Such link-ups, which ought to be a two-way street, would also increase Taiwan’s visibility internationally as a partner in fledgling coalition of democracies in their efforts to counter authoritarian influence.

It will never be possible for Taiwan to completely track and counter CCP political warfare. The scope and nature of this multi-vectorial threat is such that no state

or society will ever be able to obtain a complete picture. Nevertheless, Taiwan can and must bolster its own efforts in line with perceived increments in the hostile behavior of its challenger. Given the severity of the threat and the high likelihood that Beijing will make major increases in its political warfare efforts targeting Taiwan, Taipei cannot afford to remain idle or to continue treating this challenge as nothing other than an existential threat. More of the same, in other words, would be a recipe for disaster.

The main point: Following the January 2020 elections, in which President Tsai is likely to be given a second mandate, the CCP will likely make major adjustments to its political warfare efforts, which are also expected to be bolstered. Taiwan must therefore respond in commensurate fashion with a whole-of-society and ideally bi-partisan strategy.

The Enduring Partnership between Taiwan and South Africa

By: Katherine Schultz and I-wei Jennifer Chang

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In November 2019, the [Taiwan-Africa Business Forum](#) took place in Taipei, with 20 business leaders from Eswatini, South Africa, and Nigeria participating. The forum aimed to provide a platform for African and Taiwanese businesses to discuss trade and investment opportunities. Citing Africa’s vast free trade area as well as its status of one of the fastest growing economies in the world, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs [stated](#) that “Taiwan is hoping to build closer links with African nations,” indicating that there is great potential for development of trade and investment opportunities. Aside from the Kingdom of Eswatini (formerly known as Swaziland)—Taiwan’s sole diplomatic ally in Africa—South Africa remains Taiwan’s most significant African trading partner. Despite Pretoria’s switch in diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1998, both sides continue to pursue strong economic and friendly bilateral ties.

History of Taiwan-South Africa Relations

Prior to 1998, South Africa was Taiwan's last remaining major ally and the largest country among 30—mostly African—countries that still maintained diplomatic relations with the island. At a time when both were internationally isolated, Taiwan and South Africa's white minority apartheid government opened full embassies and exchanged ambassadors in 1976. Later, in 1985, Taiwan and South Africa signed an agreement for a 10-year supply of South African [uranium](#) to Taiwan. A wave of [Taiwanese families](#) migrated and brought their businesses to South Africa near the end of the apartheid era. In the 1990s, Taiwan and South Africa enjoyed a robust trade and economic relationship; Taiwan was South Africa's largest foreign investor and seventh-largest trading partner in 1995. [1] Taiwanese investments and exports to South Africa in 1996 also surpassed China in those two categories. [2]

Taiwan and South Africa were firm friends. President Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) donated [USD \\$10 million](#) in the 1990s to the African National Congress' (ANC) general election campaign, which became a salient factor in Mandela's desire to [maintain strong ties to Taipei](#). President Lee, in turn, utilized the strong economic and political ties with South Africa to promote Taiwan's bid to rejoin the United Nations. [3] Lee also attended the May 1994 inauguration of Nelson Mandela as South Africa's first black president, which enabled Taiwan's president the rare opportunity to meet with US Vice President Al Gore. [4] Taiwanese and South African navies also conducted joint military exercises in South African waters in 1996. [5]

Nonetheless, Pretoria had been under pressure from Beijing to derecognize Taipei and hesitated on choosing between Taipei and Beijing in the years leading up to the diplomatic switch in 1998. In an attempt to target South Africa's trade links with Hong Kong, the Chinese government threatened to prevent South Africa and other countries that recognize Taiwan from maintaining a consulate in Hong Kong after the British handover to China in July 1997. [6] Mandela announced in 1996 that his country would sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan at the end of 1997. [7] In January 1998, Pretoria switched diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China (ROC) to the People's Republic of China (PRC). Since 1998, Pretoria has maintained the Taipei-based

Liaison Office of the Republic of South Africa (南非聯絡辦事處), which is responsible for [maintaining and expanding economic, trade and investment, scientific, education, health and cultural exchanges](#) between South Africa and Taiwan. Meanwhile, Taiwan's government set up the [Taipei Liaison Office in the Republic of South Africa](#) (駐南非共和國台北聯絡代表處).

Taiwan-South Africa Relations Today

Despite the diplomatic setback, the Taiwan-South Africa relationship is experiencing a new wave of revitalization in recent years. In 2016, Taiwan's Legislative Yuan established the [Taiwan-Africa Parliamentary Association](#) designed to enhance Taiwan's bilateral and multilateral relationships with African countries in the areas of trade, education, and culture. In late 2016, Tshwane Mayor Solly Msimanga of the opposition Democratic Alliance made a [business trip to Taipei](#) and met Taipei City Mayor Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) in a form of city-to-city diplomacy to explore trade and investment opportunities. However, Msimanga's Taiwan trip became a politically sensitive topic for South Africa, whose foreign ministry claimed that Msimanga had [violated the country's "One-China" policy](#). By contrast, the ANC's main foreign policy tenet is only sustaining a [strong relationship with China](#). Nonetheless, Taiwan and South Africa have continued to build on its historically strong relations. President Tsai Ing-wen has held several meetings with South African leaders, including former President de Klerk, to discuss [transitional justice and national reconciliation](#), further highlighting the common issues that bind Taiwan and South Africa.

President Tsai Ing-wen called on her National Security Council to put forward an "Africa Plan" (非洲計畫) following her April 2018 visit to [Eswatini](#). The plan aims to [strengthen Taiwan's business layout](#) (強化台商布局) on the continent with emphasis on boosting bilateral investment and trade with three countries—[South Africa, Mozambique, and Eswatini](#). The idea behind this initiative is to work with government agencies, representative offices, as well as businesses to pursue closer relationships with Africa. In July 2018, a [southern Africa investment seminar](#) under the Africa Plan was held in Taipei. About 100 officials and businesses gathered to discuss investment and market opportunities in southern Africa, emerging commercial and industrial sectors, state support programs, and the investment

climates in Eswatini, Mozambique, and South Africa.

These initiatives are likely meant to serve as a response to the trend of declining Taiwan-Africa trade relations in the past decade—aside from the more obvious reason to further bolster its diplomatic relationship with Eswatini. In the prime years of Taiwan’s economic ties in Africa, Taiwan’s [annual imports](#) from Africa reached USD \$10.5 billion in 2011 while its [exports](#) were USD \$2.9 billion. However, by 2018, Taiwan’s imports from Africa dropped by USD \$8 billion (to USD \$2.5 billion) and its exports by USD \$700 million (to USD \$2.1 billion). Taiwan’s trade with South Africa followed a similar trend. Taiwan’s [exports](#) to South Africa had fallen by USD \$600 million (from USD \$1.3 billion in 2011 to less than USD \$700 million in 2018), while its [imports](#) declined by USD \$500 million (from USD \$1.5 billion in 2011 to USD \$1 billion in 2018).

Currently, South Africa is Taiwan’s largest trade partner in Africa in terms of both imports and exports. From January to November 2019, South African imports constituted [37 percent](#) of Taiwan’s overall imports from Africa, while Taiwanese exports to South Africa made up [27 percent](#) of total Taiwanese exports to the African continent. During this same period, bilateral trade reached [USD \\$1.06 billion](#). Taiwan enjoyed a [USD \\$17.6 million trade surplus](#) in its trade with South Africa, with Taiwanese exports to South Africa reaching [USD \\$539.6 million](#) and South African imports to Taiwan constituting [USD \\$522 million](#) during this time period. Taiwan’s key [imports](#) from South Africa are natural resources and low-tech industrial products, such as iron and coal, precious stones and gold, electrical machinery, motor vehicles, and tobacco; its [exports](#) to South Africa include electronics, bicycles, plastic resin, iron/steel products, sports equipment, and rubber goods. Given South Africa’s outsized stature as a major emerging economy on the continent, Taipei focuses on boosting their bilateral trade relations and other forms of cooperation.

In comparison, Taiwan-Nigeria bilateral trade reached [USD \\$345.9 million](#) from January to November 2019, owing largely to the dramatic growth in Taiwanese exports to Nigeria, which increased 111 percent compared to the same period (January to November) last year. Between 2017 and 2018, Taiwan’s exports to Nigeria grew 16.3 percent from [USD \\$98 million](#) to [USD](#)

[\\$114 million](#). Meanwhile, Taiwan’s imports from Nigeria fell 60 percent from [USD \\$441 million](#) in 2017 to [USD \\$175 million](#) in 2018.

By contrast, Taiwan’s trade relationship with Eswatini pales in comparison to Nigeria and South Africa, though bilateral trade has been expanding in recent years. Taiwan-Eswatini overall trade reached [USD \\$9.58 million](#) between January to November 2019. Taiwan’s imports from Eswatini grew [101 percent](#), whereas Taiwan’s exports to the kingdom fell [7 percent](#) compared to the same period in 2018. Bilateral trade grew from [USD \\$7.6 million](#) in 2017 to [USD \\$10.5 million](#) in 2018.

For South Africa, Taiwan remains economically important. As of 2017, there were about 800 Taiwanese factories and companies based in South Africa, according to the Taipei Liaison Office. [10] These Taiwanese businesses have provided an estimated 40,000 local jobs and about USD \$1.69 billion in cumulative direct investment each year. [11] Over half of these businesses are in the fields of [finance and servicing](#), while the rest falls into the industrial and manufacturing category. The [reasons](#) why Taiwanese businesses invest in South Africa include well-established infrastructure, natural resources and minerals, good living environment and education system, as well as the potential for their products to be sold to neighboring African countries and on the European market.

There are various governmental and non-governmental organizations aimed at enhancing Taiwan-Africa trade relations. The Taipei-based [Africa Taiwan Economic Forum](#) (非洲駐台經貿聯合辦事處, ATEF) was formed jointly by African embassies and trade offices in Taiwan and Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It presents itself as “a one-stop service to Taiwan’s business community by providing valuable information on trade and investment opportunities” and offers guidance to prospective Taiwanese investors before expanding into Africa.

The Ministry of Economic Affairs’ [Taiwan-Africa Trade Promotion Office](#) (經濟部非洲市場推動辦公室, TATPO) was established in March 2016, in order to [coordinate the resources](#) of multiple government units working on Taiwan-Africa trade. TATPO’s [mission](#) is to “tap the enormous potential of the continent’s high-growth emerging markets.” As TATPO’s deputy director [put it](#),

“Africa is home to many rapidly developing economies, while Taiwan needs to boost its sluggish exports.”

In addition, there is also the [Taiwan-Africa Business Association](#) (社團法人台灣非洲經貿協會, TABA), founded in 2006. In cooperation with African government agencies, the Taiwan government, and ATEF, TABA provides a platform for Taiwanese businesses to learn and exchange information about conducting business in Africa. For this purpose, TABA holds African market seminars and has organized annual [events and conferences](#) in South Africa.

Other Taiwanese organizations that explore business opportunities globally have also engaged with Africa. For instance, in 2018 the Taiwan-based Chinese International Economic Cooperation Association (中華民國國際經濟合作協會, CIECA) sent a [delegation](#) to South Africa, Mozambique, and Eswatini in 2018 to explore business opportunities in those countries. Furthermore, the [Taiwan External Trade Development Council](#) (中華民國對外貿易發展協會, TAITRA), with overseas branch office in Johannesburg, signed [memorandums of understanding](#) (MOUs) in 2017 with four African trade promotion groups to bolster opportunities for Taiwanese businesses in Africa through business exchanges and information sharing.

As South Africa continues to face pressing political and economic issues at home, ranging from [worsening corruption](#), a [declining economy](#), and [rising unemployment](#), Taiwan’s trade and investment relations with the African country may also continue to be adversely impacted. Taiwanese businesses would be wise to diversify its trade relations with emerging African economies, such as tapping into rapidly growing East African markets, in addition to its current focus on South Africa, Eswatini, and Mozambique. Nonetheless, South Africa remains the [second-largest African economy](#) (after Nigeria) and a historically friendly nation that Taipei should continue to leverage for its economic, diplomatic, and strategic plans in Africa.

The main point: Taiwan and South Africa’s historically strong economic and political relations prior to Pretoria’s diplomatic switch to China in 1998 remain relevant today. Despite the break in diplomatic relations and South Africa’s recent economic woes, Taiwan’s economic lure to South Africa, and vice versa, remains

strong and is a main factor driving bilateral relations today.

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[11] “Foreign Parts Too Much to Stomach after Taiwan,” *Cape Argus (South Africa)*, January 7, 2017. Retrieved from Nexis Uni.

Enforcement and Labor Challenges in Taiwan's Fishing Industry Governance

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The prowess of Taiwan's fishing industry is well known. [The island's behemoth fishing industry](#) is valued at \$2 billion-dollar and operates roughly 2,000 vessels—or one-third of the world's deep-sea fishing fleets. This scale was built on a massive and previously laxly regulated international labor pool. According to Taiwan's Ministry of Labor (MOL) and Fisheries Agency (FA) data in 2016, the [country's distant-water fishing fleet \(DWF\) employs](#) about 26,000 foreign crew while the US Department of State Trafficking in Persons Report 2014 and other NGOs estimate the number to be closer to 160,000. Taiwan hosts upwards of 700,000 foreign workers in total, most of them from Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. Calls to ensure safe working conditions and practices domestically and internationally have grown and Taiwan's fisheries governance reform in the last four years has been substantial. Yet, challenges concerning enforcement remain—particularly regarding the labor conditions of migrant workers in the DWF.

Human Rights of Migrant Workers

Human rights violations against migrant workers in Taiwan's distant-water fleet have been well documented. Extensive information is available in Ian Urbina's 2015 [New York Times series](#), reports in [2016](#) and [2018](#) by Greenpeace East Asia, and a [2018 report](#) and a [documentary](#) by London-based NGO the Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF). Reported abuses range from non-payment, exorbitant fees, lack of clean water and food, long working hours, to verbal and physical abuse in the form of beatings—and even murder. NGOs such as the EJF and Greenpeace have urged Taiwan to continue upgrading enforcement and to abide by key international conventions such as the [covenant on economic social and cultural rights](#). For example, Taiwan has yet to ratify the International Labour Organization's (ILO) C188, [Work in Fishing Convention](#), which outlines the occupational safety and health requirements for fishers.

In 2018, a Taiwanese vessel [Fuh Sheng No. 11](#) was detained by the South African Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA) upon request by the Indonesian Consulate. The Taiwanese vessel was the first in the world to be detained under the ILO Work in Fishing Convention. FA investigations found inaccurate catch reporting, shark finning, unauthorized employment of foreign crew, wage, overtime, and labor violations including poor living conditions on board. [Fishermen on the Fuh Sheng](#) told EJF they were sometimes only allowed to sleep for three hours, paid \$50 a month due to fees, and beaten. Medical and safety supplies were also severely lacking aboard the vessel. [The ship's owner and captain](#) were eventually fined, and the vessel's license suspended, which was a step in the right direction, but significant issues remain. After the initial inspection in Cape Town, the vessel was allowed to leave port and continued operating illegally for almost three months before being detained in Kaohsiung.

Regulatory Turning Point

Prior to recent government reform efforts, Taiwan faced considerable challenges in effectively improving fisheries governance. A lax regulatory system to monitor, surveil, and regulate the far-reaching industry largely characterized the state of Taiwan's fisheries governance. Taiwan's DWF operates thousands of miles away from the coast and many for years at a time. In addition, crews are often forced to fish illegal stock involving endangered species. DWFs often purposefully turn off their transponders and engage in remote transshipments of crew and cargo to [avoid detection by law enforcement](#).

One of the turning points came on October 1, 2015 when the European Commission (EC) [issued Taiwan a yellow card](#) for failing to comply with the EU's "[Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated \(IUU\) Regulation](#)" and was given six months to address the shortcomings before trade sanctions on fishery products exported to the EU would be considered. The [shortcomings listed](#) were a lack of laws, monitoring, surveillance, and compliance with the obligations in various Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMO). [Taiwan responded](#) by strengthening vessel traceability and monitoring systems, launching RFMO-required electronic logbooks and observer coverage, creating an inspection and sanction scheme, implementing the UN

FAO Port States Measures Agreement, and increasing financial and human resources on the regulation of fishing vessels.

Following Taiwan's reforms, the [EC finally lifted the yellow card](#) this year in June 2019. Taiwan successfully averted sanctions by also enhancing the legal framework regarding distant-water fisheries in line with the International Law of the Sea through the enactment of major legislation and regulations such as [the Act for Distant Fisheries](#). The IUU Regulation itself, however, does not address working conditions on board fishing vessels. Since the lifting of the yellow card, a Taiwan-EU working group [was established](#) to combat IUU fishing and labor violations on Taiwanese fishing vessels. The EC and the European External Action Service are now working with Taiwan to address existing labor conditions.

Taiwan's unique status in the international arena presents its own set of challenges, especially when it comes to matters of mutual assistance and cooperation with other countries for addressing IUU globally. It is in Taiwan's interest to proactively improve governance measures and safeguard the human rights of all parties involved, not just when awareness has been raised by watchdog NGOs and the media—especially when a majority of migrant workers concerned hail from countries targeted by the [New Southbound Policy](#). Positive developments such as signing an [Agreement Concerning the Facilitation of Cooperation on Law Enforcement in Fisheries Matters](#) with the Philippines brings reputational benefits to Taiwan for adhering to norms in customary international law.

It is unwise for Taiwan to risk reputational damage by continuing to let human rights abuses go unchecked, when looking to represent itself as a regional exemplar for human rights amid increasing engagement with South and Southeast Asian countries. Taiwan also stands to gain considerably from cooperating with these countries on fisheries matters. Taiwan should be even more motivated to fully address the gaps in governance, now that the international media and NGOs have already put a spotlight on working conditions in Taiwan's DWFs. Despite significant progress, a number of enforcement and systematic issues persist regarding the governance of Taiwan's fisheries.

More Work to be Done: The Hiring Process

According to the US Department of State [Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Taiwan](#), foreign workers hired through brokerage firms are often exploited and subjected to debt bondage through excessive fees charged for accommodation, travel, and training. In 2017, penalties were imposed on illegal brokerage companies, yet the fines imposed were negligible in amount; criminal charges weren't filed; and those ordered to terminate their brokerage business weren't legally prohibited from reopening under a new company register. The US Department of State [2019 Trafficking in Persons Report: Taiwan](#) revealed FA inspections found 120 cases of contract, overtime, and wage violations although only referring one wage violation for prosecution while issuing administrative warnings for the rest. Moreover, the MOL ran a Direct Hire Service Center for Foreign Workers to avoid the brokerage system but exploitative brokerage continued, which hindered its broad implementation. Despite the government amending regulations on [the employment of overseas foreign crew members](#), conditions on the ground have yet to see significant improvement. The [amended cabinet-level Council of Agriculture regulation](#) does not offer the same protections afforded by the Labor Standards Act and guarantees a minimum wage of USD \$450, which is significantly lower than the national minimum.

Enforcement Capability

It is important that Taiwan's government continues to fund programs to train and staff the FA and consider establishing a fishing industry agency or committee separate from the FA to remediate the internal conflict of interest. The industry's growth and development should not be a key concern in conversations about ensuring good labor conditions. Whether a separate committee is established under the Ministry of Economic Affairs or another branch of the government is created should not matter, as long as each respective department is adequately staffed and funded to meet the demand for regulatory inspections which may help solve the staffing problems in comprehensively tracking Taiwan's global fleet. Expanding the coordination of these agencies and clearly defining their roles and responsibilities is vital.

Legal Protections for Foreign Workers

Taiwan could also consider extending the MOL's jurisdiction to cover DWFs, defined by a vessel's originating port rather than the area of operation so that fishermen can be incorporated into labor law protections stipulated by the [Labor Standards Act](#). Lawmakers are typically hesitant to extend labor protections to non-voting migrant populations. Nonetheless, extending protections to persons regardless of whether they are able to vote or not is the right thing to do based on the principle of universal human rights. A step forward in this area could greatly benefit and extend itself to prevent the abuses of migrant workers in household care and domestic industries. Efforts should also be made to increase funding and awareness of the 24/7 complaint and assistance hotline as well as shelter services and compensation schemes run by the National Immigration Agency (NIA).

Other Areas to Reform

The US Department of State [2019 Trafficking in Persons Report: Taiwan](#) makes the following additional recommendations: increasing inspections, prosecutions, screening of migrant fishermen for forced labor with an interpreter, train inspection officials on victim identification, referral and enforcement notification processes, eliminating all recruitment and service fees on workers, cooperating on direct hiring with sending countries, requiring DWF vessels to use standard international maritime call signs, and centralizing information (vessel names, licenses, authorized areas, crew manifests) in a single database.

Taiwan's administration must remain focused on addressing labor violations and IUU fishing practices such as shark finning. In addition to protecting marine ecosystems, effective IUU and labor oversight will allow Taiwan to minimize disputes with other nations. Enhancing monitoring and surveillance measures to ensure adequate response and inquiry from governmental agencies are crucial in this regard. Previous incidences concerning fishing vessels operating in the disputed territorial waters of Japan, the Philippines, and China could benefit from increased monitoring and management from Taiwan.

The main point: Taiwan has made significant strides towards addressing IUU fishing by strengthening its

legal framework and regulatory capabilities. Efforts to enhance the effectiveness of DWF governance should continue in order to ensure safe working conditions and practices in accordance with international norms.