Political Party Identification and Support: Transitory or Turning Point?

By: Russell Hsiao

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Amid the ongoing COVID-19 crisis and other simmering political issues, party identification in Taiwan appears to be undergoing a transition, potentially signaling a turning point in Taiwanese domestic politics. According to the latest polling data from TVBS—a major media outlet aligned with the Kuomintang (國民黨, KMT)—the public support rate for the opposition KMT edged out support for the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (民進黨, DPP) in the month of July. Public opinion polls conducted by other party-affiliated as well as academic institutions released in recent months have also pointed to similar trends in party identification on the island. While the results of multiple surveys vary—with some showing the DPP’s support rating higher than that of the KMT—one thread seems consistent throughout: the level of support for the ruling party appears to be falling. This drop, and the corresponding modest increase in support for the KMT, may be attributed to several factors.

This recent decline in support for the ruling party since 2020 has been especially notable, as it followed a period of growing popularity. Indeed, according to polling data released by National Chengchi University’s Election Study Center (政治大學選舉研究中心), support for the DPP saw a sharp 14 percent increase from 2018-20, culminating with a high of 34 percent in 2020. Support rates for political parties and presidents tend to ebb and flow—shaped by the prevailing events of the time—and this decrease since 2020 appears to correlate with growing public dissatisfaction with President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) decision in August of that year to lift restrictions on US pork containing the additive ractopamine, as well as perceived failures in her handling of vaccine acquisitions.

Tsai announced the administrative order to lift restrictions on importing US pork in August 2020, almost immediately after she started her second term as president and while she was riding on an almost record high support rating. At the time, observers were uniform
in **pointing out the political risks** that Tsai was taking with that decision, and the change in public opinion appears to validate this concern. The opposition KMT **capitalized** on the about-face of the DPP (when it was in the opposition it had opposed the lifting of import restrictions), as well as public fear about the decision, and has been engaged in a full-court press campaign to drum up popular angst against the import of pork from the United States. The opposition even mobilized an effective grassroots campaign and was successful in including the pork issue in a **national referendum**, which was originally scheduled for the end of August but was **recently delayed** to December 2021 due to the country’s recent COVID outbreak. If the referendum passes, it would put a non-binding hold on the president’s ability to continue to import American pork that includes the additive.

It is worth noting that, in part, President Tsai sold the decision to lift the restrictions to the public as a **necessary step** for Washington to begin considering the possibility of negotiating a free trade agreement (FTA) with Taiwan. The Trump Administration—which by almost every measure helped to upgrade US-Taiwan relations—held off on initiating trade talks with Taiwan and did not resume Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) dialogues with Taiwan (which had not been held since 2016). The Biden Administration, to its credit, **resumed the TIFA talks** in June 2021 but gave no public indication about whether an FTA was in the cards. In any case, the resumption of TIFA appears to have had little effect on public opinion, which still trends against the lifting of restrictions.

In addition to the pork controversy, the Tsai government’s efforts to acquire COVID-19 vaccines from abroad have not been spared from domestic political wrangling. The opposition mounted a campaign that blamed the central government for failing to acquire Chinese vaccines as the country was dealing with an outbreak of the virus, after successfully containing it throughout 2020. KMT leaders seized on the growing public fear amidst the ongoing crisis, as Hung Shiu-chu (洪秀柱), former chairwoman of the party, even embarked on a visit to China to receive a jab of the Chinese vaccine that was widely publicized by the **Chinese state media**. Indeed, the **TVBS polling** from June on public satisfaction with the government’s response to purchasing and obtaining the vaccines showed that 57 percent of the public were not satisfied, whereas only 35 percent were satisfied.

It is perhaps worth noting that in the **TVBS poll**, the difference between the two parties’ support ratings (results were collected between July 27 through August 1) was marginal at best at 1.6 percent, with the KMT at 23.4 percent and the DPP at 21.8 percent. Yet the increase in the KMT’s support rating from the same poll from May to August is remarkable at 11.2 percent (from 12.2 percent). By contrast, the **DPP’s support rating** dropped by 6.9 percent (from 29.7 percent) over the same period of time.

While the various survey results do not all indicate that the KMT’s support rating has surpassed the DPP’s, one trendline appears consistent: declining support for the ruling party. For instance, the Green-leaning **Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF) polls** from July showed that support for the DPP stood at 28.3 percent and the KMT at 21.9 percent, with a plurality (32 percent) expressing support for no political party. Interestingly, however, another TPOF survey data did show a precipitous drop in party identification for the DPP, declining from 43.1 percent in March to 28.2 percent in June, whereas the KMT held steady from March (19.0 percent) to June (18.9 percent). This was the sharpest three-month decrease in the TPOF’s polling since it began polling on the issue in 2016. There was a spike in party identification for the ruling DPP after the eruption of the Hong Kong crisis in early 2019. In November 2018, support for the party stood at 23.5 percent and by June 2019 it reached 45.4 percent, ultimately reaching its peak in November 2019 at 49.6 percent.

Consistent with the other aforementioned surveys, the **latest poll** from the National Chengchi University’s Election Study Center that was released in late July showed a similar decrease in DPP support from 34.0 percent in 2020 to 31.4 percent in 2021, whereas KMT support increased only slightly, from 17.0 percent to 18.7 percent.
Image: The most recent polling data from the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF), which shows a marked decline in support for the DPP. (Image source: Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation.)

Image: The most recent polling data from the National Chengchi University’s Election Study Center, also showing a drop in support for the DPP. (Image source: National Chengchi University’s Election Study Center.)
So, what might these recent trends in party identification mean? From a historical perspective, KMT popularity also dropped steadily from its pinnacle of 39.5 percent in 2011 during the Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) Administration to 20.8 percent in 2016. Similarly, the DPP may have reached a peak at 34.0 percent in 2020 and has now begun experiencing a steady decline. To be sure, this drop followed a surge from 2018-2020 in party identification in favor of the DPP during a period of a relative economic underperformance, and in the absence of any major political shocks—which had raised the question as to whether that transition had more permanence. However, the cyclical pattern in the support ratings for the party and president may be reappearing.

In light of these recent polling results from the Election Study Center—which has been tracking party identification within Taiwan since 1992—it is worth bearing in mind that just one year ago it showed party identification with the DPP at its highest point since the poll started, a remarkable shift since its lowest point in 1992, when it registered at a mere 3.3 percent. Simultaneously, party identification with the KMT is currently near its lowest point (in the NCCU survey), only slightly higher than its nadir of 14.8 percent, which was registered in 2001 following the first transfer of political power from the KMT to the DPP in the 2000 presidential election.

Support for President Tsai has been similarly taking a beating, although some observers have taken a more sanguine view. In explaining the drop (while also critiquing the recent polling data from the TPOF), Michael Turton, a longtime political observer, opined:

“It is a story of an administration, which despite the usual abuses from China, the ractopork decision, drought, electric power struggles and a year mired in COVID-19 problems, from financial and aid issues to a dangerous outbreak, has managed to maintain ratings in the polls its predecessor administrations can only view with envy.”

While it is certainly notable to point out that the KMT’s support is increasing while the DPP’s support is dropping, party identification has tended to ebb and flow depending on the health of the economy and in response to significant political events, such as the Hong Kong crisis. Coming on the heels of the recent surge in party identification in favor of the DPP, public opinion could simply be self-correcting. The question remains: do these current public opinion trends indicate a turning point, or are they transitory? It is still too early to say. A more salient indicator will be the 2022 local elections. Yet, if what’s past is prologue, it is likely the latter.

The main point: While public support for President Tsai and her ruling DPP has declined markedly in 2021, it is unclear whether this trend is here to stay. Given the cyclical nature of party support in the past, it is possible that the drop is merely a transitory shift.

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Fighting with the Army You Have: An Alternate Vision of Taiwan Defense Reform and US-Taiwan Security Cooperation (Part 1)

By: Eric Chan

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“You go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time.” – Donald Rumsfeld, 2004

For many Western military observers, there is a dream of “Fortress Taiwan”: a Taiwan military armed to the teeth with thousands of mobile missiles, sea mines, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); a standing army with the flexibility, training, and leeway to execute decentralized mission command, backed by a millions-strong, well-trained and equipped reserve ready to wage a long and bloody insurgency; and a political system where the cost of national defense is no object, with an electorate that is Spartan in character.

Unfortunately, Taiwan does not have this military structure, political system or society.

Nor are these systems likely to exist anytime soon, absent a sea-change or major shock. Elements of these systems might be attainable, but would require a tru-
ly significant escalation in Chinese gray-zone warfare, verging into open warfare—for instance, a Crimea-like seizure of Kinmen (金門), 10 km from the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

This does not mean Taiwan is indifferent to its defense. Instead, Taiwan’s national security structure is better suited towards deterring and combating the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) constant gray-zone warfare, rather than preparing for a potential future invasion. In this article, I will highlight the differences in how the United States and Taiwan view deterrence, and outline a number of methods by which the United States can better assist Taiwan military reform in a way that addresses both the PRC gray zone campaign, as well as improving Taiwan’s ability to deter or respond to an all-out invasion.

**Saying One Thing, Doing Another?**

For years, Western military observers have commented on the decline of Taiwan’s relative defense advantage against the PRC. Back in 2000, David Shambaugh asserted that Taiwan’s qualitative training advantages and vigorous acquisition programs undertaken throughout the 1990s would keep Taiwan secure, but only through 2010. By 2008, William Murray’s seminal article “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy” highlighted how PLA improvements in ballistic missile capabilities necessitated a shift from a symmetric defense to a porcupine strategy emphasizing coastal defense cruise missiles (CDCMs), truck-mounted Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), and sea mines. This represented a significant change in the way defense experts had been talking about Taiwan military reform; previously, the main focus had been on simply increasing defense spending and jointness.

Over the next decade, a long drumbeat of military experts began advocating for asymmetric weapons, rather than tanks and fighter aircraft. Taiwan’s response soon became rote as well: genuflecting at the idea of asymmetry, while simultaneously limiting its actual acquisition priorities to what Western observers would consider symmetric platforms. Taiwan’s first-ever Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in 2009, for instance, mentioned the need for force mobility and asymmetrical warfighting. However, the subsequent 2013 QDR highlighted the need to “acquire next-generation fighters (with stealth, air re-fueling, long-range and BVR engagement capabilities).” Just to ensure US observers knew exactly which next-generation fighter Taiwan was referring to, the 2017 QDR specified that these fighters would “be capable of vertical or short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) and having stealth characteristics.” Then, in 2018, the Taiwan Ministry of National Defense, tired of US delegations lecturing on the importance of asymmetry, established the Institute for National Defense and Security Research (財團法人國防安全研究院) as a think-tank buffer.

This seeming incongruence has become a sore point in US-Taiwan security cooperation. On the US side, it often leads to charges that Taiwan is only interested in “flashy” or “big ticket” platforms that will not be survivable in a shooting war. From the Taiwan side, this leads to charges that the US leverages its status to advertently price-gouge and inadvertently weaken Taiwan’s defense industrial base, further creating dependency. The basis for this incongruence is that both sides have differing definitions of asymmetry and deterrence.

**Deterrence and 威懾 Are Spelled Differently**

From the Western/US standpoint, asymmetry for the Taiwan military should be designed around the principles of being low-cost and operationally effective. As Murray writes:

“Rather than trying to destroy incoming ballistic missiles with costly PAC-3 SAMs, Taiwan should harden key facilities and build redundancies into critical infrastructure and processes so that it could absorb and survive a long-range precision bombardment. Rather than relying on its navy and air force (neither of which is likely to survive such an attack) to destroy an invasion force, Taiwan should concentrate on development of a professional standing army armed with mobile, short-range, defensive weapons. To withstand a prolonged blockade, Taiwan should stockpile critical supplies and build infrastructure that would allow it to attend to the needs of its citizens unassisted for an extended period […] Such shifts constitute a “porcupine strategy.” They would offer Taiwan a way to resist PRC military coercion for weeks or months without presuming immediate
US intervention […] Perhaps most important, such a policy would allow the United States time to deliberate whether intervention was warranted.”

The principles that Murray outlined detail deterrence by raising operational costs for the most-dangerous scenario of an outright invasion of Taiwan island. For the most part, these principles are the ones that US defense experts propose to Taiwan today.

From a Taiwan standpoint, these proposed reforms are problematic for multiple reasons. First, from a cultural-linguistic Chinese perspective, an operationally defensive military does not exert deterrent power. Deterrence is often translated into Chinese as “威懾” (weishe), but the definitions are different: “威懾” has connotations of both dissuasion and compellence, bordering on outright coercion. Thus, an operationally defensive military aimed at efficiently inflicting casualties on the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party (aka the People’s Liberation Army) may not be optimized to coerce the leadership of the CCP, as high PLA casualties may not necessarily threaten the legitimacy of the Party.

Second, an asymmetric military would cede significant portions of the gray-zone space. Gray zone operations—the integration of political, psychological, economic, legal, and military pressure short of armed conflict—are the CCP’s preferred method of achieving unification, as they are far less costly than open warfare and can include elements of plausible deniability to control risk. For instance, the Party often uses air incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) and across the Taiwan Strait median line to simultaneously demonstrate airspace control, exhaust Taiwanese defense resources (the cost of intercepts in 2020 was USD $1.09 billion, or roughly 9 percent of Taiwan’s military budget), and to create a public perception that the PLA is an unstoppable force.

A militarily asymmetric response, such as using radars/ground-based missile tracking or UAV patrols/intercepts of hostile incursions, could help address issues of attrition. However, as these responses are not public in nature, they do not provide an effective rejoinder to the CCP integrated military/propaganda campaign touting the omnipotence of the PLA and the weakness of the Taiwan military. Moreover, without the physical response of interception, there is a significant chance that far from deterring the PLAAF, these tactics could encourage the PLAAF to utilize salami-slicing tactics to move its incursions closer to Taiwan, thereby testing Taiwan’s willingness to escalate to a kinetic response.

Finally, there are the disruptive issues associated with a transition to an operationally asymmetric military that need to be considered. Currently, the Taiwan military is dealing with significant issues of morale. Given that asymmetric recommendations generally posit a shift to an air force that consists of ground-based air defense, a navy primarily composed of small fast-attack craft, an army that is built around elastic denial (i.e. ability to conduct a fighting withdrawal), and a reserve system that focuses on territorial defense/insurgency, implementing them would likely result in additional, and severe, morale and recruitment issues. Furthermore, these reforms could also cause other thorny problems associated with training/re-training, promotion, retention, and logistics. This type of disruption would (and does) face significant opposition from within military leadership, thus weakening military cohesion and actually reducing deterrent effects in the short to medium term.

**Balancing Defense Capability**

In the end, the binary debate over asymmetric or conventional military capability for Taiwan is problematic. Given the cross-Strait disparity in budget and force, as well as increasing PRC aggression in the gray zone, the only workable response is not one or the other, but rather “all of the above.” Currently, US security assistance to Taiwan tends to be a mishmash of defense equipment that pleases no one—and is often delayed to boot. Taking one example, Taiwan’s calculations indicate that a minimum of 1200 anti-ship cruise missiles are needed to sink at least half of the current-day PLA invasion fleet. Taiwan accordingly began a rapid-acquisition project for coastal defense cruise missiles, Project Swiftness (迅捷專案). However, the latest US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) announcement of a USD $2.37 billion package of 400 Harpoon Block II anti-ship missiles is not only insufficient, but will likely involve delayed deliveries due to operational/technical issues on the US side and budgetary issues on the Taiwan side.
Given that buying missiles is probably the easiest method by which Taiwan can acquire operationally asymmetric capabilities, and that this program is a Taiwan Presidential-level priority, these delays highlight just how difficult it will be to establish more extensive, complex, and politically-costly methods of asymmetry at the speed necessary to maintain relevance. This requires a re-think of what is considered asymmetric or conventional.

In my next installment, I will discuss new methods by which the US can assist Taiwan with defense reform that will address the increasing PRC threat in both the gray zone, as well as in the scenario of an all-out invasion.

The main point: The US and Taiwan defense establishments have different definitions of asymmetry and deterrence. The US tends to focus on operational deterrence, while Taiwan tends to focus on strategic deterrence.

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Japan’s Policy Shift on Taiwan Centers on Okinawa

By: I-wei Jennifer Chang

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On July 13, the Japanese Ministry of Defense released its annual white paper, Defense of Japan 2021. For the first time, the publication mentioned the importance of Taiwan for Japan’s security, stating that “Stabilizing the situation surrounding Taiwan is important for Japan’s security and the stability of the international community.” Building on this, it continued: “Therefore, it is necessary that we pay close attention to the situation with a sense of crisis more than ever before.”

In contrast to past defense white papers that tiptoed around Tokyo’s stance on the Chinese military threat to Taiwan, the recent statement referencing Taiwan’s role in Japanese national security is a reflection of a perceptible Japanese policy shift, which has reduced some ambiguity regarding Tokyo’s willingness to enter a potential military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. In a departure from its previous, risk-adverse approach towards China, a number of high-level Japanese officials have been increasingly outspoken on the need to defend Taiwan. This rhetorical shift in Japanese official statements on Taiwan, which is driven largely by concerns over protecting Okinawa, could pave the way for direct discussions and collaboration between Japan and Taiwan on collective defense issues.

Japan’s Policy Shift

In recent months, several senior Japanese government officials have expressed unusually strong statements stressing the importance of Taiwan’s security, while also linking it to Japan’s national security. During the March 16 “2+2” meeting between US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Toshimitsu Motegi (茂木 敏充), and Japanese Minister of Defense Nobuo Kishi (岸 信夫), both sides issued a joint statement that “underscored the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.” Secretary Austin warned during the consultative meeting that the situation in the Taiwan Strait directly impacts Japan’s national security, suggesting that if conflict erupted over Taiwan, the safety of Okinawa would be affected. [1] Minister Kishi reportedly confirmed in this meeting that if China were to use military force against Taiwan, then the United States and Japan would work closely together to respond within the framework of the US-Japan Security Treaty.

The United States and Japan have both been alarmed by China’s increasing assertiveness in the region, including in the maritime domain. The ministers’ joint statement singled out China and “expressed serious concerns about recent disruptive developments in the region, such as the China Coast Guard law.” In reference to the Senkaku Islands (尖閣諸島)—also called the Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台列嶼) by Taiwan and the Diaoyu Islands (釣魚島) by China—the statement asserted, “The United States and Japan remain opposed to any unilateral action that seeks to change the status quo or to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands.”

China’s Coast Guard Law (海警法) that came into effect on February 1 stipulates that the Chinese Coast Guard can use weapons against foreign ships that are viewed as illegally infringing upon Chinese jurisdiction
and sovereign rights. The Japanese government, which has seen a dramatic uptick in Chinese naval intrusions into Japanese waters near the Senkaku Islands, is concerned that the new Chinese law will target Japanese fishing vessels and patrol boats in order to reinforce Chinese claims in the East China Sea.

On April 16, US President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga (菅 義偉) issued a joint statement that said “We underscore the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and encourage the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.” This was the first mention of Taiwan in a US-Japan joint statement since 1969. The Biden Administration has also encouraged other US allies, including South Korea and European countries, to adopt a unified stance on preserving peace in the Taiwan Strait. The US-South Korea joint statement, which followed Biden’s meeting with South Korean President Moon Jae-in, and the G7 joint communique, both issued in May, also have similar references to the Taiwan Strait.

Other Japanese officials have highlighted the connection between a Taiwan contingency and the defense of Japan. In an online event organized the Hudson Institute on June 28, Japanese Deputy Defense Minister Yasuhide Nakayama (中山 泰秀) said it was time to “wake up” to China’s growing threats to the region and “to protect Taiwan as a democratic country.” Calling Taiwan a “brother” and “family,” and likening Taiwan’s physical proximity to Japan to that of “nose and eyes,” Nakayama said that a military attack on Taiwan would also impact Okinawa and invoke the US-Japan security alliance.

Indeed, the common thread among Japanese policymakers is that if something happens to Taiwan, then Okinawa—and thus Japan—will likely be affected as well. In July, Japanese Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso (麻生 太郎) said in a speech that in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, Japan would exercise the right of “collective self-defense” and work with the United States to help defend Taiwan. Aso cited the “existential threat” to Japan’s security, and also stated, “If Taiwan falls, Okinawa is next.” These Japanese statements suggest that Taiwan’s territorial integrity cannot be separated from the protection of southern Japan, especially Okinawa.

**Okinawa’s Strategic Role**

Taiwan lies 450 miles from Okinawa Island (沖縄島) and only 70 miles from Okinawa Prefecture’s Yonaguni Island (與那國島), which constitutes the westernmost point of Japan. [2] Japan’s territorial waters and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) are also close to the north-east side of Taiwan. Given this geographical proximity, a potential Chinese naval blockade of Taiwan during a military conflict could directly impinge upon Japan’s outlying islands, including Yonaguni, Iriomote (西表島), Miyako (宮古島), and Ishigaki (石垣島). The People’s Liberation Army (PLA, 中國人民解放軍) could seek to control surrounding areas during an offensive against Taiwan, possibly seizing the disputed Senkaku Islands.

Strategically speaking, Taiwan and Okinawa serve as one another’s buffer against a Chinese invasion. In a potential war in the Taiwan Strait, the Chinese military could attack US military bases in Okinawa to prevent the United States from directly intervening in the conflict to assist Taiwan. A former Japanese military officer has also suggested that after China gains control of Taiwan, the PLA could also invade Okinawa, where Beijing has sought to drum up anti-US military and anti-Tokyo sentiment.

It could be argued that Japan’s recent remarks about protecting Taiwan are primarily motivated by the security imperative to defend Japan’s southwestern islands from a Chinese military assault. In April, a group of Chinese warships, including the Chinese aircraft carrier
Liaoning (遼寧), passed through the Miyako Strait (宮古海峡) between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island and conducted military exercises in waters near Taiwan. Japan, alarmed by the Chinese aircraft carrier’s activities in the waters off Miyako Island, deployed a destroyer and patrol aircraft to monitor the movements of the Chinese navy.

As China has built up its regional maritime presence and aims to increase pressure on the Senkaku Islands, particularly with the passage of the Chinese Coast Guard Law, the Japanese government has fortified the defenses of its southwestern islands. In recent years, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) have established new bases on Japan’s outlying islands, including Yonaguni, Miyako, and Ishigaki. Japan has also strengthened its military deployment to these islands in an effort to prevent a contingency in the Taiwan Strait from reaching Japan. There have also been reports that Japanese naval vessels were familiarizing themselves with naval routes around the Taiwan Strait in 2018, possibly in preparation for a potential Taiwan contingency.

Taiwan-Japan Security Dialogue

It remains to be seen whether Japan’s rhetorical policy shift will be translated into concrete actions towards enhancing Taiwan’s security, such as direct collaboration between Japan and Taiwan, which has been elusive in the past. Japan’s previous policy on cross-Strait relations was extremely cautious, as Tokyo was largely unwilling to openly confront China over Taiwan. According to a Japanese commentator, Japan’s rhetorical shift on Taiwanese security may create new breakthroughs in Japan-Taiwan exchanges.

Taiwan has long wanted to conduct military exchanges and training programs with Japan, but Tokyo was reluctant to offend Beijing. During an interview with the Japanese newspaper Sankei Shimbun (産経新聞) in early 2019, President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) proposed a Taiwan-Japan Security Dialogue (台日安保對話) to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s (安倍 晋三) government as a platform for discussing regional security and cybersecurity issues. Tsai called for direct bilateral talks between Taiwanese and Japanese officials amid growing Chinese military threats to the region. She indicated her desire to overcome legal barriers in sharing information on Chinese naval and military activities around Taiwan and Okinawa.

Despite being a strong supporter of Taiwan, Abe’s government rejected Tsai’s proposal for direct dialogue. Subsequently, Japanese officials told China’s state-run Global Times (環球時報) that Tokyo was not considering engaging in a security dialogue with Taipei, and that nothing had changed regarding Japan’s unofficial relationship with Taiwan. Some scholars surmised that the Abe Administration had prioritized the improvement and normalization of relations with China during that time, and thus was careful to avoid antagonizing Beijing. However, after leaving office, Abe has been more outspoken on the Chinese threat to Taiwan’s democracy. "What happened in Hong Kong must never happen in Taiwan," said the former prime minister in July during the online meeting of Trilateral Strategic Dialogue attended by lawmakers from the United States, Japan, and Taiwan.

At bottom, Tokyo’s recent discourse on Taiwan is laying the groundwork for potential policy adjustments in the future. After Suga became prime minister in September 2020, Japanese Defense Minister Kishi expressed his expectation that Japan, the United States, and Taiwan would soon start a security dialogue. Some commentators have pointed out that Tokyo is unlikely to directly engage in such a dialogue involving Taiwanese officials given the political risks to its relations with Beijing, and that the United States must take a leading role. In any case, a future trilateral security dialogue is likely to focus on Okinawa’s strategic role, which is key to discussions on Taiwan’s and Japan’s national security. Okinawa could serve as an important bridge to begin actual security cooperation among Japan, the United States, and Taiwan.

The main point: The rhetorical shift in Japanese official statements on Taiwan, primarily motivated by the need to protect Okinawa, could pave the way for a US-Japan-Taiwan dialogue and collaboration on defense issues.


[2] Ibid.
CCP Proxies Call for Mutiny, Violence, and Overthrow of the Tsai Government

By: J. Michael Cole

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While the world focuses on the threat posed by a potential invasion of Taiwan by the Chinese military, pro-Chinese Communist Party (CCP) elements in Taiwan are increasing their calls for the overthrow of the Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) Administration. Although such elements remain in the marginal minority, the groups nevertheless tap into extremist sentiment within the pro-CCP and Deep-Blue camp that could potentially result in isolated acts of violence against government officials.

Two recent incidents involving Chang An-le (張安樂), the founder of the China Unification Promotion Party (CUPP, 中華統一促進黨), and Kao An-kuo (高安國), a retired Republic of China (ROC) Army general, raise the specter of efforts by sub-state actors—possibly acting in conjunction with, or at the direction of, the CCP—to destabilize state institutions.

Calls for Uprisings and Military Mutiny

During a July 15-16 forum in Shanghai titled “Chinese Compatriots Across the Strait, Joining Hands to Realize the Chinese Dream” (攜手圓夢:兩岸同胞交流研討活動), the CUPP’s Chang said “I have made the proclamation in Taiwan that China must annex Taiwan.” Chang spoke of the need to “make friends” and network with retired and active military personnel within Taiwan. “I have called on them to surrender [...] on the day that China starts its military invasion of Taiwan. We will launch a revolt, an armed insurrection against the government here. [...] The youth groups at many temples in Taiwan with which we have been networking will join us when this day comes.”

This was not the first time that Chang referred to recruiting youth—one of the key targets for recruitment by the CCP—from temples across Taiwan. In an interview with Central People’s Broadcasting Station (中央人民廣播電台) in February 2021, Chang stated that one of his priorities was to enlist young people from central and southern parts of Taiwan and “turn them from green” (that is, supporters of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party and/or Taiwan independence) “to red,” or pro-CCP. Such recruits, he added, would then assist the CCP in promoting “reunification” and sparking “an uprising.” In the same interview, Chang added that he was willing to die a martyr for the cause of “reunification.”

During the July event in Shanghai, Chang also advocated for the creation of a propaganda team, with influencers and a manifesto in Taiwan to promote “reunification with the motherland” (促進祖國統一的宣傳隊, 播種機, 宣言書). Arguing that this was how the CCP won the Chinese Civil War, Chang said that the team would “spread seeds for growth and propagate our political ideology.”

The forum was organized by the Cross-Strait Relations Research Center (海峽兩岸關係研究中心) under the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO, 國務院臺灣事務辦公室). Approximately 100 people, including Taiwanese academics, youth representatives, and political party delegates, reportedly took part in the event.

Meanwhile, in videos posted on Chinese social media and a YouTube channel, Kao An-kuo, a former deputy commander of the Taoyuan-based Sixth Army Command (第六軍團指揮部), called on the command-
ing officers of the Taiwanese military to “stand up for Chinese nationalism” and “overthrow the DPP and the Taiwan traitor group” in order to “achieve the sacred mission of unification of the Chinese race.” In the same video, the 77-year-old Kao says the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) should “feel ashamed of itself” and laments the “languishing party’s” unwillingness to “join forces for the third time with the CCP to realize the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”

During the 2014 China Cross-Strait Military Generals Forum (2014中國海峽兩岸將軍論壇) in Xiamen, Fujian Province, Kao had made a similar call for the Taiwanese military to refrain from taking action if China launched an attack against Taiwan. An estimated 30 retired generals from the Taiwanese side are said to have participated in that forum. (Since 2016, the Taiwanese government has implemented stricter rules on travel to China and participation in political events there by retired military personnel.)

Besides calling for what amounts to mutiny, in another video Kao launches a tirade against Minister of Health and Welfare Chen Shih-chung (陳時中), whom he compares to a “failed general” on the battlefield. “The people’s resentment in Taiwan is boiling,” Kao says, “and the air is filled with the smell of gunpowder, which will ignite the long-lasting anger in Taiwan.” Using a historical reference to the Three Kingdoms Era, Kao argues that the top commander of the Central Epidemic Command Center (CECC, 國家衛生指揮中心中央流行疫情指揮中心) should be “beheaded.”

**Threat Assessment**

The rhetoric used by both Chang and Kao operates on two levels. First, it seeks to exacerbate alleged discontent with the Tsai Administration over its “betrayal” of the “Chinese race” and its supposed mishandling of the COVID-19 outbreak, the latter in the face of all evidence to the contrary. Second, it signals the intent to create an alliance of non-state actors whose purported aim represents a direct threat to state stability and the safety of government officials. Both Chang, a former head of the violent Bamboo Union (竹聯幫) triad, and Kao, who joined the CUPP and the Blue Sky Alliance (藍天行動聯盟) in sometimes violent protests against legislators and officials over the Tsai Administration’s pension reform plans in 2017-2018, have a demonstrated commitment to using violence to achieve their goals (during the 2017 protests, Kao called on protesters to surround the Presidential Office and “topple the government in one go”). The following year, Kao announced the creation of a “Republic of China Taiwan Military Government” (中華民國台灣軍政府), declaring “war” on the Tsai Administration as well as the pro-independence Taiwan Civil Government (台灣民政府). Kao claimed his organization comprises seven units around Taiwan, namely the Taipei Military Region, Taichung Military Region, Tainan Military Region, Taitung Military Region, Penghu Military Region, Kinmen Military Region, and Matsu Military Region. (The pro-CCP outlet China Review News also reported on this here, although this article refers to only four alleged military regions.)

Such groups may also seek to exploit controversies such as the recent allegations of espionage against former Deputy Minister of National Defense Chang Che-ping (張哲平) to force a wedge or cause mistrust between the Tsai government and the armed forces. Chang’s CUPP has long had a symbiotic relationship with the Bamboo Union, which—among other areas of activity—is deeply involved in arms trafficking. Such access to firearms greatly enhances the ability of pro-CCP organizations to launch attacks against officials and critics of the CCP regime, and potentially inflict serious damage on state institutions. Violence of this type could be self-initiated or enacted at the behest of Chinese officials—with the additional advantage for Beijing of plausible deniability. For his part, Kao is tap-
The singling out of officials like Chen Shih-chung—to which we can add the TAO’s direct threat of punitive action against “hardcore separatists” such as Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Wu (吳釗燮) and, more recently, Legislative Speaker You Si-kun (游錫堃)—also constitutes incitement that could compel disgruntled Chinese or Taiwanese ultranationalist lone wolves to take matters into their own hands.

**Responses**

Activities such as those that Chang and Kao are involved in represent a threat to the state, and should therefore be countered with commensurate measures. On the legal front, the National Security Act (國家安全法), the Anti-Infiltration Act (反滲透法), and the Organized Crime Prevention Act (組織犯罪防制條例) all contain provisions that can facilitate prosecution. Advocating for unification technically falls under free speech, and therefore is unlikely to lead to prosecution. However, calls for mutiny, for the overthrow of the government, or for the armed forces to refuse direct orders from their commander-in-chief—as well as advocating violence against the state and officials—do not constitute freedom of speech but rather treason. When such a line is crossed, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ, 法務部) can—and must—act upon such regulations, regardless of whether perpetrators like Chang recognize the legitimacy of the ROC legal system (he doesn’t). Under such laws, Chang could face a minimum of seven years imprisonment for sedition and related charges. For far too long the MOJ has tiptoed around the issue of prosecution against such individuals and organizations; one wonders how much more explicit they need to make their threats against the state before prosecutors finally take action.

Besides legal means, it is essential that the state apparatus strengthen protective measures for government officials, legislators, and members of society who stand to be targeted by the CCP or its proxies in Taiwan. One of democratic Taiwan’s many virtues is the openness of its society and institutions. However, the hostile intentions of Taiwan’s authoritarian neighbor cannot be ignored, and remedial measures must be taken to diminish the likelihood that China’s “gray zone” operations, such as those discussed above, can exploit that openness to cause great harm to Taiwanese society. Officials like Chen, Wu, and You who have been singled out by the Chinese state apparatus or its proxies in Taiwan must receive extra physical protection against the possibility of an orchestrated attack or one by a lone wolf. Where necessary, security should also be augmented at the ministries where such attacks are likely, including the addition of metal detectors at points of entry. The idea is not to turn the state into a fortress, but rather to address the overly lax security that tends to characterize access to government buildings across Taiwan. Whether we like it or not, Taiwan is in a state of quasi-war with its neighbor; ignoring the threat will not make it disappear.

The CCP and its proxies in Taiwan have the capability for violence, and have signaled their willingness to use violence against officials and state institutions. Taipei cannot afford to wait until the Chinese side finally acts upon those threats to finally implement the appropriate protective measures, and to put behind bars those who have clearly telegraphed their hostile intentions.

**The main point:** Chinese “gray zone” operations drawing on proxies in Taiwan are intensifying, with calls by a former gangster and a retired general for the violent overthrow of the sitting government and attacks on government officials. The state has various instruments at its disposal to mitigate the threat, including legal means as well as upgraded security measures. Both must be utilized before it’s too late.

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**The Struggle Over “Comfort Women” in Taiwan: Historical Memory and Lack of Consensus**

By: Emilie Hu

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The *Ama Museum* (阿嬤家-和平與女性人權館)—the only museum in Taiwan dedicated to the victims of Japanese military sexual slavery during World War II—first opened in 2016. Ama (阿嬤), the word for grandma in Taiwanese Hokkien, refers to the advanced age of surviving “comfort women.” [1] *Inaugurated on Human Rights Day in 2016* with former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) in attendance, the museum displayed photos and documents related to the Taiwanese “comfort women” and hosted events related to feminist human rights movements. It had to briefly close its original location in Taipei’s Datong District (大同區) in November 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic aggravating a decline in ticket sales. By contrast, South Korea—another democratic country that endured Japanese colonization—opened its *first museum* dedicated to victims of Japanese military sexual slavery far earlier, back in 1998. To this day, South Korean activists and survivors *make global headlines* for their frequent demonstrations in front of *commemoration statues*—whereas the Ama Museum struggles to stay open.

What explains the emergence of the “comfort women” redress movement in South Korea and not Taiwan? The lack of national historical consensus concerning the plight of “comfort women” in Taiwan impedes the island’s ability to attain justice for survivors and their families through policy and legislation. As a result, the “comfort women” issue has become politicized within the context of Taiwan’s party politics. Despite this controversy, redressing the issue will restore justice for former “comfort women” and help set a precedent for future human rights activism and feminist movements worldwide.

**Japanese Imperialism and World War II**

Following the Qing Dynasty’s surrender in the First Sino-Japanese War, Japanese forces seized Tainan from the short-lived Republic of Formosa (臺灣民主國) in 1895 and occupied Taiwan until 1945. [2] As part of its colonial project, Japan focused on developing Taiwan’s infrastructure and forcing assimilation through public education. [3] During World War II, *Japan used Taiwan as a base* for invading Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Throughout this period, “comfort women” were recruited and abducted to serve Japanese soldiers in brothels. The Taipei Women’s Rescue Foundation (TWRF, 慰安婦援基金會) *estimates* that more than 2,000 Taiwanese women were forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese during World War II. Japan surrendered Taiwan in 1945, and following the Chinese Civil War, the Kuomintang (KMT, 國民黨) retreated to Taiwan and established martial law on the island. [4] While most Taiwanese were ethnically Han Chinese, those who lived under Japanese rule *did not necessarily identify with* political developments and culture in China. Popular uprisings against the KMT regime ensued, ultimately culminating with the *228 Massacre* (also known as the 228 Incident, 二二八事件), which marked the beginning of a period of violent crackdowns that become known as the “White Terror.”

The KMT’s oppressive rule of Taiwan has resulted in a complicated historical memory of Japanese imperialism. From the perspective of many native Taiwanese people, the KMT effectively *replaced* the Japanese as the island’s main aggressors. Consequently, there tends to be a greater emphasis placed on *redressing* the crimes committed under Chiang Kai-Shek’s (蔣介石) rule than on redressing the atrocities perpetrated under Japanese occupation. While Pan-Blue (Nationalist/KMT) ideology still emphasizes *depicting Japan as a historical adversary* during the Second Sino-Japanese War, some older Pan-Green (DPP, 民進黨) members recall the Japanese occupation with greater sympathy.

Like its occupation of Taiwan, Japan’s colonial projects in Korea included infrastructural development and efforts to enforce assimilation. However, Koreans showed significantly more resistance towards Japanese imperialism. In contrast to Taiwan’s conflicted sense of national identity, Korea developed a *unified sense of national identity* centuries before the Japanese invasion and thus regarded Japanese occupation as a period of exploitation and humiliation. Around 2 million Koreans rebelled against their Japanese oppressors in the *1919 March 1 Movement* (三一運動). During World War II, Japan subjected Koreans to military sexual slavery on a much larger scale than in Taiwan. An estimated 80 percent of the *100,000 to 200,000 girls and women* forced into sexual slavery were Korean. [5] The painful memory of Japanese occupation *runs deep in Korean national identity* and continues to affect *Japanese-Korean relations* today.
The Movement for Reconciliation

The victims of Japanese military sexual slavery endured physically and psychologically inhumane treatment. For decades following World War II, survivors did not speak out about their experiences due to social stigma. It was only in 1991 that the first halmeoni (the Korean term for grandmother, also used to refer to surviving "comfort women") gave public testimony to acknowledge the abuse she suffered at Japanese "comfort stations" during World War II. [6] Her testimony rekindled the redress movement and spurred grassroots investigations and lawsuits for reparations. The redress movement in South Korea quickly transformed into a transnational movement for former comfort women across Asia. In response, the Japanese government organized the Asian Women’s Fund (AWF), an organization funded mostly by ordinary citizens’ donations, to show "atonement" from the Japanese people to former comfort women.

Nevertheless, activists and former comfort women in Taiwan and across Asia have demanded what they could consider as an unambiguous apology that admits the Japanese government’s culpability in establishing comfort stations in Asian nations and enslaving women to provide sexual services to Japanese soldiers. Furthermore, they have called on the Japanese government to provide reparations to the survivors and families. As a result, in 2002 the Legislative Yuan’s Taiwanese Comfort Women Investigation Committee instituted monthly payments of USD $525.38 to 36 Taiwanese women identified as survivors, hoping to eventually receive reparations and a formal apology directly from the Japanese government. Eighteen years later, the Japanese government has yet to fulfill this demand.

Chen Shui-bian and Taiwan’s Identity Politics

The lack of historical consensus regarding the “comfort women” issue exacerbates tensions in Taiwanese party politics. Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), Taiwan’s first president from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民進黨), encountered one such controversy in 2001. At that time, presidential advisor and businessman Hsu Wen-lung (許文龍) participated in an interview with a Japanese comic book editor, in which Hsu asserted that women had volunteered to serve Japanese soldiers during World War II. Pan-Blue legislators quickly accused Hsu of pandering to Japan and demanded an apology. [7] Pan-Blue activists subsequently criticized Pan-Green politicians for being unpatriotic and disrespecting Taiwan’s national identity.

Throughout the Chen Administration, the movement to raise awareness and obtain redress for comfort women became overshadowed by Taiwan’s increasingly politicized discourse on identity. Thus, it could not generate ubiquitous support from the public in the same way that South Korea’s movement has garnered support, as British-Japanese scholar Shogo Suzuki has argued. [8] The net effect of this dispute was a growing inability to agree on relevant historical facts. [9] The politicization of the “comfort women” issue in Taiwan has meant that activists have been left to their own devices with little support from the government, and the issue remains unresolved.

Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT Nationalist Framework

In contrast to the disarray surrounding the “comfort women” issue during Chen’s presidency, his successor Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) made definitive statements condemning Japan’s treatment of women during World War II. Ma consistently reiterated his promise to restore justice for the former “comfort women” throughout his presidency. When he screened the documentary Song of the Reed—which depicts the plight
of four “comfort women” during World War II—at the presidential office, Ma went so far as to criticize the lack of consensus in Taiwan by calling it “perhaps the only country that doesn’t believe the comfort women were forced.”

Following the monumental agreement between South Korea and Japan in December 2015 for an apology and 1 billion yen (USD $9.4 million) in reparations for South Korean survivors and their families, Ma demanded that Japan apologize and compensate former Taiwanese “comfort women” as well. Notably, Japan’s apology and plan for reparations were ultimately deemed unauthentic by South Korean citizens and human rights activists.

Because Japan and Taiwan do not have formal diplomatic relations, Taiwan’s Association of East Asian Relations and Japan’s Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association coordinated the talks. Taipei’s demands included an official apology, compensation, and restoration of victims’ reputations and dignity. However, Taiwan’s de facto ambassador to Japan stated that Taiwan needed to reach a clear consensus before seriously moving forward with negotiations. Subsequently, then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga—Japan’s current prime minister—indicated that Japan’s talks with Taiwan would not result in a deal similar to the one with South Korea. Despite President Ma’s formal call for negotiations, the Japanese government has not attempted to resolve this issue or address Taiwan’s demands.

Tsai Ing-wen and Relations with Japan

Since her first term, President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) has largely avoided speaking about the “comfort women” issue in relation to Japan. In conjunction with the 2018 unveiling of Taiwan’s first Japanese “comfort women” memorial statue, an event attended by Ma, the TWRF protested outside the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association in Taipei. In response to the demonstrators, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reaffirmed that it would continue to stand by its policy to fight for the dignity of “comfort women” despite the Tsai Administration’s overall inaction. However, without any official statements coming from President Tsai herself, the commitments do not carry much significance. This raises the question of whether the current government has the willingness to even seek justice for former “comfort women.”

One of President Tsai’s long-term projects has been to redress Taiwan’s complicated human rights record, specifically under the KMT’s martial law period. In 2018, she presided over the opening of the National Human Rights Museum (國家人權博物館), the first museum of its kind in Taiwan. In her speech, Tsai touched on the importance of restoring justice for the older generations who suffered in silence. If the Tsai Administration can redress historical wrongdoings and painful memories of oppression during the White Terror, it should be capable of demanding reparations and an apology from Japan. However, it appears to lack the political will to push forward an agenda of transitional justice for former Taiwanese “comfort women.”

Recommendations

While revisiting the controversial and traumatic “comfort women” issue may be uncomfortable for Taiwan, not doing so would only perpetuate the lack of consensus on important matters of national history. On International Comfort Women Memorial Day in 2020, the TWRF demanded that the Taiwanese government change the term “comfort women,” written in junior high and high school history textbooks to “comfort women: military sexual slaves,” following the example of a 1995 UN Commission on Human Rights report. Changing the “comfort women” term in Taiwan’s textbooks could be a key step towards reshaping how Taiwanese society understands this atrocity. More urgently, the window of time to ensure that the remaining survivors can see justice restored is about to close. As of 2020, the TWRF knew of only two former “comfort women” who were still alive. As the 2021 International Comfort Women Memorial Day approaches on August 14, the Tsai Administration will likely be the last administration able to demand that Tokyo meet survivors’ demands while they are still alive. Squandering the opportunity to seek justice for former “comfort women” once and for all would be regrettable for Taiwan.

The main point: Politicization of the “comfort women” issue impedes the process of forming a national historical consensus on the issue and prevents the Taiwan government from attaining justice for the Taiwanese women who endured Japanese military sexual slavery.

[1] The author would like to note that the term “comfort women” (慰安婦) is used to follow conventional
usage. “Comfort women” is written in quotation marks because it is a euphemism, derived from Japanese military documents, for women held as sex slaves by the Japanese military during the World War II era.


[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.


[6] Ibid.


[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.