In September, the Inspector General of the US Department of Defense (DoD) released a report, “Evaluation of the DoD’s Tracking and Accountability of Presidential Drawdown Equipment Provided to Taiwan,” which analyzed the implementation of the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), a mechanism used to expedite the transfer of US military aid to foreign allies. While this tool has been instrumental in getting US military equipment to Ukraine to aid in its fight against Russian aggression, this report highlights several shortcomings in the PDA process over the past year. In 2023, President Joseph Biden authorized up to USD $345 million in US military equipment to be transferred to Taiwan under PDA authority. With the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) actively altering the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, more care and oversight are urgently needed to ensure that PDA shipments to Taiwan are timely, effective, and—most importantly—capable of strengthening its defense posture.
What is the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA)?
The Presidential Drawdown Authority allows the US president to pull military equipment (as aid) from US stocks to send to foreign countries. In each fiscal year’s National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), there is usually a set amount of money that is budgeted for the president to use under PDA authority. For example, for Fiscal Year 2023, Congress authorized for the president to draw down up to USD $1 billion specifically for Taiwan. July 2023 was the first instance of the Biden Administration using that funding to send military aid to Taiwan.
How Does Military Aid Get to Taiwan under PDA?
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) plays a central role in executing the Presidential Drawdown (PD) by issuing the Presidential Drawdown Execution Order (PD EXORD). A PD EXORD is an official directive that initiates the process of transferring military equipment or services from US government stocks to foreign governments without requiring congressional approval, typically for emergency purposes. As noted in a figure from the report, the overall process relies on the coordination of several government agencies (see Figure 1 below). First, the DSCA monitors all actions related to the PD. Following the directive, the US military services provide the necessary weapons and equipment from existing stocks, which are delivered to a point of embarkation (POE) for onward movement. The United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is responsible for transporting the equipment via air or sea from the US POE to the point of delivery (POD) in the destination country. In the Asia-Pacific region, United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) manages security cooperation relationships and oversees the area of operations. Additionally, the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) handles all transactions and relations between the US government and Taiwan regarding the delivery and implementation of the PD.
Figure 1: How Military Aid under PDA Gets to Taiwan (Figure source: DoD Inspector General Report)
Findings of the Report
The report on the PDA process for Taiwan highlights several key issues related to the accountability, quality control, and logistics of military equipment transfers. One of the primary findings is that the DoD’s procedures for tracking and managing equipment deliveries were inadequate or nonexistent. Over 340 pallets of equipment suffered water damage at Travis Air Force Base due to poor storage conditions and inefficient airlift scheduling. The report underscores the need for better coordination between the DSCA and military services to avoid delays and ensure proper handling of equipment.
Another critical finding was the delivery of unserviceable or damaged equipment to Taiwan. Items such as wet and moldy body armor and expired ammunition were received, largely because the units in the United States that were responsible for the shipments failed to follow proper packaging and shipping standards. This raised concerns about the US military’s preparedness and attention to quality when supplying vital defense materials to allies, particularly during times of heightened geopolitical tension.
The damaged and improperly packaged equipment caused significant financial and operational strain for both the United States and Taiwan. Additionally, the report noted that the Taiwanese government and US agencies had to spend additional resources to remediate or replace the faulty items, resulting in extra costs that could have been avoided with better logistical planning and quality control. Moreover, the delivery of non-mission-capable equipment risks undermining Taiwan’s confidence in US defense support, which could have broader implications for security cooperation in the region.
In response to these issues, the report recommended several corrective actions. It urged the DSCA to collaborate more closely with military services to improve the scheduling of shipments and ensure that equipment is properly checked before being transported. Enhanced pre-shipment quality controls were emphasized, especially in cases where US personnel would not be present to supervise the delivery. The report also highlighted the importance of maintaining trust and reliability in US-Taiwan defense relations, which are vital in the context of growing regional security challenges.
Overall, the findings call for better oversight, improved logistical operations, and a commitment to providing Taiwan with the high-quality defense equipment it needs to maintain its security, particularly as tensions with China escalate. The report highlights not only the technical failures in equipment delivery but also the broader strategic risks posed by lapses in US defense cooperation practices.
Suggestions for Improvement
In order to improve the delivery of military aid to Taiwan under the PDA, the DoD should conduct a final quality check on all equipment before it reaches Taiwan. Currently, there is no standardized process for ensuring the condition of military aid before it is handed over to Taiwan’s MND. This oversight is problematic because damaged or unserviceable equipment, such as expired ammunition and moldy body armor, was delivered in the most recent PD shipment. A final quality assurance check would ensure that all items are mission-ready, up to standards, and capable of being immediately integrated into Taiwan’s military. Without this critical step, there is a risk that Taiwan could receive equipment that is not only useless but also costly and time-consuming to replace—thereby undermining the entire purpose of the aid package. Instituting a mandatory, final quality control procedure would greatly enhance the reliability of and allies’ trust in US military assistance.
The absence of DoD or AIT representatives on the ground during the handover of military aid is another significant concern. Potentially due to the unique unofficial relationship between the United States and Taiwan, no US personnel are physically present in Taiwan when PDA shipments are transferred, Instead, non-US contractors are responsible for delivering the equipment to Taiwan’s MND, creating a gap in oversight and accountability. Having US representatives, whether from the DoD or AIT, involved in the handover would ensure that the equipment is delivered in good condition. Additionally, this would provide the US government with a clearer understanding of the on-the-ground conditions in Taiwan and allow for more immediate feedback on the quality of assistance provided. Given Taiwan’s strategic importance to US interests, it is essential to ensure that US oversight does not stop once the equipment leaves American shores.
Another crucial step in improving the Presidential Drawdown process for Taiwan is the establishment of clear logistical requirements tailored to Taiwan’s needs. Currently, there is no comprehensive logistics plan specific to Taiwan’s PDA shipments, which has contributed to delays, equipment damage, and poor storage conditions. For such a critical Indo-Pacific ally, the DoD should develop logistical protocols for handling military aid deliveries—from initial shipment to final handover. These protocols should include guidance on storage, transportation conditions, and packaging standards, particularly for sensitive or perishable equipment like ammunition or body armor. Clear logistical requirements would help mitigate the risk of damage during transit and ensure that Taiwan receives equipment in the condition intended, boosting both the efficacy of the aid and Taiwan’s confidence in US support.
Additionally, it is important for the president to fully utilize the budget set by Congress for the PDA as allocated in the NDAA. The budget cap established for Taiwan’s military aid should be fully utilized to ensure that Taiwan is equipped to defend itself, particularly in the face of increasing military pressure from China. Underutilizing this budget not only leaves Taiwan at a strategic disadvantage but also sends a weak signal about the US commitment to its defense. If all available PDA resources are used, Taiwan can benefit from a comprehensive aid package that covers all of its pressing defense needs, from equipment and weapons to logistics support and training. Fully exercising the PDA budget would reinforce Taiwan’s preparedness and deter potential aggressors.
One unresolved issue is whether the United States can make good on its promises, and provide replacements when faulty or damaged equipment is delivered under the PDA–without the president having to authorize additional spending from the FY23 PDA allocation. If Taiwan receives equipment that is not up to standard, it is unclear whether the same items can be re-sent without needing to dip further into the authorized budget. Establishing a clear policy on this would be beneficial, as it would allow the United States to correct mistakes without additional financial strain on both its PDA allocations and Taiwan’s MND. This would also ensure that Taiwan receives what it is promised without enduring lengthy delays while budgetary approval is sought for replacement items.
Impacts on Growing American Skepticism in Taiwan
Chinese disinformation in Taiwan, such as American Skepticism Theory (疑美論), is already negatively impacting Taiwanese public opinion in regards to whether or not the United States will come to Taiwan’s defense if China invades. This narrative asserts that America is not to be trusted as an ally; that the United States only uses Taiwan as a bargaining chip in its relationship with China; and that the United States ultimately will abandon Taiwan when it suits its interests. In February 2023, Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation (台灣民意教育基金會) conducted a poll asking Taiwanese citizens their confidence in US intervention if China invaded Taiwan. A plurality, 46.5 percent, of those polled do not believe that the United States would come to aid Taiwan, while 42.8 percent believe that the United States would help Taiwan. This represents significant uncertainty within the Taiwanese public regarding the United States and its role in deterring China.
Doublethink Lab’s report on Taiwanese attitudes after the 2024 Taiwanese election showcases the polarization in Taiwanese society regarding “American Skepticism Theory.” The study revealed that 61.58 percent of respondents who use Chinese social media agree more with the statement “The United States is not a trustworthy ally and only wants to exploit and drain Taiwan” (see Figure 2). Two other questions that are influenced by Chinese information operations (question 27 and 28) also show a majority of respondents expressing anti-American viewpoints. In addition, polarization is not just limited to what social media platform one uses. Across a variety of questions (see Figure 3), supporters of the Kuomintang (KMT, 國民黨) are more likely to exhibit anti-American opinions. The United States has become a partisan issue in Taiwan, with supporters of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民進黨) generally displaying more pro-American viewpoints, as contrasted with more anti-US attitudes among self-identified supporters of the KMT. As the KMT now has effective control of the Legislative Yuan (LY, 立法院), the United States needs to seriously improve its military support to Taiwan in order to bolster bipartisan support and strengthen Taiwan’s defense capabilities. By addressing logistical challenges and enhancing oversight, the United States can reinforce its role as a dependable ally, thereby helping to mitigate the partisan divide in Taiwanese politics.
Figure 2: Chinese Disinformation Effects on the Taiwanese Public (1) (Figure source: Doublethink Lab, “2024 Taiwan Election: The Increasing Polarization of Taiwanese Politics — Reinforcement of Conspiracy Narratives and Cognitive Biases”)
Figure 3: Chinese Disinformation Effects on the Taiwanese Public (2) (Figure source: Doublethink Lab, “2024 Taiwan Election: The Increasing Polarization of Taiwanese Politics — Reinforcement of Conspiracy Narratives and Cognitive Biases”)
US military weapons and equipment purchased by Taiwan are already facing backlogs, and PDA usage was supposed to be a quick way of addressing this issue. If the United States fails to remedy this situation promptly, it may inadvertently validate Chinese propaganda, fueling skepticism in Taiwan about American support—while also affecting US taxpayers, whose resources are being wasted. Once clear and established guidelines for the transportation of PDA equipment to Taiwan are in place, these recent issues can be addressed, reducing the risk of future incidents and helping to restore confidence in the US commitment to Taiwan’s defense. Such improvements are essential not only for Taiwan’s security but also for maintaining the credibility of US military aid in the eyes of both Taiwanese citizens and the American public.
The main point: From November 2023 to March 2024, DoD failed to implement quality control measures for the Biden Administration’s July 2023 decision to use PDA to send military aid to Taiwan. As a result, this led to a large portion of the shipments being unusable by Taiwan’s MND. Such missteps by the United States increase anti-American sentiments in Taiwan by feeding into Chinese propaganda about the narrative that the United States isn’t a credible ally. Addressing these issues is key to providing Taiwan with a credible deterrent against Chinese aggression.
