The United States’ cross-Strait policy is one of the most decisive factors shaping the strategies of both China and Taiwan. Current US President Donald Trump’s approach, widely seen as transactional and unpredictable on regional security and alliance management issues, has increased uncertainty regarding the Taiwan Strait. A closer look at Trump’s policies during his first year in office reflects several key trends: ranging from compounding strategic ambiguity to trade renegotiated in America’s favor. There is also a more activist 119th Congress— which, since taking its two-year term in January 2025, has introduced an unprecedented number of Taiwan-related bills.
Strategic Ambiguity
While most US presidential administrations have been widely described as pursuing a policy of “strategic ambiguity” towards Taiwan since 1979, President Trump’s approach has compounded this ambiguity through contradictory signaling—and, at other times, striking silence. [1] Some of Trump’s policy maneuvers unnerving Taiwan have included pressuring Taipei to raise defense spending to 10 percent of GDP, while repeatedly urging higher defense outlays in parallel with expanded U.S. arms sales; maintaining heavy tariffs and trade policies under an “America First” approach; and continuing to frame alliances and security commitments in transactional terms. The uncertainty triggered by these actions could possibly be one of the reasons behind Taiwan President Lai Ching-te’s (賴清德) unprecedented defense modernization effort in 2025.
Nonetheless, despite these pressures and uncertainties, the Trump Administration has implemented a range of policies supportive of Taiwan. It has pressed Taipei to substantially increase defense spending and has welcomed Taiwan’s move to adopt a large multi-year special defense budget to fund force modernization and asymmetric capabilities. After initial backlogging, the administration approved a record USD 11 billion package to support Taiwan’s move toward asymmetric warfare. The approval of this package invoked a strong reaction from China. At the same time, the Trump Administration signaled the possibility of record-high arms sales in 2026 and signed into law the Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act, which would require the State Department to regularly review US-Taiwan relations.
At the same time, notable public silence was another feature of Trump’s strategic ambiguity towards Taiwan. For context, some of Trump’s predecessors have been less reserved when asked about the US commitment regarding a potential Taiwan contingency. For instance, President Joe Biden stated on four different occasions that the United States would intervene if Taiwan were invaded by China. Similarly, when former President George W. Bush was asked if Washington had an obligation to defend Taiwan if it was attacked by China, he replied: “Yes, we do, and the Chinese must understand that. Yes, I would.”
Conversely, Trump has maintained a notably cautious public stance. On several occasions, when pressed on how he would respond to a People’s Republic of China (PRC) invasion of Taiwan, Trump’s responses included: “I don’t comment because I don’t ever want to put myself in that position,” “You’ll find out if it happens, and [Xi] understands the answer to that,” and “I can’t give away my secrets. The other side knows.” In a January interview with The New York Times, Trump further compounded this ambiguity. On the one hand, he stated that actions regarding Taiwan would be up to Xi Jinping; while on the other, he claimed that China would not invade until the end of his term in office, and that he would be very unhappy about such an outcome. For a president known for discussing everything, remaining “noticeably cagey” about Taiwan was extraordinarily unusual.
While there remain different interpretations of Trump’s decision not to raise the Taiwan issue during his first face-to-face meeting with Xi Jinping in South Korea in October 2025, one argument is that this reflected his continued ambiguity on the matter. This left both Beijing and Taipei speculating about his stance. In a subsequent telephone call, Xi Jinping was reported to have told Trump (per Chinese media) that Taiwan’s “return” to China is a key element of the post-war international order, framing unification as part of the unresolved legacy of the Second World War and the post-1945 settlement.
Pushing Taiwan for a Defense Buildup and Self-Reliance
Another important component of Trump’s Taiwan policy has been pressing the island to enhance its self-defense through an increased defense budget and structural reforms. In contrast, most past US administrations regarded arms sales and occasional US military posturing during cross-Strait tensions as primary signals of support. These traditional policies have kept Taiwan heavily reliant on the United States for its defense.
In contrast, the Trump Administration—under its broad strategy of demanding all its allies raise defense spending and improve burden-sharing—has demanded that Taiwan raise its defense budget to an exorbitant 10 percent of GDP. While achieving a 10 percent figure is unrealistic, Taiwanese authorities have announced that they will increase defense spending to 3.3 percent of GDP by 2026, and to 5 percent by 2030—the largest increase in Taiwan’s history. Taipei also restructured its defense sector, implemented an “all-out defense concept,” invested in new weapons systems, and strengthened indigenous defense production.
Taipei’s increased defense spending would ultimately serve American interests. Firstly, it would enhance Taiwan’s defense modernization and strengthen self-reliance, thereby reducing America’s responsibility and lowering the risk of entanglement. Secondly, because a large share of Taiwan’s weapons procurements and defense advisory support comes from the United States, these expenditures would ultimately bolster the US defense industrial base and align with Trump’s “America First” agenda.
Activist Congress Advances Unprecedented Taiwan-Friendly Legislation
It is also notable that since starting its two-year term in January 2025 (parallel with Trump’s second four-year term), the 119th Congress has introduced or passed over a dozen Taiwan-related legislative measures, an unusually high number by historical standards. The Republican majority in the US Congress—along with the perception that the president would not veto Taiwan-related bills—likely contributed to the rapid pace of such legislation.
In December 2025, Trump signed into law the Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act, which will explore ways for the United States to gradually remove self-imposed “red lines” on official government contact with Taiwan. This was the first Taiwan-related law enacted in Trump’s second term.
The 119th Congress is also moving ahead with other important bills: which include the PORCUPINE Act, which would treat Taiwan similarly to “NATO Plus” partners for expediting arms transfers and defense assistance; the Deter PRC Aggression Against Taiwan Act, which would establish a sanctions framework if China uses force or coercion against Taiwan; the US-Taiwan Partnership in the Americas Act, which would support Latin American and Caribbean states that maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan, and help them resist Beijing’s economic pressure; and the Taiwan International Solidarity Act, which would clarify that UN Resolution 2758 does not determine Taiwan’s sovereignty or representation, and would seek to remove hurdles to Taiwan’s participation in international organizations.
If enacted, these bills would strengthen US-Taiwan ties, enhance Taiwan’s international participation, and counter China’s efforts to isolate Taiwan—especially regarding its membership in various international bodies.
The US National Security Strategy: Elevating Taiwan’s Status, Lowering Commitments
The Trump Administration’s December 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS)—a document published by every new presidential administration that lays out overall US security priorities—also provides guidelines for its Taiwan policy and regional strategy. The NSS highlighted Taiwan’s significance not only because of its semiconductor industry, but also because of its strategic location—which, according to the NSS, “provides direct access to the Second Island Chain and splits Northeast and Southeast Asia into two distinct theatres. Given that one-third of global shipping passes annually through the South China Sea, this has major implications for the US economy.” Therefore, “deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority.”
Strategic ambiguity is also manifested in the NSS. While it elevated Taiwan’s status, the NSS downgraded the US commitment by replacing the word “oppose” with “does not support” in reference to a “unilateral change to the status quo” (a catch-all term for a PRC invasion or a declaration of independence by Taipei). The 2022 NSS issued by the Biden Administration stated that the US “opposed” unilateral changes to the status quo; whereas the 2025 NSS stated that “the United States does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.” Some analysts argue that this represents a policy shift: as the word “oppose” implies active resistance and potential consequences, while “does not support” indicates a more passive form of disapproval.
A US-Taiwan Trade Deal, under Tariff and Investment Pressure
Trump’s forceful pursuit of a trade deal with Taiwan is another lens through which to analyze his cross-Strait policy. On April 2, 2025, Trump imposed a broad 32 percent “reciprocal” tariff on most imports from Taiwan. This rate was higher than some other US partners in Asia. As part of its broader trade strategy, the Trump Administration used steep reciprocal tariffs to push Taiwan into rapid tariff and trade negotiations with Washington, seeking to secure a more favorable deal. The administration was well aware that under increasing Chinese pressure—with a growing number of military exercises around Taiwan—Taiwan had no option but to negotiate with the United States.
Throughout this period, Taipei refrained from trade retaliation. To further appease Trump, Taiwan increased investment and industrial cooperation in major American firms. For example, TSMC pledged about USD 100 billion for new fabs and capacity expansion in Arizona. Under a deal announced by the US Department of Commerce in January 2026, Taiwan’s semiconductor and technology companies committed to at least USD 250 billion in new direct investment in US manufacturing; while the Taiwan government promised an additional USD 250 billion in credit guarantees to help smaller supply-chain firms build or expand plants in the USA.
Conclusion
By the end of the first year of the Trump Administration, the contours of its Taiwan policy were clear. At the rhetorical level, Trump not only maintained the United States’ traditional policy of strategic ambiguity but further compounded it. As a president known for his propensity to talk, Trump’s striking silence on pointed questions about Taiwan was surprising. Meanwhile, contrasting US signaling towards both Beijing and Taipei, such as the combination of a moderated rhetorical commitment in the 2025 NSS and an increase in sales of weapons to Taiwan, added to this ambiguity.
Aware of China’s growing pressure on Taiwan through military exercises, the Trump Administration has adeptly exploited the situation to secure a US-tilted trade deal, extracting large-scale investments from Taiwan. Taiwan had no option but to accede to Trump’s terms.
Whether it was due to Trump’s pressure, or to Taipei’s own assessment of China’s plans to apply further coercive pressure in the not-so-distant future, Taiwan has also embarked on unprecedented defense modernization. This would invariably help the United States by pushing Taiwan to take greater responsibility for its own defense—thus reducing the prospects of potential direct American involvement, and benefiting the US military-industrial complex by facilitating large-scale orders from Taiwan.
In 2026, one of the key developments to watch will be the progress of US-China trade talks. It remains to be seen whether Trump will use the Taiwan card as a bargaining chip—as some analysts have speculated—and what position Trump takes during his first visit to China in early 2026.
The main point: Trump’s policy towards Taiwan during this second term amplifies long-standing “strategic ambiguity,” combining high tariffs and pressure for greater self-defense with record arms sales and pro-Taiwan legislation. Similar mixed signals appear in his NSS 2025. These contrasting policies of coercive economic statecraft, security support, and notable rhetorical silence have heightened uncertainty in Beijing and Taipei about Washington’s ultimate intentions in a cross-Strait crisis.
[1] The term “strategic ambiguity” is not an official, codified US policy label, but an analytic description commonly used in academia and policy debates to characterize Washington’s deliberate refusal to state clearly whether it would use force to defend Taiwan.
