April 10: US-Taiwan Relations: Advancing Four Pillars of the Strategic Partnership

Thursday, April 10, 2024 from 12:15PM – 2:00PM (EDT)

In-person and Webcast

Summary: US-Taiwan Relations: Advancing Four Pillars of the Strategic Partnership

Thursday, April 10, 2025

12:15 pm – 2:00 pm

On Thursday April 10, 2025, the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) hosted a public seminar to launch a GTI published report titled, “US-Taiwan Relations: Advancing Four Pillars of the Strategic Partnership.” The event was held in person, as well as accessible through a livestream on GTI’s youtube channel. Authors of the report (minus GTI Program Manager Adrienne Wu who was unable to attend) composed a panel of three, with POLITICO Correspondent Phelim Kine as the moderator and Ambassador Alexander Yui Tah-ray as the keynote speaker. The panelists reviewed advances in four key pillars: defense and security, economics, people-to-people ties, and Taiwan in the international space, with policy recommendations that can ensure that the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and the US-Taiwan strategic partnership remain strong into the future.

Speakers

Moderator- POLITICO’s China Correspondent, Phelim Kine

Keynote Speaker-Taiwan’s Representative to the United States Ambassador Alexander Yui Tah-ray 

• Russel Hsiao, former GTI Executive Director
• Brent Christensen, Former American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) Director, Brigham Young University Professor, and GTI Advisor
• Derek J. Mitchell, Center for Strategic and International Studies Non-Resident Senior Adviser to the Office of the President and the Asia Program

Russel Hsiao

• Introduced GTI and its programs and thanked the board of directors, advisors, staff and interns. 
• The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) provides a legal framework for US-Taiwan relations, focusing on national security, international space, economic, and people-to-people ties.
• US policy toward Taiwan faces challenges from China’s aggressive actions, emphasizing the need for a reevaluation of current approaches.

Ambassador Alexander Yui Tah-ray 

• Thanked GTI for its contributions promoting Taiwan’s voice in Washington, DC and globally. Since its founding in 2016, GTI has become a key player in the Taiwan policy community.
• The TRA remains the foundation of the US-Taiwan relations, ensuring cooperation in defense, trade, people-to-people exchanges, and support for Taiwan’s international space. 
• Taiwan is currently the United States’ seventh-largest trading partner and plays a major role in global supply chains, particularly in semiconductors and advanced technology. While Taiwan is facing challenges such as the recent 32 percent US tariff on certain imports, it is committed to resolving issues through negotiation rather than retaliation and will continue to invest in US markets, such as the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Ltd.’s (TSMC) promise to invest USD 100 billion into the US ecnonmy. 
• The US also backs Taiwan’s participation in international organizations despite Beijing’s opposition. People-to-people ties are strong, with high numbers of students and visitors between the two countries, growing state-level cooperation, and cultural diplomacy.
• The speech closed by affirming the US-Taiwan partnership as being key to global peace and prosperity.

Derek Mitchell-Defence and Security 

• Defense has long been the foundation of US-Taiwan relations. Taiwan’s very existence is under threat daily, making its security central to the bilateral relationship since at least 1950.
• National security for Taiwan goes beyond military issues—it’s comprehensive, involving military, economic, political, societal, informational, and psychological elements. The TRA is essential because it provides a flexible framework to support Taiwan’s peace and security in the Indo-Pacific.
• While traditional arms sales were once the main focus of US-Taiwan relations, today’s challenges require a broader, integrated approach to security. Taiwan now faces unprecedented threats, including:

1. Chinese air, sea, land, and cyber exercises;
2. Sophisticated cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns;
3. Electronic warfare and missile threats; and
4. Undersea cable disruptions threatening communication security.

• These developments suggest a possible Chinese “squeezing” or blockade strategy, thus Taiwan’s defense requires a “whole-of-society, whole-of-government” approach.
• Taiwan’s security must be viewed holistically—economic, political, and military health are all interconnected.
• Deterrence and commitment from both the United States and Taiwan are essential.
• Taiwan should increase its defense budget based on real needs. There isn’t necessarily a need for any particular percentage but Taiwan does need to increase its defense budget. The US side has been pushing Taiwan to increase the budget to 3%. If it can go even higher, great but it is important for Taiwan to do whatever it needs to do to take care of its legitimate military needs, is extremely important. 
• Taiwan’s security needs include military hardware, energy, food, and logistics.
  The United States must strengthen its defense industrial base to deliver aid to Taiwan more quickly.
• Joint operational planning with allies and partners is urgent and there is no time for delay.
  Bipartisanship on defense issues is critical in both the US and Taiwan.
• The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) remains a cornerstone of US foreign policy; reaffirming its importance is vital.
• The United States must respond materially to coercion or force used to alter the Taiwan Strait status quo.

Brent Christensen-International Space 

• Taiwan’s global visibility and reputation have improved, but Taiwan remains excluded from many international organizations due to pressure from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Despite this, the United States supports Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international bodies and opposes PRC’s reinterpretation of UN Resolution 2758.
• Taiwan has proved its capability to be a global leader through its leadership during the COVID-19 pandemic, during which it provided aid to many countries, expanded its international engagement through the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF).
• Recommendations for Taiwan’s International Space includes:

1. Highlighting Taiwan’s global value with like-minded countries;
2. Passing the Taiwan International Solidarity Act;
3. Expanding GCTF membership; and
4. Enabling Taiwanese expert participation in technical agencies.

Brent Christensen-Economics ;

• Taiwan is a critical economic partner for the United States, particularly in the semiconductor industry, where it supplies over 60 percent of global semiconductors and 90 percent of the most advanced chips. 
• Taiwanese companies, notably TSMC, have made significant investments in the United States, including a USD 165 billion project in Arizona, which stands as the largest foreign investment in US history. 
• The economic relationship between the United States and Taiwan has deepened, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, which highlighted the importance of resilient supply chains.
• Initiatives like the US-Taiwan 21^st Century Trade Initiative and the Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue have been instrumental in strengthening bilateral ties. 
• Despite such progress, recent US tariff proposals, such as the 32 percent tariff on Taiwanese imports, have introduced uncertainties into the relationship. Despite these challenges, Taiwan continues to excel in sectors like artificial intelligence, electric vehicles, and telecommunications, maintaining its role as a key player in the global technology landscape.
• Recommendations to strengthen US-Taiwan economic relations include:

1. Advancing the US-Taiwan 21^st Century Trade Initiative toward a comprehensive free trade agreement;
2. Encouraging other nations to formalize trade and investment agreements with Taiwan;
3. Increasing the presence of senior US economic officials in Taiwan to support bilateral economic initiatives; 
4. Recognizing and supporting Taiwanese companies investing in the United States, promoting initiatives like Startup Island Taiwan–Silicon Valley to foster innovation and collaboration; and 
5. Expediting negotiations for a US-Taiwan double taxation agreement, alleviating tax burdens and further facilitating cross-border investments.

Russel Hsiao-People-to-People Ties

• People-to-people ties between the US and Taiwan are increasingly strategic but often underappreciated. These ties provide a strong foundation despite limited formal diplomatic relations.
• According to public surveys, US public opinion toward Taiwan is positive and growing. For example, 65 percent of Americans have a favorable view  of Taiwan (Pew, 2023).
• There is strong support for US policies supporting Taiwan, f.e. the creation of a free trade agreement, inclusion in global organizations, recognition of Taiwan as an independent country.
• Taiwanese public opinion of the United States is also generally favorable, though trust has fluctuated due to geopolitical uncertainties.
• Some strategic US-Taiwan people-to-people initiatives include: the Taiwan Fellowship Act (2022), the US-Taiwan Education Initiative (2020), the Public Health Protection Act. Additionally, the United States and Taiwan have signed science and technology agreements.
• As the number of Confucius Institutes based in the United States have declined, more than 66 Taiwan Centers for Mandarin Learning have launched in the United States.
• Programs like Fulbright Taiwan and the International Visitor Leadership Program are vital and should be expanded.
• Evidenced by the fact that 23 US states and Guam have now opened state offices in Taiwan, subnational engagement between the United States and Taiwan is continuing to grow. This growth also helps in countering PRC influence at local levels.

Q&A

Is the TRA enough in the current global context of US-China tensions, and Trump’s ambivalence to openly support Taiwan? How concerned should Taiwan be about what the Trump Administration says and does?

Brent: The TRA is enough for now and it has been quite resilient for the past 46 years. It’s too risky to change the TRA now. Even if our foreign policy is a bit different, it will come back around because typically US national security interests do not change from administration to administration. 

Russell: We must look at what Trump does rather than what he says. US policy towards Taiwan is highly elastic. 

Derek: Concerning the Hill, we’ve seen an avalanche of legislation introduced or commented on regarding Taiwan. While not all of these pieces of legislation are passed into law, it demonstrates that the Hill is not wavering on Taiwan. Trump is impossible to predict. He’ll say nice things about autocrats like Xi Jinping and yet still slap tariffs on him. Regarding what Trump Administration personnel are doing and saying, it seems to be business as usual when it comes to support of Taiwan. 

This administration is saying Taiwan is not doing enough, such as raising its defense budget. Do you feel this is correct or not?

Derek: The budget issue is a partisan issue in the Taiwan Legislative Yuan. The Democratic Progressive Party is now getting serious and they must relay to the people their commitment to defense including civil defense. Taiwan should increase its budget to some number but the United States must also send Taiwan the backlog of weapons that they have purchased. 

What more could Taiwan be doing so that Americans and other people around the world not only know or recognize more about Taiwan but are willing to support the United States and/or other countries to come to Taiwan’s defense in the case of an invasion?

Brent: Taiwan is an impressive democracy but it is not clear whether this will impress the Trump Administration. It’s best to recognize what the economic interests are because people pay attention to that. US national interests support a strong relationship with Taiwan. 

Given the recent statement by the G7 in regards to changing language regarding Taiwan, what might more support from the G7 countries look like in terms of action and not just rhetoric? 

Derek: We’re talking about why Taiwan matters and how to make the case. There is a linking of autocracies today who are looking to settle issues and create new spheres of influence and dominate by force. What the G7 countries and others in Europe are doing is making an analogy between Russia and Ukraine and how this relates to what China is doing in Taiwan. So deterrence matters to them. We can see this with the trade war. So European and Asian countries should also make it clear that a war in the Indo-Pacific would be very costly for China. 

Why hasn’t the Department of Defense (DOD) responded to China’s recent military drills across the Taiwan Strait?

Derek: I wouldn’t say the US isn’t responding. The key is to act with greater urgency. What China is doing is serious. These are dress rehearsals for the real thing and this should light a fire under the people of Taiwan, the Taiwan government, Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan, and the United States. We don’t need to be brandishing US weaponry in response but we will be doing something symbolic to show we are still committed to Taiwan. 

Russell: On the day of Trump’s inauguration, the QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Alliance) met which is emblematic of the emphasis that this administration places on the Indo-Pacific. The United States is prioritizing the Indo-Pacific theater as we move away from focusing on Eastern Europe and Ukraine. The Defense Secretary just had a tour in the Asia Pacific, within the first 100 days of the administration, and this is an intentional presence for the United States.

Chinese soldiers were caught by the Ukrainian army. Could this be something we may see in the future in terms of a China-Russia military alliance?

Derek: This is certainly a serious escalation. We’re not sure who these soldiers are or if they’ve been authorized by the PRC but this is not a good sign. Close cooperation between China and Russia could go both ways. Once Russia is done in Ukraine it’s possible they could turn toward helping the PRC in Asia. There is friction between the PRC and Russia in Asia as Russia has relations with North Korea, Myanmar and Burma. 

Can the United States play a role in bridging ties between Taiwan and India?

Brent: This is something the United States can certainly encourage, especially given Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy, in terms of economic development. Taiwan is already quite good at this, but the United States could certainly encourage more cooperation between Taiwan and India.