Given recent policy actions from the Marcos Administration and statements from leaders in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), there appears to be growing momentum—or, at the very least, interest—in fostering a stronger unofficial relationship between Taipei and Manila.
Over the last month, three significant developments and signals from leaders in Manila occurred that should be interpreted by the Lai Administration as signals for a greater desire for direct exchange between the two neighbors. These developments should be taken seriously because they came from top Philippine leaders. Such leaders would not necessarily speak so directly about such a sensitive issue as Taiwan without being aware of and ready for the inevitable blowback from Beijing.
The AFP is Ready to Plan and Cooperate
In early April 2025, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Gen. Romeo Brawner initiated what became a series of Taiwan-related statements or policy actions in the Philippines. While commemorating the anniversary of the Northern Luzon Command, Brawner tasked his troops with preparing for a Taiwan contingency. Brawner’s statements are noteworthy because they clarified two distinct issues related to the role of the Philippines in a Taiwan conflict.
Brawner said, “If something happens to Taiwan, inevitably we will be involved. There are 250,000 OFWs working in Taiwan, and we will have to rescue them.” He predicts the need for the AFP to get Filipinos home in a conflict scenario.
However, Brawner did not limit his comments to the AFP’s need to prepare for a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO). Rather, he expanded the remit of the AFP in a Taiwan contingency: “But let me give you this further challenge. Do not be content with just securing the Northern Hemisphere up to Mavulis Island. Start planning for actions in case there is an invasion of Taiwan.” For context, Mavulis is the northernmost island of the Philippine archipelago, closest to southern Taiwan—even closer to Taiwan than to the main Philippines archipelago itself. His call to action counters the notion that the AFP would be responsible for securing only Philippines territory. Indeed, the AFP could have some role in responding to a full-blown Taiwan invasion.
Brawner’s statements in early April are, to date, the clearest and most direct public declarations from a high-level Philippine official regarding the country’s role in a Taiwan contingency. Unlike previous statements made by President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, Jr., Brawner’s words were not vague. For instance, President Marcos made a less definitive statement in February 2023: “When we look at the situation in the area, especially the tensions in the Taiwan Strait, we can see that just by our geographical location, should there in fact be conflict in that area . . . it’s very hard to imagine a scenario where the Philippines will not somehow get involved.”
Image: Lieutenant General Romeo Brawner (center left) and President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. (center right) shake hands to commemorate Brawner’s appointment as next Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 2023. (Image Source: Presidential Communications Office.)
These recent statements point to the AFP moving into a planning and preparation stage for a Taiwan contingency.
However, Brawner was not the only high-level officer who spoke about Taiwan. In early May 2025, Philippine Navy Rear Admiral Roy Vincent Trinidad told TaiwanPlus that direct military-to-military engagement was taking place between the Taiwanese and Philippines navies. Trinidad also highlighted the general increase in international interest, and in some cases cooperation, with Taiwan. Trinidad is quoted as confirming that there is “unofficial and informal” engagement between the two navies.
Given the delicate nature of such engagements with the military of a country that it does not formally recognize diplomatically, very few Philippine military officials have publicly confirmed such cooperation with Taiwan. Only major powers, like the United States, have begun to publicly demonstrate such cooperation with Taiwan—and even then, public acknowledgment is often delayed. Trinidad’s point is obvious: foreign militaries are more directly engaging with Taiwan’s armed forces, and that collaboration will only increase over the coming years, inevitably leading to regular joint military exercises. The more that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pressures its neighbors, including the Philippines, the more that the imperative grows to hasten this cooperation.
Room for Improved Civilian Exchange
While signals from the AFP point to not only a stronger desire for cooperation but also ongoing planning for Taiwan-related contingencies, Malacañang has created additional space for civilian interactions with Taiwanese government officials. On April 15 2025, Executive Secretary of the Philippines Lucas P. Bersamin signed Memorandum Circular 82, which eases travel restrictions on Taiwanese officials seeking to travel to Manila and vice-versa. Prior to the signing of this memo, it was difficult for members of either government to travel to either country.
Previously, Executive Order No. 313 from 1987 prohibited direct exchange or travel: “No official of the Philippine government may visit Taiwan. No official of the Philippine government may receive Taiwanese officials visiting the Philippines. No official activity relating to Taiwan shall be carried out without the clearance of the Department of Foreign Affairs.” This order effectively gave the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) a veto on all things related to Taiwan, which, according to people interviewed by the author in both countries, was frequently used to stifle exchange.
However, the new memorandum has created an opening for direct exchange and travel between the two capitals. The memo states:
“Restrictions on travel to Taiwan and contact with representatives of Taiwan shall strictly apply to the President, Vice President, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Secretary of National Defense. Philippine government officials intending to visit Taiwan for economic, trade and investment purposes, shall travel using their ordinary passports and without using their official titles. Further, they are required to: (a) inform MECO of the purpose of their visit prior to their departure; and (b) coordinate with MECO during their visit. . . . Philippine government officials and/or agencies, through MECO, may receive delegations from Taiwan for economic, trade and investment purposes.”
This guidance makes it easier for the two countries to continue to develop economic and trade ties, which is the primary mission of the Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO), the Philippines’ de facto embassy in Taipei. Given the former Tsai Administration’s emphasis on the Philippines in its New Southbound Policy, which is continuing under the Lai Administration, the memo is a clear sign that Manila is seeking to lower barriers to greater economic investment from Taiwan.
However, the memo does not mention exchange and travel unrelated to trade and investment, so there are still restrictions on defense- and security-related issues. Even though the statements from AFP leadership point to a desire for more dialogue with their Taiwanese counterparts, the Marcos Administration does not seem willing to remove said barrier just yet. Even though the Marcos National Security Policy 2023-2028 (NSP) ranks cross-Strait issues as second only to the West Philippine Sea issue, there remain restrictions on deeper relationships between the two countries’ militaries and security officials. The NSP states: “Major concern is also seen in the Cross-Straits relations that has the potential to be the flashpoint in the region. The Philippines is concerned about its economic stability, a potential influx of refugees, and the welfare of overseas populations. Any military conflict in the Taiwan Strait would inevitably affect the Philippines given the geographic proximity of Taiwan to the Philippine archipelago and the presence of over 150,000 Filipinos in Taiwan.”
However, Malacañang does not seem willing to give agencies the independence to finalize agreements with their Taiwanese counterparts. As the memo states, “No agreements, memoranda of understanding, exchange of notes or similar documents shall be concluded with any Taiwanese organization or agency without clearance from the DFA and, as may be necessary, an authority to sign from OP [Office of the President].”
Overall, the memo is a step in the right direction for easing restrictions on the ability of the two governments to conduct exchange and travel, which was rather difficult before. However, despite the continuous signaling from the Marcos Administration that Taiwan is now a worry for Manila —including from President Marcos himself—Malacañang is not willing to eliminate all restrictions and is taking an iterative approach.
A Walk Back or a Calibration?
Nonetheless, the Philippines’ progress on Taiwan policy could not come without some sort of correction. Otherwise, the developments of the last month would make it seem like the Marcos Administration was moving at full tilt toward engaging with Taiwan and preparing for a Taiwan contingency. At the opening ceremony of the 2025 Balikatan US-Philippines joint exercises, Major General Francisco Lorenzo Jr. (who is in charge of the Philippines’ involvement in the drills), seemed to throw water on the role of the Philippines in a Taiwan contingency. Lorenzo said, “The Philippines has renounced war as a means of its national policy. So if ever there will be conflict in Taiwan, the Philippines will not participate. And we will still continue to defend our territory and the Philippines.”
On the face of it, Lorenzo’s remarks end all discussion of the Philippines’ involvement in a Taiwan contingency. However, the wording of his remarks is nuanced, which leaves many options possible. For one, Lorenzo excluded in his statement what would happen in the event of a PRC attack on Philippine vessels or territory during a Taiwan contingency. The word “participate” is of particular note, as the word choice could imply that the Philippines will never get involved or that it will only get involved if provoked. Renouncing war as a means of national policy is instilled into the country’s constitution. Yet, the constitution then outlines the procedures for the Philippines to declare war. Lorenzo’s final remark on defending territory is the clarifying point in a Taiwan contingency.
Considering Lorenzo’s remarks alongside those of Brawner and Trinidad, it seems that the Philippines is prepared to defend its territory in the context of a Taiwan contingency and is preparing to evacuate Filipinos from Taiwan back to the Philippines. Therefore, Lorenzo’s clarifying remarks are not as black-and-white as they may seem.
On the Road to a Stronger Relationship
The last month of signals and statements from civilian and military leaders in the Philippines signal a realization that the country needs better exchange and cooperation with Taiwan. The regular military coercion by the PRC around Taiwan, most recently the Strait Thunder 2025A exercise in early April 2025, has created an imperative for such dialogue, cooperation, and exchange across all levels of government.
The developments are noteworthy, but not significant in their own right. The statements from military leaders demonstrate action on something delayed—i.e., the Philippines needs its own plan, in consultation with the United States, for a Taiwan contingency. And the easing of economic-related exchange and travel restrictions was a long time coming.
It is now up to the Lai Administration to continue this momentum and build on the progress. President Lai should send a business delegation to Manila after the May 12 legislative midterm elections in the Philippines. He should welcome a similar delegation from the Philippines before the end of 2025. To expand the bilateral relationship further, members of the Taiwan-Philippines Parliamentary Friendship Association in the Legislative Yuan (立法院) should travel to Manila to meet their counterparts later this summer, as well. This parliamentary friendship association was only created in February 2024, so the group needs to take advantage of these developments and meet with Philippine Senate and House of Representatives members after the May 12 midterms.
The actions taken by leaders in the Philippines need to be followed up with concrete progress and plans from Taiwan. Otherwise, the signals from the last month will become little more than a wasted opportunity.
The main point: Recent statements and actions by civilian and military officials in Manila point to a growing acknowledgment of the need for greater unofficial exchange and dialogue with Taipei. These signals should be taken seriously in Taiwan, and the Lai Administration should work to build on this momentum.
