President-elect Donald Trump himself has made many comments about Taiwan. Last month, President-elect Trump said that “Taiwan… stole our chip business,” and a few months prior stated that “Taiwan should pay us for defense.” The Chinese government has offered their own interpretation of Trump’s comments, with Zhu Fenglian (朱鳳蓮), the spokesperson for China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, saying that “very clearly… what the United States pursues is always ‘America First… [and that] Taiwan at any time may turn from a pawn to a discarded child.”
Yet as the old adage goes, we must watch what President-elect Trump does, not what he says. Donald Trump has a history of making brash, public statements in an attempt to gain as much leverage as he can for future negotiations. Donald Trump himself has stated that Chinese Communist Party (CCP, 中國共產黨) Chairman Xi Jinping (習近平) “respects” him because Xi knows that he is “crazy,” thus leaning into his perception of strategic unpredictability.
While Donald Trump himself can be wildly unpredictable in some ways, in other ways he has been remarkably consistent. At the end of Donald Trump’s first term, Taiwanese officials and citizens were generally content with his Taiwan policy. The first Trump Administration quickly approved large arms sales packages to Taiwan, increased US Navy patrols in the Taiwan Strait, and sent a slew of high-level government officials to meet with the Taiwanese government.
Additionally, what we have seen consistently from President-elect Trump and his movement is a focus on burden-sharing, trade deficits, and revitalizing US manufacturing. If the Taiwanese government were looking at ways to curry favor, it would do well to focus on these three priorities.
On burden-sharing, Taiwan should consider demonstrating it is serious about its own defense by raising its defense budget, fostering military and political leadership in realistic contingency planning, and communicating the very real threats Taiwan faces from the Chinese military to Taiwan’s populace.
On addressing the trade deficit and revitalizing US manufacturing, the Taiwanese government could think through new opportunities to invest in the United States, reform agricultural restrictions to allow for additional US exports, or consider a large arms sales package of capabilities appropriate for Taiwan’s asymmetric defense.
However, President-elect Trump is not the only voice that sets US policy towards Taiwan, and we should not forget that the United States Congress has always been at the forefront of Taiwan policy, starting with the seminal Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. Over the past four years, we’ve also seen Congress take additional steps to be more prescriptive about what our relationship with Taiwan should look like in today’s geopolitical environment—a geopolitical environment that is drastically different from 1979.
We now know that key Taiwan voices in Congress have been picked up by the Trump Administration, most notably Representative Mike Waltz’s nomination for National Security Advisor and the announcement of Senator Marco Rubio as Secretary of State. Yet this does not necessarily indicate a shift in leadership on Taiwan policy from Congress to the executive branch. There may be some changes at the executive branch level on Taiwan policy. Senator Rubio, for example, has been a long-time supporter of increased engagement with Taiwan, so there may be revisions to the US Department of State’s contact guidelines with Taiwan to facilitate more high-level interaction with the Taiwanese government. Representative Waltz, meanwhile, has made it clear that he sees a need to harden US posture in the Indo-Pacific to deter the CCP. Given these strong views, there may be a top-down push from the White House to get the national security agencies to align their resources with such a posture.
But Congress has never been keen to weaken its Article II powers or defer too much power to the executive branch. It would be hard to imagine, even with a Trump presidency, that a new Republican (GOP) majority leader in the Senate would be willing to dilute the prerogatives of the Senate. We have already seen instances where GOP senators have indicated a willingness to defy the Trump Administration’s nominations picks, demonstrating that the separation of powers still hold.
What this means is that Congressional trendlines on Taiwan are likely to stay throughout President-elect Trump’s second term. These trendlines include enhancing Taiwan’s defense capabilities, threatening financial action against the CCP if it were to disrupt peace in the Taiwan Strait, facilitating government-to-government contact with the Taiwanese, and potential movement on tax and trade.
Between the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act and the slew of Taiwan legislation that has passed a GOP majority-led House, it is clear that Congress is invested in finding ways to enhance Taiwan’s defense, from accelerating arms sales to Taiwan to authorizing stockpiles on-island. During the 119th Congress, we may see additional actions to ensure presidential drawdown authorities are used in an effective manner for Taiwan, and an expansion of current US military training programs on-island.
Congress has also been very forward leaning in introducing a slew of legislation that imposes financial costs on CCP officials for actions and decisions on Taiwan, from the revocation of permanent normal trade relations to sanctions and freezing assets. Trump himself has also threatened up to 200 percent tariffs against China if Xi were to “go into Taiwan.” Meanwhile, as Congress considers a new tax bill to replace the soon-to-expire Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, we may see attempts to address the issue of Taiwanese companies’ double taxation when invested in the United States, to facilitate additional Taiwanese investment in the United States and re-balance the trade deficit.
On people-to-people ties, the steady beat of Congressional delegation visits to Taiwan and the vocal support for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, such as the World Health Assembly, will likely remain.
However, as with all new administrations and Congress, there are outstanding questions whose answers cannot be gleaned from prior precedent. First, will concerns about semiconductor shortages and trade deficits derail additional Taiwanese business in the United States? Second, will Taiwan’s already increasing defense budget be enough to convince the new Congress that Taiwan’s will to fight is strong? Third, crucially, will Trump Administration political nominees have the wherewithal and bureaucratic know-how to ensure that national security agencies are aligned with White House policy priorities? And lastly, will other domestic issues, such as inflation, or world events, such as Russia’s war in Ukraine and the war in Palestine, distract the Trump Administration’s self-proclaimed number one foreign policy priority: China?
The main point: Despite President-elect Trump’s unpredictability, he has been consistent in his focus on burden-sharing, trade deficits, and revitalizing US manufacturing. Additionally, it is likely that current Congressional trendlines of enhancing Taiwan’s defense capabilities, threatening financial action against the CCP if it were to disrupt peace in the Taiwan Strait, facilitating government-to-government contact with Taiwan, and potential movement on tax and trade will continue.
