Editor’s note: This article is part two of a two part series that will examine three recently passed amendments in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan, which carry the capacity to fundamentally change the way that the government operates—and to seriously weaken both the Constitutional Court and the current presidential administration of President Lai Ching-te. Part one focused on the amendments to the Act Governing the Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures, which affects the balance of financial resources between the central government and local administrations. This article will focus on the amendments to the Constitutional Court Procedure Act and the Civil Servants Election And Recall Act.
The recently passed amendments to the Constitutional Court Procedure Act (憲法訴訟法) and the Civil Servants Election and Recall Act (公職人員選舉罷免法) reveal the Kuomintang’s (KMT, 國民黨) intent to weaken President Lai Ching-te’s (賴清德) administration, this time by targeting both Taiwan’s judiciary and mechanisms of political accountability. These amendments, like the changes to the Act Governing the Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures (財政收支劃分法) (as discussed in part one of this series), form a broader strategy by the KMT to expand the power it holds through control of the legislature, and to constrain the Democratic Progressive Party-led (DPP, 民進黨) central government.
These changes to the Constitutional Court Procedure Act come as President Lai has nominated judicial nominees who are critical to preserving the functioning of Taiwan’s highest court. By adjusting procedural rules and imposing barriers to Court operations, the amendments threaten to hinder the judiciary’s ability to effectively serve as a check on the legislature and executive branches. Meanwhile, revisions to the Civil Servants Election and Recall Act could make it harder to recall elected officials—most of whom represent localities controlled by the KMT.
Taken together, these amendments represent a significant escalation in Taiwan’s ongoing partisan politics, where legislative power is being leveraged to reshape institutions that are central to Taiwan’s democracy. This article will examine the motivations behind these changes, the changes themselves, and the broader implications for Taiwan’s democracy. As with the financial shifts detailed in part one, these changes underscore the critical role that legislative strategies play in the balance of power in Taiwan’s currently divided government.
Amendments to the Constitutional Court Procedure Act
The current amendments to the Constitutional Court, if implemented as written, effectively render the court unable to make any decisions. Effective as of January 25, the new amendments require a minimum of 10 justices to be present to hear and rule on any case, with at least nine justices required to declare a law unconstitutional. The court, which normally has 15 justices, currently has only eight after the Legislative Yuan (LY, 立法院) rejected President Lai’s nominees to replace the justices (whose terms expired in October 2024). Previously, rulings only required the attendance of two-thirds of all sitting justices, with decisions determined by a simple majority vote. Without the necessary number of justices, the Constitutional Court would be effectively unable to function. This creates a serious constitutional crisis, as the court cannot rule on cases–including the DPP’s recent petition to challenge the constitutionality of these very amendments.
Critics of the amendments, including the DPP and civil society groups, argue that these amendments are a direct attack on judicial independence. By increasing the necessary number of justices to hear and rule on cases, the KMT and TPP caucus in the LY have effectively changed the balance of power in favor of the legislative branch and severely weakened the executive and judicial branches. However, the KMT and TPP have defended the amendments as a necessary measure to ensure more rigorous judicial reviews, and to prevent rulings on constitutionality being decided only by a small number of justices. While framed as a means to strengthen the Constitutional Court, the amendments only hinder the court’s ability to challenge legislation.
With the Constitutional Court unable to either hear or rule on cases, President Lai will have to negotiate with the KMT/TPP caucus on the nominations of justices. As mentioned above, the LY already voted down President Lai’s seven nominees. While some of the nominees had strong legal credentials and professional backgrounds, their political affiliations and past roles indicate clear partisan ties. For instance, Chang Wen-chen (張文貞), who previously served on the Presidential Office Human Rights Consultative Committee during Former President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) administration, was later recommended by the DPP as an expert witness in the Constitutional Court to argue against the recent legislative reforms. Similarly, Liao Fu-te (廖福特), currently the chairman of the DPP Arbitration Committee, has experience as an expert witness in politically sensitive cases, including the National Communications Commission’s decision to shut down Chung T’ien Television (CTi TV). In addition, Yao Li-ming (姚立明), a former New Party legislator who later served in Former Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je’s (柯文哲) and President Lai’s campaigns, has been criticized for his shifting political allegiances, raising questions about the rationale behind these nominations. Given the current impasse, President Lai must now seek a compromise with the opposition to ensure the court can function, potentially making concessions that will shape Taiwan’s judiciary for years to come.
Image: Protestors participating in a rally in Taipei to oppose the three controversial legislative measures affecting the government budget, the Constitutional Court, and recall procedures for elected officials (December 20, 2024). (Image source: CNA)
Amendments to the Civil Servants Election and Recall Act
Under the new amendments that were passed by the LY, significant new barriers were added for initiating and supporting recall petitions. Individuals launching or endorsing a recall petition must now submit photocopies of their identification cards alongside their signatures. Beyond identification requirements, the amendments also introduce harsh penalties for fraudulent activities. Anyone found using another person’s identification or forging ID information in a recall petition could face up to five years in prison or a fine of NTD $1 million (USD $30,592). While framed as an anti-fraud measure, the threat of severe legal consequences could discourage civic engagement and deter recall movements, especially against KMT or TPP officials. In response, the Executive Yuan has asked the LY to reconsider the amendments, though it remains unclear whether the KMT and TPP caucus would be willing to revise them.
Much like the amendments to the Constitutional Court Procedure Act, which have paralyzed the court’s ability to rule on cases, these changes to the recall process appear to be part of a broader strategy by the KMT and TPP to reshape Taiwan’s institutional balance of power. By making it harder for voters to remove officials through recall, the amendments expand legislative power and weaken mechanisms for public oversight. While the KMT and TPP claim these changes enhance stability and prevent political abuse of the recall process, opponents warn that they erode democratic checks and balances, further tilting Taiwan’s political system in favor of the legislature.
Implications for Taiwan’s Democracy
The recent amendments to the Civil Servants Election and Recall Act and the Constitutional Court Procedure Act represent more than just technical changes to Taiwan’s highest court—they signal a fundamental shift in the country’s democratic balance of power. By effectively weakening the Constitutional Court and restricting the Taiwanese public’s ability to recall elected officials, the KMT and TPP-led LY have significantly tilted power toward the legislature at the expense of the executive and judicial branches. These changes, while framed as necessary by the opposition, could have profound and lasting implications for Taiwan’s democratic governance, institutional stability, and political accountability.
A key feature of Taiwan’s democracy has been its system of checks and balances, which have been designed to prevent any single branch of government from accumulating too much power. However, by raising the threshold for Constitutional Court rulings and making it impossible for the court to function without new justices, the KMT-TPP coalition seeks to effectively neuter Taiwan’s highest judicial body. This means that laws passed by the legislature cannot be meaningfully challenged or overturned. Unlike the US system, where changes to the structure of the Supreme Court are difficult to implement and are rare, Taiwan’s democracy risks shifting toward a system where the legislature is unchecked—allowing it to pass controversial laws and insulating it from legal challenges.
Changes to the recall process will similarly make it significantly harder for the public to hold politicians accountable and further consolidate legislative power. Although the KMT and TPP have framed these amendments as efforts to prevent frivolous or politically motivated recalls, in practice it will create significant barriers to civic participation. The requirement for citizens to submit photocopies of their ID cards raises legitimate concerns about intimidation and privacy risks, potentially discouraging the public from engaging in the process. Combined with severe legal penalties for petition-related fraud, these measures could dissuade voters from attempting recalls altogether, thereby shielding elected officials from public scrutiny.
These amendments are not occurring in a vacuum—they come at a time of increasing political polarization in Taiwan. This polarization, coupled with the DPP’s loss of a majority government in the 2024 elections has resulted in a KMT-TPP legislative majority that is able to and motivated to push through controversial laws. This approach mirrors tactics seen in other democracies where legislative majorities have exploited procedural changes to weaken judicial oversight. In countries such as Hungary and Poland, ruling parties have systematically eroded judicial independence under the pretense of legal or procedural reforms, allowing them to pass laws with little fear of constitutional challenges. If Taiwan continues down this path, it risks moving away from a robust democracy toward a system where the legislative majority can dictate policy without meaningful institutional constraints.
Implications for Taiwan’s Global Standing
Taiwan has long positioned itself as a model democracy in Asia, distinguishing itself from authoritarian governance across the Taiwan Strait. For example, Taiwan’s commitment to democracy has given it entry to events such as the Biden Administration’s Summit for Democracy, and underpin its cooperation in programs like the Global Cooperation and Training Frameworks’ virtual summit to defend democracy. However, these recent legislative maneuvers risk damaging Taiwan’s international reputation by undermining democratic norms. Countries that support Taiwan—particularly the United States and other liberal democracies—may become increasingly concerned about the erosion of judicial independence and democratic checks and balances. At a time when Taiwan is seeking greater international recognition, such internal political conflicts could weaken its credibility as a stable and democratic partner, and could affect Taiwan’s participation in international fora that champion democratic norms and Taiwan’s democratic achievements.
As the Executive Yuan pushes back against these legislative changes, Taiwan faces a critical juncture in its democratic evolution. Will the KMT and TPP negotiate with the DPP-led executive branch to ensure a more balanced system, or will they continue to consolidate power in the legislature? If the stalemate over the Constitutional Court justices continues, Taiwan could face a prolonged constitutional crisis, further weakening public trust in the government and international trust in Taiwan.
The main point: The recent amendments reflect a broader struggle over the future of Taiwan’s democracy. If left unresolved, they could mark the beginning of a gradual erosion of judicial oversight and democratic accountability. However, public opposition, civil society pressure, and international scrutiny could still play a role in shaping how these changes are implemented—or whether they are eventually reversed. Taiwan’s democratic resilience will be tested in the months ahead, and the outcome will shape the balance of power in the country for years to come.
The author would like to thank GTI Spring Intern Yuchen Lee for his research assistance regarding the nominees for the Constitutional Court.