Taiwan will have a potentially game-changing midterm election later this year in November, the results of which could have consequential effects on the 2020 presidential election. The attention of policymakers is reasonably focused on domestic issues. However, there are a number of pressing external factors shaping the context of relations across the Taiwan Strait in 2018 that should not be lost on observers. Since Beijing decided to freeze high-level dialogue with the Tsai Administration, when it took office in June 2016, cross-Strait relations have been at a standstill. The People’s Liberation Army has significantly ramped up military exercises around Taiwan and engaged in other coercive behaviors aimed at pressuring Taiwan’s government into submitting to Beijing’s demands. Nevertheless, the Tsai Administration asserts that it will stand its ground, but it has also repeatedly called for talks with Beijing while extending its economic and people-to-people outreach through the New Southbound Policy. In light of all of these events, what are the prospects for cross-Strait relations for the rest of 2018 and beyond? GTI held a discussion with a panel of experts from Taiwan and the United States: Dr. Ketty Chen (Taiwan Foundation for Democracy), Dr. I-Chung Lai (Prospect Foundation), Dr. Cheng-yi Lin (Institute for National Defense and Security Research), Dr. Roger Cliff (CNA), and Tiffany Ma (BowerGroupAsia).