President Donald Trump has won the 2024 presidential election and will be inaugurated as the 47th president of the United States on January 20, 2025. The 45th president won the Electoral College and the popular vote by 2.7 million votes. Additionally, the Republican Party (GOP) achieved the political trifecta: the GOP will not only control the executive branch but also both chambers of the legislative branch of the US government when the 119th Congress is in session. The president-elect and his transition team have already indicated that they intend to review the entire US government’s bureaucracies and policies thoroughly. Taiwan policy cannot be taken for granted as an exception.
The First Trump Administration and Inheritance on Taiwan Policy
While past performance is not indicative of future results, it is appropriate in this case to examine the record of the first Trump Administration (2016-2020) as it provides an empirical basis on which to assess how the incoming second Trump Administration may approach its Taiwan policy.
Moreover, it is also important to review the approaches to Taiwan policy that he will inherit from his predecessor, President Joe Biden, which will also be used as benchmarks for evaluating the success and failures of his policy for achieving US interests.
The following list does not present an exhaustive listing of all US-TW interactions under the former Trump Administration and the current Biden Administration, but it does present a starting point for an objective assessment:
| Political | Trump | As President-elect, took a congratulatory phone call from then Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文). Resumed cabinet-level visits and interactions by senior officials such as the US national security adviser and the secretary-general of Taiwan’s National Security Council, among others. Permitted the president of Taiwan to conduct high-profile visit-like transits through the United States. (This has been more restrictive under Biden.) Declassified internal policy documents that have guided US policy towards Taiwan, such as President Reagan’s memos on the Six Assurances and arms sales to Taiwan, the Indo-Pacific Strategy Framework. Delineated the US “One-China Policy” from the PRC’s “One-China Principle.” |
| Biden | President Biden made four explicit statements clarifying US commitment to Taiwan’s defense. Continued the delineation of the US “One-China Policy” from the PRC’s “One-China Principle.” | |
| Defense/Security | Trump | Regularized the arms sales process to Taiwan, which had previously been bundled into packages, and authorized record arms sales. Publicized naval transits through the Taiwan Strait and made them routine. |
| Biden | US-Taiwan Coast Guard Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding (March 2021) Authorized new instruments for security assistance, such as foreign military financing (FMF) and the presidential drawdown authority (PDA). Encouraged more partner countries to conduct naval transits through the Taiwan Strait: Canada (2024), Germany (2024), Japan (2024), Australia (2024), New Zealand (2024), UK (2021, 2023). Unveiled new training programs with Taiwan including special forces rotational training in offshore islands and The Northern Strike exercise organized by the National Guard. [1] Continued regular arms sales to Taiwan. | |
| Economics, Trade, and Technology | Trump | Launched the New Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue (EPPD) in 2020. |
| Biden | Resumed Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) Council meeting talks in 2021. Initiated the US-Taiwan 21st Century Trade Agreement (2022) and completed the 1st phase agreement in 2023. Initiated discussions on an avoidance of double taxation agreement (2024). Initiated US-Taiwan Technology Trade and Investment Collaboration (TTIC) to expand US-Taiwan cooperation on critical supply chains by promoting two-way investment. Initial areas of focus include semiconductors, 5G, electric vehicles, sustainable energy, and cybersecurity (2021). Inaugural US-Taiwan Science and Technology Cooperation Dialogue (2023) | |
| Diplomatic | Trump | Initiated consistent and high-level public support for expanding Taiwan’s participation on the global stage that included visible interactions by senior US diplomats with Taiwan counterparts at foreign missions. Elevated the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) to include new official partners and hosted the forum in different regions of the world, such as the Southern Pacific, et al. Secretary of Health Azar visited Taiwan in August 2020 and Undersecretary of State Keith Krach visited in September 2020; US Ambassador to the United Nations Kelly Craft was scheduled to go in 2021 but had to cancel at the last minute. Rescinded the State Department’s contact guidelines. |
| Biden | Internationalized Taiwan Strait Security especially through multilateral forums, such as G20, G7, Quad, US-ROK-JP, US-JP-AUS, US-JP-PHIL, et al. Reinstated a limited form of the State Department’s contact guidelines. Senior officials pushed back against the People Republic of China’s distortion of UN Resolution 2758. Initiated consistent and high-level public support for expanding Taiwan’s international space, including the launch of the US-Taiwan Working Group Meeting on International Organizations (2021). Signed memoranda of understanding (MOUs), such as the USAID-Taiwan MOU (2022), DFC-Taiwan MOU (2024) Supported the expansion of the GCTF to include Australia (2021) and Canada (2024). | |
| Congress | Trump | Signed landmark Taiwan-related bills, such as the Taiwan Travel Act (2018), Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (2018), TAIPEI Act (2020), Consolidated Appropriations Act (2021). |
| Biden | Signed the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (2022) Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in 2022. Speaker Kevin McCarthy met with President Tsai Ing-wen in 2023. |
Despite overstated concerns about fundamental ruptures in the United States’ Taiwan policy, the record of the two presidencies shows remarkable continuities in the two administrations’ policy of supporting Taiwan, despite differences in approach and emphasis. While the Trump Administration significantly enhanced the security and political dimensions of the relationship, the Biden Administration substantively improved the economic and international conditions of the partnership. Moreover, the first Trump Administration did not alter the legal framework and core policies that form the basis of US policy towards Taiwan, nor did the Biden Administration lead to a significant rollback of some of those progressive measures.
What then helps to explain the continued upward trajectory in US-Taiwan relations and continuity in policies? While structural variables such as the nascent bi-partisan “China consensus” and the staying power of the rebalance and Indo-Pacific strategy have been significant, ideas have also been important: to include the triumph of the allies and partners’ school in US Asia policy and positive American public opinion on Taiwan (and relatedly increasing negatives toward China).
American Public Opinion on Taiwan: Continuity vs. Change
Given the wave of public sentiment and populist undercurrents that carried President-elect Trump and the GOP back into the White House in 2024, it is appropriate to similarly review the trendlines in American public opinion on Taiwan. As Trump reenters the White House, he will also have to consider how public opinion on foreign policy issues might affect perceptions of his administration’s performance.
While public opinion is not decisive for executive action on foreign policy (and rarely if ever a vote-driving election issue), it still shows what policies do have public support, should decision-makers decide to act. Naturally, the larger the gap between elite and public opinion, the more politically difficult a decision would be for the former. As American scholar Walter Russell Mead observed: “Elite opinion normally carries outsize weight in foreign-policy decision making, but when wide gaps open between elite and popular views, elected officials cannot ignore the polls.”
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs consistently conducts opinion polls in the public domain that cover the views of the American public on pressing international issues—including their views on Taiwan and US policy on Taiwan’s defense. According to their most recent survey, conducted in 2024, six in 10 American respondents said that the US-Taiwan security relationship does more to strengthen US national security (62 percent) than to weaken it (32 percent). Here too views are positive across the partisan spectrum, though Democrats (67 percent) are slightly more positive than Republicans (62 percent) and Independents (58 percent).
Image: 2024 polls on US-Taiwan Policy conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. (Image source: Chicago Council on Global Affairs.)
Across a range of issues in 2024—except one—a majority of Americans support reinforcing ties with Taiwan. This includes Taiwan’s inclusion in international organizations (62 percent), recognizing it as an independent country (61 percent), and despite the general public’s antagonism towards free trade, a majority of Americans favors signing a free trade agreement with Taiwan (59 percent).
However, the scorecard is not entirely positive—a minority of Americans support US committing to defend Taiwan (aka strategic clarity) at 42 percent, with 12 percent opposing and 42 percent responding that they are not sure. Moreover, there has been a noticeable and steady decrease in the number of Americans who support the use of troops if China invaded Taiwan, decreasing 16 percent from an all-time high of 52 percent in 2021 and dropping to 36 percent in 2024.
The significant drop in American support for the use of troops to intervene in a military conflict over Taiwan is occurring amid ongoing and very polarized debates that continue to rage within the US Congress about whether supporting Ukraine against Russia’s invasion is a vital US interest—with increasingly more politicians and strategists arguing that doing so creates an unnecessary drain on resources that should be prioritized elsewhere. This phenomenon is related to public antagonism towards so-called forever wars, these debates appear to be having a spillover effect on public support for intervening in a military conflict over Taiwan.
In short: there appears to be a degree of war fatigue in US public opinion over Ukraine settling in, which could potentially exert a dampening effect on public support for Taiwan. How this trend continues may depend on what course the war in Ukraine takes over the coming months ahead and also public perceptions of Taiwan’s commitment to its own defense and how US leaders portray them.
Trump 2.0’s Taiwan Policy
President-elect Trump has said little publicly about Taiwan during his first administration—and what is known of what he said in private is not at all reassuring for Taiwan. (This included likening Taiwan to the tip of a sharpie pen; and reportedly stating in reference to a Chinese invasion “If they invade, there isn’t a f—— thing we can do about it.”) However, he was more vocal on Taiwan policy on the campaign trail for 2024.
For instance, the incoming president stated that he thought “Taiwan should pay us for defense … you know, we’re [the United States] no different than an insurance company.” He also accused Taiwan of stealing the US chips business (despite facts pointing to the contrary), “You know, Taiwan, they stole our chip business … and they want protection.” When he was asked what he would do if China made a move on Taiwan, he said, “China knows what I would do.” In stark contrast to President Biden, Trump has hewed to a more conventional approach of remaining ambiguous as to whether the United States would intervene in the event of an invasion, stating in response to a question of whether the US military would intervene in defense of Taiwan—”If I answer that question, it will put me in a very bad negotiating position.”
Trump’s Strategic Logic
While Trump’s statements on the campaign trail would leave Taiwan-supporters wanting, contrary to some critics’ assertions that Trump does not have a strategy, the 47th president has demonstrated a fairly consistent logic in how he approaches foreign relations. President-elect Trump’s statements are not necessarily unique to Taiwan and reflect three broader and fairly consistent strategies for President-elect Trump’s approach to foreign policy. Overall, President-elect Trump:
- Is strategically unpredictable (in rhetoric) and transactional;
- Seeks to reduce the trade deficit and bring back manufacturing jobs; and
- Prioritizes defense burden sharing with allies and partners.
While observers have tended to focus on the downsides of these variables, there are also potential upsides that deserve closer attention.
Defense Burden Sharing
Indeed, President-elect Trump is expected to emphasize burden sharing in US security ties with allies and partners. While this is generally seen as a downside by many allies and partners, it could also result in the United States providing a wider variety of arms to Taiwan, which are suited to a range of potential contingencies.
Reduction of Trade Deficit
Like in his first administration, President Trump will be laser-focused on reducing the US trade deficits with other countries, which he views as a one-sided loss for the United States. That means leveraging higher tariffs in the United States’ almost-certain renewed trade war with China and reshoring technology manufacturing capacity back into the United States. This will have direct and indirect effects on Taiwan’s substantial—albeit decreasing—economic interests in China. On the upside, such actions by the United States would also accelerate Taiwan’s ongoing efforts to realign its supply chain and diversify its economic partnership through the New Southbound Policy. As a result, this could open up Taiwan to new strategic partnerships with the growing countries that are increasingly seeking to engage with the Indo-Pacific region.
Strategic Ambiguity
The president-elect has already indicated that he would be less clear than President Biden as to whether he thought the United States had an obligation to come to Taiwan’s defense if China decided to invade the island. While this could potentially fan the flames of “US skepticism” already evident among the Taiwanese public, at a time when Chinese Communist Party (CCP, 中國共產黨) propaganda and disinformation are aimed at undermining US credibility, it could also galvanize public support for greater defense spending in order to assure Washington, DC of Taiwan’s seriousness about its own defense. In any case, Washington and Taipei should be prepared for Beijing to exploit this in its intensifying cognitive warfare campaigns and develop their own counter-strategies.
Removing Self-Imposed Restrictions for Leverage
It is important to remember that the president-elect has demonstrated that he is unencumbered by past precedents and norms. While the intent behind his actions are intended to increase US leverage in negotiations, this has helped to strengthen a US-Taiwan bilateral relationship that had previously been constrained by excessive self-imposed restrictions.
However, due to China exacting greater political and economic costs for international support of Taiwan, there will also be greater expectations from Washington for Taiwan to do more for its own defense and to address core US interests.
Personnel is Policy
The president is the final arbiter of policy, but officials in relevant positions who designed and implemented the policies of the first Trump Administration were instrumental to the success of furthering US-Taiwan relations. As such, personnel picks are going to matter greatly in his second administration. In this regard, the second Trump Administration is stacking his national security team—except for a few questionable picks—with experts who are strong China hawks and supportive of Taiwan’s defense. Trump’s national security team—including his picks for senior positions in his National Security Council, State, and Intelligence—are clear-eyed about the CCP’s malign influence, the importance of deterring China, and understand the importance of allies and partners such as Taiwan.
Still, this is not to say that everything will be the same as it was with the first go around. Just as there are obvious differences in the approaches taken between Trump and Biden, there will be differences between Trump 1.0 and Trump 2.0. Moreover, 2024 is not 2016 and the Trump of 2024 is not the Trump of 2016.
Conclusion
It is no exaggeration to say that the US-Taiwan relationship is stronger now in 2024 than it has ever been in 45 years and it continues to grow across political administrations.
As the State Department Deputy Secretary Kurt Campbell recently stated at a DC think tank event: “One of the proudest arenas of bipartisan engagement has been on issues associated with our policy across the Taiwan Strait …. Rarely have I seen our unofficial relationship flourishing in so many different manifestations.”
While human agency and structural variables have played important roles in these improvements in the bilateral relationship, it is also a function of the widening and increasing recognition of Taiwan’s geostrategic importance (e.g., high-tech) and shared democratic values, growing trust between Washington and Taipei, and a significant shift in the United States’ China policy. What else can explain the broad continuities between the two administrations, despite the apparent differences between the two leaders and their styles?
The centrality of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)—a domestic law that establishes the legal framework for the unofficial relations with Taiwan—cannot be overstated. Importantly, the TRA presents Congress—a co-equal branch of the US government—with its a special role in the appropriation and oversight responsibilities of Taiwan policy. Despite the polarized environment in Congress, it should send a reassuring signal to Taiwan-supporters that Taiwan policy retains bipartisan support and, in fact, differences between each party’s approach are often wildly exaggerated often for political purposes. The establishment of the bi-partisan House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party in 2022, now under the leadership of Chairman John Mooleneaar, can be expected to continue the drumbeat of focus on the threats posed by the CCP and the importance of supporting Taiwan in the new Congress.
That US-Taiwan relations have withstood precarious conditions since the United States’ 1979 change in diplomatic recognition—despite expectations of the contrary—is a strong testament to the enduring qualities of US policy towards Taiwan, as well as the robust, flexible legal and policy framework provided by the TRA that has allowed US policy to evolve and remain responsive to the challenges threats. These bonds will only grow stronger with care and good management by both Washington and Taipei. This is likely even more so because the American public agrees that, on a whole, the security relationship between the United States and Taiwan benefits Americans as well.
As President Biden inherited and built on a strong foundation of Taiwan policy, the 47th president will inherit a robust regional architecture and increasing international awareness about the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait built on by his predecessor. It would behoove the incoming president and his team to deepen and expand on that inheritance—which the first Trump Administration had a hand in shaping.
The main point: Amid widespread speculation about the potential changes that a second Trump Administration could bring to US policies towards Taiwan, the record of the first Trump Administration suggests a likely course of continuity with the policies established under the first Trump Administration and the Biden Administration. This is likely to result in continued closer relations between Washington and Taipei.
[1] A contingent of soldiers from Taiwan’s army participated in the “Northern Strike” training exercise held at Camp Grayling (a Michigan National Guard training facility) in August 2024. See: “Taiwanese Soldiers Joined US Military Exercises in Michigan” (Taiwan News, Sep. 3, 2023), https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/4988338.
