The Prospects for Taiwan’s 2024 Presidential and Legislative Elections

By: Russell Hsiao

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With precisely one month left before Taiwan’s 2024 presidential and legislative elections on January 13, there is now firm confirmation regarding the candidates from the three political parties who are vying for the power to govern the island democracy. The lead-up to the candidates’ November 24 official registration deadline for the offices of president and vice president was nothing short of dramatic. On election day, voters in Taiwan will have the chance to choose between three sets of candidates for president and vice president, as well as to elect their district representatives in the Legislative Yuan (立法院). This analysis will survey current public opinion polls, as well as data from recent presidential and legislative elections, in order to make preliminary assessments on the current trajectory of the races—as well as their implications for Taiwan’s political landscape post-January 2024.

The 2024 Presidential Race: Lai with Edge, Widening Margin

One of the defining features of the 2024 race for president has been the rampant speculation about whether the opposition parties, namely the Kuomintang (KMT, 國民黨) and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP, 民眾黨), were going to form a unity ticket. The ticket’s unexpected materialization—in the form of a half-baked commitment to cooperate slapped together by former President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九)—was extremely short-lived, and also drowned out another important element of the presidential race that had hitherto gained little attention: the vice presidential candidates.

The DPP has had an early decider advantage in terms of voter expectations by announcing its presidential candidate early on in the race back in April, while the KMT did not announce its candidate—Hou You-yi (侯友宜)—until July, after a tense, competitive process. Similarly, for the vice presidential candidates, the DPP had the advantage of knowing early on that only a handful of candidates would likely be Lai’s running mate, whereas a number of factors generated uncertainty regarding the KMT’s vice presidential selection right up until the registration deadline. These included the back-and-forth over the sensational but spec-
tacularly failed unity ticket, as well as the unexpected challenge posed by would-be KMT presidential contender Terry Gou’s (郭台銘) announcement in late August (two months after the KMT selected Hou) that he was going to run as an independent. (Gou subsequently declined to register as a candidate prior to the deadline.)

Indeed, just days before the official deadline for registration and before any of the other parties, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民進黨) announced that current Vice President Lai Ching-te’s (賴清德) running mate would be Hsiao Bi-khim (蕭美琴), Taiwan’s former representative to the United States. Shortly thereafter, the KMT announced that media personality and one-time New Party (NP, 新黨) politician Jaw Shaw-kong (趙少康)—often likened to be Taiwan’s version of Tucker Carlson, due to his populist appeal—would be Hou’s running mate. After much ado about a potential joint ticket with Foxconn (鴻海科技) founder Gou, the TPP’s Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) announced that Cynthia Wu (吳欣盈), a legislator and granddaughter of the tycoon of the financial conglomerate Shin Kong Group (新光集團), would be his running mate. [1]

With a little more than a month left before voters cast their ballots, the DPP’s ticket of Lai and Hsiao leads in five out of seven leading public opinion polls taken since the official registration of the candidates (see table below), with a margin ranging from 2 to 10 percent. Only one of the polls places the KMT ahead of the DPP—but with less than a 1 percent margin—while another positions the TPP’s candidate Ko Wen-je as slightly edging out Lai by around 2.7 percent.

The Hou-Jaw ticket was unexpected, in the sense that Jaw was never publicly seen as a viable vice-presidential contender. However, the selection of Jaw was also perhaps politically necessary to the extent that Hou needed to pull back traditional KMT voters siphoned off by the TPP and Terry Gou. Furthermore, after all the vetting and process of elimination that the KMT went through internally to arrive at Hou as its presidential candidate, Jaw may have been the only alternative capable of salvaging an otherwise unwinnable race as highlighted by a poll conducted by the Taiwan-based Broadcasting Corporation of China (中國廣播公司) and Gallup released in June 2023. Additionally, the unity ticket fiasco likely turned off voters between the two sides, with both the TPP and KMT potentially losing independent supporters—the extent to which those voters will turn to the DPP remains to be seen.

While the polling numbers remain fluid and the cross-Strait situation dynamic, support for the Lai-Hsiao ticket appears to have an edge over its political opponents. It seems that after the sheen of the official tickets of the other two parties wore off (with some polls initially showing the KMT with the lead), most of the polling figures appear to have returned to earlier, pre-unity ticket fervor levels—with Lai in the lead, a position the candidate has enjoyed for most of the race.

The current polling data more closely resembles the normal variation observed before the volatility caused by Terry Gou’s run on an independent ticket, as well as the spectacular failure of the KMT-TPP unity ticket. To be sure, the collapse of the unity ticket reflects the inability of KMT and the TPP to reconcile their differences—particularly in terms of the personal animosities of Hou and Ko, which some observers have noted run deep. Moreover, both the KMT and the TPP were unwilling to play second fiddle; and, while there is broad support for change due to incumbent fatigue following eight years of DPP rule, the break-

![Image](image_url)
down of the unity ticket has likely dampened public support for “change” to either of the opposition parties. [2]

The 2024 Legislative Race

As always, the composition of the Legislative Yuan will be key to an effective government. When Taiwan had its first peaceful transfer of political power in 2000, the new DPP administration was constantly faced with gridlock as it was new to governing and faced off with a legislature under opposition control. From 2000-2008, even though the DPP controlled more seats than the opposition parties, it never held a full majority. This allowed a coalition of opposition parties—excepting the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU, 台灣團結聯盟)—to command a majority and frequently caucus together to push back against many of the new government’s initiatives.

This challenge of persistent gridlock was overcome after constitutional amendments approved in 2005 reduced the number of seats from 225 to 113. In the 2008 legislative election, the first election held after the constitutional amendment, the KMT commanded an absolute majority, holding power in both the executive and legislative branches of the government.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>DPP</th>
<th>KMT</th>
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*Figure 2: Numbers of seats held in the Legislative Yuan, 2000–present. (Source: Compiled by the author)* [3]

In addition to voting held for individual candidates in district seats, there is also another ballot for political parties, which is used to allocate quotas for at-large legislators in the Legislative Yuan. According to a poll conducted by the TVBS Poll Center (民意調查中心), among the major political parties, the KMT currently enjoys the highest support in this context (32 percent of voters), followed by the DPP (28 percent), the TPP (18 percent), and the New Power Party (NPP, 時代力量) (3 percent), while the remaining 18 percent expressed no opinion. Given the uncertainty as to whether the NPP—traditionally a DPP partner—will acquire any at-large seats, it is not clear whether the DPP will have a viable and reliable coalition partner.

Similarities and Differences from the 2020 to 2024 Presidential and Legislative Elections

In the 2020 election, President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) received 57.1 percent of the total votes, whereas her main challenger, Kaohsiung Mayor Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜), received only 38.6 percent. While Tsai’s victory was resounding, the path for the DPP has been far from smooth or guaranteed. Given the three-way race, it is very likely that the next president will not receive a majority of the votes.

Despite its modest victory in the local elections in 2022 under the leadership of Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫), the weakness of the opposition KMT has carried over to 2024. Even though the local elections are referred to by some observers as a bellwether for the country’s presidential and legislative elections, the predictive value of the local elections as to which party will win the presidential election is marginal at best. Over the past 22 years, there were only two local elections—2006 and 2014—in which the party that won in terms of total votes went on to win the presidential elections.

Another factor that contributed to Tsai’s electoral victory in 2020—and which will likely contribute to the 2024 results—will be the youth vote. According to one researcher from Academia Sinica, 72 percent of voters below the age of 40 cast their ballot for Tsai in 2020, while more than 60 percent of college graduates also chose to re-elect the president. However, polls have indicated that the youth vote is turning towards Ko Wen-je, which could cut considerably into the DPP’s winning 2020 coalition. Yet, the KMT’s continued inability to reform will likely offset the DPP’s disadvantage with that demographic.

In light of these struggles, forming an opposition coalition could be critical for the party’s prospects.

Conclusion

Despite the current lead that the Lai-Hsiao ticket enjoys in the polls, the road to the presidential office and legislative control is far from certain. The most recent polling conducted by My Formosa (美麗島電子報) showed that while a plurality (33.4 percent) of respondents believe that the DPP should continue to control the presidency, 43.4 percent think that another political party should provide the next president. However, neither opposition party is the favorite alternative: 28.9 percent believe that the Kuomintang should occupy the presidency, while only 14.5 percent think the president should come from the Taiwan People’s Party, and 23.2 percent did not answer clearly.

The aforementioned poll reflects a continuation of a strong trend in Taiwan in favor of the transfer of political power for this election, though voters do not see a clear alternative. This should serve as a warning sign that the public will not be as for-
Taiwan’s election dynamics have evolved—of support, the dynamics of a three-way race—in both the national election cycle in 2020. Although most polls show considerably from the circumstances seen in the last national election. The main point: the presidential and legislative races—make the outcomes difficult to predict. However, the most likely scenario for the next four years could well be one of divided government.

Whoever wins the next presidential election, it will likely be a much weaker presidency and government than the one in power from 2016-2024 (or from 2008-2016 under the KMT). The most likely prospect appears to be a return to a divided minority government, as was seen from 2000-2008. However, it should be noted that the parties are very different now. For one, the DPP has more governing experience than it did in 2000; and the KMT is less powerful and organized. In such a case, the gridlock of the early 2000s could likely be avoided. In any case, as the strongest third political power, the TPP could emerge as the decisive swing party and be critical for governance in any new administration. To this end, the bad blood generated by the failed coalition partnership could make the TPP more willing to work with the DPP, whether they are in the ruling or opposition coalition.

China has a vote as well, and could likely interfere more easily in the political process overseen by a divided, minority government, in which the power is split among three political parties following the 2024 elections. As Taiwan’s election quickly approaches, Beijing is actively trying to influence voters through a combination of measures such as through economic coercion and other forms of political warfare. After effectively sidelining Gou, Beijing is likely seeking to undercut support for Ko in favor of the Hou-Jaw ticket. Indeed, researchers in Taiwan have already discovered an amplification of online attacks against Ko on social media following the collapse of the unity ticket, although it remains to be determined whether Beijing is behind this campaign. Additionally, national security officials in Taiwan have recently revealed that Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders have directed the government to influence public opinion in Taiwan through a more “effective and discreet” manner in the lead up to the elections.

While the results are far from certain, one thing is for sure: the political landscape after the 2024 presidential and legislative elections will be very different from that of 2020.

The main point: Taiwan’s election dynamics have evolved considerably from the circumstances seen in the last national election cycle in 2020. Although most polls show DPP presidential candidate William Lai holding a plurality of support, the dynamics of a three-way race—in both the presidential and legislative races—make the outcomes difficult to predict. However, the most likely scenario for the next four years could well be one of divided government.

[1] Terry Gou’s consideration of a last-minute independent run was apparently sidelined after the PRC announced that it was investigating his business assets. Beijing will also want to further deter Gou from supporting either the KMT or the TPP, as his doing so could tilt the balance in favor of one of the candidates. See: Yimou Lee and Ben Blanchard, “Taiwan’s Foxconn Faces China Tax Probe, Seen as Politically Motivated—Sources,” Reuters, October 23, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/technology/foxconn-shares-drop-after-chinese-report-tax-audit-land-use-probe-2023-10-23/.

[2] The failure of the unity ticket also reflects the marginalization of KMT Chairman Chu, and the lack of authority that KMT chairmen following Ma Ying-jeou have had. As the establishment candidate representing the moderate wing of the party, it is unclear how Chu’s political future will affect future reform efforts within the party.

[3] Note that in some cases numbers are initial figures, and may not reflect the exact number of seats controlled by the party in question at every point in time during the term, as the numbers of seats held may change over the course of the four-year term due to run-offs and other factors. The “Other” category includes smaller parties such as the New Party, New Power Party, People’s First Party, and Taiwan Solidarity Union, among others.

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The Axis of Disorder: How Russia, Iran, and China Want to Remake the World

By: Michael Mazza

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Is the world entering a new age of global disorder? Signs point to yes: we see simultaneously the biggest armed conflict in Europe since World War II, a war in the Levant, and a short, sharp war in the Caucasian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. These seemingly separate conflicts are in fact connected not just by a coincidental moment in time, but by the actors involved. From Russia to Iran to a veritable smorgasbord of terrorist groups, bad actors have unleashed turmoil in a swath of territory stretching from
Ukraine to Azerbaijan to Yemen.

Behind them all stands the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Beijing has sought to give the appearance of being an independent peacemaker. But the veil it has erected is transparent in nature. It is less interested in peace, stability, and justice for the victims of aggression than it is in fostering a global state of affairs in which China can more easily pursue its own ends. For now, disorder suits Xi Jinping (習近平) just fine.

Defining Disorder

Is this burgeoning period of global history truly different from what preceded it? After all, there is no period in living memory in which the world can truly be said to have been at peace. Since the close of World War II, the United States has fought wars or engaged in military interventions in East Asia, Southeast Europe, the Middle East, Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America. Insurgencies and civil wars have been regular features across much of the developing world. Terrorism has been an ever-present concern since the 1970s. The Rwandan Genocide occurred during what might be considered the high-water mark of global order in the 1990s, with the genocide in Darfur following just a decade later.

Yet, both the Cold War and post-Cold-War eras featured an order of a kind, even if that order was at times quite bloody. Henry Kissinger helpfully defined world order as “the concept held by a region or civilization about the nature of just arrangements and the distribution of power thought to be applicable to the entire world.” Whatever the order, its durability depends on its general acceptance, or legitimacy, and a balance of power that can sustain it. For much of history, orders have been regional, rather than worldwide, in nature. That changed beginning in the nineteenth century, when Europe’s Westphalian order went global.

What is the Westphalian order? According to Kissinger, “it relied on a system of independent states refraining from interference in each other’s domestic affairs and checking each other’s ambitions through a general equilibrium of power.” Those fundamental features remain, even as the system has evolved:

“The contemporary, now global Westphalian system [...] has striven to curtail the anarchical nature of the world with an extensive network of international legal and organizational structures designed to foster open trade and a stable international financial system, establish accepted principles of resolving international disputes, and set limits on the conduct of wars when they do occur.”

Those modern-day structures arguably include the norm of peacefully resolving international disputes, the law of armed conflict, freedom of the seas, the United Nations system, and the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Arguably, each of these contributes to the presiding order’s legitimacy and enables the balance of power needed to ensure its survival.

The United States sought to reshape global order in the wake of the Soviet Union’s dissolution. In particular, it aimed to weaken the norm against interfering in the domestic affairs of others—not because it was eager to meddle in the nitty-gritty of foreign political processes, but because it saw the unipolar moment as a moment in which it could, finally, give in to its evangelistic impulses. Here was an opportunity to fulfill the destiny Thomas Jefferson had foreseen for the United States: that it would become an “empire for liberty,” spreading democracy to the furthest reaches of the world.
illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the full-scale assault on Ukraine in 2022 all made manifest what Putinistic rhetoric had long espoused: a worldview in which Russian neighbors are not sovereign states, properly understood. Russia now stands at the precipice of a return to the tsarist approach of nonstop expansion; whether Russia topples over the edge depends in large part on what happens in Ukraine.

China, meanwhile, has long bristled at a world order in which it is supposed to be bound by rules it did not write—and in which it is simply one country among many equals, both in Asia and globally. Beijing has set out to reestablish a Sino-centric order, at least in its own neighborhood—and perhaps beyond. Domestic and international economic policy and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, formerly known as “One Belt, One Road,” 一帶一路) are designed to ensure that all economic roads lead to Beijing. Investments in military power and the increasing use of that power are meant to ensure Beijing can secure by intimidation and force what foreign economic interests alone do not guarantee: that China, and China alone, sits atop a new Asian hierarchy, in which might makes right and which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can rule over something like a modern-day tributary system.

Iran and its Shiite satellites, including Hamas and Hezbollah, have a very different idea of international order, but share with Russia and China opposition to the presiding order today. Tehran’s goals in some ways call to mind pre-Westphalian Europe, in which sectarian differences drove interstate conflict. Iran remains committed to “exporting” the revolution, by which it aims to spread Shiism and provide Shia Muslims with the ideological, military, and economic tools to defeat “imperialists.” Despite Hamas’s role in governing Gaza, its objectives are similarly religious in nature, according to its own covenant: “They are the fighting against the false, defeating it and vanquishing it so that justice could prevail, homelands be retrieved and from its mosques would the voice of the mu’azen emerge declaring the establishment of the state of Islam, so that people and things would return each to their right places and Allah is our helper.”

Russia, China, Iran, and Hamas are all, then, revisionists. They may not agree on what world order should ultimately look like—or whether there should even be a world order—but they are united in opposition to the order as it stands. And they are making headway. The world now may be approaching a moment in which, to use Kissinger’s framing, no single concept of order enjoys widespread legitimacy and the balance of power that has long upheld the presiding order proves no longer up to the task.

Richard Haass, former president of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and longtime US diplomat, is right when he argues that “the term ‘order’ implicitly also reflects the degree of disorder that inevitably exists.” But what happens when disorder—or the lack of any agreed upon framework for organizing the world—reigns supreme?

**China Gets Ready to Pounce**

At the moment, Russia, Iran, and Iranian state and nonstate satellites are the main antagonists in the assault on global order. All are striving to wipe fellow sovereign states off the map, and have strained against or ignored entirely the “international legal and organizational structures” that Kissinger points to as aimed at curtailing “the anarchical nature of the world.” Beijing has decided not to stand in their way. Indeed, China has provided modest but important support for their efforts. Xi Jinping, perhaps, assesses that once others have done the hard work of tearing down global order, China can swoop in to rebuild order in its own image.

In the meantime, Xi is likely assessing what he can get away with in this incipient age of global disorder. He may already be trying to take advantage, most notably in the South China Sea. The past year has been marked by near-unrelenting pressure on the Philippines. That it is targeted at the only American treaty ally with South China Sea claims is no accident. Beijing is clearly testing the Biden Administration at a time when it is grappling with other conflicts and has been signaling that it is eager to stabilize US-China relations. Put another way, he is testing both the legitimacy of an order in which international differences are supposed to be solved peacefully and whether American (and allied) power is capable of upholding it.

What Xi learns in the South China Sea and from observing American approaches to countering Russia and Iran could prove ominous for Taiwan, Japan, and China’s other neighbors in Asia. The United States has crucial, regionally specific interests at stake in both Europe and the Middle East, but it also has a more abstract interest in defending the global order in which it has thrived—and under which repeats of the twentieth century’s most abhorrent spasms of bloodletting have been largely avoided. If Washington fails to do so, the risk that China will pounce will grow far more acute.

**The main point.** The United States has an interest in defending the global order in which it has thrived. If Washington fails to do so, a Chinese turn to aggression will become far more likely.

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Despite Chinese Market Controls, Taiwan’s Semiconductor Supply Chain Remains Secure

By: Jordan McGillis

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The security of the semiconductor supply chain vaulted into the awareness of the American public and political class when pandemic-related disruptions to chip deliveries slowed the production of important consumer products like motor vehicles in 2020 and 2021. Many Americans learned then that while the United States is home to Silicon Valley, it no longer leads in manufacturing the chips that made the region world-famous. As Americans are now fully aware, the industry’s most important manufacturing nodes are concentrated on the island of Taiwan.

Taiwan’s most successful industrial enterprise, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC, 台湾積體電路製造股份有限公司), produces an estimated 90 percent of the world’s leading-edge chips, which enable the functioning of a huge variety of electronic goods, ranging from vehicles to smartphones to missile defense systems. As Global Taiwan Institute Adjunct Fellow Christina Lin wrote in March 2023, “given TSMC’s near monopolistic position in production of advanced semiconductors, Taiwan is a linchpin in supply chain security for the United States.”

While the pandemic tripped the alarm, more fundamental, lasting threats to the semiconductor supply chain emanate from the geopolitical designs of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Fear of destabilizing PRC cross-Strait action disrupting chip production and export motivated Congress to pass the 2022 CHIPS and Science Act, a law that funds US-based semiconductor manufacturing and innovation.

President Biden, upon signing the plan, stated that it “supercharges our efforts to make semiconductors here in America, those tiny computer chips smaller than a fingertip that are the building blocks for our modern economy, powering everything from smartphones, to dishwashers, to automobiles.” He further noted that “The United States must lead the world in the production of these advanced chips. This law will do exactly that.” TSMC officials, including Chairman Mark Liu (劉德音), toasted to the CHIPS Act with American politicians, but have communicated that TSMC’s expansion of overseas chip manufacturing sites is part of the company’s common sense approach to supply chain resilience rather than an effort to bolster US production. In response to a shareholder question about overseas fab construction, Liu stated that “Satisfying customers’ demand is our main consideration when building an overseas fab,” and went on to explain that that justification underlies the company’s choice of the United States and Japan over Europe as targets for investment.

Despite the American political spotlight being shined upon the risks to the production and export of chips from Taiwan, less attention has been devoted to TSMC’s own supply chain—i.e., the pathways through which it procures the materials it needs in order to produce those chips. With the most advanced chip production guaranteed to continue to take place on the island for the foreseeable future—despite the United States’ (and other world governments’) attempts to “onshore”—how TSMC procures its materials will remain a globally significant economic question of the highest order.

In 2023, that supply chain came under increased pressure when, in July, the PRC announced a new set of export controls on Chinese companies. The rules, which came into effect on August 1, require exporters of gallium and germanium, two elements that are essential for the production of certain chip variations, to obtain special licenses before selling abroad on ostensible national security grounds. For the semiconductor supply chain, gallium is the more crucial and the more vulnerable of the two. Gallium is a key input for new, advanced chip designs—and the PRC produces 98 percent of the world’s supply of the element at this time.

Gas Guzzlers Are Out, Gallium Is In

Just as the automotive industry was put under supply chain stress by pandemic-era delivery slowdowns, it again finds its plans jeopardized by instability in the semiconductor sector. Among other defense and commercial goods, the PRC’s new gallium export policy will have substantial impacts on the production of electric vehicles, which S&P Global Mobility forecasts will constitute more than a quarter of vehicle production by 2030.

While all modern cars are highly sophisticated “computers on wheels,” electric vehicles (EVs) are particularly dependent upon semiconductors to regulate the supply of power to and from their batteries. Accordingly, new chips are being designed to accommodate these requirements and to produce better EVs. Gallium-nitride (GaN) chips are considered a leading candidate to make these valuable upgrades for vehicle chargers, inverters,
and converters.

According to the US Department of Energy, gallium—a wide bandgap semiconductor material—will “allow power electronic components to be smaller, faster, more reliable, and more efficient than their silicon (Si)-based counterparts,” which will in turn “accelerate widespread use of electric vehicles and fuel cells.” While still just a small part of the total semiconductor volume used in cars, GaN chips are growing in importance.

In its most recent annual report—released in March 2023—TSMC touted its new process to produce gallium chips for electric vehicles, reporting that “6-inch gallium nitride (GaN) on silicon technology successfully passed customer product quality and reliability qualification. In 2022, this technology was widely adopted in power supplies for various consumer electronic devices featuring high power efficiency and small footprint. 8-inch GaN on Silicon technology development is on track and is expected to be ready in 2025 to further support automotive applications.”

An example of a company for which TSMC manufactures gallium chips is GaN Systems, a Canadian firm. GaN Systems is noted for its leading-edge gallium application know-how, and was acquired by Germany’s Infineon Technologies in October 2023, positioning it to be a key automotive industry supplier as GaN technology supersedes traditional silicon chips for certain components.

**TSMC’s Gallium Supply**

Though TSMC was sanguine in response to the PRC gallium export control announcement—“After evaluation,” the company told Reuters in July, “we do not expect the export restrictions on raw materials gallium and germanium will have any direct impact on TSMC’s production”—the gallium it uses for GaN chips is likely produced largely within the PRC, as is almost all of the global supply.

Coverage from CommonWealth Magazine in the wake of the export control announcement echoed Reuters’ coverage. CommonWealth’s Elaine Huang (黃亦筠) reported on July 17 that “a high-level executive from an unnamed compound wafer foundry” noted that his firm’s gallium supply chain involved processing raw gallium in South Korea and then in Kaohsiung to a high-purity state before the firm took possession. Stephen Oliver, vice president of Navitas Semiconductor, a GaN chip customer of TSMC, also told IEEE News, “They’ve been using non-Chinese sources for a while, and they’ve confirmed with us that they don’t see an issue in going ahead,”

While the impact to TSMC may not be direct, the ramifications to the global market and the intermediaries through which it procures gallium are unavoidable. If less PRC gallium enters the open global market, the price—all else being equal—that TSMC must pay will rise. Indeed, immediately following the export control announcement, the price of gallium on metals markets jumped 27 percent.

In October, Reuters reported that the gallium price had again risen, though no slowdown in gallium exports from the PRC has yet been observed. Germanium exports, on the other hand, have slowed to a trickle.

**PRC Gallium Position**

Today, the PRC has the capacity to produce 750,000 kilograms of gallium per year, or 86 percent of global capacity. In 2022, it produced 98 percent of real global raw gallium output. But although gallium is a critical mineral, it is not a rare mineral.

Raw gallium is recovered as a byproduct of processing bauxite to make aluminum. (Zinc processing is another, less productive gallium source.) As recently as 2013, listed countries like Germany, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine right alongside the PRC as “leading producers” of gallium. In the intervening decade, however, the PRC has come to dominate global gallium production through targeted industrial policy. Using significant subsidies and incentives, the PRC increased aluminum production ten-fold. Today, the PRC accounts for more than half of global aluminum smelting capacity. The key to its gallium dominance is Beijing’s mandate that aluminum producers extract gallium from the process. Through this industrial policy, the PRC drove up the global gallium supply and drove down the price, making gallium extraction elsewhere mostly uneconomical. The remaining sliver of global raw gallium production today takes place mainly in Russia, Japan, and South Korea. Outside of China, Japan is the leading processor of gallium into the purified form needed for gallium-based chips. Japan is also noted for its recycling-based gallium recovery.

**Trade Weapon Limits**

Beijing’s new policy has had a predictable effect: a flurry of new gallium investment interest. Gallium extraction is not a technically difficult industrial process; PRC dominance arises from its own policies. Paradoxically, the PRC’s export controls may actually inhibit its ability to control the global market.

By rattling the trade sabre, the PRC will generate a rebound in global, non-China gallium production. Mytilineos, a Greek conglomerate, said it November that it will be able to scale cost-eff-
effective gallium extraction within 18 months. Germany stated prior to the export controls announcements that it was considering restarting gallium production, with global demand expected to boom with the incorporation of more electric power into the energy system. The new policy from Beijing has only made that consideration more salient. By showing its hand, the PRC has elevated awareness in Asia, Europe, and the United States of its dominant gallium position and prompted a political and market response. Also worth noting, Australia—not China—is the global bauxite production leader, meaning that its geoeconomic partners like Japan, Taiwan, and the United States will not lack access to the ore needed for aluminum production, and thus the gallium byproduct. Of course, any revitalization of such industries would come at significant expense.

In the end, TSMC’s sanguine attitude is probably appropriate. The company is renowned for its diversity of suppliers and ability to manage geopolitical tensions and tumult. Extra risk is now priced into the supply chain, but with the flexibility of global commodities markets and the existing know-how for gallium production and refining embedded in many countries outside of the PRC, TSMC and Taiwan manufacturers more generally will likely weather this export control storm.

The main point: The PRC’s gallium export controls provide it a chokepoint from which it could disrupt global supply chains, including for Taiwan’s semiconductor manufacturing, but market dynamics will likely limit the trade weapon’s effectiveness in the long term.

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**Advancing the US-Taiwan Partnership to Bolster Democracies in Asia**

By: Robert Wang

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In 2020, then-Presidential candidate Joseph Biden warned that “democracies—paralyzed by hyper-partisanship, hobbled by corruption, weighed down by extreme inequality—are having a harder time delivering for their people. Trust in democratic institutions is down.” In response to this challenge, he announced that “during [his] first year in office, the United States will organize and host a global Summit for Democracy to renew the spirit and shared purpose of the nations of the free world. It will bring together the world’s democracies to strengthen our democratic institutions, honestly confront nations that are backsliding, and forge a common agenda. The Summit for Democracy will also include civil society organizations from around the world that stand on the frontlines in defense of democracy.”

Upon taking office in 2021, President Biden thus convened the Summit, with the participation of 100 governments as well as civil society organizations (CSO). The event provided a platform for leaders to announce both individual and collective commitments, reforms, and initiatives to defend democracy and human rights at home and abroad. The United States then worked with a number of governments from different regions of the world, including for Taiwan, to co-host a second Summit in March 2023 and follow up on the commitments made. In the wake of the recent crises in Ukraine and the Middle East, Biden warned again that “the world faces an inflection point, where the choices we make will determine the direction of our future for generations to come.” He called on “allies and partners to stand up to aggressors and make progress toward a brighter, more peaceful future.”

Underscoring the President’s message, US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan wrote that “strategic competition has intensified and now touches almost every aspect of international politics, not just the military domain” and emphasized the urgent need for the United States to “adjust to the main challenge it faces: competition in an age of interdependence.” As evidence of the pressing nature of this challenge, he argued that “This task was brought into stark relief by Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, as well as by China’s increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea and across the Taiwan Strait.” He further stated that “the United States’ alliances and partnerships with other democracies have been its greatest international advantage. They helped create a freer and more stable world. They helped deter aggression or reverse it.” The Summit for Democracy, he pointed out, “has created an institutional basis for deepening democracy and advancing governance, anticorruption, and human rights—and getting fellow democracies to own the agenda alongside Washington.”

**Expanding US-Taiwan Cooperation**

Despite Beijing’s strong objections, President Biden invited Taiwan to participate in the Summit for Democracy, where Taiwan developed its own statement outlining broad commitments to advance democratic principles and practices at home and abroad. Under the “Summit Pillar: Defending Against Authoritarianism,” Taiwan specifically committed to work with other de-
democracies “to foster a more open and enabling environment for international civil society organizations to act as a regional hub for international civil society.” In pursuit of this objective, Taiwan has facilitated the establishment of regional offices in Taiwan by several major international human rights-focused non-governmental organizations (NGO), including the Europe-based Amnesty International and Reporters Without Borders and the US-based Freedom House, National Democratic Institute (NDI), and International Republican Institute (IRI).

At the same time, Taiwan and the United States have also expanded their cooperation under the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF), established by the Obama Administration in 2015. This platform has allowed partner nations and observers to benefit from Taiwan’s expertise to provide training and address global issues of mutual concern for officials and experts, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. Since its inception, the GCTF has held over 60 regional and international workshops across a broad range of subjects, including public health, law enforcement, e-commerce, energy efficiency, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and capacity building in areas such as anti-corruption, women’s empowerment, and combating disinformation. Japan and Australia were invited and joined as full partners of the GCTF in 2019 and 2021, respectively, while many other countries have also cohosted workshops. Recognizing its vital role, the US Congress has significantly increased funding for GCTF in recent years, with appropriation reaching USD $4 million in 2023.

**Launching the Taiwan NGO Fellowship Program**

In October 2023, the Taiwan Alliance in International Development (Taiwan AID) organized and hosted a month-long NGO Fellowship Program, funded by the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA, 中華民國外交部). The goal of this program was to provide training for young NGO professionals from South and Southeast Asia in order to enable regional NGOs to more effectively tackle problems of inequality and human rights in their own countries. During the first week of the program, Taiwan AID—a coalition of more than 30 Taiwan NGOs with operations at home and abroad—held a workshop that invited experts and leaders from major Taiwan NGO co-organizers to speak on subjects such as project management, fundraising, and advocacy. Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation (TAEF, 台灣亞洲交流基金會) Chairman Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao (蕭新煌) began the workshop by providing a historical overview of how the growth of NGOs and civil society had contributed to Taiwan’s remarkable democratic transformation over the past few decades. At the end of the workshop, the regional fellows joined other Taiwan NGO professionals in a roundtable to share their own experiences and exchange views on different ways to advance NGO goals.

Following this workshop, the fellows were then placed in different Taiwan NGOs according to their specific professional backgrounds in order to engage directly with their Taiwan counterparts in daily operations for another three weeks. As part of this year’s pilot program, the 10 Fellows (selected from a list of 172 applicants) hailed from NGOs in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Nepal (South Asia) and Myanmar, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam (Southeast Asia). The focuses of their various NGOs ranged from assisting remote villages in developing sustainable agricultural systems, drinking water supplies, and educational facilities to providing vocational training for persons with disabilities, menstrual hygiene management training for adolescent girls, as well as advocacy work for the rights of women and those suffering from HIV/AIDS. Many of these fellows had founded their own NGOs.

Through this program, these regional NGO fellows have derived valuable lessons from Taiwan NGOs and their operations that should help them advance their own work in improving conditions for disadvantaged populations in their own countries. This is critical in underscoring that, apart from offering direct foreign assistance, Taiwan is enabling regional NGOs to serve their own communities. As in the case of Taiwan, the work of these NGOs will thus build up and strengthen civil societies, which can in turn help sustain and spur the growth of democracies. More broadly, this program has also facilitated connections among regional NGO activists that will help create a support network among civil societies in Asia. Finally, these fellows have also come to learn more about Taiwan society and its history, while establishing close personal ties with Taiwan NGO professionals that they can continue to maintain after they return home. By building a regional NGO hub in Taiwan, this program also contributes to the positive expansion of Taiwan’s international space among like-minded civil societies and democracies in the region.

**Forging a Values-Based Partnership**

In response to President Biden’s key foreign policy initiative, the United States and Taiwan have thus moved forward with concrete actions through the Summit for Democracy, the GCTF, and the NGO Fellowship Program to begin forging a values-based partnership to combat corruption, advance good governance, and bolster civil societies “that stand on the frontlines in defense of democracy.” Nonetheless, as Sullivan noted, the challenges facing democracies in Asia remain very serious, especially giv-
en China’s increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea and across the Taiwan Strait. At the same time, Beijing has become increasingly authoritarian at home—including in Hong Kong—while also supporting and enabling autocrats across the region.

Hence, it is critical at this “inflection point” that Taiwan and the United States redouble their efforts to work together to strengthen and expand these programs. In particular, they need to commit to continue and increase funding for the pilot NGO Fellowship Program, given the strong demand among NGOs in the region, and eventually establish a permanent, regional NGO center in Taiwan. As Sullivan pointed out, “the United States’ alliances and partnerships with other democracies have been its greatest international advantage. They helped create a freer and more stable world. They helped deter aggression or reverse it.” For Taiwan, facing increasing cross-Strait tensions, it is even more critical at this stage to forge a values-based partnership with the United States, demonstrating that bilateral ties go beyond strategic defense and economic interests. In doing so, Washington and Taipei can build trust and confidence in their mutual commitments as like-minded democracies.

**The main point:** Taiwan and the United States are increasing cooperation under the umbrella of the Summit for Democracy, the Global Cooperation and Training Framework, and the recently initiated NGO Fellowship Program, to help bolster democracies in Asia. It is important that they continue to expand these programs at this critical juncture to enhance this values-based partnership and strengthen trust in mutual commitments as like-minded democracies.

*The author would like to thank Taiwan AID for the opportunity to participate in the NGO Fellowship Program workshop in October 2023.*

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**Notes on the TACPS Cultural Petition to the 2024 Presidential Election**

By: Adrienne Wu

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On October 30, 2023, the *Taiwan Association of Cultural Policy Studies* (TACPS, 臺灣文化政策研究學會) released a cultural petition ahead of the 2024 Taiwanese elections. Produced in conjunction with the *Foundation for Future Generations* (青平台), the petition advocates for the implementation of five core strategies to advance Taiwan’s cultural sustainability and democratic governance within cultural policies. For Taiwanese policymakers, the petition is a vital road map for strengthening Taiwan’s cultural and creative industries and supporting Taiwanese creators; for researchers, the petition gives insight into the current state of Taiwan’s cultural ecosystem and the core issues of importance.

**Democratic Governance of Cultural Policy**

To better understand the aims of this petition, it is helpful to place it into the context of Taiwan’s history of cultural policy decisions. “**TACPS Cultural Petition to the 2024 Presidential Election: The Sustainability of Culture and Democratic Governance in Taiwan**” (hereafter referred to as the “2023 Petition”) is the culmination of four expert forums held in September 2023. The forums consisted of buy-in from many different attendees, “[converging] opinions from practitioners, academics and professionals in the areas of arts, culture, public policy, societal studies, economy, enterprises, heritage studies, architecture, design, urban planning, communication, technology, community regenerations, and labor conditions.” Similar to trends discussed in a previous *GTB* article on museum curation, Taiwan’s cultural policy practices—especially in comparison to those under martial law in Taiwan, which only lifted in 1987—have become more bottom-up and have allowed for more public participation. The 2023 Petition also praises Taiwan’s current “civil-activated model of participatory cultural governance, and cultural democracy” as being distinctive in Asia.

Beginning in 2000, conferences have been used as a way to consolidate opinions and influence official government policy. Scholars Tsai Hui-ju and Lin Yu-peng credit three international conferences held in Taiwan from 2000-2002 as “key moments for disseminating discourses relating to creative economies from Britain to Taiwan.” [1] While the first two conferences were organized by the British Council and non-governmental actors in Taiwan, the last of these three conferences—held following the announcement of Taipei’s *Challenge 2008: National Development Plan* (挑戰2008：國家發展重點計畫)—was co-organized by Taiwan’s Council for Cultural Affairs (CCA, 文化建設委員會). [2]

After 2002, the next cultural congress held by the government in order to consolidate public opinions regarding cultural policy occurred in 2017. Held under the Tsai Administration, the 2017 National Cultural Congress (2017全國文化會) aimed to address six main areas: cultural democracy, cultural creativity,
cultural vitality, cultural viability, cultural tolerance, and cultural transcendence. While one motivation for holding the 2017 National Cultural Congress was to update Taiwan’s cultural policy to reflect advancements brought about by the internet, then-Minister of Culture Cheng Li-chun (鄭麗君) also expressed an intention to “reverse” previous administrations’ emphasis on economic development and the importance of creating policies from the bottom-up, in order to highlight the “democratization of culture.” Additionally, it was the first National Cultural Congress that was not invitation-only, and was open to public participation.

Following the 2017 National Cultural Congress, the government introduced the Culture Technology Policy to solidify continued democratic governance of culture. Among other things, the Act stipulates that the government must hold a National Cultural Congress every four years in order to “collect the opinions of all sectors, and map out national cultural development.” That same year, the Ministry of Culture also introduced the Regeneration of Historical Sites Policy (再造歷史現場), an initiative that addresses the “restoration, repurposing, [and] operational management” of historical sites while also considering the cultural significance and public memory linked with them. In 2019, the Ministry of Culture proposed the Culture Technology Policy Agenda (文化科技施政綱領), with the aim of using technology to enhance participation in and dissemination of culture.

Despite stated intentions to hold a National Cultural Congress every four years, the 2021 National Cultural Congress was delayed until 2022 due to the impact of COVID-19. Taking place over two days, the congress was also accompanied by four expert forums. Then-Minister of Culture Lee Yung-te (李永得) discussed some of his key takeaways upon the completion of the event, focusing mainly on the issue of “cultural sovereignty” in an age of digital streaming. [3] In addition to having forums on cultural digital communication and cultural technology, the congress demonstrated a strong interest in the integration and impact of technology. In contrast to the 2017 congress’ emphasis on democratic governance, Lee’s comments focus more on necessary structural changes such as talent cultivation and the government budget—although his comments on the lengthy process of collecting public input shows that democratic governance is still a vital part of the cultural policy. However, no new white paper was produced following the 2021-2022 National Cultural Congress. [4]

**2023 Core Issues and Summary of Recommendations**

Framing the entire petition under the theme of cultural sustai-
bility and ease of cultural asset donations; sustaining initiatives for privately-owned historic structures and enhancing associated regulatory limitations; instituting guidelines for cultural asset restoration and maintenance; broadening cultural asset education and its integration from a grassroots level; supporting the growth of fundamental research on cultural assets; and cultivating cultural asset professionals, who are provided with job security. Overall, the recommendations show an interest in aiding education, management, and professional growth associated with cultural assets—with a particular focus on private-public partnerships and job creation.

Cultural Technology and Cultural Communication Sustainability

Again, these recommendations build upon previous policy. The petition notes some of the shortcomings of the 2019 Culture Technology Policy Agenda, particularly in regards to shortcomings in developing infrastructure, difficulties that occur from Taiwan’s digital initiatives being spread between the Ministry of Culture (MOC, 文化部), the Ministry of Digital Affairs (MODA, 數位發展部), and the National Communications Commission (NCC, 國家通訊傳播委員會), and a lack of coordination between the cultural and technology industries. To address these challenges, the petition advocates for: stable public infrastructure that cultural technology and communication can use as a foundation; a platform for cross-ministry collaboration; a platform for bridging the gap between technology and art; cultivating interdisciplinary talents; and using cultural technology for advancing public services and citizen engagement.

Improving Conditions of Artistic Labor and Local Economic Sustainability

This last section of the 2023 Petition addresses challenges of cultivating talent. The petition critiques the current “festivalization” of cultural policies—i.e. the tendency of festivals to be the platforms through which art and performances may gain exposure and legitimacy—as neglecting the well-being of artists, and cautions that art that is contract-driven can result in works that are repetitive and hinders the growth of art that requires longer production times. To combat these issues, the petition highlights the importance of networks that involve both the government and citizen organizations, restructuring of art centers’ operational models, and connecting local arts and culture with the regional economy. In short, the section both notes the drawbacks of having art being too profit-driven, while also pointing out that artists require more stability.

Conclusions

The petition represents several balancing acts that future cultural policy will have to navigate. Of these, possibly the most pressing one is related to balancing culture as an economic resource, versus as a creative one. Developing a sustainable cultural ecosystem is a long-term investment. While it is easier to focus on the issue from an economic perspective, in terms of both justifying it to the voters and quantifying the returns, this also can have negative effects on artistic innovation and creativity. Adding to this issue is the lack of continuity that could occur in the event of a change in power: particularly due to some partisan disagreements related to the definition of Taiwanese, and the fact that the process of democratically-governed culture policies gained momentum under the Tsai Administration. While Taiwan has made commendable progress in making the formation of cultural policy a bottom-up process, it will be important to solidify these advancements through the implementation of protective laws and clear implementation processes.

The main point: Regardless of which party comes to power after the elections, the new administration should continue Taiwan’s bottom-up method of cultural policy creation, while also focusing on core issues that have been raised through these public forums—especially relating to resource allocation, talent cultivation, and technology—to create a healthy cultural ecosystem that also has the capability to represent Taiwan on a global scale.


[3] Cultural sovereignty refers to the act of using culture to assert claims of sovereignty, often done in the process of reclaiming cultural heritage following decolonization.

[4] Information provided to the author in an email correspondence with TACPS Executive Director Jerry Liu.

[5] TACPS Executive Director Jerry Liu (who was also a guest in our event titled “Assessing Taiwan’s Soft Power: Cultural Policy and its Implications Abroad”) was a co-organizer of the 2017 National Cultural Congress, and co-authored a paper assessing the 2017 congress. Additionally, the chairman of Foundation for Future Generations is Cheng Li-chun—the same minister of culture who had presided over the 2017 National Cultural Con-
[6] Information provided to the author in an email correspondence with TACPS Executive Director Jerry Liu.