Thursday, June 4, 2026 from 9:30AM – 12:00PM (ET)
In-person and Webcast
Event Summary
On June 4, 2026, the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) hosted a seminar entitled “Taiwan’s Connections to Regional and Global Security.” The panel discussion focused on the “Perspectives on Taiwan and Indo-Pacific Regional Security, ” featuring Dr. Renato De Castro, a distinguished professor at the Department of International Studies, De La Salle University, Manila, Kitsch Liao, the Associate Director of Global China Hub at the Atlantic Council, Yuki Tatsumi, Senior Director from Institute for Indo-Pacific Security, and Dr. Tsiam Siong-Ui (詹祥威), Assistant research fellow from Institute for National Defense Security Research, Taipei. The second session covered keynote address and moderated discussion with Ms. Dovilė Šakalienėm, Member of Lithuanian Parliament, former Lithuanian defense minister.
Kitsch Liao addressed the three main topics: the revised Taiwan Special defense budget and its implications, the opportunity framing of Taiwan’s defense situation, and the Taiwan-Europe defense relationship. He emphasized that key defense initiatives were cut from Taiwan’s special defense budget, including drone supply chain development, ammunition production, and the commercial expansion of the Taiwan Tactical Network. He warned that these cuts weaken Taiwan’s efforts to address critical ISR and command-and-control gaps, hinder the rollout of tactical communications for its military, and undermine long-term domestic ammunition production capacity. He argued that military capability should be evaluated also by organizational effectiveness, doctrine, and leadership. While Taiwan is making progress in these areas, he emphasized the need for greater public attention and external support. He also noted emerging opportunities for Taiwan’s defense exports to the Czech Republic and Poland to support Ukraine. He concluded by calling for closer coordination between Taiwan’s government and defense industry, warning that civilian and military efforts may become misaligned without a unified strategy. He identified defense exports as a promising area for bridging this gap and recommended continued monitoring of domestic defense investment programs and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) developments.
Yuki Tatsumi highlighted key developments in Japan’s evolving security posture in the Indo-Pacific. She began by noting an unprecedented speech by Japan’s Defense Minister at the Shangri-La Dialogue, in which he directly pushed back against Chinese characterizations of Japan’s regional engagement as militaristic, marking a notable shift in Japanese diplomatic candor. She then outlined Prime Minister Sanae Takaichie’s updated “Free and Open Indo-Pacific 2.0” vision, which emphasizes supply chain resilience, energy security, and each nation’s capacity for self-reliance, with Taiwan as a critical component of this regional framework. She also cautioned against the misconception that Japan would take direct military action alongside the US in a Taiwan contingency. She clarified that Japan’s role is limited to supporting US operations and defending its own territory. Such a role is vital given Japan’s geographic proximity to Taiwan and its hosting of key US military assets. Finally, she pointed to Japan’s deepening multilateral security cooperation, including joint exercises with the Philippines, Australia, and European partners, as well as a new Reciprocal Access Agreement. She noted that lessons drawn from the Russia-Ukraine war are expected to be reflected in Japan’s forthcoming revised national security strategy documents.
Dr. Renato De Castro highlighted two key indicators: the Balikatan 2026 military exercise, which brought together seventeen thousand troops from the US, Philippines, and Japan, and the Enhanced Comprehensive Philippines-Japan Strategic Partnership, which expanded beyond coast guard cooperation to include weapons transfers and joint military exercises. He introduced the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC) as the centerpiece of the Marcos administration’s security strategy which is the first grand strategy the Philippines had ever formulated. CADC represented a significant shift from the military’s traditional focus on internal security toward addressing external maritime threats, particularly Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea. Key elements included the acquisition of anti-ship missile systems, fortification of the Batanes Islands near the Luzon Strait, and the expansion of Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement sites to accommodate greater US military presence. However, he cautioned that these developments did not guarantee Philippine involvement in a Taiwan contingency. The Philippines would largely follow the United States’ lead, and ultimate decisions would rest on the political will of whoever occupied the White House. Preparations were underway, but a military response remained fundamentally a matter of political choice.
Dr. Tsiam Siong-Ui argued that Taiwan’s TDOM concept should be understood not merely as a rebranding of its air defense system, but as a fundamental structural upgrade aimed at aligning Taiwan’s defensive architecture with broader Integrated Air and Missile Defense principles. He emphasized that the primary threat Taiwan faces is not precision strikes alone, but the sheer volume and psychological impact of mass rocket and drone attacks, which could overwhelm high-cost intercept systems early in a conflict. He explained that TDOM seeks to shift Taiwan’s defense posture from isolated, platform-centric systems toward an interconnected, AI-enabled battle management grid. He identified three critical gaps Taiwan must address: AI-enabled decision support, resilient coalition data-link protocols, and sustainable magazine depth given Taiwan’s geographic isolation as an island. He concluded by placing Taiwan’s defense in a broader global context, warning that a Chinese takeover of Taiwan would constitute a catastrophic blow to democratic credibility worldwide, making Taiwan’s security a matter of universal strategic importance rather than a localized dispute.
Ms. Dovilė Šakalienė, a member of the Lithuanian Parliament and former defense minister, argued that Lithuania’s support for Taiwan is rooted not in idealism but in its own historical experience of Soviet occupation and resistance to authoritarian expansion. Drawing on her family’s experience of Soviet repression—including the deportation of relatives to Siberia—as well as her own blacklisting by Beijing for criticizing China’s human rights record, Ms. Šakalienė argued that authoritarian coercion must be confronted early. These experiences, she said, underpin her belief that defending Taiwan is not only a matter of supporting democracy, but of preventing the spread of the same imperial and authoritarian practices that have shaped Lithuania’s own history.
She drew strong parallels between Russia’s claims over Ukraine and China’s claims over Taiwan, warning that security in Europe and the Indo-Pacific is inseparable and that Taiwan is a critical pillar of global stability. Emphasizing the growing cooperation between Russia and China, she called for greater democratic solidarity, stronger deterrence, and continued allied cooperation on cybersecurity, information resilience, and defense preparedness.
About GTI
The Global Taiwan Institute is a 501(c)(3) think tank dedicated to deepening understanding of Taiwan, and strengthening US-Taiwan relations through research, policy outreach, and public engagement.