With President Joe Biden’s term complete, it is an appropriate time to analyze and take stock of Senator, Vice President, and President Biden’s comprehensive track record when it comes to Taiwan and cross-Strait relations. Biden has been in the public eye since he first became a senator in 1973, marking over 50 years of public service. Biden was in the Senate when President Jimmy Carter changed formal diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing; he voted in favor of the passage of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act; and he saw Taiwan’s democratization in the 1990s, as well as the rise of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) more assertive and militaristic actions against Taiwan over the past few years.
As president, Biden continued the traditional approach of support for Taiwan typical of his predecessors. In some respects, Biden went further than other presidents—while in others, he either did not go far enough or failed. This article will analyze the highs and lows of Biden’s Taiwan stances and policies from his time in the Senate to the Oval Office. It will also briefly consider what, if anything, Biden could do about Taiwan in his post-presidency.
Biden, the Senator
While serving in the Senate from 1973 to 2009, Joe Biden became a leading Democratic foreign policy voice. Serving as both ranking member and chair on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Joe Biden had plenty of time over the course of his long tenure to develop a view on Taiwan and its status.
Early in his second term, while serving on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the debate over the future of the United States’ relationship with Taiwan came to head. In 1978, President Jimmy Carter announced that Washington would sever its official relationship with Taipei in favor of Beijing. The Senate was a strong proponent of the US-Taiwan relationship and moved to ensure that the United States would not completely abandon Taiwan. Senator Barry Goldwater and other members of Congress went so far as to sue Carter to stop the move. The effort failed in the courts. However, the Congress did pass the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)—which Biden voted in favor of—in March 1979, and Carter signed it into law on April 10, 1979. The TRA created the framework through which the United States would be able to interact with Taipei in an unofficial capacity. In its 45th year, the TRA still serves as the bedrock of the US-Taiwan relationship.
The TRA does not provide Taiwan with an explicit security guarantee in the same way that the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China (which was abrogated with the shift in official recognition) “recognize[d] that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.” Since the TRA is domestic law and not a bilateral agreement, the spirit of the text is very different. And the language of the law is rather vague on what it commits the United States to do for Taiwan under certain circumstances. The most important question from the law is whether Washington is committed to defend Taiwan in the event of a conflict. While the TRA does not provide a clear security guarantee, the language does hint towards some level of US action under particular circumstances should the PRC use non-“peaceful means” or “any resort to force or other forms of coercion.” This ambiguous language forms a part of the long-term US policy of “strategic ambiguity” towards the defense of Taiwan.
As a senator, Biden understood these points quite well: so well, in fact, that in 2001 he was clear that the United States is not required to defend Taiwan—and that no president should make promises hinting towards such a commitment. President George W. Bush made headlines when he said on Good Morning America that the United States had an obligation to defend Taiwan. Bush said, “Yes, we do, and the Chinese must understand that. Yes, I would.” When pressed about the use of US military force, Bush responded, “Whatever it took to help Taiwan defend theirself.” Those comments did not sit well with Senator Biden, who wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post criticizing Bush and clarifying his own view on Taiwan and the US commitment. He wrote clearly, “The United States has not been obligated to defend Taiwan since we abrogated the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty.” He continued to explain the difference between specific words and language, “As a matter of diplomacy, there is a huge difference between reserving the right to use force and obligating ourselves, a priori, to come to the defense of Taiwan.” The op-ed did not argue that the United States should cede Taiwan to China, but that Bush had misinterpreted the TRA.
After writing that op-ed, Biden traveled to Taiwan later in August 2001 as part of a bipartisan delegation of senators. This trip appears to be the only time that Biden has traveled to Taiwan. After that visit, on September 12, 2001, Biden continued his attempts to correct Bush’s statements. In Washington, Biden continued to advocate for the long-term policy of strategic ambiguity. He said, “So don’t go declaring independence, because we are not willing to go to war over your unilateral declaration of independence.” He continued, “Depending on how each of the parties behaves […] We reserve the right, as we do in every circumstance, to use American forces. […] It will depend upon the circumstances. That’s how it’s been for seven presidents. That’s how it should remain.”
None of these statements were new policy developments, but maintained the status quo of avoiding an explicit commitment to defend Taiwan. During the Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) presidency, there was a widely shared concern in Washington that Taipei might declare independence, start a war with Beijing over such a declaration, and bring the United States into such a conflict. Biden was essentially sending a warning to Chen on independence, and reiterating the policy of strategic ambiguity.
Biden, the President
Considering the statements of Senator Biden, one might reasonably expect that Biden’s term as president would be a bad one for Taiwan—an extension of the Obama Administration’s prioritization of engagement with Beijing over meaningful work with Taiwan. However, given the changing dynamics in the Indo-Pacific—largely characterized by a more assertive and aggressive Beijing—President Biden was much more supportive of Taiwan than his record in the Senate would have led one to predict.
Once he became POTUS, Biden started speaking more like President George W. Bush. On multiple different occasions, Biden publicly committed to defend Taiwan:
- In August 2021, he told George Stephanopoulos: “We made a sacred commitment to Article Five that if in fact anyone were to invade or take action against our NATO allies, we would respond. Same with Japan, same with South Korea, same with—Taiwan.”
- In October 2021 during a townhall, Biden said that “Yes, we have a commitment to do that”—i.e., defend Taiwan.
- In September 2022, Biden said to 60 Minutes, “Yes, if in fact there was an unprecedented attack” he would send US forces to defend Taiwan.
- In June 2024 he said to Time, “We are not seeking independence for Taiwan nor will we, in fact, not defend Taiwan if they if, if China unilaterally tries to change the status.”
These statements align with those of President Bush (43) and were a departure of those made by Senator Biden. Why the change? The most likely explanation is that Biden witnessed Beijing changing the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, and determined that Beijing was taking actions that run counter to the spirit of the TRA. In light of Beijing’s evident moves preparing for an eventual non-peaceful takeover of Taiwan, Biden’s own calculations changed.
Beyond his statements on the defense of Taiwan, Biden also raised eyebrows for his comments regarding Taiwan independence. In November 2021, Biden said in reference to Taiwan, “I said that they have to decide – Taiwan, not us. We are not encouraging independence. […] We’re encouraging that they do exactly what the Taiwan Act requires. […] That’s what we’re doing. Let them make up their mind. Period.” There is a key difference between “encouraging” and “supporting,” and Biden’s November 2021 statement seemed to run counter to the long-term US policy of not supporting Taiwan independence. Around one year later, during the 60 Minutes interview mentioned earlier, Biden said, “Taiwan makes their own judgments about their independence. […] We are not moving—we’re not encouraging their being independent. We’re not—that—that’s their decision.” Here, Biden again used “encourage,” not “support.” Biden did not say that his administration did not “support” independence until after President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) won the January 2024 presidential election.
Despite these statements, Biden in other occasions has not risen to the spirit of his own comments. Biden did not send high-level, sitting administration officials to visit Taiwan as occurred during the first Trump Administration. The chance to regularize cabinet-, deputy-, or undersecretary-secretary-level visits to Taiwan was halted for four years. Biden did send three unofficial delegations at critical junctures: after his inauguration in 2021, after the January 2024 presidential and legislative elections in Taiwan, and for Lai’s May 2024 inauguration. Biden’s reluctance to send someone higher up in his administration is likely connected to Beijing’s aggressive response to then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022 (see here and here), even though the Taiwan Travel Act allows for such high-level engagement. The Biden Administration reportedly worked privately to convince Pelosi not to go to Taiwan. Biden publicly stated that “the military thinks it’s not a good idea,” but he himself did not go so far as to personally tell Pelosi not to go—and she likely would only have listened to such a direct appeal from the president.
Interestingly, while the Biden Administration was reluctant to send high-level officials to Taiwan, it gave Hsiao Bi-khim (蕭美琴), then-Taiwan’s de facto ambassador to the United States, an official invitation to attend Biden’s inauguration. Hsiao was the first-ever Taiwanese representative to receive an official invitation from the incoming administration. (Before 2021, Hsiao’s predecessors had attended at the invitation of a member of Congress.) That goodwill towards Taiwanese continued into Biden’s 2021 “Summit for Democracy,” during which then-Digital Minister Audrey Tang presented virtually. However, the video feed mysteriously cut out (with audio still working) after Tang showed a map with Taiwan as a different color than China. One administration official called it an honest mistake, but other sources said that the map “caused panic.” [1]
In the defense space, the Biden Administration, in cooperation with Congress, made significant changes in Taiwan’s ability to access specific security assistance programs. The Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act, part of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2023 (NDAA), gave Taiwan access to the presidential drawdown authority (PDA), foreign military financing (FMF), and international military and education training (IMET) programs. Before this NDAA, Taiwan was primarily limited to purchasing arms without any monetary assistance from Washington. The PDA allows the president “to direct the drawdown of defense articles and services from U.S. agencies’ stocks to respond to foreign crises.” Taiwan was granted up to USD $1 billion annually, but the Biden Administration only utilized USD $345 million of that provision. For FMF, Congress did not appropriate funds for Taiwan, but the State Department provided Taiwan with USD $135 million for FMF, and Taiwan could receive some of the funding from the 2024 emergency supplemental law. IMET allows for Taiwanese military officials to receive training, along with other international partners, in the United States. These changes in the defense space were important, but underutilized.
It is things like the map incident, the lack of support for the Pelosi visit, and the underutilization of potentially transformative defense policy changes that mar Biden’s presidential Taiwan legacy. Whenever the administration appeared to be making strong steps towards charting a new course and direction for Taiwan policy, it would pull the rug out from underneath those positive developments. The administration made progress in trade by adopting the US-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade, which started in June 2022 (with the first element reaching agreement in May 2023, and taking force in December 2024). Unfortunately, US Trade Representative Katherine Tai did not travel to Taiwan to any of these occasions, and the fact that it entered into force in the Biden Administration’s final month shows how progress was slow and delayed.
Despite this progress, Biden—like every president before him, despite bipartisan congressional support—did not secure a free trade agreement with Taiwan. Another failure of the Biden Administration would be a lackluster follow-through on utilizing the TAIPEI Act to increase support for countries seeking to enhance their unofficial and official relationships with Taiwan, and to punish countries that do the opposite. The changes to defense allocations were a major breakthrough, but the Biden Administration was not able to utilize even half of the congressional allowance for Taiwan. Considering the immense time lag in Taiwan receiving the arms that it purchased, the PDA could have moved things forward in a new way. The PDA could have improved Taiwan’s readiness and provided it with additional munitions stocks or other materiel needed to pushback against PRC military coercion, but the slow rollout demonstrated the Biden Administration’s reluctance to treat the cross-Strait region as the true national security priority for the Indo-Pacific region.
Holistically, the Biden Administration adopted a traditional approach towards Taiwan, considering the current geopolitical situation in the Indo-Pacific and a more assertive China. What sets Biden’s four years apart is his personal language for Taiwan. Biden’s language created an opportunity for the administration to make progress in treating Taiwan differently than before—and to develop new strategies and policies as a result. That did not happen. Instead, the administration ended with typical achievements despite bipartisan support for Taiwan.
What’s Next in Biden’s Post-Presidency?
Considering Biden’s illustrious foreign policy career, he and his team should seriously consider a visit to Taipei in the next few years. As a private citizen, there are no limitations on his ability to visit Taiwan. Biden’s predecessors have visited Taiwan in their post-presidency, so a visit would not be out of the ordinary. George H.W. Bush visited Taiwan in 1993, less than one year after leaving the Oval Office. Jimmy Carter went to Taiwan in 1999, coinciding with the 20th anniversary of the passage of the TRA. Bill Clinton visited Taiwan in 2005 and 2010. Neither George W. Bush nor Barack Obama have made such a visit after their terms ended (although Bush seemingly agreed to visit in 2010, with no follow through).
A post-presidency visit to Taiwan would not be Biden’s first-ever visit to the country. However, a visit after 2025 would be critical in determining the ever-shifting red-lines that Beijing has imposed upon high-profile US visits to Taipei. A trip to Taiwan would cement Biden’s foreign policy legacy, and mark the final chapter in his long-term support for Taiwan after his vote for the TRA in 1979. Perhaps more important than legacy, a possible visit would be instructive for sitting and former politicians as to how negative of a reaction would come from Beijing. Beijing has gotten into the habit of over-reacting to high-profile visits by politicians, particularly US politicians of a certain stature. A Biden visit to Taiwan would send a message to leaders and politicians around the world not to be deterred by threats from Beijing, and that Taipei can be a trusted partner. It would help to normalize future visits by leaders on the fence about whether they want to deal with that level of pressure from the PRC.
The main point: Biden’s statements about Taiwan as president strongly differed from his earlier statements while in the Senate. President Biden’s clear support for the defense of Taiwan marked a new course for US Taiwan policy, but his administration never took the opportunity to advance a new way of thinking about Taiwan and the US-Taiwan relationship.
[1] Shortly after the map issue, a disclaimer appeared on the screen: “Any opinions expressed by individuals on this panel are those of the individual, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States government.” It is ironic that, at a summit for democratic governments, the US government was afraid of how an authoritarian nation (which was not invited) would react to a presentation.
