Last month, Taiwan’s referendum to restart the Maanshan Nuclear Power Plant (馬鞍山核能發電廠), the last nuclear plant in Taiwan, failed. Though almost 75 percent of voters supported the restart, the referendum fell more than half a million votes short of the required threshold of 25 percent of the entire electorate. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民主進步黨) had backed a shutdown of the plant, in order to fulfill its longstanding pledge for a “nuclear-free homeland.” Yet, after the vote, Taiwan’s DPP President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) made a statement acknowledging “society’s expectations for diverse energy options,” and conceded that his party wouldn’t rule out nuclear energy in the future.
Taiwan’s political polarization is deeply reflected in its energy policy. The DPP has long advocated for an accelerated green energy transition at the expense of nuclear power, while the pro-nuclear Kuomintang (KMT, 中國國民黨) is pushing for a slower transition in order to preserve a stable energy supply. The Maanshan Plant referendum is only a microcosm of this divide, leaving Taiwan’s energy policy confused and, at times, contradictory.
The outcome has been the worst of both worlds.
In advance of the referendum on the Maanshan plant, the DPP had finally eliminated Taiwan’s nuclear power. Meanwhile, budgetary opposition in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (立法院) from the KMT—which holds a legislative majority in partnership the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP, 台灣民眾黨)—constrains aggressive renewables promotion. Major initiatives, including Taiwan’s ambitious artificial intelligence (AI) agenda, will require a significantly greater power supply for industry (which already consumes more than half of Taiwan’s total electricity; the OECD average is 32 percent). Beyond the power generation facilities themselves, Taiwan will require fuel for energy-guzzling AI data centers, providing the necessary computational power to harness AI in new areas such as robotics.
In just a few years, AI is expected to rapidly accelerate Taiwan’s energy demand. As a result, any vulnerabilities in Taiwanese energy security will likely be multiplied in scope and depth. For Taipei, the stakes of developing a resilient energy mix could not be higher.
What’s next for Taiwanese energy security after the failed referendum on restarting the Maanshan Nuclear Power Plant? This article will identify the major vulnerabilities currently threatening Taiwan’s energy mix, while breaking down Taiwan’s power generation among renewables, liquefied natural gas, and coal.
Institutionally Troubled: Taiwan’s Uneven Renewable Deployment
Deploying renewable power has been at the top of Taipei’s agenda for years. Taiwan has spent billions developing offshore wind and solar energy. The result has been lackluster. The waters off Taiwan’s west coast have remarkably high potential for wind power—an advantage that has attracted substantial domestic and foreign investment. Implementation, however, has been more sluggish than expected.
Construction and procurement problems have led to severe cost overruns, and installation has stalled due to permitting issues. Attempts to allocate capital are facing a byzantine legal and bureaucratic system that appears incapable of providing new capacity at the pace needed for Taiwan to meet its green energy goals. The government’s original 2025 target of 5.7 gigawatts in installed offshore capacity has been pushed to 2026 due to the unexpectedly slow progress. By late 2024, Taiwan had installed only 2.8 GW in offshore wind.
Solar looks more promising—but only marginally so. Rooftop panels have proven the most successful, though installation has slowed due to high upfront costs and inconsistent grid integration. Last December, Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan introduced subsidies offering select households NTD 300,000 (USD 9,257) per installation. Yet widespread adoption still remains far off.
Large-scale solar projects are plagued with similar grid integration issues, but are mainly constrained by Taiwan’s high land costs. Worse yet, the country’s high energy sourcing costs deflate demand for green power, hurting the long-term viability of investment in solar. This is largely due to Taiwan’s “feed-in tariff,” a government subsidy to buy locally-made green energy at a baseline premium. While guaranteeing returns for energy producers, the subsidy raises costs for consumers and artificially reduces uptake from otherwise interested buyers, especially small and medium enterprises (SMEs).
Additionally, Taiwan’s electricity market is managed by Taipower (台電), a state-owned enterprise often criticized for poor grid reliability and sourcing energy at inflated rates.
Due to these factors, growth in solar has been sluggish for years, missing 2020 and 2025 targets by 0.7 and 7.5 GW, respectively. Taipei has effective policy options for expediting renewable implementation, including accelerated permitting, revising the feed-in tariff, and investing in modernized grid integration. All these options, however, face strong political opposition in the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan’s bureaucracy, and civil and environmental advocacy groups.
Taiwan’s difficulties with renewable energy are far from unsolvable. But solutions will take more time than Taipei is willing to admit. Even without the impending AI-driven increase in power consumption, the government’s plan to achieve 40 percent renewable electricity by 2030 seems unrealistic.
Image: File photo of wind turbines at the Shih-Men Wind Power Plant (石門風力發電站) in northern Taiwan. (Image source: Wikimedia Commons)
Great Rewards and Greater Risks: Taiwan’s Growing Adoption of Natural Gas
The greatest risk to Taiwan’s energy security lies in a rare point of political consensus. Both the DPP and KMT support the phaseout of coal in favor of cleaner and more efficient liquified natural gas (LNG). To accommodate increases in demand, the government is now rapidly expanding LNG import capacity and a new fleet of gas-fired power plants.
At the government’s behest, Taipower is managing an unprecedented LNG buildup. It is now developing Taiwan’s third import terminal in Taichung and two new gas-fired power plants. LNG is intended to provide half of Taiwan’s total energy by 2030, though the proportion could increase much faster depending on the pace of industrial growth. The island currently depends on LNG for roughly 42 percent of its electricity. Compared to other energy sources, LNG is both easier and cheaper to deploy. The major supply bottleneck, terminal import capacity, is rapidly abating, ushering in LNG dominance as an affordable, efficient driver for Taiwan’s industrial growth.
But there’s a catch. LNG has a limited shelf life. When stored, LNG begins to “boil off,” meaning liquid fuel evaporates into gas that builds potentially hazardous pressure in storage tanks. This makes storing LNG exceedingly difficult and expensive, and, using current technology, near-impossible to stockpile adequately. In fact, Taiwan’s current LNG stockpiles would only last for 11 days of normal use under a blockade. Despite producing the largest share of Taiwan’s power consumption, LNG reserves would only last about a quarter of the time as Taiwan’s stockpiled coal.
This makes LNG a grave liability in the event of a Chinese blockade—almost half of Taiwan’s energy infrastructure relies on stockpiled gas that couldn’t provide power past a few weeks. While research into more efficient storage and larger government holdings is estimated to increase the duration of stockpiles, initial extensions won’t add more than a few extra days. Taiwan is also largely dependent on Qatar for LNG imports, which ships energy through a series of international chokepoints and hotspots, including the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, and the South China Sea. As a resource-poor country forced to import fuel, Taiwan is faced with inherent vulnerabilities.
Despite these growing security risks, Taipei’s political consensus is that LNG is conducive to economic growth and can efficiently replace coal (an energy source that is widely unpopular throughout Taiwan). Security considerations aside, this makes sense. LNG capacity is easier to expand than renewables, cleaner than coal, and more popular than nuclear. It would be the best option if Taiwan were in a more secure position. Unfortunately, Taiwan confronts the risk of imminent blockade by China. As such, it must view LNG with measured scrutiny.
A Necessary Evil: Taiwan’s Rejection of Coal Amid Energy Insecurity
In Taiwan, coal is the hugely unpopular backbone of the energy mix. It is simultaneously the pre-existing cornerstone of Taiwanese energy security, while also being the island’s least efficient, dirtiest, and deadliest source of energy. In fact, the KMT and DPP both agree that eliminating coal is an imminent national priority—the two only differ on the timeframe.
Unlike liquid fuels, coal is primarily imported from Indonesia and Australia, which means comparatively limited reliance on international chokepoints. Coal is also far easier to preserve: current coal stockpiles would last more than 40 days of normal use. During a crisis like a blockade, austere usage could stretch that limit far longer. Additionally, coal is used as a fallback for failed projects and other closures. For example, after the initial phase-out of nuclear power earlier this year, coal plants increased production to compensate for the lost supply. This measure ignited intense opposition from local communities and activists. Nonetheless, Taiwan has found it more straightforward to increase the supply of coal energy, as the power source doesn’t rely on major physical infrastructure such as wind farms or specialized LNG import facilities.
This gives coal power operators the necessary flexibility to adjust production levels based on the performance of Taiwan’s other energy resources. Yet, just as Taiwan recently became nuclear-free, the government plans to eliminate one of its largest coal plants by 2034. The government plans to replace this lost power with renewable production and hard-to-stockpile LNG. Whether Taiwan’s renewables market will have matured by then—or the risk of blockade will have weakened—remains to be seen.
Is Energy Security Possible for Taiwan?
The future of Taiwan’s energy security is rife with risk. By cutting off nuclear power amid lagging renewables deployment and the phaseout of coal, Taiwan is hurtling toward heavy reliance on LNG. Massive spikes in energy demand due to AI and associated expansions in advanced chip manufacturing are set to accelerate this trend. Energy security concerns may preserve coal in the short-term, but Taiwan’s massive investments in LNG terminals signal a long-term shift toward gas.
However, without home-grown alternatives, Taiwan is highly vulnerable to both a blockade and grey-zone aggression by China. Beijing likely knows it only needs to wait a few weeks to starve Taiwan’s power supply. In the short term, it may become emboldened by its substantial leverage to commit to greater economic coercion against Taiwan by limiting its access to energy. One worrying scenario is that China could inflate LNG prices on the open-spot market, straining supply for the island.
Meanwhile, it is unclear what the United States—Taiwan’s third-largest LNG supplier—will do to defend an important customer. Perhaps President Donald Trump’s persistent interest in selling American gas will guarantee Taiwan’s energy security. Yet, this may be a gamble Taiwan doesn’t have to take. Even if Taiwan’s current nuclear infrastructure is dead, President Lai can still make hard decisions to enhance Taiwan’s energy security. Though coal remains highly unpopular, Taiwan may have no choice except to preserve its coal-fired plants, which could occur alongside sizeable investments in renewables.
Energy security and clean energy aren’t necessarily in opposition. Taiwan must liberalize its energy sector, particularly for renewables, so that the industry can mature and establish itself as a competitive player in the island’s energy market. Though LNG will be necessary for Taiwan’s continued competitiveness in high-tech manufacturing, it must not dominate Taiwan’s energy generation at the expense of other fuels. At its current rate of expansion, the short-term economic gains of LNG power might be outweighed by the long-term loss of security.
If Taiwan is willing to be pragmatic, energy security is possible. Back in 1985, nuclear power provided 52 percent of Taiwan’s energy. While navigating valid security concerns, Taipei must strive to preserve its nuclear sector and retain coal power capacity, at least until renewables production matures.
As partisan warfare escalates in Taipei, the government might be tempted to fall back on easy, politically uncontroversial energy sources. But to secure Taiwanese power for the next generation, the government must make painful choices in the present.
The main point: Despite investments in renewables, Taiwan is becoming increasingly reliant on liquefied natural gas (LNG) for its energy needs—resulting in extreme vulnerability to a PRC maritime blockade. To ensure resilience, Taiwan should prioritize a diverse energy mix, even if it includes less popular energy sources such as coal and nuclear power.
