In 2016, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began its most ambitious and far-reaching cycle of reforms in the past 70 years. The key operational goal was to improve the PLA’s ability to carry out joint operations such as blockades, island landing operations, and joint firepower attacks (involving strikes launched from land-, air-, and sea-based platforms). The first tranche of the reforms, announced last year, took a step in this direction through several high-level structural changes, most notably by creating a permanent joint command and control system. Commanders of five new regionally-aligned theater commands will able to develop and deploy force packages from army, naval, air force, and conventional missile forces—a capability that proved elusive under the former Military Region system.
A second phase of Chinese military reforms, to be announced this year, will attempt to reduce the remaining obstacles to successful PLA joint operations. In part, this will mean putting the new joint command and control system into practice, such as by having theaters take the lead in joint training and peacetime operations (some of which continue to be led by the individual services). It will also mean additional structural and policy changes, including those in the following areas:
- Force Composition Changes. At present, PLA force structure is heavily skewed towards the ground forces (which account for approximately 70 percent of PLA end strength). The reforms this year will likely make deep cuts to the PLA ground forces, focusing especially on non-combat units and headquarters staff, while increasing the relative (and perhaps absolute) size of the navy, air force, and rocket forces. These changes will be carried out as part of a planned downsizing of the PLA from 2.3 to 2 million personnel, slated for completion by the end of this year.
- Army Force Structure Changes. Along with shrinking the ground forces, the PLA will also likely overhaul the army’s outdated force structure. At present, the army is still centered on 18 large-scale group armies, which primarily operate in fixed geographic areas. Changes could consolidate or eliminate group armies, while placing more attention on smaller, more deployable units such as brigades. Another beneficiary could be special operations forces, which currently only number around 20,000-30,000 personnel.
- More Joint Leadership. Historically, the PLA has had a ground force-centric leadership, with army officers occupying most senior command and staff billets. Personnel turnover ahead of the 19th Party Congress, which will be held this fall, will give the PLA an opportunity to advance more air force and naval officers into senior positions, especially in maritime-focused theaters. An early example was the promotion of North Sea Fleet commander Yuan Yubai to lead the Southern Theater Command, which is responsible for operations in the South China Sea.
- New Career Paths. A persistent weakness has been lack of officers qualified to conceive, plan, and lead joint operations. Reforms this year will likely address this problem by offering officers rotational assignments, in which they will gain “joint” experience at various points in their careers. The professional military education system will also undergo reforms to enhance schoolhouse and field training in joint operations, introducing these concepts earlier in an officer’s career.
- New Laws and Regulations. At a more general level, the PLA has struggled to establish and enforce laws and norms governing its personnel. Specific impediments have included corruption and a culture in which officers think that “their word is law.” In 2017, the PLA will likely take steps to address both problems, including continuing the anti-corruption campaign (which could focus on higher level officers and operational commanders, who have heretofore been excluded from the campaign), and introducing new regulations. One sign of progress in the latter area was the recent release of new guidelines governing auditing work.
A major question mark is the extent of potential resistance in the PLA to any or all of these efforts. Major force composition and structure changes impinge on what Xi Jinping and other Chinese reformers call “bureaucratic interests” (部門利益). The ground forces could be a particular obstacle to reform, as well as individual officers who might, as part of the force reduction, lose their jobs entirely or be forced to transfer to civilian roles in the PLA (with an inferior pension and lesser benefits). The personnel reshuffle could give Xi a chance to counter opponents, but might not be sufficient to stamp out resistance altogether. Another challenge could be discontent on the part of demobilized soldiers—recent veterans’ protests in Beijing suggest that prior efforts to compensate laid off personnel have not been entirely successful.
What do these changes mean for Taiwan?
First, stronger PLA joint operations capabilities could lead to increasing operational challenges for Taiwan and its outlying islands. For instance, the PLA could more easily conduct a blockade of Taiwan or seize the Penghu Islands (even though a full-scale amphibious invasion would continue to face major challenges). US forces might also encounter greater difficulties in intervening in a Taiwan crisis; in particular, the PLA could use joint firepower strikes to threaten regional bases from which US forces operate, such as those in Japan, or carrier strike groups. In these respects, planners need to consider upcoming PLA reforms in the context of ongoing improvements in Chinese power projection capabilities, such as stronger precision-guided missile and anti-surface warfare forces.
Second, new PLA capabilities could enhance China’s efforts to intimidate Taiwan, the United States, and others in the region considering closer ties with Taipei (such as Japan). Beijing could use new and improving military forces in a variety of ways to underscore concerns about the Tsai administration’s policies, including her refusal to endorse the 1992 Consensus, and closer Taiwan-US relations, as symbolized by the phone call between Tsai and then President-elect Trump. The PLA could, for instance, conduct joint exercises, missile tests, or combat patrols near Taiwan as a warning to Tsai. Depending on the circumstances, her reaction, and Washington’s decisions, could lead to another crisis on the scale of the 1995-19966 Taiwan Strait Crisis (though presumably Tsai would seek to avoid such an outcome).
None of this implies that the PLA will drastically improve its ability to threaten or coerce Taiwan overnight. Potential resistance in the PLA, along with the inherent difficulties of carrying out both a major force restructuring and a large-scale downsizing of the PLA, could mean that the operational effects of the reforms will not be fully apparent for years. Nevertheless, it is never too soon for Taipei and Washington to consider the implications of PLA reform on defensive operations, and how to improve military cooperation to counter increasing challenges. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, signed by President Obama in December 2016, calls for senior-level military exchanges in both Taiwan and the United States. One subject of those exchanges, if they occur, could be to discuss insights about PLA reform and modernization, and steps both sides can take, individually or in concert, to address attendant challenges.
The main point: 2017 will be a busy year for PLA reform. Key goals include rebalancing towards a greater focus on the navy and air force, restructuring the ground forces, and revising the personnel system to promote stronger joint operations capabilities. Taiwan needs to work, both individually and in concert with the United States, to mitigate the risks of a PLA that will be better organized, trained, and equipped to threaten the island’s safety.
