Surveying the Taiwanese Psychology on Self-Defense and Self-Determination

Austin Horng-En Wang
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Introduction

In the 2016 Taiwan National Security Survey (hereafter TNSS) conducted by Duke University and National Chengchi University in Taiwan, 60.4% of Taiwanese respondents believed that “the majority of Taiwanese people will fight against China if China invaded Taiwan.” However, only 27.1% of the respondents said that he/she would join the fight (if). As the military power of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to rise, the TNSS survey result raises serious questions about the psyche of Taiwanese people towards these existential issues. First, why is the number of Taiwanese people willing to fight so low? Second, if we can figure out the factors driving the level of self-determination and self-defense, under what condition could the Taiwan government possibly enhance them?

Literatures in behavioral economy and social psychology suggest that a person’s decision-making and behavior are not independent of one another. Rather, people’s decisions rely on their perception of others and their own previous experiences. In the case of a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, cohesion among Taiwanese people would surely play a critical role in a war. The level of cohesion is a function of people’s perceptions of others as well as one’s own worldview based on group identity. Meanwhile, military training also presumably helps one to better calculate the chance of winning in the war. In short, this project experimentally examined three factors shaping the willingness to fight: (1) Perceived Collective Action, (2) US-Taiwan-China Interaction, and (3) Military Service Experience.

In addition to examining the factors that contribute to people’s willingness to fight, this research project also explores the Taiwanese people’s perceptions of one of the most important yet controversial “keywords” in the Taiwan-China relationship—the so-called “1992 Consensus.” Previous polls in Taiwan suggest that the “1992 Consensus” was supported by the majority of Taiwanese people. However, recent studies show that many voters in fact misunderstood the content of key political issues.

Given the perceived importance of the “1992 Consensus,” this study also explores what Taiwanese people think is the “1992 Consensus.”

With the help of Pollcracylab, an online academic platform at National Chengchi University, a large-scale survey experiment was conducted on July 6-9, 2018. The experiment recruited 1,001 Taiwanese samples with the diverse and representative background.

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1 The 2016 TNSS was conducted in Nov. 18-22, 2016 (n=1069). Data are available at https://sites.duke.edu/pass/
3 e.g. Lupia, A. (2016). Uninformed: Why people know so little about politics and what we can do about it. Oxford University Press.
The survey results support the three hypotheses:

1. **You fight, I fight**

First, whether Taiwanese people perceived “others will fight” strongly influence his or her own willingness to fight. In the control group, about 50.4% of Taiwanese people are willing to fight if China decided to invade Taiwan. Yet when the subjects read a follow on sentence saying that “According to a new survey … 82% of Taiwanese are willing to fight,” then their willingness to fight increased to 60.4%. Yet when the subjects read a follow on sentence saying that “According to a new survey … 18% of Taiwanese are willing to fight,” then their willingness to fight dropped to 40.6%.

2. **Importance of Democratic Coalition**

Second, a declaration of Taiwan independence does not appear to decrease Taiwanese people’s willingness to fight (resist chinese coercion). Rather, whether the United States will help plays a key role in the Taiwanese people’s willingness to fight. Our subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four groups and then were asked their willingness to defend the invasion (from 0 to 10): (1) China attacks because Taiwan declared Independence, and the United States helps Taiwan (2) Taiwan Independence, and the United States won’t help (3) China attacks even Taiwan maintained status quo, and the United States helps Taiwan (4) Status quo and the United States won’t help.

The results show that whether China attack was because of Taiwan independence or not (meaning the cause) did not influence Taiwanese people’s willingness to fight; there is no difference between group 2 (mean = 4.14) and group 4 (mean = 3.93). In contrast, whether the United States will help strongly increase Taiwanese willingness to fight; there is a statistical difference between group 3 (mean = 4.821) and group 4 (mean = 3.93). In the end, the combination of Taiwan Independence and United States help will create the highest willingness to defend against China’s invasion (group 1, mean = 4.841).

3. **Military Training Matters**

There is a robust and positive correlation between Taiwanese men’s military service experience and their willingness to fight.

There is significant difference in views between the people who served in the various branches and their willingness to fight. On average, those who served in the Army before and those who did not serve in the military are the least willing to fight against China’s invasion. Among those who had served in the military in our...
dataset (490 men), 62.4% agreed “the training they received is useful when facing the enemy in real conflicts,” while 35.3% disagreed. After controlling other covariates through a regression model, a person who considered the military training they received useful can increase his willingness to fight from 3 to 6 on a 0-10 scale (from very useless to very useful). Moreover, the effect is even stronger when the United States will help Taiwan. When Taiwanese men received useful military training, they are much willing to fight against China when the United States helps. But if they considered their military training useless, the help from the United States will instead decrease Taiwanese willing to fight.

4. Additional Finding: 
Non-consensus on the “1992 Consensus”

Apart from the aforementioned three major findings in the survey experiment, to the survey also investigated another research question in the US-China-Taiwan relationship, the so-called “1992 Consensus.” Previous polls from several institutions suggest that the majority of Taiwanese people supported the “1992 Consensus,” but did Taiwanese people really understand the meaning of it? This survey results project shows that most did not.

The survey polled 1,001 Taiwanese respondents the following question:

"Which definition below is closer to your understanding of the 1992 consensus?
( a ) On international affair, both ROC and PRC claim to represent the whole Chinese people including both mainland and Taiwan.
( b ) ROC represents Taiwan, PRC represents the mainland, the two governments belong to the same country waiting for unification.
( c ) ROC represents Taiwan, PRC represents the mainland, the two governments belong to two different countries.
( d ) PRC represents the whole Chinese people including both mainland and Taiwan, and ROC is the local government.

Result shows that 17% chose (a), 34% chose (b), 33% chose (c), and 5% chose (d) (and 11% chose none-of-the-above or left no answer). The distribution suggests that Taiwanese people did not understand the meaning of the 1992 Consensus – one-third of Taiwanese believed that the 1992 Consensus means “two countries”!
There is no consensus among Taiwanese on the definition of the 1992 Consensus.

Things become more interesting when the survey asked Taiwanese respondents “whether they will support the government to accept the 1992 consensus” if the definition is (a), (b), (c), or (d), respectively. It turns out that 40.0% will support if the definition is (a), 48.5% will support (b), 75.0% will support (c), and 10.1% will support (d). The only definition that received the overwhelming support among Taiwanese is (c)—the one that defines ROC and PRC as two different countries.

The result challenges the presumptions of previous surveys on the popularity of the “1992 consensus.” It could be likely that many Taiwanese people supported the policy merely because they misunderstood the consensus meant “two countries.” This misunderstanding would instead cause backfire and instability in the cross-strait relationship if the 1992 consensus was accepted and turns out to deviate from people’s belief as “One Country, Two Systems” has in Hong Kong.
People’s willingness to defend against foreign military intervention can usually be characterized as a collective action problem. If everyone worked together and fought, the strength of the defense and presumably the odds of success will likely increase. Yet, individuals have the incentive to betray their fellow citizens and seek personal security and prosperity over the collective whole.

In such a classic dilemma of collective action, political theorists offer two possible solutions. The first is a signal of collective action. (H1-1) If an individual receives the signal that others will fight, then he or she will also be more likely to fight, and vice versa. The second solution is with temporal discounting. Temporal discounting refers to how people discount the payoff that will happen in the long run, compared with the same event that happens immediately. (H1-2) If people consider the war as well as their life as a multiple-shot game instead of a one-shot game, they will see the long-term benefit after winning the war; as a result, they are much likely to work together to defend against an invasion.

**1. Experimental Design**

To test the two mechanisms, a two-way survey experiment was designed in the questionnaire.

On Q10, one-third of the subjects did not receive any treatment as the control group. One-third of the subjects were asked to describe what they will be doing after ten years, a classic treatment to make people far-sighted. The other one-third of the subjects were asked whether they could list ten reasons that the current self will be different from future self. It is another classic treatment in behavioral economics that manipulates people’s level of temporal discounting. The treatments have been proved effective on undergraduate students in the United States.

After the treatments of temporal discounting, all 1001 subjects were randomly assigned to answer one of the three questions below:

11. Even though we did not want another war, but we would like to ask you the following question: If China decides to invade Taiwan by military force, will you resist?
   ○ I will choose to resist
   ○ I will not resist

11. According to a newly published academic survey, when being asked the question “If China decides to invade Taiwan by military force, will you resist?” About 82% of Taiwanese respondents will say “Yes.”

Even though we did not want another war, but we would like to ask you the following question: If China just decides to invade Taiwan by military force, will you resist?
   ○ I will choose to resist
   ○ I will not resist

11. According to a newly published academic survey, when being asked the question “If China just decides to invade Taiwan by military force, will you resist?” About 18% of Taiwanese respondents will say “Yes.”

Even though we did not want another war, but we would like to ask you the following question: If China just decides to invade Taiwan by military force, will you resist?
   ○ I will choose to resist
   ○ I will not resist

Clearly, the major difference between the three versions of Q11 is the information about others’ behavior. Q11a provides no information on how other Taiwanese will behave, Q11b im-
plies that most Taiwanese people will fight, and Q11c indicates that most Taiwanese people will not fight.

There are two major reasons for designing two treatments and one control group. First, if the theory of collective action can apply to the case of China’s invasion, we should expect the treatments can strongly influence Taiwanese people’s willingness to fight. Furthermore, by comparing the two treatments and the control group, we can observe what people usually believe when there is no additional information. That is, if the respondents in the control group behave similarly to those in the 18% group, we can tell that 18% is what Taiwanese people generally believed without additional information. The same logic applies to the comparison of the 82% group and the control group.

2. Analysis

First, Q12 and Q13 were used to examine the effectiveness of the temporal discounting treatment. Unfortunately, the treatments I used to manipulate people’s level of temporal discounting failed to effectively influence the participants I recruited. Therefore, we cannot establish a causal relationship on how people’s discounting factor may influence their willingness to fight. Nevertheless, we can still use people’s response on the Q12 and Q13 to measure their general level of patience. That is, we can still explore whether patient people are much likely to fight or not.

ANOVA test reveals that there is no difference in the assignment of Q11, the perception of others. There were no difference in aspect of people’s gender (p=0.858), age (p=0.185), education (p=0.434), partisanship (p=0.42), and news consumption (p=0.07).

All subjects’ response on Q11 were recoded to be “Willing to fight=1” or not (=0). Among the three groups in Q11, 47.4% chose to fight in the control group (did not receive any information), 58.4% chose to fight in the 82% group, and 43.7% chose to fight in the 18% group. T-test reveals a significant difference between every two groups. The descriptive analysis provides the direct evidence that manipulating perception of collective action can strongly influence Taiwanese people’s willingness to fight against China’s invasion.

To mitigate the problem of randomization and clarify the impact of treatments, multivariate logit regression and simulation are used. In the regression model, I try to control all possible covariates from the available data, including the respondents’ partisanship, father’s ethnicity (Mainlander = 1), level

“The public opinion in Taiwan on ‘1992 consensus’ is malleable depending on how Taiwanese people perceive and interpret the term.
of patience, gender, age, level of education, and level of income. The analysis was done by R 3.1.2. The result of the logit regression model is shown below.

In the regression analysis, OtherT1 and OtherT2 are the two treatments of the respondents’ perception of others’ action. It is clear that both treatments are effective in the expected directions. Among the covariates, pan-green supporters are much likely to fight against China compared to the non-partisans and pan-blue supporters. Besides, male and old people are also much willing to fight.

After the regression analysis, simulation is used to estimate the average effect of the two treatments. That is, the variance-covariance matrix estimated from the logit model is used, and all variables except for the two treatments are assumed to be the median values. After five hundred times of simulation on the matrix, we can capture the distribution of the two key treatments controlling for other covariates at their median. The distribution is shown below, in which the errorbars are indicating 95% confidence intervals. T-test reveals that there is a significant difference between the control group and both treatment groups (p<0.01 in all comparisons).

In the figure, it is clear that the control group (no other info) locates between the two treatment groups. This location suggests that Taiwanese people had a default belief that there will be between 18% to 82% of Taiwanese people that will fight in the Taiwan-China conflict. At the same time, the survey experiment also confirms the effect of propaganda and mobilization – the Taiwanese government can enhance the chance of winning by persuading the people on collective action, while the Chinese government may lower Taiwanese’s morale by spreading the false information that no Taiwanese will fight.
Project 2: US-Taiwan-China Interaction

In Project 1, the study found that Taiwanese people will estimate the chance of winning by taking others’ action into account. Since this is the case, how Taiwan’s most important security partner the United States acts would undoubtedly influence the Taiwanese people’s willingness to defend against an invasion by China.

The US government continues to maintain its “One China Policy” and also an approach of “strategic ambiguity” such that the United States has neither committed to defend Taiwan nor expressed its intention not to come to Taiwan’s defense. In the past, it is widely believed that this strategic ambiguity helped maintain the stability of the Taiwan Strait. If the United States promised to help Taiwan in the Taiwan-China conflict, we could reasonably hypothesize that (H2-1) the help from the United States will increase Taiwanese people’s willingness to fight against China.

Additionally, how people attribute the cause of war may influence their willingness to fight. In the case of Taiwan-China-US interaction, whether Taiwan announced independence before China’s invasion may influence Taiwanese people’s willingness to defend the invasion or not. Given that many Taiwanese people still prefer the “status quo,” the second hypothesis (H2-2) is that if Taiwan declared independence that caused China to attack Taiwan, Taiwanese people are less willing to fight.

Interestingly, no study thus far has ever experimentally examined these two factors. That is why this second experiment was included in this project.

1. Experimental Design

After all, subjects passed the first experiment, they were all asked a series of questions related to the 1992 consensus (which will be discussed in Project 4). After that, they were randomly assigned again on Q24. In Q24, there were four different scenarios:

- Q24a. Taiwan declared independence, China attacked Taiwan, and the US helped Taiwan.
- Q24b. Taiwan kept the status quo, China attacked Taiwan, and the US helped Taiwan.
- Q24c. Taiwan declared independence, China attacked Taiwan, and the US won’t help Taiwan.
- Q24d. Taiwan kept the status quo, China attacked Taiwan, and the US won’t help Taiwan.

When the subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four scenarios, they were asked to estimate their level of willingness to fight against China (from 0 to 10).

2. Analysis

First of all, ANOVA analysis shows that there is no significant difference among the participants in each experimental group in the aspect of their gender (p=0.891), age (p=0.072), education (p=0.367), income (p=0.72), and news consumption (p=0.53). Fortunately, the experiment in project 2 passed the randomization check.

Descriptive analysis of the four groups shows that the mean values are 4.76 in TW_ind+US_help, 4.75 in TW_sq+US_help, 4.09 in TW_ind+US_no, and 3.94 in TW_sq+US_no. There are significant differences between the first two and the last two groups. This analysis provides direct evidence on the impact of the US’s endorsement on Taiwan. At the same time, this
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Evidence also questions the negative impact of Taiwan as the first mover, since the factor has no impact on the difference between group 1 and 2, and between 3 and 4. To further control the covariates, the regression model is used again. In the regression model, I control all possible covariates from the available data, including the respondents’ partisanship, father’s ethnicity, level of patience, gender, age, level of education, and level of income. Basically, the covariates are the same as in Project 1. The analysis was done by R 3.1.2. The result of the regression model is shown below.

```r
Call:
  lm(formula = tri ~ treat_ind + treat_us + BLUE + GREEN + shengi + patience + SEX + AGE + EDU + income, data = project1[project1$attention == 1, ])

Residuals:
     Min      1q  Median      3q     Max
-6.7252 -3.2477  0.1007  3.1973  7.7317

Coefficients:
             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)  6.0406537    1.1267642  5.351  1.06e-07 ***
treat_ind   -0.0002283    0.2431961  0.004    0.996980
 treat_us    0.7728401    0.2438905  3.160    0.001584 **
 BLUE        -0.2253181    0.3990652 -0.564    0.572894
 GREEN       -1.1527722    0.3883623 -2.949    0.003274 **
 shengi       1.7567442    1.2221314 -1.437    0.150953
 patience    -0.0871128    0.4932213 -0.179    0.858807
 SEX         -0.8209011    0.2473126 -3.382    0.000836 ***
 AGE          0.2414888    0.3105579  0.785    0.438514
 EDU         -0.1973641    0.2778942 -0.709    0.479196
 income      -0.1288925    0.2248443 -0.573    0.567622

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Signif. codes:  < 0.001 ***  0.01 **  0.05 *  0.1 . 1

Residual standard error: 3.603 on 866 degrees of freedom
(13 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared:  0.06989,  Adjusted R-squared:  0.05915
F-statistic: 6.507 on 10 and 866 DF,  p-value: 9.624e-10
```

There are several important findings in the regression table. First of all, the treatment “treat_ind” is insignificant. It indicates that declaring independence by the Taiwanese government plays no role in Taiwanese people’s willingness to fight. Second, the treatment “treat_us” is very significant, and the estimated value is high (0.77). This partial coefficient suggests that the US assurance to defend Taiwan can, on average increase 0.77 of Taiwanese people’s willingness to fight along the 0 to 10 scale. The regression model provides convincing evidence on the impact of the US assurance.

Among the covariates, we find the same distribution as was found in Project 1. On average, pan-green supporters are much likely to fight against China, compared with pan-blue supporters and non-partisans. Besides, males and old people are much willing to fight.

In the end, the same simulation method is used to estimate the net effect of both treatments. After controlling all other covariates at their median values, the figure below reveals that the US_help treatment can effectively increase Taiwanese people’s willingness to fight against China’s invasion. At the same time, whether the war can be attributed to Taiwan’s declaration of independence plays no role in the morale of Taiwanese people.

Furthermore, we can found that the group with the highest willingness to fight is the first group – Taiwan declared independence. First, China attacked Taiwan, and the US helped Taiwan (4.841). In contrast, the group with the lowest fight will is that Taiwan kept the status quo and the US will not help Taiwan (3.932).
Project 3: Experience in Military Training

Project 1 focuses on people’s perception of others and Project 2 focuses on foreign policy. In Project 3, the survey turned to the respondents themselves: namely, whether the military training they received significantly factored into their calculation on the cost of war and their willingness to fight. This question is especially important since both the current Tsai Ing-wen administration and the former Ma Ying-jeou administration pushed for military reform and the reduction of mandatory military training.

However, we did not build in any strong assumption on the relationship between military training and people’s willingness to fight. Since people’s experience is something that cannot be manipulated, we did not use an experimental design to confirm the causal relationship. Rather, since assignment to the military branch is nearly random in Taiwan—they could be randomly assigned to a different branch if they did not volunteer—the study exploited this semi-natural experiment and explored the long-term relationship between the experience of military training, people’s feeling towards the training and their willingness to fight.

1. Questionnaire Design

On Q26, all 1,001 subjects were asked if they have ever served in the military, and if yes, what kind of military service did they serve. Among the subjects, 47.4% had no experience on military training, 42.8% had compulsory training, and 5.6% volunteered. Unfortunately, the percentage of volunteer in the dataset is much higher than the real value, which is about 0.91%. So any inference drawn from the relationship in this section should be conservative.

For those who answered yes in Q26, they were then asked about their branch (Q27), an age when serving (Q28), perceived usefulness of military training when faced the real enemy (Q29), and feeling on dealing with a supervisor in the military (Q30). For those who have never served in the military, they were also asked about what they know about the military service (Q31–Q35).

2. Analysis

On Q27, 67.3% of respondents who had served in the military served in the Army, 5.5% in Navy, 10.4% in the Airforce, 8% in Military Police, and 5.7% in Marine. According to the government’s document, there are about 72% in the Army, 9% Navy, 9% Marine, and 10% in the Airforce. The two distributions are similar so the percentage in this dataset is representative of the real distribution.

On Q29, 20% of respondents said that the military training they received “help a lot” with dealing with the enemy, 42.4% said “help to some extent,” 22.9% said “did not help to some extent,” and 12.4% said, “not helpful at all.” Generally speaking, 62.4% of soldiers believed that military training is useful.

It is quite interesting to compare this distribution to Q31 (what others have heard about the military training). On Q31, about 65.4% said that they had heard the useless of military training. There is a gap between who had been trained and who had not. On the figure below, I further compared soldiers’ experience in dif-
different branches. Generally speaking, there is no significant difference in their experience of military training, but those who served in Military Police and Army had a better experience on average.

Would their military training influence their willingness to fight? To test this hypothesis, the analysis uses the regression model in Project 2 and controls for all other covariates as well as the two treatments (TW_ind and US_help). I then use simulation to estimate the net effect of serving in a different branch. The result is shown below. Interestingly, there is no significant difference on the branch they served, even though serving in the Army has the lowest willingness to fight against China but the value is still higher than those who have never served in the military.

Moreover, I found an interesting interaction effect between the military training and the effect of the US_help treatment. Interaction effect refers to whether two variables will influence the dependent variable together. In the case of this project, interaction effect means that for those who received better military training, they are much likely to calculate the chance of winning the war, and they are better interpreting how much help that the United States can provide. Therefore, I hypothesize that the information of aid from the United States could influence those who received better military training on their willingness to fight.

The regression analysis shows that the interaction effect is significant—controlling for all other covariates. In the regression results shown below, there are several important findings. First, experience in the military training (the learning variable) has a positive and clear effect on the willingness to fight against China. Therefore, enhancing the quality of military training is crucial to increase the morale of Taiwanese soldiers. As an aside, pan-green supporters and old people are still more likely to fight.

Third, the interaction between US_help and learning is also significantly positive. The result here provides empirical support to the interactive hypothesis: the information of aid from the United States could influence those who received better military training on their
willingness to fight more than those who did not receive better military training. To better illustrate the interaction effect, I use the simulation method again and the result is shown below. After controlling other covariates through a regression model, a guy who perceived the usefulness of military can increase his willingness to fight from 3 to 6 on a 0-10 scale (from very useless to very useful). Moreover, the effect is even stronger when they think the United States will help Taiwan. When Taiwanese men received what they saw as “useful” military training, they are more willing to fight against China when they think the US will help. But if they received what they saw as “useless” training, help from the United States will even decrease the percentage of Taiwanese willing to fight.
The so-called “1992 consensus” is believed to be a critical factor in the stability of the cross-strait relationship. Since the Tsai Ing-wen from the Democratic Progressive Party won the presidency and refused to openly accept the “1992 consensus,” the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cut all senior official channels of communication between China and Taiwan. When Chinese people boycotted 85C, a popular café chain from Taiwan, because of its welcome to Tsai during the president’s visit to the United States, the CEO of 85C pleaded to Chinese consumers by announcing the company’s support for the 1992 consensus. The PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office repeatedly announced that accepting the “1992 consensus” is the key for starting any official contact between China and Taiwan. Some researchers and some think tanks in the United States had called Tsai for accepting the 1992 consensus, citing that the 1992 consensus was supported by the majority of Taiwanese in the polls. However, do Taiwanese people support the “1992 consensus”? Considering the internal validity of this question, we must step backward and ask a much basic question: do Taiwanese people understand what the 1992 consensus really is?

“The Taiwanese government can enhance the chance of winning by persuading the people on collective action, while the Chinese government may lower Taiwanese’s morale by spreading the false information that no Taiwanese will fight.”

This question is meaningful in several aspects. Actually, the definition and interpretation of the term “1992 consensus” had been changing since it was created. During the CCP’s 19th Party Congress on November 2017, CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping mentioned the “1992 consensus” four times, arguing both the mainland and Taiwan belong to the “One China,” which aim at the ultimate unification followed by “one country, two system.” Xi’s interpretation, considering the Taiwan government as a local one, is clearly different from KMT’s claim that “both the mainland and Taiwan belong to the one China.”

The Taiwan and China governments are in conflicted on the issue of representation derived from the “1992 consensus.” From the decision of the United Nations to the debate in WHO and WTO, the Chinese government argued that its “One China Principle” indicated that CPP could represent the people in both Taiwan and the mainland. Meanwhile, without using the name Taiwan or Republic of China, the Taiwan government always tried to join the international organization and only represent the residents of the islands within its jurisdiction.

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Given its complexity, it is very likely that ordinary citizens did not understand the meaning of the “1992 consensus” at first, thereby foregrounding the reliability of its popularity.

1. Questionnaire Design

On Q19, we asked the Taiwanese respondents “which definition below is closer to your understanding of the 1992 consensus?”

(a) On international affair, both ROC and PRC claim to represent the whole Chinese people including both mainland and Taiwan.
(b) ROC represents Taiwan, PRC represents the mainland, the two governments belong to the same country waiting for unification.
(c) ROC represents Taiwan, PRC represents the mainland, the two governments belong to two different countries.
(d) PRC represents the whole Chinese people including both mainland and Taiwan, and ROC is the local government.

Among the four definitions, (d) is closer to Xi’s speech in the 19th Party Congress, (b) is KMT’s claim, (a) was closer to the competition of the one China before 1992, while (c) is simply wrong because the 1992 consensus never contains the idea of “two countries.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Both ROC and PRC government respectively claims that it represents the whole China.</td>
<td>166 (16.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROC represents Taiwan, PRC represents the mainland, the two governments belong to the same country waiting for unification.</td>
<td>341 (34.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROC represents Taiwan, PRC represents the Mainland. Two governments belong to two different countries.</td>
<td>334 (33.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC represents the whole China, and ROC is the local government under PRC.</td>
<td>49 (4.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of the above/Do not answer</td>
<td>111 (11.1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table. How Taiwanese defined the ‘1992 Consensus’

2. Analysis

Here are the poll results: 17% chose (a), 34% for (b), 33% for (c), and 5% for (d) (and 11% chose none-of-the-above or left no answer.

First of all, it is surprising that one-third (c, 33%) of Taiwanese people believed that the “1992 consensus” means two countries. Meanwhile, only 5% (d) of Taiwanese people have the same understanding of 1992 consensus as CCP General Secretary Xi. Even though half of the Taiwanese people correctly perceived that “One China” was the core of the “1992 consensus,” they are uncertain about whether ROC and PRC are representing the whole China (a, 17%) or not (b, 34%) nowadays. Since no option received more than 50% of support, the distribution clearly reveals a truth: Taiwanese people have no consensus over what the “1992 consensus” really means. Things become much more interesting when we asked Taiwanese respondents “whether they will support the government to accept the 1992 consensus” if the definition is (a), (b), (c), or (d), respectively. It turns out that 40.0% will support if the definition is (a), 48.5% will support for (b), 75.0% will support for (c), and 10.1% will support for (d). The only definition that received the overwhelming support among Taiwanese is (c):the one that considers ROC and PRC as two different countries.

When the “1992 consensus” was gradually limited and reshaped by Xi, who defined ROC as a local government like in (d), it also loses support among Taiwanese people. For example, during the 2015 Xi-Ma meeting which both Ma and Xi failed to mention “with different interpretation,” which KMT had insisted for years, KMT soon lost the support of independents and moderate KMT supporters.

The survey provides important policy implication to the current cross-strait relationship. If China and the Unit-
ed States wanted the Taiwan government to openly accept the “1992 consensus,” they should at first loosen, rather than constrain, the definition of this magic word. As can be seen in the second part of our survey, the public opinion in Taiwan on “1992 consensus” is malleable depending on how Taiwanese people perceive and interpret the term.

Besides, the result questions previous surveys on the popularity of the “1992 consensus.” It could be likely that many Taiwanese people supported the policy before merely because they misunderstood the consensus as a leeway to “two countries.” This misunderstanding would instead cause backfire and instability of the cross-strait relationship once the “1992 consensus” was accepted and turns out to deviate from their belief. In other words, future work on asking people’s support of the “1992 consensus” should clarify the definition at least for the internal validity and overall reliability.