Global Taiwan Institute

“Patriots Governing Taiwan” Part 1: The Taiwan-Focused Proxy Groups of the Chinese Communist Party



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Cover Photo: Supporters of the organized crime-affiliated "China Unification Promotion Party" (中華統一促進黨) carry PRC flags during a demonstration in Taipei (May 2016).
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Introduction: The CCP's Narratives on "Reunification" and "Patriots Governing Taiwan"

On October 25, 2026, at a forum in the southeastern Chinese city of Fuzhou, Song Tao (宋濤)—director of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO, 中央台辦)—gave a speech commemorating the PRC's "Taiwan Restoration Day" holiday (台灣光復紀念日), which marks Taiwan's retrocession to Chinese administration at the end of World War II. Amidst the boilerplate phraseology in his speech, Song vowed that "We must firmly support patriotic unification forces within the island, firmly advancing unification of the motherland, working in common in the great enterprise of national revival" (我們堅定支持島內愛國統一力量，堅定推進祖國統一，共襄民族復興偉業).[1]

Song's comments are part of a larger Chinese Communist Party (CCP, 中國共產黨) discourse on "patriotism" in Taiwan. In the same timeframe as Song's speech, from October 26-28, 2025 the Xinhua News Agency—the official PRC state news outlet—released a series of three official editorials under the pseudonym Zhong Taiwen (鐘台文). In the second of these, "The Development of Cross-Strait Relations and the Benefits of Unification" (兩岸關係發展和統一利好), Xinhua made this assertion:

> *In the name of ensuring national sovereignty, security, [and] development interests, after peaceful unification the Taiwan region's current social system, way of life, etc. will receive full respect. [We shall] implement "patriots governing Taiwan," [with] a high degree of autonomy, [and] the broad mass of Taiwan compatriots can truly have the leading part. Private property, religious faith, lawful rights and interests, etc. will receive abundant protections, [and] feelings of loving Taiwan and loving the land will receive full consideration.*[2]

Alongside these apparently soothing reassurances regarding property rights and other matters is the significant mention of "implementing 'patriots governing Taiwan'" (實行"愛國者治台"). While vague in many respects, the official editorial appears to promise that private life in Taiwan would be left alone—while also strongly signaling intent to transform Taiwan's form of government into one more to the CCP's liking. However, what exact form this might take—as well as the identities and backgrounds of the "patriots" who would govern Taiwan in this future scenario—are left unexplained.

The messages regarding "patriotic forces" in Taiwan parallel CCP narratives connected to the control of restive peripheral regions currently under PRC administration. Persons of Tibetan and Uyghur heritage, for example, who join and support state organizations in the PRC are praised for "patriotic" actions (*see accompanying image*). Submission to central government authority, and the merging of ethnic differences into the larger "Chinese nation" (中華民族), are regularly praised in CCP-controlled channels as "patriotic"—a propaganda message that has grown in prominence throughout the tenure of CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping (習近平).[3]

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1 "Forum on Commemorating the 81st Anniversary of Taiwan Recovery Convened in Fuzhou" *(纪念台湾光复81周年座谈会在福州举办), People's Daily Online* (Oct. 26, 2026), https://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2026/1026/c64387-40821401.html.

2 "Xinhua Publishes 3 Signed Articles: The Cause of National Unification Enters a New Historical Process" *(新华社连发3篇署名文章：国家统一事业进入新的历史进程), Beijing Daily* (Oct. 28, 2025) https://xinwen.bjd.com.cn/content/s69005589e4b02424b-0c22a6f.html .

3 For one example of such CCP discourse, see: "Patriotism Is the Core of the Spirit of the Chinese Nation" *(爱国主义是中华民族精神的核心), Qiushi* (求是), Oct. 13, 2024, https://www.qstheory.cn/laigao/ycjx/2024-10/13/c_1130209360.htm. For a discussion of CCP discourse regarding the "Chinese nation" *(Zhonghua Minzu,* 中华民族*),* see: John Dotson, "Campaign Against 'New Qing History' Reinforces Ethnic Unity," *China Brief* (Oct. 1, 2026), https://jamestown.org/campaign-against-new-qing-history-reinforces-ethnic-unity/.



Image: In a 2015 meeting, Gyaincain Norbu, the Chinese government-designated 11th Panchen Lama (not designated or recognized by the Dalai Lama), presents a gift to CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping. State media commentary on the meeting praised Gyaincain Norbu and other state-designated religious figures for upholding "glorious patriotic faith traditions" (愛國愛教的光榮傳統).[4]

Beijing's crackdown on liberal institutions and personal freedoms in Hong Kong, in particular, bears a number of significant hallmarks that foreshadow how it would likely approach the administration of Taiwan.

Beijing's crackdown on liberal institutions and personal freedoms in Hong Kong, in particular, bears a number of significant hallmarks that foreshadow how it would likely approach the administration of Taiwan. This includes a prominent discourse on the need for "patriots" to govern the territory.

The Narratives on "One Country, Two Systems" and "Patriots Governing Hong Kong"

The mention of "patriots" ruling a future Taiwan is not an isolated one-off: it exists in a larger context of CCP discourse regarding the processes for taking control of peripheral territories beyond its control. There are many narrative parallels in the CCP discourse for both Hong Kong and Taiwan—particularly in regards to the CCP's "One Country, Two Systems" (OCTS, 一國兩制) framework and its pro forma promises of autonomy, as well as the discussion of "patriots" in each region. The PRC's pacification of unrest in Hong Kong, and the subjection of the territory to firmer central government control, is consistently held up in state discourse as a successful example of the application of the OCTS framework.[5] The PRC government continues to mandate the application of OCTS as the framework for the future annexation of Taiwan.[6] However, OCTS has been firmly rejected by all but fringe elements of Taiwan's political spectrum.[7] *(Note: Further discussion of "One Country, Two Systems" and its relevance to Taiwan will be discussed in the second report in this series.)*

4 "Chinese President Urges Panchen Lama to Carry forward Patriotic Tradition," *CCTV* (June 10, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ujp6R-RcSE-w.

5 "The Successful Application of 'One Country Two Systems' Is Recognized Around the World -- Chairman Xi Jinping's Important Speech Produces an Enthusiastic International Response" *("一国两制"实践在香港取得的成功举世公认——习近平主席重要讲话引发热烈国际反响), Xinhua (July 3, 2022),* https://www.hmo.gov.cn/25/25rlfx/202207/t20220703_35639.html; and "'One Country, Two Systems' a Success," Hong Kong City Government (July 1, 2024), https://www.news.gov.hk/eng/2024/07/20240701/20240701_001907_778.html.

6 *The Taiwan Problem and the Enterprise of China's Reunification in the New Era (《台湾问题与新时代中国统一事业》白皮书),* PRC State Council Information Office (Aug. 10, 2022), http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2022n/202304/t20230407_710481.html.

7 For an example of public opinion polling on this issue, see: "Taiwan Public Rejects 'One Country, Two Systems'," ROC Mainland Affairs Council (March 21, 2019), https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=2BA0753CBE348412&s=9F000FAD137241F9&Create=1.



Image: A 2022 PRC state media graphic praising the success of the "One Country, Two Systems" framework for Hong Kong. The quote is from an official with the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, a branch of the PRC's Ministry of State Security (MSS, 國安部).[8]

The official CCP discourse surrounding the crackdown on Hong Kong autonomy — an effort that kicked into high gear in the period 2019-2021 — is instructive. In this context, the formulation of "patriots governing Hong Kong" (愛國者治港) has been a central theme: with "patriots" or "patriotic" used as coded language to indicate persons deemed loyal to the Chinese central government in Beijing (and by extension, to the CCP).

In April 2021, Xia Baolong (夏寶龍), director of the PRC's Hong Kong and Macao Work Office, delivered a speech about Hong Kong in which he asserted that "patriotism means the love of the People's Republic of China." Bao went on to explain that: "Patriots are inevitably committed to upholding China's national sovereignty, security and development interests… whereas the reverse is true for the anti-China, destabilizing forces," who had "exploited various elections to infiltrate [Hong Kong]'s structure of governance." Particular vigilance is called for in the latter case, for:

> *[In regards to the] anti-China, destabilizing forces and separatists … Seizing the governing power and destabilizing Hong Kong were in fact only part of their goal. They also conspired to destabilize the mainland, and to subvert the leadership of the Communist Party of China as well as the socialist system with Chinese characteristics, ultimately disrupting the course of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.*[9]

An official document issued by the city government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) during the same timeframe was even more direct in making it clear that a "patriot" is someone loyal to the Communist Party. It stated that:

> *The patriots in HKSAR's political structure must always adhere to the principle of "One Country" and respect the differences of "Two Systems." Article 1 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China clearly stipulates that the socialist system is the fundamental system of the People's Republic of China. Leadership by the Communist Party of China is the defining feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics. It is prohibited for any organization or individual to damage the socialist system. Patriots must respect and should not attack the fundamental system and characteristics of our Country.*[10]

8 Zhang Yangfei, "'One Country, Two Systems' Key to Hong Kong," *China Daily* (May 22, 2022), https://www.chinadailyhk.com/hk/article/272639.

9 National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, "Speech by Xia Baolong at Symposium on Implementing Principle of 'Patriots Administering Hong Kong'" (April 6, 2021), http://en.cppcc.gov.cn/2021-04/06/c_608784.htm.

10 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region *Government, Improve Electoral System, Ensure Patriots*

The Role of the CCP United Front Work Department

In the CCP's efforts to control potentially restive regions already under its administration (such as Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong), as well as its efforts to assert control over Taiwan, the CCP United Front Work Department (UFWD, 統一戰線工作部) plays a key role. Both united front work as a concept, and the functions of the UFWD as a specific apparatus of the CCP, are generally poorly understood except by a small number of academic specialists.[11] United front work, in broad terms, encompasses the CCP's efforts to cultivate, coopt, and control persons and social groups outside the ranks of the Party itself.[12]

The UFWD, as a particular functional CCP bureaucracy, performs a number of roles, both domestically and abroad. Internationally, it operates a range of front organizations—such as the Council for the Promotion of the Peaceful Reunification of China (*see further below in this report*)—that spread pro-CCP propaganda and seek to exert influence over business, Chinese diaspora, and other groups. Within the PRC itself, the efforts of the UFWD cut across a range of policy areas: to include ethnic policy, controlling religious organizations, monitoring private enterprises, and operating the "Eight Democratic Parties" of the PRC system.[13]

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United front work conducted by the CCP is not limited to the UFWD as a specific bureaucracy: under Xi Jinping, official Party materials have consistently asserted that united front work is an "all of party" (全黨) effort.[14] That said, the UFWD does bear specific responsibilities for much of the Party's united front work, particularly as it pertains to the management of the CCP's broad array of front organizations. This is very much the case in relation to Taiwan—where, as the subsequent examples detailed in this report will demonstrate, the UFWD is the hidden hand (and often, hardly hidden at all) behind many of the CCP's primary "patriotic" Taiwan-focused organizations.

Administering Hong Kong, p. 30) (March 2021), https://www.cmab.gov.hk/improvement/filemanager/content/pdf/en/resource-centre/booklet.pdf.

11 For an excellent overview discussion of united front work as a concept in CCP statecraft, see: Anne-Marie Brady, "On the Correct Use of Terms," *China Brief* (May 9, 2019), https://jamestown.org/on-the-correct-use-of-terms-for-understanding-united-front-work/. See as well: Peter Mattis," How China Shapes the World: An Introduction to United Front Work," essay published on LinkedIn (Sep. 21, 2017), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-china-shapes-world-introduction-united-front-work-peter-mattis. This latter essay also includes links to other worthwhile sources.

12 In the context of Taiwan, the author has previously defined united front work as follows: "A range of measures—including but not limited to financial and/or psychological cooptation, the creation and manipulation of front organizations, and political subversion—intended to allow the CCP to coopt and control persons or social groups outside the ranks of the party." See further discussion in: John Dotson, *The Chinese Communist Party's Political Warfare Directed Against Taiwan: Overview and Analysis,* Global Taiwan Institute (May 2024) (pp. 14-16), https://globaltaiwan.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/OR_CCP-Political-Warfare.pdf.

13 Marcel Angliviel de la Beaumelle, "The United Front Work Department: "Magic Weapon" at Home and Abroad," *China Brief* (July 6, 2017), https://jamestown.org/united-front-work-department-magic-weapon-home-abroad/.

14 "General Secretary Xi Jinping's Important Thought on Successfully Performing the Party's United Front Work in the New Era Is Fundamental Guidance for United Front Work in the New Era" *(*习近平总书记关于做好新时代党的统一战线工作的重要思想是新时代统战工作的根本指针*)*, Guangdong Province UFWD (Dec. 20, 2024), https://www.gdtzb.gov.cn/llyj/txlj/content/post_88745.html.

The Taiwan Front Organizations of the CCP United Front Work Department

Within the territory of the PRC, the CCP UFWD maintains control of an array of "patriotic" Taiwan-oriented front organizations. These organizations are operated primarily for propaganda purposes, to promote a narrative that the majority of people in Taiwan are eager to be incorporated into the PRC. These organizations are also used for the cooptation of persons who may be leveraged in pursuit of CCP goals, and who might help build networks of people for influence and information gathering. A full list of all such organizations would be beyond the scope of this report. However, two of the most prominent such organizations are the "Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League" and the "All-China Federation of Taiwanese Compatriots," which serve nominally distinct but functionally similar roles within the CCP's Taiwan-oriented united front system. A third organization, the "Council for the Promotion of the Peaceful Reunification of China", operates both domestically and internationally to promote the annexation of Taiwan under PRC sovereign control.

The Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League

The first of these organizations is the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League (TDSGL, 台灣民主自治同盟).[15] The TDSGL (frequently abbreviated as "Taimeng," 台盟), is one of the "eight democratic parties" (八大民主黨派) that operate as CCP adjuncts within the PRC political system.[16] The 8 nominal parties are a "political alliance of patriots, accepting the leadership of the Communist Party and working in concert with the Communist Party" (愛國者的政治聯盟，接受中國共產黨領導的同中共通力合作) to achieve its goals.[17] The Taimeng purports to be a political party representing pro-unification Taiwanese. In reality, the Taimeng, like the other official "democratic parties," operates as a propaganda vehicle controlled and stage-managed by the UFWD. Its prominent members both participate in other UFWD-controlled organizations, and appear regularly alongside UFWD officials at state-sponsored fora and other public events (*see accompanying images*).

While the PRC regime presents the existence of the "democratic parties" as proof of political pluralism, official PRC sources (in Chinese) consistently emphasize the subordinate nature of these "parties" to the CCP. The Taimeng's own website describes the group as a CCP proxy, in convoluted and almost comically servile terms: it is "a friendly party that accepts the leadership of the Communist Party and works in concert with the Communist Party, a party joining government in multi-party cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the Communist Party in the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics" (是接受中國共產黨領導、同中國共產黨通力合作的親密友黨，是中國共產黨領導的多黨合作和政治協商制度中的中國特色社會主義參政黨). The group's avowed purpose is to "promote ties between league members and Taiwan compatriots" (推動盟員和所聯繫的台灣同胞), in order to "make contributions to building socialism with Chinese characteristics and promoting the great cause of national unification" (建設中國特色社會主義和促進祖國統一大業作出了貢獻).[18]

15 Further information about the Taimeng, to include its nominal leadership and public activities, may be found on its website: https://www.taimeng.org.cn/.

16 In a united front structure that dates back to the founding of the PRC in 1949—and which is similar to the "multiparty" systems of certain former Soviet Bloc states like East Germany—the PRC political system includes 8 smaller "democratic parties" that operate legally alongside the CCP. (See: *China: Democracy that Works*, PRC State Council Information Office (Dec. 4, 2021), http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2021n_2242/202207/t20220704_130720.html.) These parties are intended to provide the CCP party-state with a veneer of pluralism. In reality, these "parties" are stage-managed adjuncts of the CCP, overseen and operated by the CCP United Front Work Department.

17 "How the 8 Democratic Parties Were Ultimately Formed" (八大民主党派是如何最终形成的) Guangdong Province UFWD (July 8, 2020), https://www.gdtzb.gov.cn/llyj/tzll/content/post_82693.html.

18 "Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League Introduction" (台湾民主自治同盟简介), Taimeng website (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.taimeng.org.cn/tmly/tmjj/.



Image: Zhang Yanlin (張彥琳), deputy director of the Liaoning Province UFWD (left), and TDSGL Vice Chairman Kong Lingzhi (孔令智) (right), appear together at an August 2026 ceremony to inaugurate the "Taimeng Patriotic Education Base" (台盟愛國主義教育基地) in the city of Shenyang.[19]

In this capacity, some TDSGL members also serve dual-hatted roles in other UFWD-controlled organizations—such as the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC, 中國人民政治協商會議), a nominal advisory body that purports to allow groups outside the CCP (especially the "8 democratic parties") to offer recommendations on government policy. For one such example, current Taimeng Chairwoman Su Hui (蘇輝) holds a dual role in the UFWD system as one of the designated vice-chairs of the CPPCC.[20] Her official biography indicates that she became a CCP member long before joining the TDSGL (1984 and 2007, respectively), and maintains dual party membership—thereby further exposing the fiction that the TDSGL has any sort of independence from the CCP.[21] Su Hui is also a designated vice chairman of the Council for the Promotion of the Peaceful Unification of China (*see further below*), thereby making her triple-hatted in the UFWD's network of Taiwan-oriented front organizations.[22]



Image: TDSGL Chairwoman Su Hui delivering a lunar year message in February 2026. The message stated in part, "Under the firm leadership of the Communist Party central leadership with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core... we fervently look forward to the prospect of national revival, [and] together with all sons and daughters of the Chinese nation pursue the great matter of national reunification."[23]

19 "Inheriting the Spirit of the War of Resistance / Taimeng Central Committee Holds an Unveiling Ceremony for the 'Taimeng Patriotic Education Base' in Shenyang City, Liaoning Province" (传承抗战精神 台盟中央在辽宁省沈阳市举行"台盟爱国主义教育基地"揭牌仪式), Taimeng Liaoning Provincial Committee (Sep. 3, 2026), https://www.taimeng.org.cn/dtxw/tmyw/202609/t20260903_551711.html.

20 See: "CPPCC Vice Chairwoman, Taimeng Chairwoman Su Hui Gives Congratulations on the 2026 Spring" (全国政协副主席、台盟中央主席苏辉恭贺丙午新春), *Taimeng* (Feb. 16, 2026), https://www.taimeng.org.cn/dtxw/zydt/202602/t20260216_531259.html.

21 "Comrade Su Hui Biographical Notes" (苏辉同志简历), Xinhuanet (Dec. 9, 2017). https://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2017-12/09/c_1122084817.htm.

22 Biography of Su Hui on the Taimeng website (undated). https://www.taimeng.org.cn/tmly/xrld/202403/t20240325_407671.html.

23 "CPPCC Vice Chair, Taimeng Central Committee Chair Su Hui Offers Congratulations on Spring 2026" (全国政协副主席、台盟中央主席苏辉恭贺丙午新春), *Taimeng*, Feb. 16, 2026. https://www.taimeng.org.cn/dtxw/zydt/202602/t20260216_531259.html.



Image: Members of the Taimeng, accompanied by "relevant comrades from the Central UFWD" (中央統戰部有關負責同志), hold a ceremony in a Beijing park to commemorate "Taiwan Recovery Memorial Day" (Oct. 25, 2026).[24]

The All-China Federation of Taiwanese Compatriots

In contrast to the TDSGL, which cosplays as a political party, the All-China Federation of Taiwanese Compatriots (ACFTC, 中華全國台灣同胞聯誼會) (frequently abbreviated as "Tailian," 台聯), is a nominal civic organization, a "patriotic popular organization for Taiwan compatriots led by the Chinese Communist Party, [and] a bridge and link for the party and government with the broad mass of Taiwan compatriots" (是中國共產黨領導的台灣各族同胞的愛國民眾團體，是黨和政府聯繫廣大台灣同胞的橋樑和紐帶).[25]

Although the TDSGL is not officially a political party, its members serve in similar roles to those of TDSGL members, and provide nominal representation for "Taiwan Province" in official PRC institutions. For example, current ACFTC Chairman Zheng Jianmin (鄭建閩) is the designated leader of the "Taiwan Province delegation" to the current National People's Congress (NPC, 全國人民代表大會), China's rubber stamp legislature.[26] Similar to the TDSGL, ACFTC members are employed as mouthpieces to parrot CCP talking points. For example, during the annual "Two Sessions" meetings (the near-simultaneous meetings of the NPC and CPPCC each year in the spring) in March 2022, ACFTC Vice Chair Yang Yizhou (楊毅周) praised the CCP's "Comprehensive Plan for Resolving the Taiwan Problem in the New Era" (新時代黨解決台灣問題的總體方略) for "resolutely advancing the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations."[27]

The political roles awarded to selected members of both the Taimeng and Tailian—roles in which they are afforded official positions in government, even while they are figureheads in reality—allows the Chinese government to claim that "Taiwan Province" already enjoys representation within the PRC political system. This in turn serves Beijing's position that Taiwan's own elected government (normally dismissed as the "Taiwan authorities" or "Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民主進步黨) authorities," or as "Taiwan separatist forces") is illegitimate.[28]

24 "Taiwan Recovery Memorial Day / Land with a Common Root / Always Remember Recovery / Taimeng Central Committee Holds Activities to Commemorate the 81st Anniversary of Taiwan's Recovery" (「台湾光复纪念日」山河同根 光复铭记——台盟中央举办纪念台湾光复*81*周年主题活动), Taimeng website (Oct. 25, 2026), https://www.taimeng.org.cndtxw/tmyw/202610/t20261025_555550.html.

25 "All-China Tailian Introduction" (全国台联简介), ACFTC website (Feb. 17, 2023), https://www.tailian.org.cn/static/content/tlgk/bhjj/2023-02-17/1328763251671957507.html.

26 "14th National People's Congress Taiwan Province Delegation Makes Inspection Visit to Qinghai" (第十四届全国人大台湾省代表团赴青海视察), Tailian (July 21, 2026). https://www.tailian.org.cn/static/content/gt/2026-07-22/1534146914983124992.html.

27 John Dotson, "The CCP's 'Taiwan Work' Surrounding the Winter Olympics and the Annual 'Two Sessions'," *Global Taiwan Brief* (March 23, 2022), https://globaltaiwan.org/2022/03/the-ccps-taiwan-work-surrounding-the-winter-olympics-and-the-annual-two-sessions/. For discussion of the "Plan," see:
John Dotson, "What Is the CCP's 'Comprehensive Plan for Resolving the Taiwan Problem'?" *Global Taiwan Brief* (Feb. 9, 2022), https://globaltaiwan.org/2022/02/what-is-the-ccps-comprehensive-plan-for-resolving-the-taiwan-problem/.

28 For one example of this narrative messaging, see: PRC Foreign Ministry, "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Guo Jiakun's Regular Press Conference on June 25, 2026" (June 25, 2026), https://us.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/fyrth/202606/t20260625_11952387.htm.



Image: Members of the "Taiwan delegation to the 14th National People's Congress," led by ACFTC Vice Chair Yang Yizhou, during a group tour in China's Qinghai Province in July 2026.[29]

The Council for the Promotion of the Peaceful Reunification of China

The Council for the Promotion of the Peaceful Reunification of China (CPPRC, 中國和平統一促進會)[30] is arguably the largest international front organization operated by the CCP, with identified branches in over 90 countries.[31] The CPPRC claims to be a "national, non-profit civic organization with an independent status, composed of volunteers from all walks of life" (各界人士自願結成的具有獨立法人地位的全國性, 非營利性社會組織),[32] but in reality the organization is a fully subordinate branch of the UFWD. By longstanding practice, the CCP Politburo Standing Committee member responsible for the united front policy portfolio also serves as the chairman of the central organization of the CPPRC; while the director of the CCP UFWD serves as the CPPRC executive vice-chairman.[33] Currently, these persons are Wang Huning (王滬寧) and Li Ganjie (李幹傑), respectively (*see accompanying image*).

29 "Taiwan Delegation to the 14th National People's Congress Make an Inspection Trip to Qinghai" *(*第十四届全国人大台湾省代表团赴青海视察*), Tailian* (July 21, 2026), https://www.tailian.org.cn/static/content/gt/2026-07-22/1534146914983124992.html.

30 The name of the organization is often translated into English in a few different forms. PRC sources often render it as "China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification" (CCPPNR). Subordinate affiliate branches abroad also use a range of names in English, which nearly always include "peaceful reunification" or some variant. Despite this, the name in Chinese is consistent: 中国和平统一促进会. *See*: John Dotson, "The United Front Work Department Goes Global: The Worldwide Expansion of the Council for the Promotion of the Peaceful Reunification of China," *China Brief* (May 9, 2019), https://jamestown.org/the-united-front-work-department-goes-global-the-worldwide-expansion-of-the-council-for-the-promotion-of-the-peaceful-reunification-of-china/.

31 John Dotson, "The United Front Work Department Goes Global: The Worldwide Expansion of the Council for the Promotion of the Peaceful Reunification of China," *China Brief* (May 9, 2019), https://jamestown.org/the-united-front-work-department-goes-global-the-worldwide-expansion-of-the-council-for-the-promotion-of-the-peaceful-reunification-of-china/.

32 "Council for the Promotion of the Peaceful Reunification of China Basic Introduction" *(*中国和平统一促进会简介*),* CPPRCC website (Apr. 23, 2008), www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/bhjs/201210/t20121011_3169352.html.

33 For a fuller discussion of the evidence identifying the CPPRC as a subordinate branch of the CCP UFWD, see: John Dotson, "The United Front Work Department in Action Abroad: A Profile of The Council for the Promotion of the Peaceful Reunification of China" *China Brief* (Feb. 13, 2018), https://jamestown.org/united-front-work-department-action-abroad-profile-council-promotion-peaceful-reunification-china/.



Image: A screen shot from the CPPRC webpage, showing its top positions: Wang Huning (王滬寧), the Politburo Standing Committee member responsible for the united front portfolio, serves as the CPPRC chairman; and Li Ganjie (李幹傑), director of the CCP UFWD, serves as the CPPRC's executive vice-chairman.[34]

The CPPRC serves, in broad terms, a dual role: it acts as a propaganda mouthpiece advocating for the annexation of Taiwan under Beijing's "One Country, Two Systems" framework; and as a mechanism for exerting CCP influence over diaspora Chinese communities abroad.[35] It also serves a secondary role as a propaganda vehicle to extol the PRC's success in incorporating other restive peripheral regions: for example, the CPPRC organized a 2025 "Harmonious Xinjiang" tour of CPPRC-affiliated persons to tour Urumqi and other cities in the region.[36]



Image: During an August 2025 CPPRC-hosted "Harmonious Xinjiang" tour, participants view an exhibit about the history of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (新疆生產建設兵團).[37]

Senior CCP figures are prominent in the major meetings of the CPPRC. For example, at the September 2025 meeting of the group's standing committee (itself reflecting a CCP-model organizational structure), Central UFWD Director Li Ganjie presided over the meeting, in his dual-hatted role as CPPRC executive vice-chairman. Li also delivered the central address, vowing that the CPPRC would "comprehensively implement the Party's Comprehensive Plan for Resolving the Taiwan Problem in the New Era, firmly grasp the correct direction of opposing 'independence', [and] unceasingly solidify a common ideological political foundation" (全面貫徹落實新時代黨解決台灣問題的總體方略，牢牢把握反"獨"促統正確方向，不斷夯實共同思想政治基礎) in all of its work.[38]

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34 "Organization Introduction" (本会介绍), CPPRCC website (undated), www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/bhjs.

35 John Dotson, "The United Front Work Department in Action Abroad: A Profile of The Council for the Promotion of the Peaceful Reunification of China" *China Brief* (Feb. 13, 2018), https://jamestown.org/united-front-work-department-action-abroad-profile-council-promotion-peaceful-reunification-china/.

36 "Overseas CPPRC Members Conduct 'Harmonious Xinjiang' Study Tour to Urumqi, Altay, Other Visits" ("和美新疆"海外统促会代表人士新疆访学团赴乌鲁木齐、阿勒泰等地参访), CPPRC (Sep. 4, 2025), http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/hnyw/202509/t20250904_12721993.html.

37 "Overseas CPPRC Members Conduct 'Harmonious Xinjiang' Study Tour to Urumqi, Altay, Other Visits" ("和美新疆"海外统促会代表人士新疆访学团赴乌鲁木齐、阿勒泰等地参访), CPPRC (Sep. 4, 2025), http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/hnyw/202509/t20250904_12721993.html.

38 "Council for the Promotion of the Peaceful Reunification of China Convenes Tenth Session, Third Plenum Meeting of the Standing Executive Committee" (中国和平统一促进会召开十届三次常务理事会会议), CPPRC website (Sep. 24, 2025), http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/hnyw/202509/t20250924_12725303.html.

The Pro-CCP and Pro-Unification Fringe Parties in Taiwan

In addition to the Taiwan-oriented front organizations operated within China and internationally by the CCP United Front Work Department, the CCP also seeks to exert influence over Taiwan's society through proxy persons and organizations. This takes multiple forms: to include the cooptation of selected business figures and media outlets,[39] and efforts to cultivate local (i.e., municipal- and county-level) officials with subsidized trips to China and other benefits.[40]

However, in addition to such measures, the CCP also sponsors more direct pro-PRC proxy organizations within Taiwan itself. These organizations serve as mouthpieces for CCP propaganda narratives on a range of issues, to include: the inevitability of unification, attacks on Taiwan's DPP, and depiction of the United States as an unreliable ally. As revealed by recent legal cases (*see further below*), these groups also serve more directly subversive purposes: including laundering PRC money, engaging in espionage, and potentially serving as "fifth column" elements supporting the PRC in the event of a future crisis.

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While the Taiwan-oriented front groups in the PRC are wholly-owned subsidiaries of the UFWD, the ties between the Chinese government and the pro-CCP groups within Taiwan itself are more complicated. They exist on a spectrum: ranging from pre-existing organizations that, over time, appear to have been coopted by the PRC; to front groups actively created by persons acting on behalf of Chinese government agencies.

As with the PRC-based front organizations described in the previous section, this list of Taiwan-based, pro-CCP proxy organizations is intended to be illustrative, rather than exhaustive. A full exploration of such groups would lie beyond the limited scope of this paper. However, three of the most prominent such groups operating within Taiwan are fringe political parties: the "New Party," the "China Unification Promotion Party," and the "Taiwan People's Communist Party."

The New Party

The New Party (NP, 新黨) was formed in Taiwan in the early 1990s, emerging out of a split with the then-ruling Kuomintang (KMT, 國民黨). The breakaway members of the New Party were critical of the mainline KMT for allegedly going soft on matters such as Chinese identity, and the pursuit of unification with the PRC. The party enjoyed marginal electoral successes in the early 2000s: one member, Wu Cherng-dean (吳成典) (now party chairman), was elected to represent a constituency in Kinmen in the Legislative Yuan from 2002-2008; and in the 2005-2006 local elections, NP members won a county magistrate seat in Kinmen, and 4 city council seats in Taipei City.[41] The party's fortunes have declined in more recent years, and it currently has only one member holding any noteworthy office: Hou Han-ting (侯漢廷), also the party's deputy secretary-general, who holds a seat on the Taipei City Council representing the Shilin and Beitou districts.[42]

39 Jonah Landsman, "Assessing Taiwan's Media Landscape and PRC Influence, Part One: The Dangers of Deregulation," *Global Taiwan Brief* (July 19, 2023), https://globaltaiwan.org/2023/07/assessing-taiwans-media-landscape-and-prc-influence-part-one-the-dangers-of-deregulation/.

40 Yimou Lee, "Exclusive: China Lures Hundreds of Taiwan Politicians with Cheap Trips Before Election," *Reuters* (December 1, 2023), https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-lures-hundreds-taiwan-politicians-with-cheap-trips-before-election-sources-2023-12-01/.

41 Wikipedia entry "Wu Cherng-dean" (undated), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wu_Cherng-dean; and Wikipedia entry "2005-06 Taiwanese Local Elections" (undated), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005%E2%80%9306_Taiwanese_local_elections.

42 "Current Council Member -- Hou Han-ting" (現任議員--侯漢廷), Taipei City Council (undated), https://www.tcc.gov.tw/Councilor_Content.aspx?n=13898&s=2552.

The New Party continues existence as a fringe party—and as it has become more marginalized, its positions have aligned ever-more closely with the CCP. New Party members are prominent fixtures at state-sponsored united front events in the PRC. In such events, they support CCP propaganda messaging—to the extent of parroting specific phraseology, as a means of signaling subordination and loyalty. To cite but one example, in June 2024 Wu Cherng-dean (now NP chairman) spoke at a PRC-sponsored united front forum in Xiamen, where he declared that "only when the mainland is good *[content]* can Taiwan be good *[content]*" (只有大陆好台灣才會好)—thereby mirroring phraseology employed by CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping exactly one year earlier, when speaking of the need for Taiwan to align with Beijing's programs for unification.[43]



Image: Li Shengfeng (李勝峰), deputy chairman of the New Party, speaks on Chinese state television in early 2026 to praise PRC policies for unification—including the "One Country, Two Systems" framework, and the concept of "patriots governing Taiwan."[44]

43 "New Party Chairman Wu Cherng-dean: We Are All Chinese, Only When the Mainland Is Good Can Taiwan Be Good" (新党主席吴成典：我们都是中国人，只有大陆好台湾才会好), *52.hrtt.com* (June 17, 2024), https://www.52hrtt.com/fj/n/w/info/K1716344080159. For Xi's comments, see: "Xi Jinping: Only When the Country Is Good, and the Nation Is Good, Can Cross-Strait Compatriots Be Good" (习近平：国家好，民族好，两岸同胞才会好), *Xinhua* (June 17, 2023), https://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/2023-06/17/c_1129702758.htm.

44 "Discussing 'The Benefits of Cross-Strait Development and Unification' / Li Shengfeng: 'One Country Two Systems' of Course Needs a Foundation of a One Country Patriotic Spirit" *[*谈《两岸关系发展和统一利好》，李胜峰："一国两制"当然要以一国

New Party members are also commonly featured in PRC-sponsored media and social media, both to praise the PRC and to advance conspiracy theories about the United States (which themselves match PRC narratives). For example, in one undated short video posted to TikTok in February 2023, Hou Han-ting identified US arms sales to Taiwan as part of an American scheme to manipulate Taiwan and the PRC into fighting a war, so that Taiwan may be used as a proxy to damage China with minimal cost to the United States. In the video, Hou states:

> *America has a group of strategists [who] hope to see the two sides of the Strait fight as soon as possible, [and to see] Taiwan people die in great numbers… afterwards the mainland will be weakened, [and] America therefore will be able to continue consolidating and maintaining its hegemony. America has repeatedly sent or sold military equipment to Taiwan. What is America's intent in doing this? It is to promote war between the two sides, and only Taiwan people will die, not Americans. So from this, we can see America's treacherous intentions.* [45]



Image: Hou Han-ting, speaking in video clip posted to TikTok in early 2023, declares that US arms sales to Taiwan are part of a scheme to spark a war in the Taiwan Strait, with the intention of weakening China and maintaining American "hegemony."[46]

In addition to promoting pro-PRC messages, in recent years the New Party has been involved in controversies and legal cases in which prosecutors have charged members of the group, on alleged grounds of either conducting espionage or spreading disinformation on behalf of the PRC. In autumn 2017, four party members—Wang Ping-chung (王炳忠), Hou Han-ting, Lin Ming-cheng (林明正), and Chen Ssu-chun (陳斯俊)—were detained and questioned by authorities in relation to their connections with Zhou Hongxu (周泓旭). Zhou was a Chinese student in Taiwan, who was arrested in spring 2017 on espionage charges after attempting to bribe an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA, 外交部) to hand over classified documents. Despite suspicious evidence turned up in the case—reportedly including evidence of cash transfers originating in China, and a document in which Wang Ping-chung pledged loyalty to the Communist Party—the four New Party members were eventually acquitted, and Zhou's conviction was

为基础的爱国精神作为条件*], Dongnan TV,* undated 2026. https://www.youtube.com/shorts/NnOrDnPBlP0.

45 "Taiwan Media: America Treacherously Seeks to Trap Taiwan for its Own Selfish Interests" (台媒: 美國用心險惡為一己私對坑害台灣*), TikTok video* (February 25, 2023), https://www.tiktok.com/@hhm.men/video/7204037523981552901?_r=1&%3B_t=8cCbtEhhNjH&%3Bsocial_sharing=v1 (link no longer active).

46 "Taiwan Media: America Treacherously Seeks to Trap Taiwan for its Own Selfish Interests" *(*台媒: 美國用心險惡為一己私對坑害台灣*), TikTok video* (February 25, 2023), https://www.tiktok.com/@hhm.men/video/7204037523981552901?_r=1&%3B_t=8cCbtEhhNjH&%3Bsocial_sharing=v1 (link no longer active).

overturned, by Taiwan's High Court in 2022.[47]

Some "Deep Blue" political actors in Taiwan invoked the case as evidence of a "Green Terror" (綠色恐怖) campaign allegedly waged by the DPP against domestic opposition—a theme actively magnified in PRC state media outlets (*see accompanying image*). This theme, which has continued in more recent years,[48] demonstrates one of the challenges that law enforcement and national security officials face in Taiwan: conducting counter-intelligence and counter-infiltration investigations within living memory of the "White Terror" (白色恐怖) of Taiwan's martial law era.



Image: A cluster of four protestors stand outside the Investigation Bureau office in Taipei's Xindian District, decrying the investigation of New Party members as "Green Terror" conducted by the then-Tsai Ing-wen Administration. (Dec. 19, 2017).[49]

In January 2024, just prior to Taiwan's presidential and legislative elections, Hou Han-ting convened a press conference to promote a document—allegedly leaked from a "Central Party Committee Election Strategy Group" (中央黨部選戰策略小組) of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), that called for using government resources to smear figures from both the KMT and Taiwan People's Party (TPP, 民眾黨) as CCP collaborators. (Hou himself was running in the election as a candidate for the Legislative Yuan.) However, the DPP denied that any such committee existed, and analysis of the document revealed discrepancies (including frequent use of PRC-style simplified characters) that marked it as an evident forgery. In August 2026, the Taipei District Prosecutor's Office filed charges against Hou on grounds of promoting false materials with intent to influence the outcome of an election.[50]

47 Brian Hioe, "Controversy Ensues After Detention and Questioning Of New Party Members," *New Bloom Magazine* (Dec. 2017), https://newbloommag.net/2017/12/20/new-party-detention/; and "High Court Upholds Zhou Hongxu's Espionage Conviction," *Taipei Times* (Apr 27, 2018), https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2018/04/27/2003692088?platform=hootsuite; and Jason Pan, "New Party's Wang, Others Charged with Espionage," *Taipei Times* (June 14, 2018), https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2018/06/14/2003694843; and Jason Pan, "Experts Criticize Espionage Acquittals," *Taipei Times* (May 15, 2022), https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2022/05/15/2003778233.

48 Michael Turton, "Notes from Central Taiwan: Ko, Xu and the Politics of 'Green Terror' ," *Taipei Times* (Apr. 2, 2026), https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2026/04/02/2003854871.

49 Image source: "The DPP Reveals the Fangs of Green Terror" (民进党"绿色恐怖"露出獠牙), *People's Daily* (Overseas Edition) (Dec. 20, 2017), https://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2017-12/20/content_1824684.htm.

50 Pan Chien-shih, "Faked Materials Blow Up Before the Election! Hou Han-ting Charged with 3 Counts of Interference / Chiu Yi Made Warning: Documents May Be Fake (選前爆假資料！侯漢廷涉3罪起訴　邱毅曾提

The provenance of the document remains murky, and the case is pending.

"Propaganda Laundering" in Taiwan

The January 2024 press conference involving Hou Han-ting was not the first time that fringe figures from the "Deep Blue" end of Taiwan's political spectrum have engaged in "propaganda laundering" by promoting propaganda / disinformation material apparently originating in the PRC. For example, in February 2023 Tsai Cheng-yuan (蔡正元), a former legislator, posted to his Facebook page the "Seven Laws of US Diplomacy" (美國外交七定律), a linked series of graphics and commentary depicting the United States as a treacherous ally. While nominally produced by Tsai, the material showed evident signs of origin in the PRC.[51]

Likely PRC-generated disinformation materials have also sometimes penetrated more mainstream publications. For example, in July 2023 the United Daily News (UDN, 聯合報) published a pair of articles based on an allegedly leaked government document, which purported to reveal plans to build a US-funded biological warfare laboratory in Taiwan, with intent to target China with genetic weapons. Elements of this story paralleled a similar Russian-generated disinformation narrative about U.S.-funded biological warfare laboratories in Ukraine. The underlying document featured in the UDN articles was also exposed as a forgery.[52]

The China Unification Promotion Party

The China Unification Promotion Party (CUPP, 中華統一促進黨) is one of the largest and most colorful fringe parties in Taiwan—and in many respects, the most sinister. The CUPP is led by Chang An-lo (張安樂), a reputed organized crime figure commonly known by his nickname "White Wolf" (白狼). Chang has long been reputed to the be the leader of the "Bamboo Union" (竹聯幫)—one of Taiwan's largest criminal syndicates, with affiliated branches in Asia and the United States—although Chang has not publicly acknowledged such a role.

Chang spent 10 years in prison in the United States (from 1985-1995) for a variety of crimes, including drug trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion. After a brief return to Taiwan, Chang relocated to the PRC in 1996 to avoid local police investigations. He subsequently lived in the PRC for the next 17 years, forging close ties with a number of influential CCP officials—reportedly including Hu Shiying (胡石英), the son of former CCP propaganda chief and ideological hardliner Hu Qiaomu (胡喬木). Chang reportedly founded the CUPP in the PRC circa 2004-2005, initially directing it from his sanctuary in China. Chang eventually returned to Taiwan in June 2013, to take a more direct hand in running the CUPP (and the Bamboo Union).[53]

醒：文件恐是假的*), TVBS News* (Aug. 21, 2026), https://news.tvbs.com.tw/local/4010488.

51 See: John Dotson, *Chinese Information Operations against Taiwan: The "Abandoned Chess Piece"* and *"America Skepticism Theory*, Global Taiwan Institute (pp. 7-8) (Aug. 2023), https://globaltaiwan.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/OR_ASTAW-0807FINAL.pdf.

52 John Dotson, "Beijing Dusts Off an Old Playbook with Disinformation about Taiwan Biological Warfare Labs," *Global Taiwan Brief* (Nov. 1, 2023), https://globaltaiwan.org/2023/11/beijing-dusts-off-an-old-playbook-with-disinformation-about-taiwan-biological-warfare-labs/.

53 Mark Arax, Reputed Gang Leader Jailed on Kidnaping and Extortion Charges, *Los Angeles Times (*June 12, 1985), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1985-06-12-me-6129-story.htm; and J. Michael Cole, "On the Role of Organized Crime and Related Substate Actors in Chinese Political Warfare Against Taiwan," *Prospect & Exploration* (Vol. 19, No. 6, June 2021), https://www.mjib.gov.tw/FileUploads/eBooks/6f2646ebb06a4ddba2449c950a42533d/Section_file/8a0b255919bc48e1bc3d2a38825cd3c8.pdf; and presentation by J. Michael Cole, *PRC Influence in Taiwan's Grassroots Society,* Global Taiwan Institute seminar (Sep. 23, 2026), https://globaltaiwan.org/events/prc-influence-in-taiwans-grassroots-society/.



Image: New Party Chairman Wu Cherng-dean presents a painting of Kuan Kong (a popular folk religion deity) to CUPP Chairman Chang An-lo at a ceremony to mark the anniversary of the founding of the New Party (Aug. 22, 2026). The public meeting appeared to indicate contacts, and at least limited cooperation, between the two groups.[54]

In addition to acting as a sort of political front for the Bamboo Union syndicate, the CUPP functions as a pro-CCP united front proxy organization. As assessed by analysts J. Michael Cole and Ben Sando, while CUPP has played little role in actually fielding candidates for office, it has acted as a CCP proxy in three broad areas.[55] These activities have included:

- Facilitating clandestine visits of CCP officials to Taiwan, often using the Huaxi Dadi Travel Service (華夏大地旅行社) operated by Chang An-lo's son Chang Wei (張瑋). This reportedly included the use of forged documents, which were employed in visits by Chinese government intelligence and united front personnel.
- Acting as a money laundering mechanism to channel funds from the PRC government to temples and other grassroots community organizations.
- Intimidating and assaulting civil society activists in Taiwan, as well as persons associated with the democracy movement in Hong Kong. This included a September 2019 incident in which pop singer and democracy activist Denise Ho (何韻詩) was splashed with red paint by men associated with CUPP.[56]

In addition to such activities, the Bamboo Union's long history of firearms smuggling has led to concerns that the group might, in the event of a future crisis, act as a potential fifth column and/or militia element acting on behalf of the PRC.[57]

In August 2026, Taiwan's Ministry of the Interior (MOI, 內政部) took the extraordinary step of filing a petition to the Constitutional Court for the dissolution of CUPP, on the grounds that it represented a threat to national security. Specific accusations made by the ministry against CUPP included: that it had facilitated espionage recruitment of military personnel; channeled PRC funds into election campaigns and engaged in vote-buying; recruited PRC nationals married to Taiwan residents to take part in pro-CCP united front networks; and infiltrated temples and other local organizations to advance pro-CCP united front work.[58] As of the publication of this report, the petition is pending consideration by the court.

54 Chen En-yu, "White Wolf Appears at a New Party Ceremony! Wu Cherng-dean Presents Gift of a Painting, Shouts: 'I Am Chinese, I Am Proud'" *(白狼張安樂現身新黨黨慶！吳成典送關公畫　開口秒喊：我是中國人我驕傲), SETN News* (Aug. 22, 2026), https://www.setn.com/news/1893640.

55 J. Michael Cole, "On the Role of Organized Crime and Related Substate Actors in Chinese Political Warfare Against Taiwan," *Prospect & Exploration (*Vol. 19, No. 6, June 2021), https://www.mjib.gov.tw/FileUploads/eBooks/6f2646ebb06a4ddba2449c950a42533d/Section_file/8a0b255919bc48e1bc3d2a38825cd3c8.pdf; and Ben Sando, "Taiwan's Underworld, Part 2: The Chinese Communist Party and United Front Work," *Global Taiwan Brief* (Sep. 18, 2024), https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/09/taiwans-underworld-part-2/.

56 "Sentence for Attack of HK Activist Denise Ho Upheld," *Taipei Times* (July 30, 2022), https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2022/07/30/2003782667.

57 Katrina Northrop and Pei-Lin Wu, "Behind Taiwan's 'Unification' Party, Chinese Espionage — and a Criminal Gang," *Washington Post* (Sep. 29, 2025), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/09/29/china-influence-taiwan-gangsters/.

58 "MOI Asks Constitutional Court to Dissolve Pro-China Political Party," *Focus Taiwan* (Aug. 7, 2026), https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202608070018.



Image: Interior Minister Liu Shyh-fang (劉世芳) (center, speaking) and other officials hold a press conference in which they announce a petition to legally dissolve the China Unification Promotion Party on national security grounds (Aug. 7, 2026).[59]

The Taiwan People's Communist Party

The Taiwan People's Communist Party (TPCP, 台灣人民共產黨) is another fringe party, which openly identifies itself with the Chinese Communist Party ruling the PRC. The party was founded in 2017 in Tainan under the direction of Lin Te-wang (林德旺), a former member of Kuomintang Central Committee.[60] (Lin was expelled from the KMT in 2016.) The stated purpose for the party, as proclaimed at its founding, was to "advocate for modern socialist economic development, to insist upon the '92 Consensus', and to promote cross-Strait peace." (為主張現代式社會主義發展經濟，堅持'九二共識'，推動兩岸和平).[61]

As with the other pro-Beijing parties, the TPCP has faced suspicions and investigations regarding its connections to the CCP. Lin Te-wang, party Vice Chair Cheng Chien-hsin (鄭建炘), and member Yu Sheng-hung (余聲洪), were charged in October 2023 under provisions of the *Anti Infiltration Act* (反滲透法) for acting as agents of the PRC. Prosecutors alleged that, from at least 2017 onwards, Lin had maintained regular communication with officials of the CCP TAO and the UFWD, to include a specific TAO official named Hu Chunguang (胡春光). Per the indictments, Lin received both funds and direction from TAO officials to organize protest activities (including paying participants to protest the 2022 visit by then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi), to organize visits by CCP officials to Taiwan, and to field candidates in local elections.[62] Prosecutors also alleged that Lin received further instructions from an official named Zhang Chaode (張朝德), then-director of the Yunnan Province Taiwan Affairs Office (雲南省委台灣工作辦公室), to run as a candidate for the Tainan City Council; and to arrange for Cheng Chien-hsin to run as a candidate for the Taipei City Council. To support this, Lin allegedly received $30,000 NTD (approx. $912 USD) and $10,000 USD in funding to support the campaigns.[63]

59 "MOI Asks Constitutional Court to Dissolve Pro-China Political Party," *Focus Taiwan* (Aug. 7, 2026), https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202608070018.

60 "Lin Te-wang Raises the Red Flag in a Key Position of the Green Camp" (林德旺，绿营重镇竖"红旗") *Huanqiu Renwu* (Issue 4, 2017), https://paper.people.com.cn/hqrw/html/2017-02/16/content_1760463.htm.

61 "Lin Te-wang: Why I Founded the 'Taiwan People's Communist Party" (林德旺：我为什么成立"台湾人民共产党") *Huanqiu Wang* (Feb. 4, 2017), https://news.sina.cn/gn/2017-02-04/detail-ifyafenm2734756.d.html?vt=4.

62 Wang Ting-chuan and Jake Chung, "Taiwanese Communist Party Trio Indicted," *Taipei Times* (Oct. 4, 2023), https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2023/10/04/2003807177.

63 Taejun Kang, "Taiwan Communist Party Leaders Indicted for 'Infiltration'," *Radio Free Asia* (Oct. 4, 2023), https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/taiwan-communist-infiltration-10042023041825.html.



Image: Lin Te-wang, chairman of the Taiwan People's Communist Party, holds up the party's flag—a seemingly curious amalgam of the Imperial Japanese flag, Communist symbols, and a dolphin—at a banquet held in Tainan to launch the party (Feb. 3, 2017).[64]

In late 2026, the TPCP once again emerged into Taiwan news headlines, with further allegations that it was funneling funds from the PRC into local election campaigns. On November 6, 2026, investigators from the Tainan and Hsinchu District Prosecutors Offices conducted searches at multiple locations associated with the TPCP, including its local campaign headquarters in Hsinchu. Prosecutors have alleged that party chairman Lin Te-wang took both direction and funding from CCP officials to run for borough chief in Tainan's Xinying District, and for party member Chen Zhen-zhou (陳震宙) to run for Wuling Ward chief in Hsinchu City's North District. The men are also under investigation for recruiting voters for all-expenses-paid trips to China, with intent to influence their votes and foster further united front recruitment. Lin has been detained in conjunction with the case, which remains under investigation as of the publication of this report.[65]

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64 "Lin Te-wang: Why I Founded the 'Taiwan People's Communist Party" *(*林德旺：我为什么成立"台湾人民共产党"*) Huanqiu Wang* (Feb. 4, 2017), https://news.sina.cn/gn/2017-02-04/detail-ifyafenm2734756.d.html?vt=4.

65 "Taiwan Communist Party Chair, Hsinchu Candidate Investigated Over Alleged Chinese Election Funding," *Taiwan News* (Nov. 9, 2026), https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/6473738.

Conclusion

The Chinese Communist Party, despite never administering any of the territory of Taiwan, has made clear its intent to annex the island and incorporate its people—willingly or not—into the People's Republic of China. From the CCP's perspective, in doing so it must eliminate Taiwan's liberal democratic system, which is incompatible with CCP rule—and which, by its mere existence, presents a corrosive threat to the CCP's totalitarian one-party system.

One key element of the CCP's plans, as revealed by its own statements, would be to substitute elections and other elements of multi-party democracy with rule by "patriots." In CCP discourse, a person is defined as a "patriot" not by love of country or by civic service, but rather by demonstrated loyalty to the CCP and work in support of its goals. In this sense, the CCP front groups and proxy organizations profiled in this report exemplify the "patriotism" touted by the CCP. Such Taiwan proxies are marginal figures within Taiwan itself, but are heavy touted in PRC media as the legitimate representatives of Taiwan's people.

A survey of the figures involved in Beijing's Taiwan proxies reveals a number of common trends. Financial motivations are often a significant factor. Within the PRC-based groups directly controlled by the UFWD, members may often be businesspeople eager to curry favor with the government. They may also be long-time CCP functionaries who adopt a role as spokespersons for Taiwan (as with the case of Taimeng Chairwoman Su Hui). Within Taiwan, persons connected to the pro-unification fringe parties also frequently carry cynical financial motivations: whether it is the illicit business interests of the CUPP/Bamboo Union, or those of a more personal nature. (For example, Lin Te-wang, chairman of the TPCP, has reportedly sought Beijing's favor to obtain a lucrative license to export maotai liquor.) Matters of identity may also be a factor: these organizations also tend to attract figures from the far fringes of Taiwan's political spectrum, to whom a sense of ethnic affiliation is more important than any of Taiwan's democratic freedoms. And finally, ego on the part of alienated or marginalized people, who see the CCP as a vehicle for thwarted ambitions they could not otherwise achieve, should not be discounted.

Such figures would likely provide many of the puppet figures selected to be the "patriots governing Taiwan" under a future CCP-controlled regime. This is not to say that such figures would enjoy real authority—not any more than ethnic token officials in Tibet and Xinjiang, or officials of the Hong Kong territorial administration, exercise real authority. The whip hand in any CCP-controlled regime in Taiwan would be held by the party, its united front apparatus, and its security services.

Any democratic society faces real challenges in drawing the lines between, on the one hand, effective counter-intelligence and counter-subversion measures in the face of hostile authoritarian threats; and on the other, preserving individual rights of expression and political affiliation. This challenge is particularly acute in Taiwan, which continues to grapple with the legacy of authoritarian rule from the 1940s through the 1980s. The continuing controversies surrounding the application of laws such as the *Anti-Infiltration Act and the Election and Recall Act* (公職人員選舉罷免法)—as well as the cries of "Green Terror" that inevitably follow government investigations and enforcement measures—demonstrate these continuing challenges.

However, the "patriots" serving Beijing's interests should not be regarded as good faith actors in Taiwan's democratic society: they are instead willing participants in the CCP's efforts to erode that free society, and to ultimately replace it with what would be, by necessity, brutal authoritarian rule. The list of CCP proxy organizations profiled in this report is not an exhaustive one, but these groups do illustrate the multi-faceted efforts of the CCP intelligence and united front systems to seek inroads into Taiwan society, and to lay the groundwork for a future occupation regime.

The outlines of such a CCP occupation regime will be the focus of the second report in this series. *Patriots Governing Taiwan" Part 2: The Chinese Communist Party's Discourse on Ruling Taiwan* will be published by the Global Taiwan Institute in early 2027.