By:
John Dotson
In late November 2025, the Executive Yuan (行政院) of Taiwan’s government unveiled a proposed 1.25 trillion NTD (approximately $40 billion USD) supplemental defense budget, titled the “Program of Acquisition Special Regulations for Strengthening Defense Resilience and Asymmetric Combat Capacity” (強化防衛韌性及不對稱戰力計畫採購特別條例) (hereafter “special budget”). If implemented, the special budget—which would be projected to extend over 8 years, operating in tandem alongside the regular annual budget—would represent a significant increase in Taiwan’s defense spending, up to an estimated 3.3 percent of GDP in 2026.
By:
Cara Bilson
In stark contrast to the discourse in the United States, there have been very few open conversations between Europe and Taiwan regarding defense spending or arms acquisitions. While the United States is actively exerting pressure on Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (立法院) to pass a national defense budget that will incorporate a USD 11.1 billion arms package, European countries have retained a cautious, low-profile stance on the matter. This is likely due to the diplomatic and economic pressure that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has historically exerted on Europe’s middle powers. For example, in the 1980s, the PRC downgraded diplomatic relations with the Netherlands in response to the latter’s decision to sell two submarines to Taiwan. Reluctant to disrupt relations with such a large trading partner, the Dutch government solemnly agreed that it would refrain from further arms sales to Taiwan in the future. In 1991 and 1992, France sold six naval frigates and 60 Mirage jets to Taiwan. In retaliation, Beijing closed the French Consulate-General in Guangzhou and publicly urged France to withdraw from the sale. France has not sold Taipei any other major weapons systems since. As a result of Beijing’s coercion, three decades have passed since Europe supplied Taipei with any big-ticket defense items.
By:
Eric Chan
The end of 2025 came with yet another demonstration of Beijing’s desire to operationalize the encirclement of Taiwan: the “Justice Mission 2025” (正義使命 2025) exercise. There were several notable aspects of Justice Mission, including more and larger designated exercise zones, the deployment of the PLA Navy and China Coast Guard closer to Taiwan, and the publicized deployment of the Type 075 landing helicopter dock (LHD) vessel with Z-8/Z-20 helicopters on Taiwan’s east coast (implying a capability to conduct special forces raids). PLA Air Force sorties were also notably high in number, displaying unprofessional maneuvering and disrupting civil aviation.
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