President Biden and Incremental Clarity on US Commitment to Taiwan’s Defense
Russell Hsiao

President Joseph Biden stirred the Taiwan-watching community—once again—with recent comments indicating that the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense if China used military force to invade the island. In the latest of a string of similar statements made by the 46th president—and amid growing concerns about China’s “acute” military threats to Taiwan and the broader implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—Biden responded unequivocally in the affirmative when asked whether he would intervene militarily to defend Taiwan. The clarity of his response—“yes [...] that’s the commitment we made”—was uncritically examined by both its supporters and critics. Most interpretations either simply applauded or derided the president for essentially abandoning the longstanding US stance of “strategic ambiguity” for “strategic clarity” on whether the United States would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion. Yet, this is an inaccurate reading of President Biden’s statement, as well as the longstanding elasticity of US commitment to Taiwan’s defense in the absence of a defense treaty. Despite being clear that the United States would intervene militarily in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, the president did not offer an unconditional, explicit guarantee or provide precise details of what this would entail. Nevertheless, his statements do suggest that as China’s military threats against Taiwan become more acute, greater clarity in the US commitment to come to Taiwan’s defense will be necessary to respond to the growing threat.

Incremental Clarity on Taiwan

This is not the first time that President Biden has made statements that expressed his views on US commitments to Taiwan’s defense. After the controversial US withdrawal from Afghanistan, Biden was asked in August 2021 whether the decision would have an
impact on other countries’ perceptions of US commitment to their security. The president responded: “We have made, kept every commitment. We made a sacred commitment to article 5 that if in fact anyone were to invade or take action against our NATO allies, we would respond. Same with Japan, same with South Korea, same with Taiwan. It’s not even comparable to talk about that.” While the United States has not had a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan since 1979, provisions within the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), especially Section 2(b)(4-6), can be read to indicate a broad commitment to Taiwan’s defense.

Only a couple months later at a televised town hall meeting in October 2021, an attendee asked the president—in the context of reports of advances in China’s hypersonic weapons—“can you vow to protect Taiwan?” The president responded without hesitation: “Yes.” The moderator subsequently followed up to have the president clarify his statement by asking “…the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense if China attacked?” “Yes, we have a commitment,” the president confirmed.

The third and most recent statement made by President Biden on the subject of the US commitment to Taiwan’s defense was made while on his recent Asia tour. During his stop in Tokyo, a reporter asked “You didn’t want to get involved in the Ukraine conflict militarily for obvious reasons. Are you willing to get involved militarily to defend Taiwan if it comes to that?” Without hesitation, the president responded: “Yes.” The president nodded his head, “That’s the commitment we made.” Biden added: “We agree with a One China policy. We’ve signed on to it and all the intended agreements made from there. But the idea that, that it [Taiwan] can be taken by force, just not appropriate. It will dislocate the entire region and be another action similar to what happened in Ukraine and so it’s a burden that is even stronger” (emphasis added).

Biden is not the first president to express or demonstrate his views on the US commitment to Taiwan’s defense. In 1996, then-President Bill Clinton deployed two aircraft carriers to Taiwan-adjacent waters to deter China from engaging in further military provocations. Five years later, President George W. Bush was asked the question: “[I]f Taiwan were attacked by China, do we have an obligation to defend the Taiwanese?” President Bush responded, “Yes, we do, and the Chinese must understand that. Yes, I would.” “With the full force of American military?” the interviewer asked. “Whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself,” the president clearly answered.

Parsing the Language and Intent

Despite the political signal sent by President Biden’s statement of intent, the framing of his statements has been erroneously labeled in binary terms of whether it indicated an unconditional explicit guarantee that the United States would defend Taiwan in the event of an invasion or not. This misses the larger point. Absent a defense treaty—and even such treaties are not unconditional (which is why diplomacy is necessary to exact such commitments)—the decision of whether, when, and how to commit military force is more accurately described as a spectrum rather than an either-or proposition. The president’s statements on the subject matter should thus not be taken out of context and seen as an unconditional and unqualified commitment.

Furthermore, while the statement does somewhat clarify Biden’s belief that military means could be in the cards when it comes to Taiwan’s defense, “militarily” could still be interpreted in a variety of ways, ranging from providing Taiwan with the means to defend herself to deploying boots on the ground. While the president is strategically clear about the US intent to defend Taiwan militarily in some form, the president’s language still preserves a degree of tactical ambiguity as to how the United States would respond.

Critics were quick to label the statement as a gaffe, but these criticisms are misplaced. They perhaps would hold water if it was the first such comment made by the president. Yet, this is the third such statement and should reasonably be seen only in one way: that President Biden would intervene militarily in some form should China decide to invade Taiwan, especially against the backdrop of China’s tactical support for Russia’s unjustified invasion of Ukraine. Moreover, such criticisms ignore how China’s own increasingly aggressive actions have contributed to the need for the United States to shift towards clarity, and to clearly signal to Beijing that it must not resort to the use of
military force to settle its dispute with Taipei.

The misdirected attention on whether the United States has abandoned “strategic ambiguity” misses an important but underappreciated significance of President Biden’s statement. Far from an unintentional gaffe, the location and timing of the statement seemed carefully orchestrated by the Biden Administration. In recent years—and particularly in recent months—Tokyo has grown increasingly vocal about its concerns regarding China’s military aggressions. Against the backdrop of the Ukraine war, former Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo penned an April 2022 op-ed in the Los Angeles Times calling on the United States to explicitly commit to Taiwan’s defense. While the former prime minister’s argument was framed in terms of why the United States must come to Taiwan’s defense, the underlying motivation likely stems from a recognition of the role that Japan would likely have to play in the event of a military contingency over Taiwan. Given rising concerns about China’s aggression, Tokyo must make haste in its own internal debate to ensure that the political conditions and the legal means are in place to effectively respond. Accordingly, multiple statements by visiting Japanese lawmakers in recent months have called on Washington to move towards strategic clarity, reflecting this perceived urgency (and contributing to the broader debate regarding the need for a Japanese version of the TRA).

**Secretary Blinken’s China Policy Speech**

Whether or not President Biden’s statement of clarity regarding a military response to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan indicated a fundamental change in US policy should also be analyzed in conjunction with the long-awaited China-policy speech delivered by Secretary of State Antony Blinken on May 26—the first such speech of the Biden Administration. In the section containing his remarks on Taiwan (which was notably separated from the discussion on Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang), Secretary Blinken stated:

> “On Taiwan, our approach has been consistent across decades and administrations. As the President has said, our policy has not changed. The United States remains committed to our “one China” policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiqués, the Six Assurances. We oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side; we do not support Taiwan independence; and we expect cross-strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means.”

It is instructive that Blinken emphasized: “We’ll continue to uphold our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to assist Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability—and, as indicated in the TRA, to ‘maintain our capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security or the social or economic system, of Taiwan.’” Indeed, American presidents have long stated that the United States has an “unequivocal moral commitment” to the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue.

As Beijing deliberately obfuscates the Taiwan issue by conflating the “One-China Principle” (一個中國原則) with the US “One-China Policy” (一個中國政策), it also does so with the debate over “strategic ambiguity.” When combined with the President’s statements on the defense of Taiwan, greater clarity about US defense commitments to Taiwan does not mean the United States either supports or is encouraging Taiwan independence, despite Beijing’s efforts to frame the issue that way. Rather, it means support for the status quo, and is directly in furtherance of the longstanding US goal of deterring Beijing from using military force against Taiwan and ensure a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue.

In November 2021, President Biden stated: “We have made very clear we support the Taiwan Act, and that’s it. It’s independent. It makes its own decisions.” In a clarifying response, the American president added: “we are not encouraging [Taiwan] independence, we’re encouraging that they [the people on Taiwan] do exactly what the Taiwan Act requires, and that’s what we’re doing. Let them make up their mind. Period.”

**Conclusion**

President Biden’s statements do not have the legal force of a defense treaty, and even a treaty is not itself unconditional. While Taipei should feel reassured by Biden’s statement, it cannot be taken as a given, and certainly not in unqualified terms. The statement is, however, a reflection of growing trust between Washington and Taipei—trust that has not always been there
under previous administrations in Taipei and Washington. Furthermore, although Taiwan may be defensible now, it is possible that this dynamic could change in the future, rendering the costs too high for the United States to militarily intervene. [1] This is why the debate over ambiguity or clarity is not a simple either-or proposition, and is intertwined with other issues. Indeed, the key is whether there is a sufficient level of clarity necessary to satisfy a minimum threshold of reciprocal commitments to clearly establish a division of labor between the US, Taiwan, and other potential allies.

Perhaps the description that best captures the Biden Administration's current approach to this debate about the US commitment to Taiwan's defense was provided by former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Randall Schriver of the Trump Administration during GTI’s 2020 annual symposium:

“We need to think about moving toward strategic clarity and tactical ambiguity. [...] What I mean by that and what we can continue to build out, the strategic clarity part, it is in our strategic interest for Taiwan’s continued existence, survival, and success. [...] It is against our interest for Taiwan to be absorbed into the “One-China” system as long as the CCP is in power and well beyond that. The tactical ambiguity would have to be preserved because we don’t want to forecast what we would do in a particular contingency.”

Twenty-one years ago, then-President George W. Bush stated that the United States would do “whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself” in the event of attack by China. While criticizing President Bush for ostensibly playing fast and loose with US obligations, then-Senator Biden, who had signed the TRA, commented that: “I remain committed to the principle that Taiwan’s future must be determined only by peaceful means, consistent with the wishes of the people of Taiwan.” Senator Biden then asked a critical question: “What is the appropriate role for the United States?” He then concluded: “The president has broad policymaking authority in the realm of foreign policy, but his powers as commander in chief are not absolute. Under the Constitution, as well as the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act, the commitment of US forces to the defense of Taiwan is a matter the president should bring to the American people and Congress.”

The TRA’s legislative intent as well as this tension were summed up concisely by one of its authors, the late Congressman Lester Wolff, who wrote: “Countless times over the years the TRA has been called upon to render judgement over changing circumstances or events. It has met those demands and survived without serious amendment because of the ambiguity, which was built in, that provided for adaptation to current conditions [...] It was conceived as a device to enhance peace in the region and protect the political integrity of a people’s right to choose. Those people are the people of Taiwan.” [2]

The main point: President Biden’s recent statement that the US would commit itself to the defense of Taiwan was not an isolated verbal gaffe, but rather an intentional declaration consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and the position of multiple prior presidential administrations.


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The California Church Shooter and His Connections to China’s United Front System

By: John Dotson

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Between the horrific massacres that occurred on May 14 in Buffalo and on May 24 in Uvalde, Texas, another incident on Sunday, May 15 provided yet another entry in America’s tragic history of mass shootings. On that day, David Wen-wei Chou (周文偉), a 68-year-old naturalized US citizen of Taiwanese-Chinese heritage, opened fire on congregants at the Irvine Taiwanese Presbyterian Church in the town of Laguna Woods, California (Orange County, greater Los Angeles area), killing one person and wounding five more. After arriving at the church following a long drive from his residence in the Las Vegas area, Chou reportedly chained the
doors shut, super-glued locks, and placed improvised incendiary devices about the building, before opening fire on the mostly elderly attendees at a church luncheon. The shooting rampage could have had a much higher toll, were it not for the heroic actions of Dr. John Cheng (鄭達志)—who reportedly tackled the shooter, and was himself fatally shot—and other attendees who subdued and restrained the suspect.

Orange County District Attorney Todd Spitzer described the attack as a premeditated plan “to execute, in cold blood, as many people as possible,” while California officials have stated that they are investigating the incident as a hate crime. As indicated in a May 17 press release from the Orange County Sheriff’s Department, “[a]ccording to the suspect’s writings that have been interpreted, he fostered a grievance against the Taiwanese community and he was upset about the political tensions between China and Taiwan.” Prior to carrying out the attack, Chou reportedly mailed multiple copies of a journal-cum-manifesto—which he had titled “Diary of an Independence-Destroying Angel” (滅獨天使日記)—to the World Journal (世界新聞網), a southern California-based Chinese language newspaper.

Chou Wen-wei’s Life Before the Shooting

Chou is a naturalized US citizen of Taiwanese-Chinese heritage, who had lived in the Las Vegas area for at least 10 years. Per reporting in the same newspaper that received his manifesto, Chou was born in Taiwan in 1953 to a waishengren (外省人, mainlander) family, with a father who hailed from the province of Hunan. Chou grew up in a settlement for KMT military families, attending first high school and then Feng Chia University (逢甲大學) in the central Taiwan city of Taichung, before later emigrating to the United States. By some accounts, his experiences growing up as a waishengren left him with an outsider’s bitterness towards the majority native Taiwanese.

After emigrating to the United States, Chou reportedly worked in a number of jobs over time—including property management and translating immigration documents—and in more recent years had worked as a security guard. The stressors in his life had multiplied: his career had clearly not lived up to his ambitions, and his wife had reportedly fallen ill and left him to return to Taiwan in 2021. He lived alone, and—if the title of his journal is any indication—fell deeper into grandiose fantasies and radicalized resentment focused on advocates, perceived or otherwise, of Taiwan independence.

Although Chou seemed for the most part to live an isolated existence, one of his few apparent connections was with the Las Vegas chapter of the Council for the Promotion of the Peaceful Reunification of China (CPPRC, 中國和平統一促進會). Chou was present at the founding meeting of the Las Vegas chapter (see accompanying image), and by at least one account acted for a time as an executive member. The CPPRC is the largest and most widespread of the front organizations operated overseas by the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP, 中國共產黨) United Front Work Department (UFWD, 中共中央統戰部). The organization serves as a forum for disseminating CCP propaganda among Chi-
Chinese-speakers, and is the party’s single most important organization in terms of its efforts to control and mobilize the worldwide Chinese diaspora. [1]

Image: A photo from the April 2019 founding meeting of the Las Vegas chapter of the CPPRC, in which Chou Wei-wen (holding microphone) displayed a banner expressing support for the candidacy of Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜). The top line of the banner reads “swiftly pursue and attack, swiftly and fiercely destroy separatist demons” (順勢速追擊，迅猛滅獨妖). (Image source: Las Vegas Chinese News)

Chou’s connections to the CPPRC were quickly noted in the wake of the church shooting, with some commentators comparing Chou’s pro-unification extremism with the white supremacist ideology of the Buffalo supermarket shooter. In Taiwan, representatives of the Presbyterian Church convened a press conference to condemn the shooting, while also drawing direct attention to Chou’s ties to the CPPRC. In addition, members of 60 civic groups signed an open letter stating that the shooting “stemmed from the Chinese Communist Party repeatedly provoking hatred toward the Taiwanese people,” and calling on Taiwan’s government to designate the CPPRC as a terrorist group. For its part, the Las Vegas CPPRC chapter has sought to distance itself from Chou, with chapter President Gu Yawen (顧雅文) telling media that Chou’s extreme views had made him unwelcome, and that he had no role in the group’s activities after 2019.

The Presbyterian Church’s Historical Links with Taiwan’s Pro-Democracy Movement

Although Chou’s actions could hardly be considered rational, the chosen target for his intended mass murder—a congregation of mostly elderly Taiwanese-Americans, attending a social event at a Presbyterian church—was not an accident. In Taiwan, the Presbyterian Church of the martial law era played a prominent role in the pro-democracy and Taiwan native rights movement that eventually coalesced into the Tang-wai (黨外, “outside the party”) movement—which itself ultimately coalesced into the foundations of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民主進步黨). The denomination became involved in dissident activities in the 1970s, amid a cycle of increasing activism by church members, as well as state efforts to suppress Taiwanese identity and opposition activity.

In 1970, the denomination was pressured by the KMT regime to withdraw from the World Council of Churches, due to the latter organization’s support for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) entering the United Nations. Friction between the state and the church rose in the mid-1970s, when the government took steps to suppress the use of Hokkien (e.g., Taiwanese) language materials in church services. Tensions escalated even more in 1977, when the church’s general assembly issued a statement calling for the KMT government “to face reality and to take effective measures whereby Taiwan may become a new and independent country.”

Conclusions

The historical connections between the Presbyterian Church and Taiwan’s pro-democracy and pro-independence movement is an aspect of Taiwan’s history that would likely be lost on most Chinese nationalists in the PRC. Yet, the shooter in the May 15 incident, who grew up in a waishengren family in Taiwan, would almost certainly have been aware of this legacy. Furthermore, Chou’s strange blurring of political and religious obsessions—his preoccupations with “separatist demons” and “independence-destroying angels”—may well...
have made him more likely to select a church as his target, with tragic consequences.

From the limited information that has been made public, it appears that Chou was a lone actor in playing out his violent delusions. There is currently no available evidence that the CPPRC or any of its members played a role in either encouraging or assisting Chou in the shooting; and indeed, such violent incidents are counterproductive in fostering the CCP’s preferred narratives surrounding Taiwan’s “inevitable historical trend” of “reunification [...] with the ancestral motherland.” However, there remain legitimate questions regarding the degree to which the CCP’s escalating rhetoric on Taiwan—including accusations that the DPP is “conspiring with foreign forces to split the country” (與外部勢力勾連分裂國家), and directing a “green terror” (綠色恐怖) against its domestic opponents—creates an information environment in which unstable individuals like Chou may become further radicalized. Although there appears to be no direct link between the CCP’s united front system and the May 15 shooting in Laguna Woods, the demonizing rhetoric of the CCP propaganda system played a contributing role in this tragedy.

The main point: The tragic May 15 church shooting in Laguna Woods, California appears to be the work of a radicalized lone individual who was motivated by hatred of persons and organizations he perceived as advocates of Taiwan independence—in this instance, a Taiwanese-American Presbyterian Church congregation. The shooting does not appear to be directly linked to the suspect’s former membership in a pro-unification PRC front organization; however, the PRC’s escalating rhetoric against Taiwan likely played a contributing role in radicalizing this individual.

How Might US Policy Change in the Course of a Taiwan Crisis?

By: Michael Mazza

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“For God’s sake, this man cannot remain in power.” An unscripted remark, uttered by President Joseph Biden at the end of a major presidential speech in Poland, had observers wondering if the United States was about to embark on a major escalation of the war in Ukraine. Was an explicit policy of regime change in the offing? That concern turned out to be much ado about nothing, but American goals have nevertheless evolved since the start of the Russian invasion. This is natural: in war, political goals drive strategy and battlefield developments affect political aims, in a constant feedback loop.

Given an expectation that war aims will evolve over the course of a conflict, it is worth anticipating how they might do so ahead of time. As the war in Ukraine drives greater urgency in preparing for a Chinese attack on Taiwan, American planners should be grappling now with how Washington’s objectives in a potential Taiwan Strait crisis might change over time.

American Objectives in the Ukraine War

How and why have American political aims changed in the course of the Ukraine War? Initially, US goals were relatively modest. Expecting that the Russian military would steamroll Ukraine’s armed forces, the United States wanted to ensure that the invaded nation would become a quagmire for Russia—a resistance would wage a long-term fight for Ukrainian independence, denying Russia a more-or-less painless victory even if Moscow could claim triumph. Of course, Western expectations were wrong. Russian forces utterly failed to
make quick work of their Ukrainian counterparts, and the United States and its allies adjusted their sights in response.

Writing for *The Atlantic*, Eliot Cohen sums up how Western goals have changed thus far:

“From the point of view of Ukraine’s Western allies, objectives have also shifted. Originally their purpose was supporting a plucky but doomed Ukrainian conventional battle for survival and helping lay the groundwork for an insurgency that would make Russia pay a price for its aggression. When it became clear that Ukraine could bleed Russian forces dry and even defeat them, the goals subtly changed. As Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin recently said, the United States now aims to weaken Russia to the point that it is incapable of similar future aggression against Ukraine or any NATO states.”

Ukrainian battlefield successes enabled that shift. Essentially, the Ukrainians proved that Russia could be defanged, and the United States determined it would not only support that defanging but take steps to ensure Russia could not regenerate offensive capability any time soon.

**American Objectives in a Taiwan Strait Conflict**

As in Ukraine, the relative performance of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Taiwanese military—and, of course, of the United States armed forces and those of any others that might opt to intervene directly—will shape American goals. The way in which the PLA fights will likewise affect US objectives. Consider that Russian war crimes in Ukraine have likely further steeled Ukrainian resolve, and have had the unintended consequence of making Kiev less amenable to territorial concessions than it might otherwise have been.

There are numerous ways a cross-Strait conflict could play out—and thus, numerous paths along which American objectives might evolve. In the following paragraphs, I lay out some potential objectives, dividing them between limited, moderate, and ambitious goals. I will assume that China has launched an invasion of Taiwan proper, and that the United States has decided to militarily intervene at the outset.

**Limited Objectives**

Barring an utter disaster in a war’s early stages, the United States is likely to aim, at the very least, to ensure the survival of both its hub-and-spokes alliance network in Asia and of its forward defense perimeter. Were a conflict to leave the US military essentially pushed back to Guam, the United States would find itself arguably more vulnerable than at any time since 1941. Even as it might rely on allies to support its intervention, then, the United States is likely to place a premium on defending those allies against Chinese retaliation.

Of course, if the United States does opt to intervene, it will do so with the intention of ensuring Taiwan’s de facto independence. This is a *limited* goal because it asks little of China beyond halting its assault, and it need not entail broader changes to order in Asia. Achieving that goal, however, is likely to be costly. It may well entail intense naval and air combat and may require dislodging Chinese invaders from the island. A strategy to defend Taiwan and no more could still involve force-on-force encounters in a battlespace stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Sea of Japan and beyond.

It would not be surprising for that level of violence to spawn new objectives. As Cohen argues, “war is about passion and ideas no less than slices of territory. Ignoring the importance of those emotions, which are just as real as the more concrete purposes often discussed, would be a mistake.”

**Moderate Objectives**

There are a range of imaginable moderate objectives, which in turn may vary in their ambition. Moderate objectives are likely to entail a desire for changes to the regional security order that make that order more conducive to US interests and less conducive to China’s own. For example, if PLA outposts on disputed territory in the South China Sea play a role in the fighting and complicate American operations, the United States might seek not only to destroy those installations during the war but also to seek relinquishment of Chinese claims during peace talks.

The United States might similarly seek to diminish Chinese influence in the Pacific Islands and to secure the cancelation of any security agreements Beijing has in the region. That goal is likely to emerge if Chinese forces are able to operate out of the islands during a
conflict in ways that cause difficulties for the United States. An effort to push China out of the Pacific Islands could likewise arise due to allied pressure should Australia (and perhaps New Zealand) contribute to American efforts to defend Taiwan. Indeed, in a coalition contest, allies will get a vote on war aims. It is worth considering ahead of time how such aims might differ from America’s own—they may be more limited, but they might also be more ambitious.

Efforts to push China out of the Pacific Islands and the South China Sea would amount to efforts at rollback—returning Chinese influence and power projection capabilities in those regions to levels comparable to what they were in the early 21st century. But the United States might opt, in turn, to extend its own influence and power projection capabilities. Perhaps most likely, Washington could aim to secure a permanent military presence in Taiwan (if amenable to the Taiwanese people). More expansively, the United States might seek out new access arrangements and even permanent bases, and perhaps new allies, across the region. That would be far easier in the wake of naked Chinese aggression than it is now.

Most ambitiously—and perhaps “moderate” only relative to the potential goals outlined in the next section—Washington might seek to so weaken the PLA that reconstituting its combat power would require a years-long effort. Washington might likewise seek to so significantly hobble the Chinese economy that it would face stark “guns versus butter” choices. This would be akin to US goals vis-à-vis Russia now, and would likely require military operations that go far beyond those required to more narrowly defend Taiwan.

_Ambitious Objectives_

A war that is particularly vicious or that sees major American casualties, and in which American victory remains viable, could see a significant escalation of US war aims. The United States might direct efforts to weaken China—not only in terms of military or economic strength, but also in terms of China’s very unity. As Charles Horner and Eric Brown of the Hudson Institute have argued, Beijing already “finds itself engaged in an open-ended struggle on many fronts—against Xinjiang’s Muslims and Tibet’s Buddhists, against Chinese compatriots in China proper itself, against the citizens of Hong Kong and the nation on Taiwan, and against Chinese communities around the world.” If in the course of a war the United States finds it is able to successfully place pressure on the internal seams of the Chinese empire—such as those that run between Han China on the one hand, and Tibet and Xinjiang on the other, or between mainland China and Hong Kong—Washington might be tempted to see if it can rip those seams apart, leaving a still-very-large Chinese rump state with far more limited geographic and diplomatic reach. Washington might look to its own history of supporting Tibetan separatists during the Cold War for inspiration, but diplomatic and economic initiatives would likely also have a role to play.

Alternatively (or additionally), American leaders might conclude in the course of a war that China under current leadership is so dangerous that it cannot be allowed to continue running the show. Washington might employ covert means to effect a change at the top of the Chinese Communist Party hierarchy or could opt for forceful regime change.

Perhaps less ambitious, but with far-reaching consequences even so, the United States might aim to lead a wide-ranging group of countries to establish formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan in the wake of a Chinese invasion. As with the immediately preceding objectives, such an effort would arise from a conclusion in Washington and other capitals that there can be no going back to the status quo ante—that the world China’s invasion begets must be far different than the world China sought to forge. Even if not an initial goal, Washington would be wise to telegraph its potential adoption before and in the opening stages of a conflict. The limited goal of ensuring Taiwan’s _de facto_ independence outlined above will seem more acceptable to Beijing by comparison, and sharpen the risks for Beijing of persisting with efforts at forced unification.

_Conclusion_

The preceding discussion is not intended to be predictive. Importantly, it does not take into account how Beijing might react and adapt to shifting American objectives. Nor does it consider how nuclear escalation concerns would shape US goals—indeed, those concerns probably make the specified ambitious objectives fairly unlikely.
Even so, it is a useful exercise to think through how American ends might evolve over the course of a war. They are unlikely to remain static. Knowing this, American leaders should ensure that the United States has sufficient means to pursue a variety of potential political goals in what may be a drawn-out conflict, and that the United States can exercise flexibility in how those means are employed.

The main point: American goals might evolve in a number of ways over the course of a Taiwan Strait conflict. Initial, relatively limited goals are likely to include the preservation of the US alliance system in Asia and of Taiwan’s de facto independence; more ambitious goals might include regime change in China or worldwide establishment of diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

The History of the Taiwan Strait Centerline

The centerline splits the Taiwan Strait down the middle and for decades has been a generally accepted geographic boundary marker between Taipei and Beijing for the purposes of naval and aerial operations. The demarcation was first drawn by the United States in the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China (ROC). In that treaty, the US security guarantee extended to Taiwan proper as well as the Pescadores (Penghu), but excluded the outlying islands of Kinmen and Matsu. Additionally, the United States agreed to a buffer zone in the Taiwan Strait, within which US aircraft would not fly; the eastern boundary of that zone later became known as the centerline of the Taiwan Strait.

While the centerline created a buffer between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan, the Taiwan Strait is considered international waters. As such, Beijing has never been obligated to adhere to the US-created line. As Raul Pedrozo wrote for Lawfare in September 2020 after the Krach-related crossing, “China is [...] not legally prohibited from crossing the line. However, even though China does not officially recognize the existence of the de facto center line, there has been a tacit understanding on both sides of the strait to respect the unofficial boundary.” That tacit understanding lasted for decades mainly because Taipei—with the support of Washington—had military aviation superiority. It was not in Beijing’s interests at the time to cross the centerline, nor did the PRC have the capacity to pressure Taiwan via aerial incursions across the strait.

However, as the military balance began to shift in Beijing’s favor, the Taiwan Strait became fair game for escalation, signaling, and training purposes. The first reported centerline crossing by a Chinese military aircraft occurred in July 1999 in response to then-Presi-
dent Lee Teng-hui’s statement that relations between the PRC and Taiwan should be conducted “between two countries, at least special relations between two countries.” In 2004, Defense Minister Lee Jye (李傑) described Taiwan’s defense posture regarding the Taiwan Strait in stark terms: “Whenever their aircraft or vessels are approaching the middle line, our aircraft and vessels will be standing by [...] Once they keep going east and enter our ‘hunting zone,’ we will take care of them.”

The next crossing did not occur until 2011, in response to US military activity in the region. Following this, there was another long break before the next centerline crossing, which occurred in March 2019. In the years since, crossings have occurred more frequently, with two taking place in 2020: the first in response to a visit to Taiwan by then-Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar, followed by the aforementioned flights following the visit by Keith Krach. Before Krach’s visit, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin warned, “China will make a necessary response depending on how the situation develops.” Chinese government officials regularly connect large-scale incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ with a related “pro-Taiwan” event. Even though Beijing did not, and does not, acknowledge the existence of the centerline—because in Beijing’s view, the Taiwan Strait is only a body of water separating China from one of its provinces—it has generally respected the line as an important delineation point for the two militaries.

Yet, as the PRC military has grown stronger, centerline crossings have become more common, though they still remain rare. In this regard, Beijing perhaps acknowledges the stability of unofficially adhering to the line’s existence. Regularly conducting incursions over the centerline would provide Taipei a reason to do the same, and also potentially for the United States to venture across. Keeping the line in an unofficial state of limbo reduces the risk of escalation from both sides, and reduces the potential for an accident or accidental shootdown.

The Latest Centerline Crossing

After nearly two years of no centerline crossings, the WZ-10 attack helicopter broke the calm. It was the first time that a helicopter crossed the centerline, though it only crossed 0.5 nautical miles onto Taiwan’s side. Notably, it was likely not the recent update to the US State Department factsheet on US-Taiwan relations, which was updated on May 5, that led to the incursion.

The likely reason that the helicopter crossed the centerline was recent US naval activity in the Taiwan Strait. On May 10, the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Port Royal (CG 73) transited through the Taiwan Strait. According to a US 7th Fleet Public Affairs statement, “The Ship transited through a corridor in the Strait that is beyond the territorial sea of any coastal State. Port Royal’s transit through the Taiwan Strait demonstrates the United States’ commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. The United States military flies, sails, and operates anywhere international law allows.” According to S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Research Fellow Collin Koh, this is the first time that a Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser has made the transit since February 2020, when the USS Chancellorsville (CG 62) did so.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theater Command (ETC) released a statement condemning the US transit and acknowledging the actions that the PLA took in response: “The US has been frequently carrying out provocative acts to send wrong signals to the ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces, deliberately stoking tensions across the Taiwan Strait.” According to Senior Colonel Shi Yi, PLA ETC spokesperson, the PLA “tracked and monitored” the Port Royal. In addition to the US naval transit, the PLA had conducted live-fire drills in the region on May 6-8. A PLA statement on the drills said, “The naval, air and con-
ventional missile forces of the Chinese PLA Eastern Theater Command held drills in seas and airspace to the east and southwest of Taiwan Island from May 6 to 8, in a bid to test and improve the joint operations capability of multiple services and arms.” Notably, Chinese carrier Liaoning participated in the drills to the east of Taiwan. Given its proximity to Japan’s southern islands—several aircraft breached Japan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ)—the exercise caused Tokyo to scramble escort aircraft. Chinese military drills in this part of the region are meant to demonstrate and test Chinese capabilities during a potential invasion of Taiwan. These goals were especially clear during these recent exercises, which included several missile tests.

It is odd that the US transit would have triggered the first centerline crossing in almost two years. The US Navy has conducted on average one Taiwan Strait transit per month since President Joseph Biden assumed office in January 2021. As such, the Port Royal’s presence is nothing particularly new to prompt such a response from Beijing. A large drill in January 2021 between the US and Japanese navies resulted in 39 aircraft crossing into Taiwan’s southwestern ADIZ, where the PLA normally conducts these operations, without any centerline crossings. Centerline crossings, by contrast, are normally reserved for showing Beijing’s displeasure at trips by senior administration officials, such as those that occurred in August and September 2020. During the September 2020 crossing, the aircraft flew much longer distances along the centerline. The May 2022 centerline crossing is notable in that it happened, but nothing much beyond that. It does not appear to represent a move by Beijing to escalate its ADIZ operations.

While Beijing would never admit it, it is also possible that this crossing was an unintentional accident, and that the helicopter was supposed to turn around before breaching the centerline—especially since it crossed over to Taiwan’s side alone, without escorts by fighter aircraft. During the September 2020 incursion, it was only J-16, J-10, and J-11 fighter aircraft that crossed the centerline. A sole attack helicopter making the crossing is an odd choice. The long delay between the large-scale September 2020 incursion and the solo May 2022 crossing is also puzzling if Beijing hoped to signal its displeasure with the regularly scheduled US naval transit.

To add another layer of complexity to the May 10 crossing, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines testified before the US Senate Armed Services Committee on that same day to discuss the 2021 Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community. The assessment concluded that “Beijing will press Taiwan to move toward unification and will react to what it views as increased US–Taiwan engagement. We expect that friction will grow as China continues to increase military activity around the island, and Taiwan’s leaders resist Beijing’s pressure for progress toward unification.” Given the focus of Haines’ testimony on the threats of Russia and China, it was an even odder choice that May 10 would be the day that Beijing would purposefully send an aircraft across the centerline of the Taiwan Strait.

Whether intentional or not, the May 10 centerline crossing resets the clock until the next time that a Chinese aircraft does so. Perhaps the next breach will shed more light on Beijing’s behavior. Even though Beijing asserted that the sortie was conducted in response to a US naval operation, that rationale has proven to be quite perplexing given the serious nature of centerline crossings and the regularity of US naval transits through the Taiwan Strait. The response does not match the seemingly “offending” behavior.

The main point: The latest Taiwan Strait centerline crossing, carried out on May 10 by a solo Chinese WZ-10 attack helicopter, appears to represent an isolated incident rather than a major escalation by Beijing.

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An Interview with TAICCA on Taiwan’s Cultural and Creative Industries and the Future of Taiwan’s Soft Power

By: Adrienne Wu

Adrienne Wu is a research assistant at the Global Taiwan Institute and has a dual MA from Ritsumeikan University and Kyunghee University.

Over the past few decades, the idea of governments being able to take advantage of soft power—especially in regards to the ability of pop culture to showcase a
country’s culture and values to foreign audiences to attract other nations—has gained popularity. Soft power theorist Joseph S. Nye consistently refers to the role Hollywood plays in spreading American political and cultural values abroad, and more recently South Korea has been able to gain international visibility with K-pop and productions such as *Parasite* and *Squid Game*. Taipei has also been taking note of these successes and in 2019, the Taiwan government established the Taiwan Creative Content Agency (TAICCA, 文化內容策進院), a cultural intermediary intended to act as a link between the government and private industries to help nurture domestic creatives and to find ways to popularize them on a global scale. While soft power may not speak as loudly as hard power does, cultural and creative exports provide Taiwan additional ways of connecting with the global community. In the following interview, GTI asked TAICCA representatives about their role in branding Taiwan and the challenges that exist when exporting Taiwanese culture abroad.

**Adrienne Wu:** According to your website, TAICCA is a “professional intermediary organization that promotes the development of Taiwan’s content industries.” What is an “intermediary”?

**Zoe Wang, Director of Global Business Department:** Intermediary organizations are formed with the British arm’s length principle in mind. In other words, not only is the organization independent of the government, it also adheres to the principles of professionalism, independence and flexibility. It is impartial in allocating the government’s resources, and has greater flexibility in human resources, budgeting and operations due to its professional governance capacity.

**Wu:** What are the sectors included in Taiwan’s “content industries”? Could you provide a brief overview of your organization’s scope of activities and the guiding principles behind it?

**Wang:** Currently, TAICCA’s mandate includes ten major sectors: movies, TV shows, pop music, publications, animation, gaming, comics, fashion design, art, and immersive content. Through platforms like TAICCA School and TAICCA Accelerator that consider industry and international trends and offer talent training programs, TAICCA aims to provide access to shared resources while helping to secure funding and financing for cultural projects in Taiwan. Moreover, TAICCA encourages diverse cultural content, leveraging Taiwan’s advanced technologies to help our brands enter the international market while promoting Taiwan culture, and establishing Taiwan’s national brand in the international community. TAICCA also strives for promoting co-productions between Taiwanese and international partners.

**Wu:** TAICCA has been able to give Taiwanese productions international exposure through matching programs such as the Taiwan Creative Content Fest (TCCF, 創意內容大會) and Taiwan Pavilion. Could you introduce some of your flagship programs and explain the current focus of TAICCA?

**Wang:** TAICCA develops marketing strategies for Taiwan’s cultural content and helps Taiwan’s brands enter the international market, while continuously looking into potential market opportunities and promoting Taiwan’s intellectual property. This year, we officially signed an MOU with Festival Séries Mania, becoming their first Asian partner. We also went to France this March and took part in the Festival in Lille, to enhance Taiwan’s international networks and promote Taiwanese films and TV shows in the European market. Moreover, we also signed an MOU with Festival des 3 Continents/Produire au Sud for bilateral talent development.

We had Taiwanese producers participate in international training programs to receive guidance on developing their proposals, have the opportunity to secure venture capital, and attract international investment. In the Market section of our annual event, TCCF, we also have pitching sessions to help Taiwanese filmmakers connect with major international buyers.

**Wu:** What are some of the opportunities and challenges for TAICCA when hosting these events and attracting international investment?

**Wang:** Streaming services that have emerged in recent years give Taiwanese films and TV shows a better opportunity to enter the global market. The possibility for viewership on international platforms incentivizes local producers to create works that can resonate with international audiences, and the diverse topics and content of Taiwanese works gives producers a wide range of stories to develop.
However, for a number of different reasons, investments in the entertainment industry made by traditional Taiwanese businesses tend to be more limited, so Taiwanese content creators are more challenged than their counterparts in other Asian countries who can receive funding from their local conglomerates. Therefore, TAICCA needs to work to both encourage deployment of domestic resources for the cultural sector, but also to help local teams find ways to attract international funds.

**Wu:** Another one of TAICCA’s goals is to promote Taiwan’s national brand. What does TAICCA see as being Taiwan’s national brand?

**Wang:** TAICCA celebrates that Taiwan’s national brand continues to evolve and blossom out of our creators’ great reserve of creativity. Free and open, Taiwanese society allows its creators to delve into a variety of social issues highly relevant to the audience and enables creators to develop diverse stories.

**Wu:** Is this part of a larger cultural strategy by the government or is this independent of the government’s influence?

**Wang:** Both. It is a government strategy because when it comes to positioning the image of Taiwan’s brand and the general direction of the cultural content industry, the policies of the Taiwanese government have consistently focused on Taiwan’s freedom and openness, as well as the diversity of Taiwan’s content, while supporting the development of Taiwan’s cultural content in various ways. It is also a distinct approach that TAICCA adopts because TAICCA focuses more on the branding and commercialization of cultural content and assists the industry as a whole.

**Wu:** Does this relate to how TAICCA decides which industries to prioritize?

**Wang:** In terms of its strategies for developing the cultural industry, TAICCA does not favor any specific sector over the others. Instead, it continually assesses the development of each sector (including the market for each sector) (emphasis in original) and offers its assistance through different approaches, such as bridging together talent from different disciplines, providing training, promoting in global markets, or supporting development plans.

**Wu:** As a supervisor to TAICCA, to what extent is the Ministry of Culture (MOC, 文化部) involved in TAICCA’s activities and decisions?

**Wang:** The MOC is the head of Taiwan’s cultural affairs, and TAICCA is mostly funded by it. Both the MOC and TAICCA aim to promote Taiwan’s cultural content, but the two organizations adopt different approaches. While the MOC focuses on creating cultural policies, TAICCA connects with industry directly to help promote the wellbeing of the cultural industry as a whole.

**Wu:** Has the successes of Japanese and South Korean pop culture abroad affected TAICCA’s approach to entering the US market?

**Wang:** The success of Japanese and Korean pop culture has been a game changer for Asian works in the global market, including the US. The success of *Drive My Car*, *Parasite*, and the Korean series *Squid Game* shows the growing popularity of foreign-language films and TV shows in the US market (subtitles should no longer be considered an obstacle) and highlights the influence of global streaming platforms (not to mention the possibilities they offer). The fact that films and shows from other Asian markets have been able to cross over to global markets confirms that there is indeed an appetite for local/regional content in the US market, and that barriers to entry continue to come down.

Therefore, TAICCA has continued to both identify resources and build relationships all around the world in order to help local creators better connect with potential partners, platforms, and audiences in the US. For example, TAICCA has entered into MOUs with global players like Netflix, CJ Entertainment, and HBO Asia in an effort to help strengthen the ties between local creators and international teams.

**Wu:** To what extent is TAICCA based on the Korea Creative Content Agency (KOCCA)? Could you elaborate on some similarities or differences?

Both TAICCA and KOCCA are arts and culture intermediary organizations aiming to promote domestic cultural and creative industries. KOCCA and its success since its establishment should be important reference points for any organization with similar objectives (i.e., to promote local content and culture). However, there are still differences between TAICCA and KOCCA in
terms of focus and organizational structure. For example, South Korea has set up specialized organizations for each sector, whereas TAICCA is responsible for all sectors in the arts and cultural industry in Taiwan.

**Wu:** What are the commonalities and differences between Taiwan’s creative industries with that of its regional competitors?

**Wang:** Films and TV shows from Taiwan have tended to explore themes and subject matters that are relatively similar to content from Japan and South Korea. Taiwan’s society is diverse and open, which allows for a wider range of creative themes, and creators have more room to play by nature. Social issues such as martial law and same-sex marriage are themes that are often seen in Taiwanese works.

In terms of industrial scale, unlike China, Japan, and South Korea, where large enterprises invest heavily in the cultural industry, Taiwanese content creators receive less support from businesses in Taiwan outside of the entertainment industry. Moreover, Taiwan’s domestic market is small compared to neighboring countries such as China, Japan, and South Korea, and Taiwan’s cultural consumption power is not as strong as theirs. These, together, highlight the importance for Taiwanese creators to explore global opportunities and partnerships.

**Wu:** What are the biggest challenges to the development and promotion of Taiwan’s creative industries?

**Wang:** As Taiwan filmmakers and production teams have traditionally focused on local and Chinese-speaking markets, which may have different tastes from global audiences, they may face some barriers (e.g., cultural) when promoting their materials on the international market, and therefore there is a need to invest a significant amount of resources in developing content (and effectively translating the works) for foreign audiences. The long-term goal would be to build an internationally recognizable brand for Taiwanese content so that the international market gains greater familiarity with Taiwanese films and series—in effect, to create a virtuous cycle of success allowing for increased output of Taiwanese content that is accessible to global audiences.

**Wu:** What can US companies and policymakers do to help?

**Wang:** Come learn more about Taiwan! If teams from the US enter into joint ventures with or invest in Taiwanese creators, these collaborations can help create more opportunities for international distribution of Taiwanese content and increase the visibility of Taiwanese works in the US market. On a policymaking level, mechanisms to help encourage and incentivize joint ventures, investments (e.g., in the form of tax reductions, rebates, or credits), or even exchange (e.g., cultural, knowledge) could be monumentally helpful to help introduce Taiwan to the US market. So we at TAICCA welcome any inquiries and are open to establishing and creating dialogue with both US companies and policymakers, and in fact we have international advisors in-house to help facilitate such discussions.

**Wu:** Is there anything else that you feel is important to understand about TAICCA? What, if any, are your activities in the US and are there ways for people to become involved?

**Wang:** TAICCA is here to help. Our goal is to support local content creators, and we continue to be open to exploring different avenues in the US to help create more and more opportunities for our creators and their content, whether it’s by extending our reach on the ground in the US by participating in events and sharing more about Taiwan, or it’s forging new connections with partners to help our creators stateside. Again, we encourage people who are interested to become involved to learn more about Taiwan and TAICCA. Global streaming platforms have already helped to bridge the gap by making Taiwanese works accessible to audiences in the US, where our films, shows and music currently are already available.

As for friends in the industry, Taiwan Pavilion, Books From Taiwan and Taiwan Comic City, all set up by TAICCA, are good online platforms allowing people from all over the world to connect with Taiwanese creators. At the same time, we’d also like to invite American producers to join us at TCCF, scheduled to take place in both in-person and online events this coming November. We welcome industry friends to find more information on our TAICCA website or email us at service@taicca.tw for inquiries.