Thursday, April 30, 2026 from 9:30AM – 1:30PM (ET)
In-person and Webcast
Event Summary
On January 22, 2026, the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) hosted a public seminar entitled “The Growing Threats to Taiwan and Taiwan’s Efforts to Boost Its Defenses”. The discussion featured three panels: PRC Coercive Threats to Taiwan and Taiwan’s Defense Policies, Current Issues Affecting Taiwan’s Defense Acquisitions and Force Structure, and a Moderated Discussion with Senior US Defense Officials.
Panel #1: PRC Coercive Threats to Taiwan and Taiwan’s Defense Policies
Moderator: Ben Sando (GTI Research Fellow)
Alexis Turek (Coalition Defense of Taiwan Project)
Alexis gave a brief overview of the PRC’s current pressure campaigns against Taiwan. In 2025, the People’s Liberation Army intensified its pressure campaign against Taiwan through sustained military, cyber, diplomatic, and economic tactics designed to destabilize the island without triggering open conflict. Monthly air incursions have averaged around 300 since mid-2024, alongside regular China Coast Guard patrols near Taiwan and Kinmen, expanded cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, and military drills simulating blockades and amphibious assaults. Beyond military pressure, Beijing has ramped up diplomatic isolation efforts, AI-driven disinformation campaigns targeting Taiwanese society, and espionage operations, while simultaneously using “carrot” economic incentives, such as promoting tourism and trade engagement, to portray itself as a more dependable partner than the US and shape Taiwanese public opinion.
Dr. Chen Liang-chih (Evans Chen) (Research Fellow, INDSR) (remote)
Liang-chih Evans Chen argues that Taiwan can draw key lessons from both the Russian invasion of Ukraine and recent Middle East conflicts, with Ukraine offering a model for defending against full-scale invasion and the Middle East illustrating the challenges of enduring prolonged gray zone coercion. He highlights the strategic imbalance between China’s need for rapid offensive success and Taiwan’s imperative to build resilience, maintain political will, and ensure economic continuity during sustained pressure or conflict. Chen also stresses that Taiwan’s security will depend heavily on international support, noting stronger Western unity over Ukraine than on Iran, while support for Taiwan remains less certain despite alignment between the United States and Japan, with other regional partners showing more mixed levels of commitment.
Eric Chan (GTI Senior Non-Resident Fellow)
Eric Chan argues that since 2022, Taiwan has increasingly adopted a war of attrition shaped by lessons from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, shifting its defense strategy toward eroding the combat power of the People’s Liberation Army rather than seeking decisive victory. He notes that the rapid expansion of the PLA under Xi Jinping has given the People’s Republic of China more tools for coercion, including gray zone tactics, coast guard pressure, and maritime militia operations. In addition, cognitive warfare designed to convince Taiwan that resistance is futile continues to be a central part of the PRC’s influence campaign. In response, Taiwan’s defense reforms since 2022 have focused on narrowing the gap between strategic ambitions and limited resources, manpower, and budgets by embracing an “all-of-society” resilience model, with greater military-civilian coordination, clearer mobilization roles, and a long-term aim of strengthening deterrence by making conflict too costly for Beijing.
Panel #2: Current Issues Affecting Taiwan’s Defense Acquisitions and Force Structure
Moderator: Dr. Michael Hunzeker (George Mason Univ.)
John Dotson (GTI Director) “Taiwan’s Special Defense Budget”: Dotson detailed Taiwan’s proposed eight-year special defense budget totaling approximately $38-40 billion USD, aimed at strengthening defense resilience and asymmetric combat capabilities. The budget emphasizes arms purchases from the US, including precision munitions, artillery rocket systems, UAVs, and air defense systems. However, political divisions in Taiwan’s legislature have stalled approval, with opposition parties proposing smaller budgets and demanding more transparency, reflecting complex domestic political dynamics.
Pinshan Lai (Hudson Institute) “Building a “non-red” supply chain”: Lai highlighted Taiwan’s successful indigenous submarine program, Haikun, as a proof of concept for building a non-red supply chain independent of PRC influence. Despite international isolation and pressure, Taiwan has collaborated with countries like the US, UK, Australia, South Korea, India, Spain, and Canada to source components and expertise. This program exemplifies Taiwan’s broader strategy to decouple critical defense industries from China, enhance domestic capabilities, and integrate into global defense supply chains to increase resilience and deter coercion.
Cara Bilson (GTI Intern) “Taiwan-EU Defense Cooperation”: Bilson discussed Taiwan’s emerging defense technology collaborations with European countries, focusing on submarine components, UAVs, and satellite connectivity. Despite historical Chinese pressure limiting large-scale arms sales, Europe has engaged in discrete partnerships supporting Taiwan’s defense modernization and non-Red supply chain development. However, recent Chinese blacklisting of European countries involved in these collaborations poses challenges to future cooperation and European solidarity in supporting Taiwan’s security.
#3 Moderated Discussion with Senior US Defense Officials
Moderator: John Dotson (Global Taiwan Institute)
LtGen. Wallace Gregson (USMC, ret.)
Lieutenant General Chip Gregson focused on the strategic costs of weak US–Taiwan defense interoperability, arguing that although Taiwan has made sustained efforts to maintain military ties with the United States, current cooperation remains far below what deterrence requires. He stressed that interoperability is not simply a matter of compatible weapons systems or technical coordination, but of trust built through sustained “eyeball-to-eyeball” relationships between officers, senior leader visits and joint exercises. Drawing lessons from Ukraine, he also highlighted the importance of adapting to new defense technologies and mobilizing younger generations, arguing that Taiwan should better harness the technological fluency, entrepreneurialism, and patriotic potential of its youth population in order to build a more innovative and resilient defense posture.
RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery
RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery presented Taiwan as both a frontline security partner and a critical economic ally whose semiconductor industry is deeply embedded in the US economy and defense supply chain. He argued that Taiwan’s role as a major supplier of both advanced and legacy chips—essential for everything from consumer goods to US weapons systems—means there is no strategic benefit to the United States in allowing Taiwan to fall under PRC influence or coercion. Montgomery also emphasized Taiwan’s substantial foreign direct investment in the United States and exclusive reliance on US weapons systems, describing it as a “model ally” that Washington has failed to treat as such. He sharply criticized the current state of US–Taiwan defense cooperation, arguing that interoperability has been deliberately limited to basic deconfliction due to Washington’s fear of provoking Beijing, despite the fact that Taiwan would be an active participant in any conflict over the island. Drawing on war-gaming scenarios, he warned that this lack of integration could dramatically increase US casualties in a contingency. Montgomery further linked Taiwan’s security to broader US global force posture, cautioning that prolonged military commitments in the Middle East divert key naval and air assets away from the Indo-Pacific, strain munitions stockpiles, and erode long-term readiness for a Taiwan scenario. In his view, excessive deployments outside Asia risk weakening deterrence precisely at a moment when sustained readiness in the Indo-Pacific is most strategically important.