When a Taiwanese temple sends its idol onto the streets for a procession, a band of devotees will lay on facepaint and flank the deity as bodyguards. The facepaint twists their features into the scowls of divine beasts, and they can utter no words during the procession. If they do, the ghosts that run scared from their advance will immediately turn back and possess them, no longer fooled that they are deities. Though these devotees cannot communicate with words, the large tattoos adorning their arms and shoulders suggest another affiliation—many are members of Taiwan’s local gangs, or “brothers” (兄弟).
Gangs are a tenacious influence on Taiwan’s society and politics. This often surprises foreigners, accustomed more to Taiwan’s efficient governance and lauded democratic system. What makes Taiwan’s criminal organizations even more unique is their intimate connection to temples and Daoist (道教) folk religion. When gangs, temples, and local politics combine into splendid religious festivals—such as the Dajia Mazu pilgrimage in central Taiwan—every layer of Taiwanese society is visible to see.
From the early days of Han Taiwanese society, through the period of Kuomintang (KMT, 國民黨) martial law and on to the era of democratization, the influence of Taiwan’s gangs has evolved. The activity of some gangs (but not all) has spread beyond extracting profit from local territory–through extortion, prostitution, and gambling–to international transactions involving drug, arms, and human trafficking. This has sowed connections between certain Taiwanese gangs and foreign actors, such as Chinese triads and government officials engaging in united front work for the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As elections become more competitive in Taiwan, gangs have leveraged their control of prominent Taiwanese temples to influence politicians seeking support from religious communities. Such deep-rooted connections between gangs and local communities obstruct democratic development based on transparency and open debate, especially in Taiwan’s rural areas.
This article will unpack the history of gangs in Taiwan and their marriage into Taiwan’s temples and politics. A forthcoming second article in this series will explore gangs’ relationships with the government and triads in the PRC, and how PRC actors may use gangs to exert CCP (中國共產黨) united front political influence on Taiwan society.
The Origin of Taiwan’s Gangs
Taiwan’s gangs originate in the immigrant Han society of the Qing Dynasty. Disparate groups from coastal Chinese provinces landed in Taiwan and, in the absence of effective Qing government authority, were forced to spar over territory ceded by indigenous populations. These Han groups were divided by home region, language, and the gods they worshiped. Temples, and the idols of their chosen deities within, were the focal points of each ethnic community. When these communities formed militias to establish order or struggle over land and taxation rights, temples and idols served as the banners demarcating territorial control.
In 1853, the Quanzhou “Three Counties” people waged war on the Tongan people for access to the wharves in Monga (Wanhua District in modern-day Taipei). The Three Counties people targeted the Qingshui Zushi Temple, burning it to the ground, before reaching the Tongan base in Bajia Village. The Tongan people beat a retreat to Dadaocheng, carrying the effigy of their protector god, Xiahai Chenghuang. These skirmishes in early Han Taiwanese society prompted the fusion of temples with the militias charged with protecting their devoted communities.
The strict Hoko system of social control under the Japanese colonization of Taiwan (1895-1945) limited opportunities for local gangs to amass power. Though some local gangs opted to engage in criminal enterprise through opium or gambling dens, the Japanese colonial administration sought to de-Sinicize Daoist folk religion and infuse it with Shintoist tradition. These policies constrained temples’ roles as the rally points for local militias.
Organized crime began to achieve its modern character during the period of KMT martial law in Taiwan (1949-1987). A flood of immigrants arrived in Taiwan under the banner of the KMT, triggering yet another episode of gang violence based on regionalist divides. This time, the children of KMT immigrants formed gangs of mainlanders (外省人) to protect themselves from local Han Taiwanese (本省人). Several gangs emerged during this time, including the Four Seas Gang (四海幫) and the Bamboo Union (竹聯幫), arguably the most notorious criminal organization in present-day Taiwan. At this time, the gangs of Taiwan were still engaged in criminal activity of a quintessentially “local” character, such as prostitution, gambling, bid-rigging, and extortion. In other words, these activities were grounded in domination of a particular swathe of territory rather than cross-border transactions with foreign criminal organizations.
As the KMT dictatorship faced mounting political challenges, exacerbated by the United States’ diplomatic pivot from the Republic of China to the PRC in 1978, the Taipei government increasingly turned towards local gang leaders to shore up support for the regime. Gang leaders, inextricably linked to local communities, were willing to marshal support for the KMT regime in exchange for relaxed police oversight. As Jacob Tischer has written, this also raised the incentives for gang leaders to dominate Daoist temples, as control of the religious institutions enhanced the gangsters’ social capital in local communities. Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國), the son and presidential successor of Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石), made more than ten trips to the storied Chaotian Temple (朝天宮) in the 1980s in a bid to shore up weakening support for the KMT. Chiang’s connections to gangs, in particular the mainlander Bamboo Union, are evidenced in a tragic historical saga: In 1984, Chiang’s intelligence service arranged for two Bamboo Union hitmen to travel to San Francisco, USA, and kill a Taiwanese-American dissident named Henry Liu (劉宜良). This assassination triggered a diplomatic uproar and triggered US congressional hearings that pressured Chiang into democratic reforms.
Gangland after Democratization
As is all-too-common during democratic transitions, the end of the KMT dictatorship in the late 1980s precipitated a dramatic growth in organized criminal activity in Taiwan. One consequence of the end of martial law was a decline in maritime patrols off the coast of the main island of Taiwan. As one former chief of police of a southern Taiwanese city relayed to Ko-Lin Chin (陳國霖) in Heijin, the most complete account of gangs in Taiwan: “After martial law was lifted in 1986… patrols of the coast became almost non-existent, and as a result, it was easy to smuggle guns and drugs into Taiwan. That completely changed the crime scene here.”
The ingress of guns and drugs changed the business activity of Taiwanese gangs and the manner in which gangs fought over control. The increased firepower of imported weapons allowed smaller gangs to rival bigger ones for eminence. Meanwhile, the onset of smuggling permitted certain gangs to enter more lucrative international trades such as the trafficking of heroin or amphetamines. Violence and homicides surged in Taiwan in the 1990s. It was at this time that a significant number of gang leaders established legitimate businesses so as to launder their money and invest their excess capital. Some gang leaders also entered politics directly, or else supported the campaigns of gang-affiliated politicians. In 1994, the Taiwanese political scientist Chao Yung-mao (趙永茂) estimated that over 50 percent of Taiwanese city and country councilors had gang affiliations. This was especially pronounced in rural Taiwan, with one 1993 magazine survey suggesting that Yunlin County, Chiayi City, and Changhua County had the highest incidences of gang participation in politics.
As some gangs engaged in more lucrative or violent strands of criminal activity, a distinction began to emerge between members of gangs engaging in traditional, “local” crime and groups involved in international crime. Members of gangs who engage in purely local crime face more incentives to maintain positive public relations with local communities. These actors are more likely to prefer the title “brothers” (兄弟) over heidao (“gangsters,” 黑道). Brothers may refrain from overtly engaging in egregious crimes like robbery, rape, or drug-dealing for the sake of public relations. As one brother shared with Ko-lin Chin in Heijin: “Being a brother means we are extremely concerned for our reputation. We are generous with people.” Such local groups are more inclined to delegate darker crimes to teenage recruits whose gang affiliations are more obscure. In an interview with the author of this article, a former teenage “brother” in Taichung, Chang Hung-Chi (張弘佶), explained that gang leaders recruit disaffected or rebellious middle schoolers who will face more lenient punishments for criminal convictions. Chang shared a second, more spiritual reason for the recruitment of teenagers: gang-affiliated temples need a supply of bodies that can dance for gods during religious ceremonies.
Image: Then-President Tsai Ing-wen making a public appearance at the Dajia Mazu pilgrimage in Taichung County (April 4, 2019). The speaker holding the microphone is Yen Ching-piao, chairman of the Jenn Lann Temple board and a prominent local gang figure. (Image source: Wikimedia Commons)
The Sacred Act of Voting
Though brothers have long donned the costumes of the “Eight Generals” (八家將) and danced before processions of Daoist deities, the stature of prominent gang-affiliated temples has only grown in the years since Taiwan’s democratization. By no means are all Taiwanese temples and their devotees gang-affiliated. Ordinary devotees tolerate, rather than celebrate, the connections between certain temples and gangs. However, the democratization of Taiwan has enabled certain gang-affiliated temples to gain unprecedented media exposure and clout among national politicians. The advent of meaningful elections in the 1990s forced politicians—whether DPP or KMT—to compete over exposure in Taiwan’s most important cultural events. In many local communities, these events are temple ceremonies such as the Yanshui Beehive Festival or the Qing Shan King Sacrificial Ceremony. Politicians are consequently compelled to associate with the gang leaders who often control parts of these events. In a 1995 interview with China Times Weekly, an underworld figure remarked that “If not for elections, I can’t imagine any other resources heidao people have to attract baidao (politicians, 白道) people.”
Jenn Lann Temple (鎮瀾宮) in Dajia, Taichung County, is one prominent gang-affiliated temple. Jenn Lann Temple organizes the Dajia Mazu Pilgrimage, the largest religious event in Taiwan. Each year, millions of devotees of Mazu—the Daoist sea goddess and most celebrated deity in Taiwan–process alongside her idol through a 340 km route in central Taiwan. The Dajia Mazu idol stops at more than 100 temples during its course and devotees jostle to pass beneath her palanquin—to do so is to come within feet of the Heavenly Mother herself, and to receive more than enough good fortune for the year.
The chairman of the Jenn Lann Temple board that manages the pilgrimage is Yen Ching-piao (顏清標), reputedly the most prominent gangster of the Taichung area. Yen’s stewardship of the Dajia Mazu Pilgrimage and his involvement in national politics has made him a household name in Taiwan. In 1999, Yen was a local politician and gang leader in Taichung County when he capitalized on a violent local feud to ascend to the chairmanship of the Jenn Lann Temple board. As a result of Yen’s savvy media engagement and alliances with other Mazu temples, the Dajia Mazu pilgrimage has surged in size and popularity. Yen has used this platform to gain a considerable level of influence over the politics of central Taiwan. Indeed, as Tischer writes, no aspiring Taichung politician can avoid appearing in Zhenlan Temple’s “performance space.”
Yen’s influence extends to presidential politics. In the 2000 presidential election, a divination from Jenn Lann Temple revealed that independent presidential candidate James Soong (宋楚瑜) was the candidate most favored by Dajia Mazu. Soong performed well in Taichung but narrowly lost the nationwide election, in part because of his perceived connections to Taiwan’s underworld. Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), Soong’s rival and the winner of the 2000 presidential election, later met with Yen Ching-piao and earned Yen’s promise of neutrality in the 2004 election. In the 2008 election, Yen threw his weight behind the eventual winner Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九)—the KMT candidate favoring friendly relations with the PRC. Ma carried the palanquin of the Dajia Mazu idol during the pilgrimage that preceded the election, and again in April 2008 to thank Mazu for his victory. In the 2020 presidential campaign, Yen was a fervent supporter of the KMT candidate Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜), although he welcomed incumbent president and DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) in stumping at the Dajia Mazu pilgrimage. Yen also employed the platform of Jenn Lann Temple for his own career in national politics, during which time he was once elected as a member in the Legislative Yuan while serving a prison sentence for graft and attempted murder.
Conclusion
The stubborn connections between gangs, temples, and politics are an impediment to the continued democratic development of Taiwan. Even as gang violence has lessened since the 1990s and reforms have made it harder for gang leaders to take office, surging interest in certain religious events has perpetuated the informal influence of temple-affiliated gang leaders. While the primary effects of this are seen in Taiwan’s domestic politics, the second article in this series will explore how temples and gangs are networked into the PRC–such as through Jenn Lann Temple’s Taiwan Mazu Fellowship in Fujian Province, and the Bamboo Union’s vast footprint across China and Southeast Asia.
The main point: Taiwanese gangs retain deep historical connections to the island’s Daoist temples. This relationship offers gangs legitimacy and local political power. In the era of Taiwan’s democratization, a few entrepreneurial gang leaders have captured control over major religious events and employ these platforms for political influence over Taiwan’s politicians.
