Taiwan's 2025 Recalls: A Civil Society Perspective

Bo Tedards

July 2025

Global Taiwan Institute

Executive Summary

Taiwan's January 2024 elections produced a divided government: with Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民進黨) winning the presidential election, and an opposition coalition of the Kuomintang (KMT, 國民黨) and the Taiwan's People's Party (TPP, 民眾黨) taking a majority of the seats in Taiwan's unicameral legislature, the Legislative Yuan (LY, 立法院). Following major political clashes in 2024 between the executive and legislative branches of Taiwan's government over matters such as the government budget, legislative authority, and the role of the constitutional court—some of which threatened a constitutional crisis—civic activists upset over the actions of the majority legislative caucus in the LY organized recall efforts against a large number of legislators from the opposition KMT Party.

As of the publication of this report, 31 legislators from the KMT face summer recall elections for possible removal from office, with the first elections scheduled for July 26th. (Parallel recall petition efforts directed against DPP legislators all failed, meaning that only KMT representatives are on the recall ballots.) This massive wave of recall elections being held against members of Taiwan's legislature could potentially change the balance of power in Taiwan's government. It is therefore naturally controversial. When used properly, recalls can be a useful mechanism for citizens to address concerns about corruption or foreign influence in politics. The current "Great Recall" (大罷免) reflects ongoing debates within Taiwanese society about political representation, accountability, and civil society engagement, and thus it represents a significant milestone in Taiwan's democratic development.

Historical Background

The concept of recalling elected officials was introduced to Taiwan by the Republic of China (ROC) government. It was featured in Dr. Sun Yat-sen's "Three Principles of the People" ideology, probably influenced by US political reform efforts around the turn of the 20th century.[1] Article 17 of the original Constitution of the Republic of China adopted in 1947 states, "The people shall have the rights of election, recall, initiative, and referendum."[2] Recall provisions were included in the local government codes enacted in the early years of the ROC government, including those governing elections of local officials in Taiwan.[3] Eventually these were consolidated into Taiwan's main electoral law, adopted in 1980, which is titled the "*Public Officials Election and Recall Act* (公職人員選舉罷免法, POERA)".[4]

During Taiwan's martial law period (1949-1987), elections in Taiwan were not free and fair, and sometimes not allowed at all, especially at the central government level. Nonetheless, recalls were attempted periodically against local elected officials throughout this period, and some of these were even successful.[5]

After democratization began in earnest in the 1990s, the newly empowered Taiwanese civil society began experimenting with recall efforts against members of the Legislative Yuan. Notably, in 1994 anti-nuclear activists launched recalls against a group of four legislators, but all failed at the ballot box amid controversial last-minute changes to the rules.[6]

"After democratization began in earnest in the 1990s, the newly empowered Taiwanese civil society began experimenting with recall efforts against members of the Legislative Yuan."

In 2013 and 2014, a series of recall efforts targeted several Kuomintang (KMT, 國民黨) legislators, the most famous of which was the "Appendectomy Project."[7] Although only one of these recalls managed to reach the ballot box (where it failed due to insufficient turnout), the campaigns stimulated an effort by some members of the KMT to amend the law to make recall procedures more onerous, but this was shelved following outcry from civil society as well as the two opposition parties at the time: the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民進黨) and Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU, 台聯黨). One of the most prominent leaders of civil society active on this issue was Huang Kuo-chang (黃國昌), who was subsequently elected to the Legislative Yuan under the banner of the newly-formed New Power Party (NPP, 時代力量) in 2016.

Soon after taking office, Legislator Huang became the primary advocate of amendments to the POERA to make

recalls easier to pass, rather than harder, including lowering signature thresholds and eliminating turnout thresholds. The Legislative Yuan (at the time, the DPP held a solid majority) eventually adopted a set of amendments in late 2016, lowering the thresholds for signatures at both stages respectively from 2 percent to 1 percent and from 13 percent to 10 percent, while retaining a kind of turnout threshold (see below). Ironically, Legislator Huang was also the target of one of the first recall campaigns under the new regulations, launched by an anti-gay marriage group; he survived the final ballot due to the turnout threshold that he had opposed, and therefore retained his seat.[8]

In 2020, a major milestone occurred in the history of Taiwan's recalls, when voters in the city of Kaohsiung successfully recalled their mayor, Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜) of the KMT. Mayor Han was not only the highest-ranking official ever to be recalled, but he also had just represented the KMT in the presidential election earlier that year (which was part of the reason why local residents felt he had been neglecting his duties as mayor).[9] In 2021, Legislator Chen Po-wei (陳柏惟) of a small green-leaning party became the first member of the Legislative Yuan to lose his seat as a result of a recall.[10]

In summary, recalls have been considered a normal part of Taiwan's (and indeed the ROC's) political system for all of its modern history, and have been used with increasing frequency during the democratic era.

Current Recall Procedures

The legal framework for recalls is laid out in the POERA, Chapter 3, Section 9 (Articles 75-92). A citizen or group of citizens with residence in a public official's constituency can initiate a recall proposal against him or her, after at least one year has passed since his or her taking office. It is noteworthy that only officials elected to represent individual districts can be subject to recall; the party-list members of the Legislative Yuan cannot be recalled.[11] The group of proposers needs to submit to the relevant local election commission a list of signatures including at least 1% of the electorate in that constituency. One citizen assumes the legal responsibility as the primary proposer. If the local election commission certifies this initial list of signatories, the recall is said to have passed the first stage, and proceeds to the second stage of public signature collection, using the official forms provided by the Central Election Commission (中央選舉委員會, CEC).[12] Within a set period (60 days for members of the Legislative Yuan), the proposers must then collect signatures representing at least 10 percent of the electorate in that district. After these are in turn reviewed by the local election commission (also within a stipulated timeframe), and if the number of valid signatures is sufficient, the local commission will then send the proposal to the CEC for certification. Then the CEC will announce a recall election date, between 20 and 60 days from the date of certification.

Recall voting follows a procedure that is similar to a regular election, except that the ballot simply presents a choice to "accept recall" or "reject recall." The recall is passed if the majority of votes cast are for "accept," and the votes in favor amount to at least 25 percent of the registered voters in that district. If a recall is passed, the CEC will then announce a date for a by-election to fill the vacant seat (the recalled member being ineligible to stand) within three months of announcement of the official recall result.

The CEC has developed standard procedures for each stage of the process, such as signature forms and reporting requirements.[13] These are the basis for the reviews by local commissions, to ensure that only valid signatures are counted. In 2024, a newly elected KMT member of the Legislative Yuan, Weng Hsiao-ling (翁曉玲), pushed for an amendment to the POERA, warning recall proposers that "they should not expect to get off scot-free" if they submit fraudulent signatures.[14] The KMT-led majority quickly adopted a new article (98-2), instituting criminal penalties for citizens found to have engaged in improper or fraudulent signature collection for recall proposals. These now include not only heavy fines, but up to five years' imprisonment. Legislator Weng went on to comment that, "the purpose of this amendment is to end the past practice of people submitting fake signatures, dead people's signatures, or copying voter registers."[15] This amendment went into effect on February 20, 2025.[16]

The Controversies of 2024 and the 2025 "Great Recall" Wave

Political Context

After eight years of a unified DPP government controlling both the Legislative and Executive Yuan, in 2024 Taiwan's voters delivered a divided government. President Lai Ching-te was elected President, while the DPP fell short of a majority in the Legislative Yuan. Out of 113 seats, the DPP won 51, the KMT 52, and the relatively new Taiwan People Party (台灣民眾黨, TPP) gained 8 seats (the TPP won no district seats, but scored high enough in the separate party list voting to win 8 seats). The TPP tacitly supported the KMT candidate for Speaker–former Kaohsiung mayor Han–and the two parties have since formed a fairly solid legislative alliance, giving the KMT a comfortable majority (the remaining two independent members also usually caucus with the KMT).[17]

This new majority, after taking office on February 1, 2024, quickly began to adopt a series of controversial legislative measures. One of the first was a package of legislative reforms that included an expansion of the powers of the Legislative Yuan itself, in ways that would significantly curtail the authority of the executive branch.[18] This sparked a new protest movement in May 2024–popularly deemed the "Blue Bird Movement (青鳥運動)"--led by civil society groups who criticized some of the proposed measures as unconstitutional and anti-democratic. These rallies drew thousands of people to the streets around the Legislative Yuan for several days.[19]

Image: "Bluebird Movement" protestors on Qingdao East Road in Taipei (May 21, 2024). (Image source: Wikimedia Commons)

In response to these proposed legislative reforms, the Executive Yuan responded by referring these measures to Taiwan's Constitutional Court, which ruled in October to strike down the most controversial elements of the "reform" package, while enabling the rest to go into effect.[20] In reaction to the court's taking up the case, in the second half of 2024 the KMT-TPP majority adopted amendments to the *Constitutional Court Procedure Act* (憲法訴訟法, CCPA). These provisions increased the quorum required for the Constitutional Court to make rulings, and the Legislative Yuan then rejected the regularly scheduled slate of new nominees to the bench (the justices serve staggered, fixed terms).[21] This combination of actions leaves the court without enough members to meet the new quorum rule.[22] The court is now in the awkward position of having to consider whether to overturn this amendment to its own procedure (the court accepted related petitions in May, but hearings have not made significant progress as of the time of writing).[23]

Meanwhile, on the budgetary front, the KMT-TPP majority also adopted revisions to the *Act Governing the Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures* (財政收支劃分法), which would sharply reduce the central

government's overall budget by reserving a much larger share of tax revenue for local governments (a majority of which, not coincidentally, are controlled by the KMT).[24] The KMT-TPP majority followed up in the annual budget review by drastically cutting allocations across the board, notably for essential spending on such matters as national defense.[25]

These moves, together with the anti-recall measures noted above, stimulated a second "Blue Bird" movement in December 2024, once again drawing thousands to the streets.[26] This second movement was led by essentially the same civil society groups that had led the first. They were especially concerned at what they viewed as an attack on the Constitutional Court. In any democracy, when there is a deadlock between the executive and legislative branches, the judicial branch is usually the best venue for resolving it. Some of the civil society groups and allied scholars began talking about Taiwan entering a constitutional crisis.[27] Therefore, the "Blue Bird" groups and allies began to prepare to open a new front, by actively promoting recall of several KMT legislators. It was this civil society mobilization that formed the nucleus of the current wave of recalls.

The Primary Recall Wave

Some "Blue Bird" groups began collecting signatures to recall various KMT members, and the momentum picked up significantly during the December protests. In early 2025, these groups and allies continued holding related events, but this time in various districts around the country, building energy at the local constituency level.[28] The campaign eventually grew to target all 37 regular constituency seats held by the KMT (including one independent who caucuses with the KMT). Note that the TPP could not be targeted, because all of their members were elected from the party list and are therefore not subject to recall.

As a result of these efforts, on the first business day in February, after the legally mandated one year had passed (the current term of legislators took office on Feb. 1, 2024), civil society groups from 19 constituencies submitted their first-stage petitions to their local election commissions.[29] Before the newly-tightened regulations took effect on Feb. 20 *(see above)*, a further 16 groups submitted their first-stage petitions. The only two groups that did not submit were those from the outlying islands of Kinmen and Matsu. In total, 35 first-stage petitions were reviewed and declared valid, enabling these efforts to begin the second stage of signature gathering on various dates in March.[30] According to the regulations, during the second stage official campaign offices may be set up, and campaign events and advertising are permitted. Therefore, much of Taiwan entered campaign mode in earnest.

The Counter-Recall Effort

As the momentum for recalls began to emerge in late 2024, some elements of the KMT began to prepare a counter-wave of recalls against DPP members of the Legislative Yuan, as well as local councilors in various parts of the country. A total of 22 DPP legislators were targeted–of which 15 eventually passed the first-stage of signature collection, beginning the second stage in April. Notably, most of these efforts were directly launched by KMT local party officers and activists, as opposed to the civil society backed recalls of KMT legislators.[31]

As noted above, all signature collection efforts are subject to strict scrutiny, with improperly documented signatures declared invalid. According to the law, when the number of signatures invalidated causes the total to drop below the mandated threshold (1 percent of the electorate in the first stage, 10 percent in the second), the proposers are given 10 days to submit additional signatures.[32] This happened to many of the recalls this year: in one notable case–that of the attempted recall of KMT legislator Hsu Hsin-ying (徐欣瑩)--the proposers were unable to submit enough additional signatures, causing the recall to fail.[33]

Some irregularities were reported during the signature collection process, including instances of ineligible or fraudulent signatures, such as the signatures of deceased individuals. The CEC announced in April that there were approximately 2,000 such signatures during all of the first-stage signature campaigns. The signatures of dead people in particular were heavily concentrated in the counter-recalls (1784 vs. 12 such signatures).[34] The CEC referred the most serious cases to relevant prosecutors' offices, and as of early June prosecutors had filed charges against 195 people across the country, of whom over 80 were KMT party staff members.[35]

Although KMT legislators had been advocating for strict er enforcement of related laws (*see above*), this wave of investigations and legal actions prompted criticism from the KMT. KMT Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) even

compared these steps to the Nazi takeover of Weimar Germany.[36] However, the relatively high frequency of errors in some of the recall efforts targeting DPP legislators also reflects general shortcomings in the efforts, which were reportedly under-resourced and rushed, possibly leading them to rely on improperly compiled signature lists, such as party membership rosters.

> "Therefore, the "Blue Bird" groups and allies began to prepare to open a new front, by actively promoting recall of several KMT legislators. It was this civil society mobilization that formed the nucleus of the current wave of recalls."

There is also a secondary "counter wave" of recalls against local elected officials of the DPP, such as city councilors and the independent (formerly TPP) mayor of Hsinchu City. A total of 18 such local recalls were initiated, though they fall outside of the scope of this policy backgrounder.

Image: Volunteer workers carry recall-related documents to the Central Election Commission in Taipei (February 3, 2025). (Image source: Central News Agency)

The Recalls State of Play (as of July 18, 2025)

For the primary wave of recalls, which targeted KMT legislators, the 60-day collection periods for each district fell on various dates in May. Four of the total of 35 recalls that passed the first stage fell short of the necessary number of second-stage signatures, thus ending those efforts. Citizens in the remaining 31 districts submitted a sufficient number of valid signatures initially: of these, 24 were certified directly, and 7 were requested to submit additional signatures within 10 days.[37] Seven of these were subsequently certified. Therefore, recall elections will be held in 31 KMT-held districts.[38] According to the POERA, the CEC is required to set dates for these votes between 20-60 days after certification.[39] At their regularly scheduled meeting on June 20, the CEC set the polling date for the 24 originally certified recalls as July 26.[40] On July 2, the CEC announced that the two recalls certified later will be held on August 23, citing "limited administrative capacity of the Nantou County Election Commission and the timeline required for recall procedures."[41]

In the counter-recall wave (which targeted DPP legislators), out of the 15 that passed the first stage, all failed to reach the second stage signature thresholds. Therefore, none of the DPP members of the LY will face a recall ballot in this year's summer elections.

Summary of 2025 Legislative Recalls *(as of July 18)*

Recalls and Counter-recalls	Targeting KMT legislators*	Targeting DPP legislators
Launched (or declared)	37	22
Passed first stage of signature collection	35	15
Passed second stage of signature collection	31	0
Recall passed at ballot box	*(to be held July 26 or Aug. 23)*	-
By-election results	*(est. to be held from Oct-Dec)*	-

* Includes one independent member who reliably caucuses with the KMT. Source: Compiled by the author.

The Next Steps in the Recall Campaign

Altogether, 31 of Taiwan's legislators will face a recall vote this summer. Since this is over a quarter of the total of 113 seats in the LY, and half of the opposition-held seats, the recall wave amounts to a virtual midterm election. It will give a large proportion of Taiwan's voters a chance to express their approval or disapproval of the performance of the Legislative Yuan, and their degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the government.

In most districts, turnout may be substantial, although it will likely fall well short of the relatively high turnout in a full national election.[42] What is less clear is how many recalls will succeed. Polling organizations are beginning to gear up to offer predictions as to how many of these members will actually be recalled, but solid data will be hard to come by for many districts (and in any case will be subject to standard restrictions in Taiwan's election law, which prohibits the release of polling data in the final ten days before voting). For those recalls that do receive enough votes, those seats would be considered vacant, with by-elections to be held within three months (i.e. roughly between October and December of 2025).

Potential Outcomes and Effects

How the composition of the Legislative Yuan will be affected by the recall wave is an open question. A net swing of 6 seats would be required to give the DPP an outright majority, placing both the legislative and executive branches under DPP control. With up to 31 seats in play, such an outcome is certainly possible. However, even a successful recall does not necessarily indicate that the seat will change parties: it would only disqualify the current member as an individual, and a new candidate from the same party might well be able to hold the seat in the subsequent by-election. Indeed, this might be as likely as not, since many of the districts in question are considered relatively safe for the KMT.[43] Those that are comparatively competitive may turn out to be the key battlegrounds in the eventual round of by-elections that determine whether or not the KMT-TPP alliance will be able to retain its legislative majority.

This fact illustrates why the common concern that recalls simply provide losing candidates with an opportunity to re-run elections may be overstated. It is true that recall efforts can be initiated by political opponents, since the process is an established democratic freedom of all Taiwanese citizens. However, as a political strategy, recalls are usually quite risky. Voters are likely to be irritated at anyone that tries to second-guess their choices, and frequent elections may lead to voter fatigue. Therefore, the political backlash of any recall can easily outweigh the political benefits, especially in the case of an obviously frivolous or spiteful effort.

In fact, due to the requirements to recall an elected official in Taiwan, recalls can only be successful when there is a substantial, broad constituency of dissatisfaction with the official involved. This is the case with many of the recalls this year. Not only are independent civil society groups highly mobilized, but non-negligible numbers of voters who supported the KMT and TPP in 2024 are dissatisfied or disappointed with the actions of their own parties in the Legislative Yuan.[44] Therefore, most of the primary wave of recalls were able to generate sufficient support to put the matter before the ballot box once again. The exceptions prove the rule: the recalls in Kinmen and Matsu never really got off the ground, and signature collection efforts fell short or struggled in many rural areas such as Miaoli and Nantou (although it is notable that they were easily successful in even more rural Hualien and Taitung).

By contrast, the counter-recalls lacked such widespread support. None of the 22 recall efforts directed against DPP legislators passed the second stage. This lack of momentum can be basically explained by the fact that voters generally understood them to be a political tactic of the KMT to hit back against the DPP–and indeed, they were mostly openly launched and run by local KMT branches.[45] Their efforts were further muddled by the fact that KMT headquarters began to adopt a general anti-recall position.

Indeed, some KMT figures have adopted increasingly charged rhetoric in response to the recalls, with party statements referring to the emergence of "Green Communism" (綠共), a term suggesting that the DPP is attempting to create a new authoritarian regime in Taiwan.[46] This narrative was presaged by the KMT's attempted launch (through the legislature) of a referendum "against Martial Law", and it emerged fully as the slogan of the KMT's major march on April 26. Likewise, KMT Chairman Eric Chu drew controversy on May 8 for doubling down on historical comparisons to Nazi Germany while criticizing President Lai, in response to the investigations of alleged fraudulent signature collection on the part of various KMT staff and officers around the country.[47]

A Step Forward for Taiwanese Democracy

Regardless of the final seat count, the recall wave has provided a platform for citizens to concretely express their displeasure at the performance of the Legislative

Yuan. This is likely to have a demonstrable effect going forward. It should deter individual members from activities that are either seen as too corrupt, or suspected of being beholden to foreign influence. It should also pull the legislative branch as a whole closer to the mainstream of public opinion.

In addition, the recall campaigns have demonstrated a high level of civic engagement across Taiwan. Volunteers were also remarkably diligent in collecting and submitting signatures in the correct format. Local election commissions also took their signature review processes seriously.

Taken together, the 2025 "Great Recall" marks a new stage of democratic development in Taiwan, reflecting the maturity of its civil society and the vitality of its electoral institutions. While controversial amid Taiwan's polarized political environment, the recall movement has been citizen-led, and the outcomes will be decided by voters at the ballot box. This expression of the vibrancy of Taiwan's democracy should be welcomed by Taiwan's friends in the international community.

The author is grateful to GTI Intern Diarra Molock for her research assistance in the preparation of this report.

About the Author

Bo Tedards is a long-time observer of Taiwan's political scene, who recently returned to the USA after living in Taiwan for over 25 years. He is a former staff member of the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (TFD), where he served as director of the International Cooperation Department (2007-2010, and again from 2016-2022). In his first years in Taiwan, he worked for the Taiwan Association for Human Rights, the Institute for National Policy Research, the Taipei Times, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From 2004 to 2010, he served as coordinator of the World Forum for Democratization in Asia (WFDA), a regional network of democracy advocates, and from 2013-2015 as director of Amnesty International Taiwan. He received his MA in law and diplomacy from the Fletcher School of Tufts University, and his BA in political science from Yale University.

About GTI

GTI is a 501(c)(3) non-profit policy incubator dedicated to insightful, cutting-edge, and inclusive research on policy issues regarding Taiwan and the world. Our mission is to enhance the relationship between Taiwan and other countries, especially the United States, through policy research and programs that promote better public understanding about Taiwan and its people.

Acknowledgements

The views expressed in this paper are the authors' own and do not necessarily represent the positions of the Global Taiwan Institute.

Cover Photo: A protester holding a banner reading "Great Recall" outside of the Central Election Commission in Taipei (undated). (Image source: CNA)

ENDNOTES

1 David B. Gordon, "American Influences on Sun Yat Sen," *Education About Asia* 16, no. 2, (2011), https://www.asianstudies.org/publications/eaa/archives/american-influences-on-sun-yatsen/.

2 Republic of China (Taiwan), Constitution of the Republic of China (Taiwan) 1947, Article 17, https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=A0000001. See also Article 133, which states, "A person elected may, in accordance with law, be recalled by his constituency."

3 See, for example, the archival record of the 1957 regulations for the election and recall of the members of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, especially page 5. 國家發展委員會檔案管理局–檔案支援教學網>檔案瀏覽>民國34年至87年臺灣議會與地方自治發展>臺灣省議會與省政.

4 *Public Officials Election and Recall Act* (Taiwan), amended February 2025. Laws & Regulations Database of The Republic of China. https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=D0020010.

5 "第九章," in 臺灣選政, Wikisource, accessed July 16, 2025, https://zh.wikisource.org/wiki/%E8%87%BA%E7%81%A3%E9%81%B8%E6%94%BF/%E7%AC%AC%E4%B9%9D%E7%AB%A0.

6 賴建寰(Lai, Chien-Huan), "割闌尾是怎麼『失敗』的？回顧94年選罷法修法史," 公民監督國會聯盟, 發布日期, February, 25, 2015, https://ccw.org.tw/news/94.

7 Su Fang-ho, "2014 ELECTIONS: Appendectomy Project has good day", *Taipei Times*, November 30, 2014, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/11/30/2003605662.

8 劉珞亦, "罷免韓國瑜，早就發生過？｜政治熱議", June 2, 2020, *Plain Law Movement*, June 2, 2020, https://plainlaw.me/posts/daniel-han.

9 Duncan Levine, "Another First for Democracy in Taiwan," *European Chamber of Congress Taiwan*, June 12, 2020, https://euroview.ecct.com.tw/category-inside.php?id=285.

10 Jason Pan, "Taichung Voters Recall Chen Po-wei," *Taipei Times*, October 24, 2021, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2021/10/24/2003766663.

11 34 members of the Legislative Yuan are not elected from districts, but from a nationwide party list; voters choose their party of preference on a separate ballot, and seats are allocated according to the percentage of votes received by each party. Therefore, such members cannot be recalled. See: *Public Officials Election and Recall Act* (Taiwan), amended February 2025. Laws & Regulations Database of The Republic of China, Art. 75, Para. 2.

12 Ibid. See in particular Arts. 79 and 83.

13 Ibid.

14 詹家威,"賴士葆稱偽造連署沒那麼嚴重 粉專貼翁曉玲影片打臉：別以為這樣就沒事!" *New Talk* 新聞, April 18, 2025, https://newtalk.tw/news/view/2025-04-18/966191.

15 Ibid.

16 Liu Shih-yi, Lin Ching-yin, Kao Hua-chien and James Thompson, "DPP seeks Recall Act injunction from Constitutional Court," *Focus Taiwan*, February 20, 2025, https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202502200021.

17 Brian Hioe, "KMT's Han Kuo-yu Is Taiwan's New Legislative Speaker," *The Diplomat*, February 2, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/kmts-han-kuo-yu-is-taiwans-new-legislative-speaker/.

18 Hsieh Chun-ling and Chen Cheng-yu, "Proposed Reforms Would Be Unconstitutional: DPP," *Taipei Times*, April 1, 2024, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2024/04/01/2003815775.

19 Jason Pan, "More than 100,000 Attend Taipei Protests," *Taipei Times*, May 25, 2024, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2024/05/25/2003818375.

20 "Taiwan Court Rules Parts of Parliament Reforms Unconstitutional in Setback to Opposition," *Reuters*, October 25, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-court-rules-parts-parliament-reforms-unconstitutional-setback-opposition-2024-10-25/.

21 Yi-Li Lee, Shao-Man Lee, Chien-Chih Lin and Vivianne Yen-Ching Weng, "Taiwan's Constitutional Court at Risk: Political Maneuvering to Erode Judicial Independence," *ConstitutionNet*, December 13, 2024, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/taiwans-constitutional-court-risk-political-maneuvering-erode-judicial-independence.

22 聲明｜「黨意先決，司法還要被綁架多久？」民間司改會針對立法院行使大法官人事同意權案聲明, *Judicial Reform Foundation*, December 25, 2024, https://www.jrf.org.tw/articles/2859.

23 林長順 ,"憲法訴訟法釋憲案 大法官過半數同意受理," 中央社 *CNA*, May 16, 2025, https://www.cna.com.tw/news/asoc/202505160081.aspx.

24 Ben Levine, "Leveraging Legislative Power: The KMT's Strategy to Regain Influence in Taiwan / Part 1: Shifting Financial Resources to Local Governments," *Global Taiwan Brief* Vol. 10, No. 2, January 22, 2025, https://globaltaiwan.org/2025/01/leveraging-legislative-power-the-kmts-strategy-to-regain-influence-in-taiwan-part-1/.

25 林雨佑, 謝馥伊, 嚴文廷 ,"20小時不斷電表決，2025總預算刪減2,075億創新高，藍白：嚴格把關、還錢於民；政院：造

成行政窒礙難行," *The Reporter*, January 20, 2025, https://www.twreporter.org/a/legislature-passes-2025-government-budget?utm_source=-threads&utm_medium=fanpage.

26 Sam Garcia, "Thousands Gather Outside Legislative Yuan to Protest Proposed Amendments," *Taipei Times,* December 20, 2024, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2024/12/20/2003828839.

27 李文馨, "反對《憲法訴訟法》修惡！90法律學者聯合聲明：盼各黨團從善如流通過覆議," *Liberty Times Net*, January 9, 2025, https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4918453.

28 Jason Pan, "Groups Begin New Phase of 'Bluebird Movement,'" *Taipei Times*, December 25, 2024, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2024/12/25/2003829080.

29 Tristan Hilderbrand, "Civic Groups Submit 20 Recall Petitions to Remove KMT and TPP Politicians," *Radio Taiwan International*, February 4, 2025, https://en.rti.org.tw/news/view/id/2012418.

30 Teng Pei-ju and Sunny Lai, "Explainer: Mass Slate of Recall Votes Leaves KMT Staring Down Disaster," *Focus Taiwan - CNA English News*, June 21, 2025, https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202506210014.

31 "民團10日將送12藍委罷免提議書 國民黨提「以罷制罷」鎖定綠委," 公視新聞網PNN, February 9, 2025, https://news.pts.org.tw/article/736956.

32 *Public Officials Election And Recall Act* - Article Content - Laws & Regulations Database of The Republic of China (Taiwan), Article 79, Paragraph 2 and Article 83, Paragraph 2.

33 Patrick Chen and Chris Gorin, "KMT Lawmaker Hsu Hsin-ying Keeps Seat After Recall Drive Falls Short," *Taiwan Plus,* May 11, 2025, https://www.taiwanplus.com/news/taiwan-news/politics/250511009/kmt-lawmaker-hsu-hsin-ying-keeps-seat-after-recall-drive-falls-short.

34 "41件罷免案涉偽造或死亡連署 名單一次看," *CNA*, April 16, 2025, https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202504160239.aspx.

35 Hsieh Chun-lin and Esme Yeh, "Twenty Detained in KMT-Linked Recall Forgery Case," *Taipei Times*, June 10, 2025, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/06/10/2003838362.

36 Lery Hiciano, "Eric Chu Criticized for Comparing Taiwan to Germany under Hitler," Taipei Times, May 8, 2025, https://www.taipei-times.com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/05/08/2003836546.

37 中央社記者高華謙，「全國罷免送件將截止 7藍委待補件查對、無綠委成案」，中央社, June 6, 2025, https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202506230278.aspx

38 Teng Pei-ju "5 more KMT lawmakers to face recall votes on Aug. 23: CEC," *Focus Taiwan*, July 18, 2025, https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202507180024.

39 *Public Officials Election And Recall Act* - Article Content - Laws & Regulations Database of The Republic of China (Taiwan), Article 87.

40 Teng Pei-ju, "24 KMT Lawmakers, Hsinchu Mayor to Face Recall Votes on July 26," Focus Taiwan - CNA English News, June 20, 2025, https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202506200019.

41 Kao Hua-chien and Lee Chieh-yu, "2 more KMT lawmakers to face recall votes on Aug. 23," *Focus Taiwan - CNA English News*, July 2, 2025, https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202507020026.

42 Sean Scanlan, "Poll predicts Taiwan recall dependent upon voter turnout", *Taiwan News*, July 15, 2025, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/6155932.

43 By definition, the KMT won all these seats in 2024, and they have won most of them for multiple cycles. By the author's calculation, in the five general elections (i.e. not including by-elections) since the adoption of single-member districts in 2008, the KMT has won 79% of the races in the 31 targeted districts. Over that same period, 12 of these seats have never been lost by the KMT, and 3 have been held continuously by the same KMT member.

44 Stella Robertson, "Are KMT Supporters in Taipei Switching Sides?" *Domino Theory*, May 2, 2025, https://dominotheory.com/are-kmt-supporters-in-taipei-switching-sides.

45 Brian Hioe, "KMT Recall Campaigns Against DPP Legislators Run Aground," *New Bloom Magazine*, June 9, 2025, https://newbloommag.net/2025/06/09/kmt-dpp-recall-campaign/.

46 "「反綠共、戰獨裁」凱道大集結 朱主席：520開始全民罷免賴清德," Press Release: Kuomintang Cultural Communication Committee, April 26, 2025, https://www.kmt.org.tw/2025/04/520.html.

47 Brian Hioe, "After Criticism from German Representative Office, Eric Chu Doubles Down on Nazi Comparisons," *New Bloom Magazine*, May 8, 2025, https://newbloommag.net/2025/05/08/eric-chu-nazi-comparisons/.