In February this year, the US State Department Fact Sheet on Taiwan dropped the phrase “we do not support Taiwan independence,” which had been indicative of the United States’ long-standing position on cross-Strait relations. China quickly rebuked the Trump Administration’s move as a “regression” and “erroneous.” Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s statements at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) meeting that same month further indicated an American pivot away from security concerns in Europe and towards the Asia-Pacific.
Whether these early moves indicate a fundamental shift in policy towards Taiwan or simply a means to signal a more aggressive stance towards China is unclear. However, the action does pose the question of whether the United States is committed to Taiwan’s defense. In 2024, then-candidate Donald Trump suggested that, as president, he would not defend Taiwan. A Trump Administration that is less interested in military commitments may also envision some means to use Taiwan as a negotiation point with China. In contrast, former President Biden pledged to defend Taiwan if China were to invade—and traditionally, most experts have assumed that the United States would respond militarily on Taiwan’s behalf.
China’s rapid military growth and increasingly provocative actions towards Taiwan challenge the United States’ policy of maintaining peace across the Taiwan Strait. The United States has increased arms sales to Taiwan in recent years, including the approval of USD 2 billion in missile and radar systems in 2024. However, even with proposed increases in spending, Taiwan cannot afford the quantity of weapons necessary for its defense. Thus, a broader US commitment is crucial.
As a result, I seek to unpack to what extent the American public supports Taiwan’s defense, especially as “America First” populism suggests an increasingly inward-looking public. At the same time, increasing anti-China sentiment and acknowledgement of the threat that a rising China poses to Taiwan may bolster efforts toward Taiwan’s defense. Moreover, how politicians in both the Republican and Democratic Parties emphasize the China threat could potentially further drive public sentiment.
Identifying the extent of support can be difficult. A plurality (44 percent) of respondents surveyed by YouGov in 2017 viewed Taiwan as friendly (with only 13 percent viewing Taiwan as an ally), while 41 percent in a 2018 Pew Research Center claimed to be concerned about cross-Strait tensions. Meanwhile, a majority (61 percent) of respondents in a 2019 Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey opposed arms sales to Taiwan. Surveys since 2020 have typically been more favorable to Taiwan, as sentiment towards China has become more negative. For example, a 2021 Chicago Council survey showed that 52 percent supported using US troops to defend Taiwan, while a 2022 survey through the International Public Opinion Lab (IPOL) found even higher support among respondents (61 percent) for defending Taiwan, including a thin majority among those who stated the United States should focus on domestic concerns. A 2023 YouGov survey further suggests that the US public is less interested in warming relations with China at the expense of Taiwan, with little difference between Democrats and Republicans. Still, the use of military force on behalf of Taiwan shows more mixed results here and in 2022.
To address such questions regarding US public sentiment, I commissioned a national web survey through Centiment from February 12-26. We asked 522 respondents: “Do you support or oppose the United States defending Taiwan if it were attacked by China?” Here, a clear majority—63.79 percent—support coming to Taiwan’s defense, with surprisingly slight variation by partisan identification (Democrats: 64.53 percent; Republicans: 65 percent). Further analysis shows that majorities in every age cohort (e.g., 18-29, 30-39, 40-49) supported the United States defending Taiwan, with older respondents slightly more in favor. Our findings are consistent with the previous surveys mentioned above finding increased bipartisan support for Taiwan.
Figure: Do you support or oppose the United States defending Taiwan if it were attacked by China? (Figure source: Created by author using data from Centiment.)
These results, however, do not tell us whether respondents are supportive of Taiwan’s defense as a result of favorable views of Taiwan itself, or whether this support simply benefits from anti-China sentiment. Suppose that views of China are the dominant factor here. In that case, this public opinion poll may suggest only a thin commitment to Taiwan—one that could be malleable if the Trump Administration gains concessions from China in areas unrelated to Taiwan’s defense.
Nonetheless, previous research indicates that sentiment towards Taiwan drives views more than anti-China sentiment. To address this, we asked respondents earlier in the survey to evaluate several countries, including China and Taiwan, on a five-point scale (1 being very negative, 5 very positive). As expected, we find a public with more favorable views of Taiwan, averaging a 3.10 on the scale to China’s 2.34—with Democrats exhibiting higher evaluations of both compared to Republicans (China: 2.58 vs. 2.13; Taiwan: 3.21 vs. 3.09). Moreover, age corresponds with greater deviation in assessments, with those under 30 exhibiting marginally higher evaluations for China over Taiwan (2.99 vs. 2.92), growing to a two-point difference for those in their 70s (1.65 vs. 3.65).
Whereas we expected those with more positive views of China to be less supportive of Taiwan’s defense, we find a nonlinear pattern. There was little substantive difference regarding support for Taiwan’s defense between those who view China very negatively versus very positively, with a total variance across views of China of only 10.72 percent. However, as views of Taiwan improve, support for its defense increases in an essentially linear pattern, with support doubling between those with the most negative views versus the most positive views of the country.
Figure: Support for Taiwan’s defense based on views of China and Taiwan. (Figure source: Created by author using data from Centiment.)
In order to capture beliefs about the role of the United States in world affairs earlier in the survey, I asked respondents which of the following best describes their views: 1) “We should pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate on problems at home;” or 2) “It’s best for the future of the country to be active in world affairs.” Even among those prioritizing domestic issues, a majority (56.33 percent) supported defending Taiwan, increasing to 75.24 percent among those supporting active US foreign policy. I also earlier asked respondents to evaluate the statement “I pay attention to international news”—finding those who agreed with the statement were predictably more supportive of Taiwan’s defense (70.45 percent). Yet, even a majority of those not paying attention to international news showed support for aiding Taiwan (56.76 percent).
Additional statistical analysis finds that when controlling for demographic factors, views on the role of the United States in world affairs, and attention to international news, evaluations of Taiwan still positively correlate with a statistically significant increase in support for its defense. In contrast, views of China are not statistically significant.
The results suggest that even as the American public has grown increasingly inward-looking, it still supports efforts to defend Taiwan. Moreover, the results incentivize Taiwan to continue soft power measures that increase public affinity for the country, as this is a greater motivator than anti-China sentiment—the latter of which will always be influenced by factors beyond the Taiwan Strait. Admittedly, this analysis does not address how deeply committed the US public is to this position or whether the United States even has the capabilities to defend Taiwan. If China were to invade, actually coming to Taiwan’s actual defense would not only far exceed the scope of current US commitments, but also likely bring about a much larger military conflict. A risk-averse US public may quickly lose support for a conflict where American casualties could exceed those from the Vietnam War. With an invasion posing considerable costs for China, other actions, such as a limited blockade, may be more probable. Unfortunately, existing survey work typically does not unpack public support for Taiwan under different contingencies. This presents the possibility that the broad, abstract US support for Taiwan’s defense may not hold up during potentially prolonged and expensive interventions.
The main point: Although the government’s “America First” rhetoric casts doubt on US commitment to Taiwan’s defense, polls indicate that a majority of Americans support the United States defending Taiwan if attacked by China. This support is regardless of the individuals’ views towards China. However, positive views of Taiwan do correlate with greater support for US defense of Taiwan.
