In recent years, the Kuomintang Party (KMT, 國民黨) has faced continuous setbacks on Taiwan’s political stage—especially in regards to its dwindling support among younger voters, sparking widespread discussions about its future. Once a dominant force in the island’s politics, the KMT now faces significant challenges. From the leadership switch just before the 2016 election (from Hung Hsiu-chu [洪秀柱] to Eric Chu [朱立倫]), to the 2020 “Han Wave” (Han Kuo-yu [韓國瑜]), and the unsuccessful “Blue-White Coalition” in 2024 (between Hou Yu-ih [侯友宜] and Ko Wen-je [柯文哲]), three consecutive election losses are no coincidence. Before Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) victory in 2016, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民進黨) had seen only one president, Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). So why, after Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) administration, has the KMT been unable to reclaim the presidency?
Over time, the “natural Taiwanese generation” has become a major demographic in Taiwan. The KMT has struggled to address issues that resonate with the younger generation, such as social equity, environmental protection, and multiculturalism. High housing prices and employment pressure are common concerns among young people, but the KMT has failed to propose practical solutions, leading to widespread disappointment and anxiety. In contrast, the DPP has more successfully attracted the attention of young people by emphasizing progressive and social justice issues, and effectively conveying its core messages through social media. And, in the 2024 elections, the emerging Taiwan People’s Party (民眾黨) proved itself highly successful in engaging youth support.
The KMT’s policies are often seen as lacking innovation and flexibility, failing to adapt to rapidly changing societal needs and values—and thereby resulting in a gradual loss of competitiveness among younger voters. Moreover, the KMT’s traditional image and conservative stance have hindered its ability to address issues such as multiculturalism and gender equality, further weakening its influence among young voters and making it difficult to compete with the DPP.
Since relocating to Taiwan in 1949, the KMT has undergone a significant transformation, yet many of its internal challenges have persisted. The party, once a dominant force on the mainland, has struggled to adapt to its new environment. The move to Taiwan marked the beginning of an era in which the KMT, despite establishing a centralized and authoritarian government, was continuously plagued by internal factionalism and the dominance of various cliques, much as it had been on the mainland. This factionalism, combined with the KMT’s inability to evolve beyond its rigid, hierarchical structures, has contributed to its current image issues. In the eyes of much of the public, the KMT remains entrenched in outdated views, often appearing detached and arrogant. One recent example could be observed in this past year’s election campaign, during which Hou’s vice-presidential candidate Jaw Shaw-kong (趙少康), repeatedly oversimplified the hardships faced by Taiwanese youth, further reinforcing the stereotype of the KMT as a “selfish elite party” among young voters.
Image: KMT Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) (center) appears with young adults recruited as part of the “KMT Successor Project” (KMT接班人計畫), which is intended to recruit newer members into the party (September 5, 2024). In recent years, the party has struggled to attract support from younger voters. (Image source: KMT website)
Regarding cross-Strait relations, the KMT’s stance, which has long centered around promoting closer ties with mainland China under the “One China, Different Interpretations” (一中各表) position—an ambiguous formula that allows for the coexistence of both the PRC and the ROC—has long been considered its core policy. However, amid a changing international landscape, this position has come under increasing scrutiny. The KMT is widely perceived as failing to adequately address the Taiwanese people’s concerns about security and democracy, especially in terms of balancing relations with mainland China. Younger voters generally hold a skeptical attitude toward China, making the KMT’s traditional stance seem outdated. Compared to the DPP’s more assertive position on cross-Strait issues and its greater association with support for Taiwan’s independence, the KMT’s advocacy of the “One China, Different Interpretations” position appears increasingly less appealing.
In early April of this year, Ma Ying-jeou visited mainland China, emphasizing that his trip was a journey of peace and friendship, aiming to promote cross-Strait exchanges and prevent war. However, local Taiwanese organizations urged him not to become a “historical criminal”—reflecting broader concerns that Ma’s visit might serve as a propaganda opportunity for the PRC government, rather than just a gesture of goodwill. Even a former president like Ma, who has been out of office for eight years with no official or party position, can still provoke significant public discontent in Taiwan when engaging with Beijing. This indicates that slogans like “promoting cross-Strait exchanges” may hold limited appeal for the younger generation in Taiwan.
The KMT’s predicament is not just a policy issue, but also involves its image and capabilities for organizational mobilization. While the KMT holds considerable influence in local government and retains strong traditional networks, its grassroots mobilization on modern communication platforms, such as the internet and social media, is relatively weak compared to the DPP. This makes it difficult for the KMT to effectively convey its policy proposals to a broader electorate, especially younger voters. The party’s image is seen as too conservative, lacking youthful and diverse representation. This situation poses a significant challenge for the KMT in attracting younger voters. Compared to the DPP, the KMT’s content on social media lacks innovation, and fails to resonate widely.
Additionally, the KMT’s organizational structure is relatively traditional, and its decision-making process often lacks flexibility, leading to slow responses to rapidly changing political environments. For example, during the 2019 protests in Hong Kong, the KMT hesitated to take a clear stance on the pro-democracy movement. In contrast, the DPP quickly voiced its support, aligning with the public’s growing concerns about China’s influence in the region. This hesitation reflected the KMT’s cautious approach due to its longstanding stance on cross-Strait relations, but it ultimately caused the party to lose ground among voters who were looking for a stronger response. Similarly, in the 2020 legislative elections, younger candidates within the KMT expressed frustration over the leadership’s reluctance to support more progressive policies, such as same-sex marriage and environmental protection. The generational gap within the party has made it difficult for younger voices to be adequately represented in high-level decision-making, further alienating young voters. This slow and conservative approach has contributed to the perception that the KMT is out of touch with the diverse values and demands of the new era.
Possible New Ways Forward for the KMT
To improve this situation, the KMT needs comprehensive reforms in terms of both image and strategy. First, it should strengthen its influence on online platforms by cultivating young opinion leaders and using multimedia formats like short videos, live streams, and interactive content to engage with voters and expand its outreach. Second, the party needs to establish more open and inclusive mechanisms to attract members from diverse backgrounds and viewpoints to participate in decision-making. For example, creating youth advisory councils or issue-specific task forces could help present a more modern and diverse image. Finally, the KMT needs to strengthen connections with communities and grassroots organizations through concrete actions, such as developing local economic programs, supporting affordable housing initiatives, and offering community services in underrepresented areas. These specific actions would be crucial to regaining voters’ trust and support.
Furthermore, the KMT must address its internal challenges by reforming its decision-making processes to be more inclusive and responsive. This involves creating channels for younger members to contribute meaningfully to the party’s work and overall direction, ensuring that their voices are heard and valued in high-level discussions. Such reforms would not only help the KMT to appear more modern and dynamic but also to tap into the fresh perspectives that are necessary for the party to remain relevant in Taiwan’s fast-changing political landscape.
The KMT should also reconsider its stance on cross-Strait relations, acknowledging the shifting attitudes of the Taiwanese electorate, especially the skepticism toward China among younger voters. By adopting a more nuanced approach that balances the need for security with the desire for peaceful relations, the KMT can better align with public sentiment. This might involve emphasizing Taiwan’s autonomy and democracy while exploring new frameworks for cross-Strait engagement that resonate with the broader population.
Finally, strengthening connections with communities and grassroots organizations through concrete actions and policy initiatives is crucial to regain voters’ trust and support. Whether the KMT can regain its footing depends on its ability to deeply analyse the current political landscape and undertake necessary reforms. As the election has shown, the public will not turn to the KMT merely because they are disappointed with the DPP. First, the KMT must seriously reflect on its policies and image and find new ways to connect with young people. Additionally, strengthening grassroots mobilization and the use of modern communication channels is critical. The KMT needs to demonstrate greater flexibility and adaptability in several key areas.
First, the party must innovate its policy platform, moving beyond traditional positions on cross-Strait relations to address contemporary issues like climate change, digital transformation, gender equality, and economic inequality, which resonate with younger generations. Second, the KMT must modernize its communication strategies by becoming more active and creative on social media, engaging in discussions, hosting live Q&A sessions, and running innovative campaigns to connect with younger voters in a more informal and accessible manner.
Third, empowering younger members is vital. The KMT should establish leadership pathways for younger voices, including mentorship programs and appointing younger individuals to senior decision-making roles, which would reflect the party’s commitment to evolving. In terms of organizational structure, the KMT needs to decentralize decision-making and empower local branches to address the specific needs of their communities more autonomously, which would enhance grassroots mobilization. Bridging the generational gap is also important: promoting internal dialogue between senior leadership and younger members will ensure that the party’s policies reflect a more diverse spectrum of views.
Additionally, the KMT must demonstrate responsive and transparent leadership, being proactive in addressing criticism, hosting town halls, and fostering two-way communication with the public. Facing these challenges, the KMT needs to show that it is not rigidly tied to past approaches but is open to reform. Taiwan’s increasingly diverse political landscape not only challenges the KMT’s policy-making, but also its organizational structure and culture. Only through deep reflection and adjustment can the KMT reestablish its position in future political contests. In this era of uncertainty, the KMT has the opportunity to redefine its role. The key lies in how the party seizes this opportunity, and undergoes profound changes to meet the political demands and societal expectations of the new era.
The main point: The Kuomintang’s (KMT) continued decline stems from its inability to resonate with Taiwan’s younger generation, and to adapt to a rapidly changing political landscape. To regain its former influence, the KMT must undergo significant reforms in both policy and image, aligning itself with the values and demands of modern Taiwanese society.
