

Meeting between the Directors of the FBI and Taiwan's MJIB Highlights Growing Law Enforcement Exchanges

Russell Hsiao

The Promotion of Wang Huning and the Prospects for an Increasingly Ideological CCP Taiwan Policy

John Dotson

Taiwan's Continued Fight Against Human Trafficking and Next Steps

Jennifer Hong

Challenges and Opportunities for the "Chip 4" Group

Erik M. Jacobs

UK's Approach to Taiwan and China Remains Stable Amid Political Turmoil

Marshall Reid

Meeting between the Directors of the FBI and Taiwan's MJIB Highlights Growing Law Enforcement Exchanges

By: Russell Hsiao

Russell Hsiao is the executive director of the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) and editor-in-chief of the Global Taiwan Brief.

On October 24, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) posted online a picture of Director Christopher Wray shaking hands with Wang Chun-Li (王俊力), the director-general of Taiwan's Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau (MJIB, 法務部調查局). Typically, a photograph of two senior law enforcement officials would not warrant much attention, but the meeting was more than a mere photo-op between the heads of the United States' and Taiwan's law enforcement and domestic intelligence agencies. The meeting was notable because it was reportedly only the [second publicly known meeting](#) between the heads of the two domestic intelligence agencies—and it underscored the growing law enforcement and counter-intelligence exchanges between the United States and Taiwan in recent years, amid growing concerns about the People's Republic of China (PRC) [malign influence operations](#).

Reportedly arranged by the US side, Director Wray and Director-General Wang held a one-hour "[high-level meeting](#)" on October 16 at the FBI Dallas Division Office on the side of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) conference held from October 15 to 18. According to the [readout of the meeting issued by MJIB](#) on October 26, the two sides had in an in-depth exchange on a range of topics of mutual concern:

"The FBI is an important international law enforcement partner of the MJIB, with a friendly and close no-limits cooperation. In this meeting, MJIB Director-General Wang and FBI Director Wray had an extensive exchange of views on international counter-terrorism, economic [crimes], money laundering, cybercrime, dangers of disinformation and related topics that both Taiwan and the United States face together, and continue the achievements from many years of cooperation, as well as make new innovations for Taiwan-US law enforcement and security cooperation and joint crime-fighting."

The Global Taiwan Brief is a bi-weekly publication released every other Wednesday and provides insight into the latest news on Taiwan.

Editor-in-Chief
Russell Hsiao
Associate Editor
John Dotson
Staff Editor
Marshall Reid

The views and opinions expressed in these articles are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Global Taiwan Institute.

To view web sources cited in the published papers (underlined in printed text), visit <https://global-taiwan.org/issues/vol-7-issue-21/>.

Global Taiwan Institute
1836 Jefferson Place NW,
Washington DC 20036
contact@globaltaiwan.org

To subscribe, visit
<http://globaltaiwan.org/subscribe/>.



Image: FBI Director Christopher Wray and Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau Director-General Wang Chun-Li meeting at the FBI's Dallas field office during the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) conference in Dallas (October 2022).

(Image source: [FBI Twitter](#))

For its part, the FBI's post on its official Twitter account read:

"At @TheIACP 's recent #IACP2022 conference, #FBI Director Wray met with Director General Chun-Li Wang of Taiwan's Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau. Our commitment to cultivating law enforcement partnerships at home and abroad helps us keep America and our allies safe."

In addition to meeting with Director Wray, the head of MJIB also reportedly met with representatives of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Homeland Security Investigations Agency, as well as IACP President Dwight Henninger and International Director Vince Hawkes. [1] These discussions reportedly focused on the prevention of transnational drug crimes; the inclusion of fentanyl, a synthetic opioid that is a leading cause of overdose-related deaths in the United States, in Taiwan's [Narcotics Hazard Prevention Act \(毒品危害防制條例\)](#) regulations; as well as [prevention of human trafficking and other major topics](#).

US-Taiwan Law Enforcement Exchanges

Although [heralded in Taiwan's media](#) as a historic first for its public nature, the heightened media attention belies the longstanding cooperation and exchanges between the two law enforcement agencies. The FBI and MJIB [exchange liaison officers](#). In the absence of formal diplomatic relations, these liaison officers act as the two countries' *de facto* [legal attachés](#), and maintain liaison with the other side's principal law enforcement, intelligence, and security services to cooperate on organized

crime, international terrorism, foreign counter-intelligence, and general criminal matters.

Taiwan has also been sending officers from MJIB and the National Police Agency (NPA, 警政署) since 1961 for [training at the FBI's National Academy](#) in Quantico, Virginia, with 36 officers having taken part in the program over the last six decades as of 2019. In 2019, the FBI National Academy Association's leadership retraining program for the Asia-Pacific Chapter was [held in Taiwan for the first time](#), with then-FBI Associate Deputy Director Paul Abbate speaking at the opening ceremony as the highest-level official from the FBI to ever visit Taiwan.

Shared Counter-intelligence and Malign Influence Concerns

Even as Taiwan and the United States maintain a longstanding law enforcement partnership, the FBI's interest in Taiwan's law enforcement capabilities has grown in recent years. Although not mentioned in either of the two agencies' publicized notices, a range of concerns—from criminal activities involving emerging technologies and cybersecurity, to malign influence by the PRC's intelligence and political warfare networks, particularly at the [state and local levels](#)—have both broadened and deepened the areas of cooperation between the FBI and MJIB in recent years.

Notably, the FBI director has recently called China the United States' "biggest threat," and in recent years has [repeatedly underscored](#) the growing volume of China-related counterintelligence cases that the Bureau has opened. The FBI director noted as recently as February 2022 that the Bureau [opens a new counter-intelligence case](#) against China about twice a day. The malign influence also extends into election integrity: in early October, the FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued a [joint notice](#) to raise awareness about the potential threat posed by attempts to manipulate information or spread disinformation in the lead up to (and after) the 2022 midterm elections. Moreover, the recent announcement of criminal indictments connected to [PRC malign schemes to obstruct US judicial prosecution of Chinese telecom giant Huawei](#) all serve to underscore the core competencies of Taiwan's law enforcement and domestic intelligence agency—which has long experience in dealing with similar threats from China, uncovering [52 Chinese espionage cases](#) involving 174 individuals in 2018 alone.

The counter-intelligence threat to the United States was so severe that the Trump Administration ordered the closure of the PRC's consulate in Houston. Then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called it a "[den of spies](#)," with another senior US gov-

ernment official cited by *Reuters* [stating](#): “the consulate in Houston was a particularly aggressive source of malign activity.” According to one [US government intelligence assessment](#): “Among the PRC government agencies involved in foreign influence operations [...] [i]n the United States, China’s Embassy and Consulate offices play an active role in such efforts.” It is therefore understandable that Taiwan has reportedly [assigned a legal attaché to its consulate in Houston](#) in July, underscoring the importance of growing law enforcement ties between the United States and Taiwan at the subnational level.

Multilateral Law Enforcement Cooperation, Taiwan’s Isolation

Yet, the alarm bell over China’s covert pressure is ringing not only in the United States and Taiwan. In July, FBI Director Wray and his counterpart at the UK’s MI5 held an unprecedented [joint appearance](#) to highlight the growing counter-intelligence threats from China. According to MI5 Director-General Ken McCallum, the UK’s domestic intelligence agency is running seven times as many China-related investigations as it was four years ago. Underlying the shared threat perception, the MI5 Director exclaimed: “The most game-changing challenge we face comes from an increasingly authoritarian Chinese Communist Party that’s applying covert pressure across the globe.”

Yet, despite the capacity and value that it could bring to the table, Taiwan has been repeatedly prevented from participating in the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), which would allow Taiwan to contribute—and the world to benefit from—its law enforcement and intelligence capacity. In October 2022, in response to Taiwan’s request to observe the organization’s general assembly, Interpol Secretary-General Jürgen Stock [stated](#) that Interpol cannot grant observer status to Taiwan because: “In 1984, the Interpol General Assembly recognized the People’s Republic of China as the sole representation of China. As such, Interpol recognizes Taiwan is part of China, and as China is a member of Interpol, Interpol cannot grant Taiwan observer status in the general assembly.”

While Taiwan is prevented from being able to participate in Interpol, the United States and Taiwan have been strengthening multilateral cooperation through other forums such as IACP. Particularly important is the [Global Cooperation and Training Framework](#) (GCTF), which counts both Japan and Australia as full members. The GCTF has co-organized international workshops over the last several years focused on law enforcement issues: for instance, in March 2022 a [GCTF forum was held on combating digital crimes](#).

In the final analysis, the public (if somewhat symbolic) revela-

tion of the meeting between Wray and Wang helps to underscore the growing ties and exchanges between the two law enforcement and intelligence agencies. While such actions invite Chinese protests, they provide a positive demonstration effect for other countries who may also want to strengthen law enforcement exchanges with Taiwan, but may feel intimidated due to Chinese pressure. The United States, Taiwan, and like-minded partners should fully utilize the GCTF to strengthen law enforcement and counter-intelligence cooperation among other groupings like the Quad and the Five Eyes.

The main point: An October meeting between FBI Director Christopher Wray and MJIB Director-General Wang Chun-li underscores the growing ties between the two law enforcement agencies, which are increasingly cooperating on issues such as transnational crime, cyber security, and Chinese malign influence operations.

[1] “HSI is the principal investigative arm of the US Department of Homeland Security, responsible for investigating transnational crime and threats, specifically those criminal organizations that exploit the global infrastructure through which international trade, travel and finance move.” See: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, [“Homeland Security Investigations,”](#) accessed November 1, 2022.

The Promotion of Wang Huning and the Prospects for an Increasingly Ideological CCP Taiwan Policy

By: John Dotson

John Dotson is the deputy director of the Global Taiwan Institute and associate editor of the Global Taiwan Brief.

The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 20th Party Congress, held from October 16-22 in Beijing, will go down in history as the event in which CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping (习近平) formally cast aside the term limit precedent observed by his two immediate predecessors—and in a larger sense, [scrapped the norms for leadership succession](#) orchestrated by Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) and other party elders in the 1990s. However, equally noteworthy were the extensive appointments of Xi’s protégés throughout the party hierarchy, which will give him even firmer control over the implementation of major policy directives—including those pertaining to Taiwan.

Following the conclusion of the party congress, the new line-up

of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC, 中央政治局常務委員會)—the senior-most executive body of the party—was unveiled in a [public ceremony](#) on October 23, when the members of the committee emerged from behind a door and lined up on a stage in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People. In keeping with a time-honored tradition of the CCP, the seven PBSC members entered the stage in hierarchal rank order: beginning with General Secretary Xi as the first to appear, and ending with Li Xi (李希), the seventh-ranked member. Aside from Xi himself, arguably the most important PBSC member for Taiwan-related policy will be Wang Huning (王滬寧), who entered the stage in fourth position. Wang’s background, and his likely policy portfolio in the new senior leadership echelon of the CCP, portends an even more hardline and ideological stance towards Taiwan for at least the next five years.




Image: Wang Huning (background, center left) was fourth in line entering the stage when the new PBSC was revealed on October 23, indicating his rank order in the new CCP hierarchy. (Image source: [CNA](#))

The United Front Policy Portfolio in the PBSC

The state (as opposed to party) positions to be assumed by the new PBSC members will likely not be announced until the next meeting of the National People’s Congress (NPC, 全國人民代表大會), the PRC’s nominal legislature, which is usually convened in the early spring of the year following a meeting (either full or plenary) of a party congress. However, senior party/state positions—with attendant policy portfolios—are usually correlated with ranked positions in the PBSC, allowing for predictions about these assignments to be made with reasonable confidence. Over the past 30 years, the number four ranking in the CCP hierarchy has consistently carried with it the chairmanship of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC, 中國人民政治協商會議), the most senior bureaucratic body in the CCP’s united front work (統一戰線工作) system. Accordingly, this position carries with it responsibility for man-

aging the party’s united front policy portfolio. [1] [2]

This makes Wang Huning the likely successor to Wang Yang (汪洋), the incumbent CPPCC chairman.

Wang Yang, a protégé of former CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) and an alumnus of Hu’s CCP Youth League faction (團派), was [ousted from the Politburo](#) and even the [CCP Central Committee](#)—alongside fellow Hu protégés Premier Li Keqiang (李克強), and Vice-Premier Hu Chunhua (胡春華)—with seemingly nowhere to go except to fade into retirement. Wang Yang will likely continue to head up the CPPCC apparatus in a nominal, lame-duck fashion until his successor is formally appointed at the presumed next meeting of the NPC in spring 2023, but we are likely to see real responsibility for united front affairs move to Wang Huning (if that has not happened already, behind the scenes).

In addition to his ceremonial state role as CPPCC chairman, Wang Yang also held the arguably more influential position as [chairman of the CCP Central Leading Small Group for United Front Work](#) (中央統一戰線工作領導小組), a body reportedly created in 2015. (The extent to which Wang Yang exercised real authority in this role, in light of Xi Jinping’s extreme centralization of authority in his own hands, is unclear.) The united front portfolio—which is focused on the [cooptation, subversion, and control of ethnic, religious, and social groups outside the ranks of the party](#)—includes many aspects of the CCP’s propaganda and recruitment efforts directed towards individuals and selected social groups in Taiwan. Wang Yang’s assigned position gave him a prominent role in overseeing these efforts, as well as in acting as a leading public face for engagement (on the CCP’s stage-managed terms) with selected “representatives” from Taiwan (see examples [here](#) and [here](#)). Wang Huning will presumably take up these roles, as well—thereby placing him at the head of the party’s top coordinating body for united front policy, and giving him a prominent public role in propaganda outreach to Taiwan.

The Background of Wang Huning

Wang Huning has had an unusual career path for a cadre who now sits at the apex echelon of the CCP. He started his career as an academic, teaching international politics and law at Fudan University in Shanghai. He moved to Beijing in 1995, alongside a large number of other officials from Shanghai elevated to central government roles under then-CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin (江澤民). Wang took up a position at the CCP Central Committee Policy Research Office (中共中央政策研究室)—an internal party think tank—rising to become its director in 2002,

as well as a member of the CCP Central Committee. He first entered the Politburo in 2012, and then the PBSC in 2017. In the latter move, he assumed duties as chief secretary of the Central Secretariat (中央書記處), which manages the day-to-day operations of the Politburo and the flow of documents to and from the party's senior leaders. He was also appointed in 2017 to membership in multiple policy leading small groups (領導小組). [4]

The directorship of the Secretariat (a position in which Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping both served prior to their ascension to general secretary) was the capstone of a career spent as an ideologist and majordomo to top CCP leaders. In addition to his behind-the-scenes work as an aide, Wang was reportedly a leading [ghostwriter for the ideological theories](#) promoted under each of the party's last three top leaders: Jiang Zemin's "Three Represents" (三個代表), Hu Jintao's "Scientific Development Concept" (科學發展觀), and Xi's own "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era" (習近平新時代中國特色社會主義思想).

Wang's ascension to the top ranks of the Politburo is unusual, in that he lacks administrative experience at the city/provincial level—or even in one of the party's functional bureaucracies, such as the propaganda system or the CCP Youth League (both associated with the former patronage network of the now-discarded Hu Jintao). However, Wang's evident skill at negotiating through rival factional networks, and at making himself the invaluable man-at-the-elbow to multiple party supreme leaders—and above all else, his apparent firm loyalty to Xi Jinping—has resulted in the improbable rise of this former academic to the CCP's top echelon of power.

Signals of a Harder Ideological Line on Taiwan

Although a former academic, Wang Huning is no liberal reformer. Rather, he has demonstrated consistent support for both [authoritarian CCP political control and Xi's nationalist vision](#). His likely assumption of the party's united front portfolio will place a Xi loyalist in control of this essential component of the CCP's outreach-cum-subversion efforts directed at Taiwan. Wang's elevation to be the PBSC's united front point man is yet another indication of Beijing's [increasingly hardline stance](#) in terms of Taiwan policy. Many parallel examples could be cited from the 20th Party Congress: one of the most troubling was the manner in which Xi Jinping's [official work report](#) for the event invoked "restored order" in Hong Kong as a successful example of the implementation of "One Country, Two Systems"—and as a model for Taiwan.

Although Wang Huning did not rise through the CCP's propaganda bureaucracy, he is an ideologist, as well as a Xi loyalist—and his ascension is yet another sign of an increasingly ideological and hardline CCP policy towards Taiwan. Outside observers of the Chinese political system have frequently underestimated the importance of ideology in CCP statecraft, but it is long past time to start taking seriously the CCP's pronouncements on ideology, and what they portend for the future. Wang Huning's assumption of the united front portfolio will likely see an even further intensification of propaganda and subversion directed against Taiwan's open society and democratic system in the years ahead.

The main point: The appointment of Wang Huning, a firm Xi loyalist, to the expected management of the CCP's united front policy portfolio is likely to prove yet another component of Beijing's increasingly ideological and assertive policy towards Taiwan.

[1] This pattern has held true from 1992 to the present: Li Ruihuan (李瑞環) in the 14th and 15th PBSCs (1992-2002); Jia Qinglin (賈慶林) in the 16th and 17th PBSCs (2002-2012); Yu Zhengsheng (俞正聲) in the 18th PBSC (2012-2017); and Wang Yang in the 19th PBSC (2017-2022).

[2] [One article from the South China Morning Post](#), published before the line-up of the new PBSC was announced, indicated that Wang Huning would be appointed as the Chairman of the National People's Congress. However, sourcing for this assertion was not indicated, and appointment as NPC chair (traditionally reserved for either the #2 or #3 in the PBSC hierarchy) would not match Wang's PBSC ranking.

[3] For biographical background on Wang's career, see the profiles: "[Wang Huning \(王沪宁\)](#)," *ChinaVitae.com*, accessed November 1, 2022; "[Wang Huning \(王沪宁\)](#)," Brookings Institution, accessed November 1, 2022; and "[A 'Dream Come True' for Communist Ideologist Behind Three Chinese Presidents](#)," *South China Morning Post*, October 21, 2017.

Taiwan's Continued Fight Against Human Trafficking and Next Steps

By: Jennifer Hong

Jennifer Hong is a senior director at the Project 2049 Institute.

Transnational crimes hurt our world and society, damaging the fabric of democracy and eroding human dignity. Human traffick-

ing and related crimes are borne out of the convergence of poverty and human greed, often amplified by the chaos of war and other crises. In transnational human trafficking, criminal actors systematically exploit gaps in the law enforcement approaches and systems of different countries, as well as the willingness, capabilities, and capacities of different governments. One of the notable transnational crime issues that Taiwan is currently combating is human trafficking.

Human trafficking is often described as [modern slavery](#). It is a crime in which a perpetrator induces, recruits, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains a victim (**acts**), by means of force, fraud or coercion (**means**), and compels the victim to provide commercial sex acts or labor or other services (**purpose**). Victims can be both men and women, as well as children. Human trafficking can often be nuanced and complex, but when there is an element from each *acts-means-purpose* category, a crime of trafficking has occurred. Notable trafficking crimes found in Taiwan include: [compelled sexual acts](#), [abuses on fishing vessels](#), and [domestic worker abuse](#). According to the US Department of State's annual *Trafficking in Persons Report* ("TIP Report"), the Taiwanese government is making vigorous efforts to combat crimes of sex and labor trafficking, and has been ranked in the Tier 1 category for the last decade. [1]

The government of Taiwan, however, has not always recognized or fought these crimes in the past. As recently as the early 2010s, Taiwan was on the brink of being downgraded to the lowest ranking in the TIP Report. [2] In response, the Taiwanese government recognized the perils of this crime and the impact it was having on its citizens and society. In the last decade, the Taiwanese government has transformed its approach to trafficking, shifting from denying its occurrence to becoming a regional leader in combating trafficking.

Some of those achievements are worth noting. In 2016, Taiwan enacted the [Human Trafficking Prevention Act](#) (HTPA, 人口販運防制法), which criminalizes all forms of trafficking, and applies stringent sentences and penalties. Since its enactment, Taiwanese authorities have used the law to prosecute traffickers, and to encourage law enforcement and judicial members to employ it as a new lens to identify the crime when it occurs—as well as employing it as a new tool to arrest, investigate, prosecute, and punish perpetrators.

One of the biggest improvements has been in recognizing the role of the employment broker system in perpetuating human trafficking. The broker model—in which labor brokers control most aspects of employment for migrant workers—has become

an undeniable part of Taiwan's employment ecosystem. As a result of its opacity, the model has allowed systematic and egregious abuses to occur. While the broker model remains prevalent and continues to contribute to abuses that pervade Taiwan's migrant worker environment, the government has taken a more forward-leaning approach to punishing brokers, resulting in a [significantly higher number of recruitment brokers being penalized for abusive practices in 2021](#).

In addition, the Taiwan government is making progress in improving victim care. Specifically, it has worked to [upgrade victim-centered shelter intake procedures for foreign victims](#), and to enhance the formal consultative role of non-government stakeholders in the victim identification, referral, and case management processes. While these efforts seem marginal and still fall short of ideal standards of victim care and support, the government has made significant progress in the last decade to treat victims with dignity, rather than as criminals.



Image: National Immigration Agency officials board the vessel Da Wang (大旺) as part of an investigation into abuses of migrant workers in Taiwan's fishing industry (undated photo, likely January 2022). (Image source: [CNA](#))

Taiwan's efforts to combat human trafficking have not been perfect, but they nevertheless demonstrate why the island is often labeled a "beacon of democracy" in the Indo-Pacific region. In the last decade, in its effort to fight against trafficking, there has been (and continues to be) a balance of push and pull between government officials and civil society groups. They have challenged each other at every stage, but still work together for the greater good of society. However messy—and at times, frustrating—it may be for both sides when dealing with each other, Taiwan is a better place today because of their dynamic exchanges and efforts to hold true to the ideals of democracy, transparency, and rules-based order.

Despite these accomplishments and robust democratic processes, issues of human trafficking remain prevalent in Taiwan. The following three issues are representative of the types of crimes that pervade and negatively impact Taiwan's society:

- **Continued forced labor abuses on the distant-water fishing fleet.** Life on fishing vessels, under the best of circumstances, is grueling and sometimes dangerous. Many fishing vessels that are either Taiwan-flagged, or else Taiwan-owned while operating under another flag, [have been reported](#) to abuse migrant workers: such abuses include withholding earned wages, depriving flexibility of movement, and confiscating passports and/or other legal documents in order to control and coerce workers. Government inspections are difficult, as many vessels are working in areas far from regular government patrol boats and routes, and rarely dock at ports. In addition, Taiwan authorities face jurisdictional issues, as different authorities are responsible for inspections, arrests (if unlawful behaviors are suspected), and investigations. Lack of coordination between agencies leads to a lack of meaningful progress in preventing trafficking on fishing vessels. Fishing vessels outside of Taiwan's economic zone that are Taiwan-owned but do not fly the Taiwan flag also evade justice because these vessels often [fly flags of nations that have less stringent labor laws and standards](#).
 - **Increased abuse against migrant domestic workers.** As Taiwan's economy improves, more people are working outside their homes and need support to care for their homes, children, and aging parents. To meet this growing demand, migrant domestic caregivers are entering into the labor system in increasing numbers. Despite the invaluable support that migrant workers bring into these homes, many factors (e.g., unfamiliar language, lack of traditional support network, new culture, etc.) leave them vulnerable to being exploited. Forced labor abuses include physical and verbal attacks and threats, long work hours, inadequate or unsafe living/sleeping arrangements, lack of freedom of movement, withheld wages, and the confiscations of passport and/or other documents. Since the location of abuse is in individual homes, it is very difficult for government authorities to prevent or intervene. Laws such as HTPA and the [Labor Standards Act](#) (勞動基準法) can be applied to prosecute abusive employers and/or protect migrant domestic caregivers, but Taiwan authorities are often reticent to recognize this category of crime as human trafficking. Thousands of migrant domestic workers are vulnerable to forced labor abuses due to this lack of enforcement.
 - **Continued broker abuse.** Despite measures and efforts by the Taiwan government to protect migrant workers from broker abuse, human trafficking remains high under Taiwan's current broker model. The current model skews the power dynamic in favor of the employers, making it easier for them to restrict migrant workers' agency and freedom when they are in Taiwan. Migrant workers lack meaningful recourse when their employers take their passport and/or other legal documents, physically or verbally abuse them, withhold their wages, or make them work under harmful or dangerous conditions. Brokers often keep the migrant work force "in line" [through intimidation and threats](#), exploiting their vulnerabilities as foreigners in Taiwan. Utilizing the broker system for finding employment/employees has become an accepted practice in the economy. Without a disruption in this cycle—via means of introducing a better mechanism or overhauling the process with better practices—the system is ripe for brokers to continue to abuse migrant workers.
- In order to continue its fight against human trafficking and maintain its leadership in the region and on the global stage, Taiwan should consider pursuing the following recommendations:
- **Fight against human trafficking with focus and resilient commitment.** All stakeholders—from government officials to civil society groups, from academicians to business leaders, from activists to survivors—should partner together to vigorously fight against human trafficking. Taiwan should investigate, prosecute, and punish traffickers; protect victims and rehabilitate them to become survivors; and prevent the crime through education and public awareness campaigns.
 - **Improve interagency cooperation to combat trafficking on fishing vessels.** Different agencies are responsible for inspection, arrests and detention, and prosecution of crimes committed onboard fishing vessels. Taiwan should provide opportunities for these authorities to train together, and to jointly establish standard operating procedures in order to ensure the successful sharing of information and delineation of duties.
 - **Ensure that Taiwan-owned vessels comply with Taiwanese labor laws.** Taiwan should review existing laws pertaining to "flags of convenience" and establish new national standards to discourage Taiwanese owners from evading labor laws by flying non-Taiwan flags on their vessels.
 - **Train law enforcement and judicial authorities to utilize existing laws to protect all victims of trafficking.** Existing

laws are adequate for prosecuting crimes of trafficking. Taiwan should train law enforcement and judicial authorities to expand their understanding of existing mechanisms—and apply those frameworks to protect victims of trafficking, including migrant domestic workers.

- **Promote accountability in the broker system.** Brokers should be held to the highest labor standards and be held accountable if they commit crimes of trafficking through their business practices. Brokers should be encouraged to use standard contracts that are fair for both parties and exclude clauses that distort power dynamics—such as mandating that passports be kept by the broker or employer, or preventing workers from reporting abuse until after a certain period of service has occurred.

In summary, crimes of human trafficking remain prevalent in Taiwan. Taiwan authorities, however, have made strides in combating trafficking in the last decade. Nevertheless, there is still more work to be done to ensure that Taiwan is a safe place for migrant workers. As it has done in the last decade, Taiwan must remain committed and resilient in combating this crime in the next decade to come.

The main point: Over the past decade, Taiwan has emerged as a regional leader in combating human trafficking. However, it must do more to ensure that migrant workers are protected from exploitation in industries such as commercial fishing and domestic home care.

[1] The US Department of State’s *Trafficking in Persons Report* ranks more than 160 countries around the world in four categories (Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 2 Watch List, and Tier 3) based on the government’s anti-trafficking efforts—to include prosecuting traffickers, protecting victims, and preventing the crime—on an annual basis. This annual report is congressionally mandated and released by the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (J/TIP), and the most recent edition can be found here: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-trafficking-in-persons-report/>. Tier 1 ranking indicates that a government has made efforts that meet the *Trafficking Victims Protection Act*’s minimum standards. Governments need to demonstrate appreciable progress each year in combating trafficking in order to maintain a Tier 1 ranking. Tier 1 ranking does not mean that the government has fully or perfectly combatted the crime of trafficking in that given year.

[2] US Department of State source.

Challenges and Opportunities for the “Chip 4” Group

By: Erik M. Jacobs

Erik M. Jacobs is an adjunct fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute.

On September 28, the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) [hosted the first virtual meeting](#) of the US-East Asia Semiconductor Supply Chain Resilience Group (or the “Chip 4” group), which aims to bring together representatives from the American, Taiwanese, Japanese, and South Korean governments to discuss and build resilience throughout the semiconductor supply chain. The initial meeting took place more than one year after [reports](#) emerged that the US government had begun discussions to establish such a group amid [tensions and disagreements](#) between participating countries on key elements of the plan. It was also held a few days before the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) [announced new export controls](#) on certain technologies—including semiconductors, chip manufacturing equipment, and super computers—that are critical to China’s domestic advanced technology industry.

Situational Understanding

In order to address pandemic- and national security-related supply chain challenges, the US government first called for [coordinating semiconductor activities](#) with like-minded nations in 2021. Yet, progress on implementing policy objectives has been slow. Leaders and ministers have met at various fora, including the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the “Quad” framework, which includes the United States, Australia, Japan, and India) and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) for Prosperity—which does not include Taiwan. These meetings have had mixed results, as bilateral engagement between Washington and Taipei, Tokyo, and Seoul has continued.

Establishing new supply chains and new procedures as a part of the Chip 4 group would have a major impact on the semiconductor industry’s global supply chains. Currently, American companies lead in the equipment and software segments of the industry; Taiwanese companies like Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC, 台灣積體電路製造股份有限公司) lead in foundries; South Korean companies like Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix lead in production; and Japan is a global leader on semiconductor materials and components. With buy-in from participating countries, a “Chip 4” arrangement could be used to coordinate export control policies and manufacturing incentives programs to lessen China’s role in the global semiconductor supply chain. With more reliable inputs compo-

nents, high production and testing standards, and visibility into the supply chain, the four countries could address both supply chain reliability and trust issues throughout the supply chain by verifying provenance, and also having greater visibility into each step of the manufacturing process with trusted partners.

While there are scant details on the [first meeting of the Chip 4 group](#) and no concrete plans were made for a follow-up meeting, it has been confirmed that representatives from the United States, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea discussed supply chain collaboration and other semiconductor-related issues. If the Chip 4 group can establish regular meetings and drive important supply chain and semiconductor production challenges forward, it would be a key step towards including Taiwan in multilateral technology discussions outside of ongoing, bilateral US-Taiwan platforms—such as the [US-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade](#), and the [US-Taiwan Technology, Trade, and Investment Collaboration](#) group.

Challenges Facing the Group

While the establishment of a Chip 4 group seems natural, it was not without tension and disagreement, as each party has varying domestic considerations when addressing how to reshape the global semiconductor industry.

American policymakers will have to address how to support and grow the American semiconductor industry, while also accounting for the possibility that commercial and political interests in other participating countries may differ despite being broadly aligned. Meanwhile, senior Taiwanese officials [have acknowledged](#) that totally decoupling the advanced technology sector from China would be exceedingly difficult—especially because China is Taiwan’s largest trading partner, with a large part of Taiwan’s export industry comprised of machinery and integrated circuits. Despite these concerns, President Tsai told a [bipartisan delegation of US lawmakers](#) visiting Taipei in September that chips being produced in democratic countries are critical for building sustainable semiconductor supply chains.

Samsung’s semiconductor business leaders have shared with the South Korean government their concerns regarding the proposal, and have even expressed a desire for the company to [“seek understanding from China”](#) before negotiating with the United States on this issue. South Korean chip producers have [relied on Chinese fabs for mass production](#), and leading South Korean firms including Samsung and SK Hynix have major facilities in China—including Samsung’s only NAND flash plant, and SK Hynix’s DRAM chip production facilities—greatly increasing their risk profile. South Korean leaders also appeared to be

acutely aware of some of the risks of Chinese retaliation for participation in the group, as Seoul was the last to [confirm its participation](#) and has not yet made a commitment to attend sessions other than the preliminary meeting. Prior to the meeting, South Korean officials [referred to the grouping as a “semiconductor supply chain consultative body”](#) instead of an “alliance,” and said they wanted to respond to the initial meeting to ensure it reflected Seoul’s national interests. For their part, Japanese representatives have also expressed some concerns about the group: for example, Economic Security Minister Takaichi Sanae [stated that](#) it would be important to “be mindful that efforts in economic security do not restrict business activities and damage innovation or efficiency” in the supply chain. [Previous political disagreements](#) between Seoul and Tokyo have also played a role in shaping semiconductor-related export policies between both countries, as well.

Other Forms of Cooperation

The US Department of Commerce’s recent decision to enhance export controls and target China’s domestic semiconductor industry is a step in the right direction to weaken Beijing’s dominance in the semiconductor supply chain. However, it could lead to problems for Taiwanese, South Korean, and Japanese producers who are over-reliant on Chinese components for their production, especially if China chooses to retaliate and restrict component supplies. Active cooperation through fora such as the Chip 4 could help mitigate these concerns, and will be essential for creating a future supply chain that is not reliant on Chinese components or unreliable supply chains.

A small provision in the USD \$52 billion [CHIPS and Science Act](#) is also reserved for coordination with foreign governments on supply chain security, and could present an opportunity for US-led cooperation as a part of a Chip 4 or similar group. In the near future, the US Department of State will create a USD \$500 million [“International Technology Security and Innovation Fund,”](#) through which the US government will seek to provide support for international information and communications technology security, as well as semiconductor supply chain initiatives. State will [work closely with the Chips Program Office](#) (CPO) located in the US Department of Commerce and other agencies—such as the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the Export-Import Bank, and the US International Development Finance Corporation—to support international semiconductor supply chain activities and projects with this fund.

CHIPS Act funding is designed to prohibit the disbursement of funds to “foreign entities of concern” (i.e., China), but does not distin-

guish between US and foreign companies when it comes to eligibility for grants and tax credits. This is intended to [assuage the concerns](#) of companies such as TSMC and Samsung, which are building and operating multi-billion-dollar fabrication facilities in Arizona and Texas, respectively. Biden Administration program directors at the [CHIPS Program Office](#) could potentially offer grants and tax credits to companies headquartered in “Chip 4” countries, so long as they go through the same application process as US-based companies and the funds are used to support their US-based manufacturing and fabrication operations. More information about the eligibility and application process for these programs will be available as the implementation of CHIPS and Science Act programs continue to take shape over the coming months after an open [comment period closes in November](#) and Commerce [releases specific funding application guidance](#) by early February 2023.

A finely tuned approach—informed by an understanding of the supply chain bottlenecks and the needs that commercial entities in all four countries have for Chinese components—could be very important in laying the groundwork for effective and efficient semiconductor and supply chain coordination between the United States, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea as funds become available for private companies and the State Department assesses the global supply chain environment.

What’s Coming Next

The Biden Administration has thus far been unable to get other players—specifically Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan—to take concrete steps and form the Chip 4 group to advance substantive policy objectives in the past year. This is unlikely to change at the government level, as the reports from the first meeting did not indicate that a follow-up meeting would take place in the near future. Additionally, it omitted announcements regarding a formal agenda for the group. This could suggest that the group will face an uphill battle as it works to develop and implement policies—despite general alignment between Washington, Taipei, Tokyo, and Seoul on the issues of semiconductor supply chains and semiconductor manufacturing.

In the meantime, Taiwanese Minister of Economic Affairs Wang Mei-hua (王美花) recently stated that [Taiwanese companies would follow](#) the new US export controls that [aim to target China’s ability to purchase and manufacture](#) high-end chips in military applications, as well as to restrict Beijing’s ability to obtain advanced computing chips and manufacture advanced semiconductors. As Chip 4 discussions will likely remain slow and limited in concrete results, export control collaboration and

cooperation may be the most successful and impactful venue for deeper US-Taiwan technology relations in the near term.

The main point: The so-called “Chip 4” grouping could prove to be a viable forum for coordinating technology and supply chain policy between the United States, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. However, each partner has thus far expressed reservations about the group, suggesting that the United States will face an uphill battle in the near-term.

UK’s Approach to Taiwan and China Remains Stable Amid Political Turmoil

By: Marshall Reid

Marshall Reid is the program manager at GTI, as well as the host of GTI’s podcast, GTI Insights.

Just a month ago, the United Kingdom’s [relationship with Taiwan](#) seemed to be moving steadily in the right direction. On September 25, then-Prime Minister Liz Truss—elected less than three weeks earlier—stated during an [interview with CNN](#) that the UK would work with allies “to make sure Taiwan is able to defend itself.” While hardly a full-throated endorsement of Taiwan, the statement nevertheless represented a remarkable shift for the UK, which had only recently exited a so-called “[golden era](#)” of relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Perhaps unsurprisingly, these remarks were met with strong approval from the [Taiwan government](#), which welcomed the opportunity “to deepen cooperation with the UK and other like-minded nations.”

Over the last several weeks, however, this growing UK-Taiwan bonhomie seems to have faded once more into the backdrop. Following a cascading series of political and economic crises, Truss was forced to resign her post as prime minister on October 20, clearing the way for Rishi Sunak to take the reins. While this turmoil on Downing Street could certainly inject uncertainty into the UK’s approach to Taiwan and China, recent trends suggest that current policies will persist.

Deteriorating UK-China Ties

While Truss’ comments on Taiwan were certainly newsworthy, they were by no means *sui generis*. In fact, as GTI Executive Director [Russell Hsiao](#) outlined in the *Global Taiwan Brief* earlier this year, the United Kingdom has been steadily shifting its approach to China over the past several years. Given London’s previous position on the PRC, the evolution towards a friendlier

posture *vis-à-vis* Taiwan has been particularly notable.

As recently as 2015, the United Kingdom appeared to be emerging as one of China's most reliable partners. In October of that year, PRC Paramount Leader Xi Jinping (習近平) [visited the country](#), where he met with Queen Elizabeth and hailed the beginning of a new era of Sino-British cooperation. In the years that have followed, however, this "golden era" has largely unraveled. Concerned by Beijing's aggressive foreign policy and highly visible human rights abuses, the UK government has grown far bolder in [criticizing the PRC](#). This shift has been accompanied by a steady [stream](#) of [polls](#) showing that the British public has grown increasingly wary of China and its role in the world, a sentiment that has [only grown](#) since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Over the last two years, this evolution in British thinking towards China has increasingly manifested in UK government policy. In 2020, London took the controversial step of [banning Chinese telecom giant Huawei's](#) (華為) 5G equipment from UK networks, designating the company a "high-risk vendor." Building on this decision, the UK has gone on to enact several other policies reflecting its growing distrust of Beijing, including [suspending its extradition treaty](#) with Hong Kong and [sanctioning Chinese individuals](#) involved in atrocities in Xinjiang. While each of these policies might appear relatively minor in a vacuum, they nevertheless suggest a significant shift in the aggregate. Once a steadfast supporter of the PRC, the UK has clearly undertaken a major evolution in its approach to Beijing. For Taiwan, this turn of events has presented unprecedented opportunities, particularly as seen during the short-lived Truss Administration.

Growing Support for Taiwan Under Truss

While the UK's falling-out with China has unfolded quite visibly in recent years, its burgeoning relationship with Taiwan has developed quietly and with considerable care. Ultimately, this delicate approach has been in line with London's long-term policy towards China and Taiwan. As a [2020 House of Commons report](#) on the UK-China relationship plainly stated, "the UK has consistently taken a low-key approach to [Taiwan]" as a "precondition for increased cooperation and engagement with Communist China."

Despite this preference for restraint, the UK nevertheless significantly expanded its involvement in the Taiwan Strait during the latter half of the Boris Johnson Administration (2019-2022). As Hsiao noted in [his analysis](#), this policy shift included Royal Navy transits of the strait, increased engagement with partners in the region, and the 2021 decision to permanently station two

warships in the region. Ostensibly undertaken as part of the so-called "[Indo-Pacific Tilt](#)"—a term coined in the UK's 2021 [Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy](#)—these moves reflected a bolder, more proactive British approach to the region. However, the effectiveness of such measures was often dulled by the personal leanings of Johnson, a politician who once described himself as "[fervently Sinophile](#)." Fearful of alienating a powerful trading partner, Johnson routinely sought to balance rising security concerns with economic pragmatism—a stance demonstrated by [his decision](#) to allow a Chinese subsidiary to purchase a Welsh microchip manufacturer, despite numerous warnings regarding the danger of doing so.

In contrast to her predecessor, Liz Truss has long proven to be a strong critic of the PRC, as well as a vocal supporter of Taiwan. In the years leading up to her election as prime minister, Truss repeatedly [questioned the wisdom](#) of building ties with Beijing, [framing China as a serious challenge](#) to the Western-led, rules-based international order. During her time as foreign secretary (2021-22), she worked to solidify her status as a China skeptic—to include steps to limit [Chinese influence in the UK](#), with a particular emphasis on Chinese purchases of British companies. This criticism of China's behavior only grew following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, when [Truss emerged](#) as one of the leading figures linking the situation in Ukraine with a potential Chinese attack on Taiwan. Building on this approach, she went so far as to [summon China's ambassador](#) to the UK in the wake of China's August exercises in the Taiwan Strait, which she described as an "aggressive and wide-ranging escalation."

In light of these statements, many [commentators](#) were quick to frame Truss' election as prime minister as a potential inflection point in the UK's approach to China and Taiwan. Indeed, during her brief time in office, she did little to dissuade such assessments. Upon her arrival on Downing Street, she quickly assembled an array of China-skeptic, pro-Taiwan cabinet members. Perhaps most notably, she appointed [Tom Tugendhat](#)—an MP sanctioned by Beijing for his vocal support for Taiwan—as her minister of state for security. In addition to her aforementioned remarks on working with allies to "make sure Taiwan is able to defend itself," Truss also [stated her support](#) for multilateral responses to Chinese pressure. Once again, she linked a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan with the war in Ukraine, arguing that the UK and its allies must move quickly to enhance deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. This Truss-led shift in British rhetoric toward China and Taiwan ultimately came to a head on October 11, when her government made the [unexpected decision](#) to frame

the PRC as a “threat” in its reworking of Johnson’s foreign policy guidelines. Given these actions and statements, it seems clear that Truss was well on her way to fundamentally altering the British approach to China and Taiwan.

Uncertainty Under Sunak

While Truss’ aggressive approach to politics may have won her support from Taiwan, it ultimately proved to be her downfall domestically. Following a [disastrous attempt](#) to “radically reorient the government’s economic agenda” that caused the pound to fall to its lowest value in decades, Truss was forced to resign her position after less than 50 days in office. Out of the political chaos that ensued, Truss’ rival Rishi Sunak swiftly emerged. While Sunak is a political veteran with many known positions, his approach to China and Taiwan is considerably less clear.

Throughout the campaign to replace Johnson in September—during which Truss and Sunak were the clear frontrunners—Truss repeatedly sought to frame Sunak as [soft on China](#). Citing Sunak’s support for Chinese investment during his tenure as Chancellor of the Exchequer, she argued that only she could stand up to Beijing. Despite these accusations, however, the campaign revealed that the two were largely in agreement regarding the threat posed by the PRC. Indeed, as [Rana Mitter](#), a professor at Oxford University, has noted, Truss and Sunak “tried to do their best to look as hardline towards China as possible.”

Based on his remarks during both campaigns, Sunak appears to have left any previous trust he had in China behind. Much like Truss, he [condemned the PRC](#) as “the largest threat to Britain and the world’s security and prosperity this century.” Going further, he [argued](#) for the creation of an “international alliance of free nations to tackle Chinese cyberthreats,” a proposal that echoes US President Joe Biden’s [“Summit for Democracy”](#). Perhaps most notably, he also [pledged](#) to close all of the UK’s Confucius Institutes, arguing that they present intolerable risks to British security. While these policies certainly strengthen Sunak’s anti-China credentials, commentators have noted that his turn against China has only come fairly recently. Indeed, as [one observer points out](#), Sunak was [touting the economic benefits](#) of Chinese trade—albeit with caveats—as recently as 2021. Given this recent policy shift, it would seem that Sunak’s China policy is still developing, though all signs point to a continued adherence to Truss-like hawkishness.

By contrast, Sunak’s approach to Taiwan remains uncertain. During the campaign to replace Johnson, [Sunak stated](#) that he would not change the UK’s policy toward Taiwan if elected. In follow-up remarks, he outlined an approach not unlike that

of Johnson: specifically, he called for a continued British naval presence in the Indo-Pacific, as well as enhanced multilateral cooperation in the region. Much like Truss, he [linked the Taiwan Strait with the war in Ukraine](#), though he placed more emphasis on deterrence than on defending Taiwan. Beyond this, however, Sunak has thus far remained fairly silent on Taiwan. While it is likely that this reluctance to discuss Taiwan is primarily a result of Sunak’s focus on domestic issues, it nevertheless suggests that a return to a quieter, more cautious British approach to Taiwan could be in the offing.

Conclusions

Since GTI last published an article on the UK’s approach to China and Taiwan, Britain has seen its political system repeatedly beset by chaos and uncertainty. While these events are likely to have profound consequences for the country for years to come, it seems likely that London’s approach to China and Taiwan will remain relatively stable. Given shifting public opinion and harsh anti-China rhetoric from political figures, reversing course may prove increasingly difficult in the coming years. For Taiwan, this growing Sino-British rift could present opportunities for cooperation between the UK and Taiwan, particularly if Taipei is able to present itself as a viable alternative to Beijing.

The main point: While the chaos following the resignation of Liz Truss has profoundly altered the UK’s political environment, recent trends suggest that the British approach to China and Taiwan will remain fairly stable in the near-term.