Introduction
The Indo-Pacific region has emerged as a focal point of global geopolitical dynamics, characterized by rising economic interdependence and security challenges. It is home to the world’s most populated countries—India, China, and Indonesia, in particular—growing middle classes, and a host of traditional and non-traditional security challenges. These traditional security challenges include weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation on the Korean peninsula, the potential for kinetic conflict across the Taiwan Strait, territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and military coordination between Russia, China and North Korea. Non-traditional security challenges such as climate change, piracy, human trafficking, disinformation, and cybersecurity add to the region’s importance.
To manage these dual challenges and seek opportunity in the Indo-Pacific region, Canada put forth an Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) in late 2022. Global Affairs Canada (GAC) asserts that the IPS aims to “seize opportunities in the national interest of Canadians, while defending the values they hold dear, Canada will invest in building capacity to engage with countries across the region, while paying particular attention to Australia, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, China, India, Japan, Pacific Island Countries, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand.”
This overlaps with Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy (NSP, 新南向政策), which was introduced by then-President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016. According to the Center of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the “NSP is designed to strengthen Taipei’s relationships with the ten countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), six states in South Asia, Australia, and New Zealand. The policy aims to leverage Taiwan’s cultural, educational, technological, agricultural, and economic assets to enhance Taiwan’s regional integration and promote the broader development of the Indo-Pacific region.”
In this context, Canada sees cooperation with Taiwan as a critical part of its IPS and Taiwan sees cooperation with Canada as an important part of its efforts to strengthen its efforts to preserve its political, economic and security status based on liberal democratic institutions.
Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: An Overview
Launched in November 2022, Canada’s IPS represents a significant shift in its foreign policy, emphasizing a comprehensive approach to engage with the Indo-Pacific region. The strategy outlines five interconnected objectives: promoting peace, resilience, and security; expanding trade, investment, and supply chain resilience; investing in and connecting people; building a sustainable and green future; and positioning Canada as an active and engaged partner in the Indo-Pacific.
The IPS recognizes the importance of Taiwan as a democratic partner and a critical player in regional security and economic frameworks. Taiwan’s strategic location in key sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that connect the South China Sea (SCS), the East China Sea (ECS), and the Sea of Japan to the Pacific Ocean; its central position in advanced semi-conductor technology production; and its position in the First Island Chain make it an essential partner for Canada in achieving its IPS objectives.
Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy: Background and Objectives
Taiwan’s NSP aims to strengthen Taiwan’s economic and cultural ties with countries in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Australasia, in the face of what the Mainland Affairs Council calls continued economic coercion from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The policy seeks to diversify Taiwan’s economic partnerships and reduce its reliance on China, particularly in the face of increasing Chinese assertiveness in the region—including military drills, grey zone operations, and daily disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks. The NSP encompasses various sectors, including trade, investment, education, and cultural exchanges, and emphasizes people-to-people connections. The NSP aligns with Canada’s IPS, as both strategies prioritize economic cooperation, democratic values, and regional stability. The potential for collaboration between Canada and Taiwan under the NSP framework presents significant opportunities for both nations.
Opportunities for Interconnections
One of the most significant opportunities for Canada in engaging with Taiwan’s NSP lies in the area of economic collaboration. Taiwan is a vital player in global supply chains, particularly in the semiconductor industry—which is crucial for various sectors, including technology, automotive, and healthcare. Canada can leverage its resources and expertise to enhance trade and investment ties with Taiwan. For instance, in 2023, Canada announced the opening of its first Indo-Pacific Agriculture and Agri-Food Office in Manila, Philippines, which aims to strengthen agricultural ties in the region, including with Taiwan. This initiative aligns with Taiwan’s NSP goals of enhancing agricultural cooperation and food security in the region.
Moreover, Canada’s emphasis on diversifying its trade relationships can complement Taiwan’s efforts to reduce its economic dependence on China. The IPS highlights the importance of expanding trade with Taiwan, which could involve negotiating free trade agreements or enhancing existing trade frameworks. Canada can do more here as G-7 chair, by advocating for Taiwan’s inclusion into the Comprehensive and Progressive Transpacific Partnership (CPTPP). As CPTPP chair Canada could champion the enlargement of the CPTPP to include Taiwan by supporting an CPTPP Dialogue Group. This approach would “socialize current and potential members around possible alterations to the existing CPTPP agreement and make recommendations to the Commission on changes.”
Strengthening people-to-people connections is a key component of both Canada’s IPS and Taiwan’s NSP. Educational exchanges, cultural diplomacy, and tourism can foster mutual understanding and cooperation between the two nations. Canada has done this by bolstering visa-processing capacities, facilitating travel to and from the region, and strengthening Canada’s international student program according to its Indo-Pacific Strategy. Similarly, Taiwan has established an office in Montréal, Quebec, Canada, to promote bilateral exchanges and cooperation. Additionally, Canada’s commitment to attracting international students from the Indo-Pacific region, including Taiwan, can enhance educational collaboration. Taiwan has a strong educational system, and partnerships between Canadian and Taiwanese universities can facilitate research collaboration and innovation.
Collaboration on Security Challenges
The security landscape in the Indo-Pacific is increasingly complex, with rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Canada’s IPS recognizes the need for enhanced security cooperation with regional partners, including Taiwan. This presents an opportunity for Canada to collaborate with Taiwan on security initiatives, such as joint military exercises and intelligence sharing. In 2024, Canada participated in multinational naval exercises in the Indo-Pacific, which included cooperation with Taiwan’s military forces. Such engagements not only strengthen bilateral security ties but also demonstrate Canada’s commitment to upholding regional stability and supporting Taiwan’s defense capabilities.
Disinformation is also a key concern, and as noted in an Asia-Pacific Foundation commentary on combatting disinformation: “[I]n June 2025, Ottawa has an opportunity to promote a G7 coordinated effort to combat disinformation with fellow G7 members. At the same time, Canada should present the idea of a non-state-level approach to disinformation through the promotion of a consortium of universities and research institutes to collectively pool their resources to combat disinformation.” Such initiatives would complement each other and be inclusive, ensuring that frontline actors like Taiwan and their invaluable experience are also leveraged to mitigate the global scourge of MDM.
Furthermore, Canada should take the opportunity to combat disinformation and make democracies more resilient against MDM by including disinformation as a major part of any joint communique released by the G7. An additional joint communique could be released focusing specifically on disinformation and the weaponization of the social media space—akin to the Hiroshima G7 Summit, when a separate communique was issued on the theme of economic coercion.
Lastly, as host, Ottawa could use the unique opportunity of the G7 framework to hold a “Combating Disinformation” conference, workshop, and/or seminar in conjunction with the Summit. Experts and scholars could be convened to convey to G7 leaders the trends, dangers, and strategic approaches to combating disinformation. Necessarily, the experts would come from frontline states and political entities facing the dangers of MDM.
Furthermore, Canada’s involvement in initiatives aimed at countering cyber threats aligns with Taiwan’s NSP focus on enhancing cybersecurity. Collaborative efforts in this area can bolster both nations’ resilience against cyberattacks, particularly those attributed to state-sponsored actors.
Challenges to Interconnections
Despite the promising opportunities for collaboration, several challenges may hinder Canada’s engagement with Taiwan under the NSP framework: including geopolitical tensions, domestic political considerations, and implementation of Canada’s IPS in the backdrop of troubled relations with China and India. In addition, Canada currently faces serious credibility issues in the region at large due to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s unexplained, last minute walkout at the 2017 Danang, Vietnam TPP signing agreement—and dissonance between his progressive ideals and heterogeneous values in the Indo-Pacific region.
The geopolitical landscape in the Indo-Pacific is fraught with tensions, particularly concerning China’s assertiveness. Canada’s engagement with Taiwan may provoke backlash from China, which views Taiwan as a breakaway province. This could complicate Canada’s diplomatic relations with China, a significant trading partner. The resulting problems could include further economic sanctions, a return to hostage diplomacy, or an intensification of efforts to interfere into Canadian domestic politics. The challenge lies in balancing the need to support Taiwan while managing relations with China, which is crucial for Canada’s economic interests.
Domestic political considerations in Canada may also pose challenges to furthering interconnections with Taiwan. Public opinion on China has shifted significantly in recent years, with increasing skepticism regarding China’s intentions and actions. This shift may create a more favorable environment for supporting Taiwan; however, it could also lead to polarized views on Canada’s foreign policy direction. The Canadian government must navigate these domestic sentiments while formulating its approach to Taiwan. Ensuring bipartisan support for engagement with Taiwan will be essential for the long-term sustainability of Canada’s IPS.
The successful implementation of Canada’s IPS is critical for enhancing interconnections with Taiwan. However, the strategy requires significant resources and commitment from various levels of government and civil society. Ensuring that the IPS translates into concrete actions and initiatives will be a challenge, particularly in a rapidly changing geopolitical environment. This implementation is now challenged by frozen relations with India following an ongoing dispute about the killing of a Sikh activist in Canada; growing tensions with China, as Canada has adopted tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles; and most recently, South Korea’s domestic politics descending into chaos with President Yoon Sul-yeol’s declaration of martial law on December 4 likely leading to a much less cooperative partner in Seoul.
Moreover, the effectiveness of Canada’s engagement with Taiwan will depend on the ability to coordinate efforts across different government departments and agencies. This is challenged by hesitancy within Canada’s political leadership to adopt more a Canadian-defined “One-China Policy”—a hesitancy that inculcates more nebulous boundaries as to what, when and how Canada engages with Taiwan while not drawing Beijing’s ire.
A cohesive and subtle approach will be necessary to maximize the potential benefits of collaboration under the NSP framework. This can and should take place at the non-state level, and within multilateral and minilateral formulas that treat Taiwan as a global public good. This should and has included highlighting the importance of Taiwan as a global public good in G-7, NATO IP4 and bilateral statements, as well as in Canada’s IPS.
Black Swans, Taiwan and the Future of Ottawa-Taipei relations
Liberal democracies around the world including Canada are facing domestic political legitimacy problems. After 9 years in power, the Trudeau government has struggled to bring prosperity to Canada. For example, in writing for the Financial Times, Valentina Romei, William Crofton, and Colby Smith found that “Canada’s labour productivity has contracted for 14 of the last 16 quarters and was 1.2 per cent below its pre-pandemic level at the end of the second quarter of 2024.” Carolyn Rogers, senior deputy governor at the Bank of Canada, warned in March that weak productivity was an economic “emergency,” adding that “over the past four decades, we have actually slipped significantly compared with some other countries.”
Moreover, Trudeau’s government has been seen to be weak on China, and as having crafted an Indo-Pacific Strategy that pandered to domestic interests not national interests. This is evidenced by the strong focus within the Canadian IPS on championing diversity, reconciliation, and environmentalism, and PM Justin Trudeau prioritization of a progressive foreign policy approach that puts a “feminist foreign policy” approach at the center of its efforts to eradicate poverty and support inclusive development.
With an election looming in Canada, there are many questions about whether a Conservative government will sustain the current IPS, or substantially revise it to be more in line with Canadian national interests rather than interest groups in Canada. Fortunately for Taiwan, the Conservatives are likely to push the boundaries of a Canadian defined “One-China Policy” to promote cooperation and a deepening of comprehensive relations.
As Canada navigates the complexities of its relationship with Taiwan, it must remain committed to supporting Taiwan’s democratic values and sovereignty while balancing its broader geopolitical interests in the Indo-Pacific. The coming years will be crucial in determining the trajectory of Canada-Taiwan relations and their implications for regional stability and prosperity.
The main point: Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy presents significant opportunities for enhancing interconnections with Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy. Economic collaboration, security cooperation, and people-to-people connections are key areas where both nations can benefit from strengthened ties. However, challenges such as geopolitical tensions, domestic political considerations, and the effective implementation of the IPS must be addressed to realize the full potential of this engagement.
