Vol. 1 Issue 2
Global Taiwan Brief – Vol. 1, Issue 2
Political Warfare Alert: Reframing the KMT in the CCP’s Political Narrative
By: Russell Hsiao
Taipei-Shanghai Forum: A Tale of Two Cross-Strait Exchanges
By: Jessica Drun
The Chinese Communist Party International Department: Advancing “One China” Behind the Scenes
By: David Gitter and Julia Bowie
Spy Games in Taiwan Strait: Taipei’s Unenviable Espionage Problem
By: Peter Mattis
Political Warfare Alert: Reframing the KMT in the CCP’s Political Narrative
Russell Hsiao is the Executive Director of the Global Taiwan Institute and Chief Editor of the Global Taiwan Brief.
Last week in Washington, DC, Arlington-based think tank the Project 2049 Institute (www.project2049.net), started by former senior U.S. government officials Randy Schriver and Mark Stokes, held a conference at the National Press Club entitled Seek Truth from Facts: The Chinese Communist Party’s War on History (hereafter “War on History”). The purpose of the conference was to discuss “[t]he CCP’s narrative of its history … [as] a critical component of the Party’s domestic and foreign policy, as it aims to legitimize its own power and supremacy.”
The first panel focused on the Second Sino-Japanese War—which ended on September 9, 1945—and speakers included academics from Japan and China. The lead presentation was given by Dr. Homare Endo, a professor at Tokyo University, who was born in China and lived through the Revolutionary War. Citing historical documents retrieved from archival research, Dr. Endo challenged Chinese Communist Party (CCP) orthodoxy and its dominant political narrative about the Party and its role during the Republican era. Specifically, she claimed that the CCP colluded with the Japanese Imperial Army during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937 – 1945).
According to Dr. Endo, CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang—whose death in 1989 precipitated the democracy protests in Tiananmen Square—stated in 1979 that “if someday, the Chinese people learned the true history of the CCP, they would overthrow the Chinese government” (要是讓人民知道了我們共產黨的歷史，人民就要起來推翻我們了). Hu’s powerful and incisive critique of CCP misdeeds shows that members in the highest echelons of the Party were aware of the Party’s murky role in contemporary Chinese history. The underlying purpose of the Party’s on-going, comprehensive war on history is nothing less than the continuation of a long struggle to maintain one-Party rule. Indeed, People’s Republic of China (PRC) political warfare is directed at all historic foes of the CCP, not only at its old nemesis the Kuomingtang (KMT), and is used as a means to shape and define the discourse of international relations in line with its political-military objectives.
Interestingly, in the same building where the “War on History” conference was held only several days later, Taiwan’s former Premier Hau Pei-tsun (郝柏村), who served as Chief of the General Staff of the Republic of China (ROC) Armed Forces (and is the father of former Taipei mayor and KMT Vice Chairman Hau Lung-pin (郝龍斌)), also gave the keynote remark at a conference entitled A War to Remember – United Chinese Effort Against Japanese Invasion.The conference’s host was the Hong Kong-based China Energy Fund Committee (CEFC). (http://www.cefc.org.hk) Speakers at the CEFC conference included Hong Kong’s former Secretary for Home Affairs Patrick Ho (何志平), Cao Tianzong (曹天忠), Fu Yingchuan (傅應川), Zuo Shuangwen (左雙文), He Shitong (何世同).
CEFC is a political warfare platform affiliated with what was formerly known as the General Political Department (GPD) and an active component of the CCP propaganda and ideology system. Open source research shows that CEFC serves as an administrative subsidiary of the China Huaxin Energy Company and has a distinct mission related to energy, maritime security, and cultural propaganda. It is therefore surprising to see the former premier of Taiwan take center stage at an event designed to propagate the CCP’s political objectives. The ROC National Army’s role in fighting the Japanese Imperial Army during the Sino-Japanese war is a historic fact, yet the CCP has long tried to erase the National government’s role in modern Chinese history. The motive behind what now appears to be the CCP’s attempts to re-assimilate the Nationalist government back into its political narrative is less clear.
The targets of CEFC’s political warfare have not been limited to retired senior military officers and government officials from Taiwan. A follow-on symposium held the day after at George Washington University, which was co-hosted by the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies, entitled “US-China Policy for the Next Administration” saw the participation of former senior U.S. policymakers. CEFC organized a similar event last year.
The linkages between CEFC and political warfare underscore the significance of General Hau’s participation as a coup for PLA political warfare. Indeed, Hau’s participation raises a serious question: What is the KMT’s role—or Taiwan’s, for that matter—in the narrative of China’s future?
To be sure, as a Chinese-speaking democracy, Taiwan plays a unique role in any possibility of a democratic future for China. However, that role may be diluted by CCP attempts to utilize the KMT to water down its role in history or manipulate Taiwan’s democracy. As longtime Taiwan reporter and former analyst at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service J. Michael Cole also observed: “[political warfare] demonstrates how China uses an ‘onion layer’ strategy to deceive and overwhelm its adversaries.” It’s high time for policymakers and historians in Washington, Taipei, and other third countries to peel back the layers of PRC political warfare.
The main point: As a Chinese-speaking democracy, Taiwan plays a uniquely important role in the competition of narratives for China’s future. However, that role may be diluted by attempts by the CCP to utilize the KMT to water down its role in Chinese history or manipulate Taiwan’s democracy.
Correction: The earlier version of this article incorrectly stated the name of the 2016 KMT presidential candidate.
Taipei-Shanghai Forum: A Tale of Two Cross-Strait Exchanges
Jessica Drun is a Bridge Award Fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research. The views in this essay are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of any organization with which she is affiliated.
Last month, Taipei City Mayor Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) hosted the annual Taipei-Shanghai City Forum (台北上海城市論壇). In its seventh iteration, this year’s twin-city forum was met with greater attention and scrutiny than the six prior, due to heightened uncertainty in cross-Strait relations and Beijing’s decision to send a party representative as delegation head, rather than a local government official.
The Taipei-Shanghai City Forum was formally established on April 6, 2010 with the signing of four Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) between the Taipei City Government and the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, after a decade of smaller cross-city exchanges under the same appellation. The purpose of the Forum is to enhance cooperation between the two cities, with each MOU outlining collaboration in key areas of focus, such as environmental protection and exchanges between each city’s respective science and technology parks.
Yet, a deeper examination into the backdrop of the formalization of the Taipei-Shanghai City Forum shows that broader overtures made by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to the administration of then-president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) provided the political preconditions for the agreement. President Ma, of the Kuomintang (KMT) party, came to power in 2008 and pursued a policy of rapprochement with Beijing after years of tense cross-Strait relations. Ma’s acknowledgment of the so-called “1992 Consensus” was seemingly reciprocated with goodwill from China, which reopened unofficial channels of communication and established official ones. The two sides also authorized direct flights between Taiwan and China and began negotiations for a preferential trade-agreement.
Explicit to the twin-city Forum was an announcement made by MOU signatory, Han Zheng (韓正), then Shanghai mayor, that the Bank of Communications would begin offering bi-directional currency exchange services between two sides’ currencies and that he would push for the establishment of direct routes between the two cities’ respective airports, as well as open a Taipei branch of the Shanghai Pudong Development Bank (上海浦東發展銀行). The gesture by the local government was consistent with the central government’s moves to relax cross-Strait restrictions, demonstrating that Beijing’s policy towards Taiwan cuts across all levels of governance.
However, the pace in expanding relations across the Taiwan Strait has stalled since the May 2016 inauguration of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文). Indeed, soon after Tsai’s inauguration, China terminated official contacts and consultation mechanisms. Beijing cites the Tsai administration’s refusal to acknowledge the so-called “1992 Consensus” and its corresponding “One China” principle as the basis for cross-Strait relations as its reason for cutting official channels.
In an unprecedented move, China sent Sha Hailin (沙海林), Director of the Shanghai Municipal Committee United Front Work Department and a member of Shanghai’s Communist Party standing committee, as head of delegation to the 2016 Taipei-Shanghai City Forum, which took place August 22-23. Sha went in lieu of Shanghai’s mayor or deputy mayor and against established precedent. In Taiwan protesters gathered at the airport upon Sha’s arrival and outside Forum venues. Ko, who identifies as an independent, was criticized for trying to undermine President Tsai and manage cross-Strait relations for his own political gain.
Ko defended the Forum, citing the importance of trade relations and arguing that the annual meetings allow for dialogue to continue with counterparts in the PRC in spite of the freeze in direct contact at the national level. The noteworthy element is the political significance of Sha’s position, which is more as a representative of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) than of the local Shanghai government. This shifts the tone of the Forum away from its original intent of advancing cooperation on more apolitical matters, such as medical services and film festivals, to one that hones in on what the Chinese leadership expects from Taiwan—and what is at stake.
Sha’s remarks at the Taipei-Shanghai City Forum were strikingly different from those of previous delegation leads. Statements from the Shanghai representative and from state-owned media on past forums commended the spirit of cooperation and the achievements of the meetings, while withholding comments on Taiwan’s political status. Even in 2015, when Ko—as the first non-KMT mayor since the inception of the twin-city forum—was pressed on the so-called “1992 Consensus,” Chinese media remained muted, citing his “goodwill” in merely saying he “respects” the 1992 Consensus, which falls short of supporting its tenets, a response that demonstrated flexibility on Beijing’s end.
Sha, however, focused his statement on the so-called “1992 Consensus” and the “One China” principle, arguing that the former is foundational to stable cross-Strait ties. He likewise stressed the “familial” ties between Taiwan and China and remarked that the Forum was not taking place in a “foreign” city. Notably, he referenced statistics on the number of Taiwanese workers and businesses in Shanghai, hinting that economic progress could be at stake. This parallels Beijing’s current approach to the Tsai administration, which has been to withhold “carrots” from the Ma years to convey its dissatisfaction.
While allowing this year’s forum to take place is seen as a reward to Ko for his conciliatory remarks towards China, Beijing may also be signaling to Tsai the consequences for not cooperating. Symbolically, Sha’s presence extends the threat, given that his vocational capacity is to mobilize outsider and nontraditional groups in support of CCP ideologies and, in particular, a unified Chinese state.
Further, by suggesting it may change its policies towards the city-level exchanges, exemplified this year by a CCP member taking the place of a Shanghai municipal government representative, Beijing is signalling its willingness to threaten local exchanges that provide tangible benefits for the Taiwan electorate. This appears to be a part of Beijing’s concerted strategy of trying to demonstrate to Taiwan’s electorate that the Tsai administration is ill-equipped to handle cross-Strait relations, with direct implications for the economy and their livelihoods.
A week after Sha’s visit, the spokesman for the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office reiterated a statement made in May that cross-Strait dialogue would resume if Taiwan’s government accepted the so-called “1992 Consensus.” Accordingly, it appears as if China’s broader cross-Strait policy is trickling down to the level of local exchanges. For instance, on September 18 a delegation of officials from select Taiwanese cities and counties visited Beijing and were received by Yu Zhengsheng (俞正声), Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Yu also reiterated how the so-called “1992 Consensus” is the basis of cross-Strait ties and openly opposed Taiwan independence.
Whether Beijing’s tactics will cover the spectrum of local exchanges between Taiwan and China remains to be seen. The recent Global Harbor Cities Forum, hosted by Taiwan’s southern city of Kaohsiung may serve as a harbinger. Five Chinese cities did not respond to DPP Mayor Chen Chu’s invitation and the forum came and went without their attendance. Perhaps most telling will be China’s approach to local-level exchanges organized or led by politicians outside the pan-green camp. As in the case with Mayor Ko and counter to Mayor Chen, Beijing may persist with a more accommodating stance towards local leaders that are willing to make concessions on the so-called “1992 Consensus.” This would allow it to seek counterbalances to Tsai and limit the DPP’s space on cross-Strait issues, with the aim of providing political capital to her domestic opponents and as part of a strategy of bringing more conciliatory parties to power.
The main point: China is using local cross-Strait exchanges, such as this year’s Taipei-Shanghai City Forum, as a platform to signal its stance that the so-called “1992 Consensus” should serve as the foundation of all levels of cross-Strait contact.
The Chinese Communist Party International Department: Advancing “One China” Behind the Scenes
David Gitter is the editor of PARTY WATCH, the premier weekly intelligence report on the activities of the Chinese Communist Party. Julia Bowie is a researcher at PARTY WATCH, and a master’s candidate at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service.
Since Tsai Ing-wen and the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) ascension to power in Taiwan this year, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has done everything possible to display its displeasure with the island’s democratic choice for restrained cross-Strait ties. Most notably, communications between Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) and Taipei’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), as well as their related semi-official mechanisms, have been halted.
TAO Director Zhang Zhijun (張志軍) made it clear that for official exchanges to resume, the so-called “1992 Consensus” and its related One-China principle must become the “common political foundation.” Notwithstanding, observers of China-Taiwan relations should not only pay attention to official statements made by the PRC’s state organs but also take note of actions taken by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to assert China’s sovereignty over Taiwan.
Specifically, the CCP’s International Department (CCP/ID; 中國共產黨中央對外聯絡部) is an important and yet often overlooked organ of the Party’s power and influence. While the department was once reserved for diplomacy with other foreign communist parties, the ID has re-identified itself over the past 20 years as a flexible and alternative channel to traditional state-to-state diplomacy. The department’s core objective is to use party-to-party contacts to help safeguard the country’s interests and facilitate state-to-state relations. Part of this work includes helping rectify foreigners’ “incorrect ideas” on the Party and country, including on issues of sovereignty.
With regards to Taiwan, the ID cooperates with other organs such as the CCP United Front Work Department to check Taiwan’s influence in regions where Taipei maintains official relations, such as Central America, the Caribbean, and West Africa. The department’s Taiwan role was especially prominent during the DPP presidency of Chen Shui-bian, as the CCP sought to leverage all channels of influence to stifle Chen’s independence-oriented policies. This history strongly suggests that the department will be utilized to help constrain the current DPP administration’s diplomatic efforts.
There is an additional reason to expect the ID’s influence in Taiwan policy to remain strong in the near-term: TAO head Zhang Zhijun is a career ID diplomat and worked his way up the ranks from 1975 to 2009 to become vice minister. Zhang has a reputation for being tough yet well-spoken and his leadership style has shaped the TAO’s policies. Although Tsai did not concede to China in her inaugural address regarding the so-called “1992 Consensus,” the TAO pledged to “advance cross-Straits exchanges and cooperation in various fields, deepen the integrated economic and social development of the two sides and improve the well-being and strengthen the close bond of people across the Straits.” To supplement the TAO’s own policies, Zhang is likely coordinating with his colleagues in the CCP/ID to apply pressure on Taiwan.
Since Tsai announced her presidential campaign in early 2015, the ID has secured declarations of support on Taiwan’s status from current high-level leadership in Comoros, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Grenada, Australia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Papua New Guinea, and the small Pacific island nation of Vanuatu, as well as from opposition parties in Cambodia, Mauritania, Armenia, Mauritius, and Samoa. It is worth noting that Vanuatu recognized Taipei in late 2004 for a short time; this explains why the ID has held four high-level meetings with the country since 2015. Each one reaffirmed Vanuatu’s support for the PRC’s One-China principle.
The CCP/ID also liaises with political parties in states that lack diplomatic ties with the PRC, most often with those that profess diplomatic support for Beijing’s definition of “One China.” Examples include ID contacts with Sao Tome and Principe’s Social Democratic Party, El Salvador’s Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, Guatemala’s Patriotic Party and National Revolutionary Unity, Nicaragua’s Sandinista Liberation Front, St. Lucia’s Labour Party, and various parties in Paraguay, Panama, and the Solomon Islands. During the presidency of Chen Shui-bian, the CCP/ID sought to take advantage of the 2004 coup in Haiti, Taiwan’s diplomatic ally, organizing a January 2005 “goodwill delegation” to discuss establishing diplomatic relations with the installed provisional government.
Such liaison work continues in the current period. In January 2015, the CCP/ID hosted the China-CELAC Political Parties Forum for parties from Latin American and Caribbean countries, with the stated purpose of exploring ways to cope with common challenges. 27 parties across the region sent representatives to the forum, including from St. Lucia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, and Panama—all diplomatic allies of Taiwan. CCP/ID Minister Song Tao (宋濤)used his address to the forum as an opportunity to stress the importance of China’s “core interests,” a reference that unequivocally includes Taiwan.
To supplement ID diplomacy, the department has an additional tool of influence to advance China’s stance on Taiwan: the Chinese Association for International Understanding (CAIFU/中國國際交流協會). As a CCP/ID front organization, CAIFU’s guiding principle is “letting the world understand China, and letting China understand the world.” More emphasis appears to be put on the former. Similar to its parent organization, CAIFU reaches out to various governments, political parties, and NGOs in order to “enhance mutual understanding and friendly cooperation.” It also publishes its own journal, International Understanding. CAIFU openly praised its own efforts to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic maneuvering under Chen Shui-bian, citing its exchanges with countries that Beijing lacks ties with. The organization has continued to advance Beijing’s stance on Taiwan in more recent meetings, such as those with Sri Lanka and Albania.
The main point: The CCP’s International Department is an important and yet often overlooked organ of the Party’s power and influence. The current suspension of official cross-Strait communications and TAO Director Zhang Zhijun’s long career in the ID suggest that the department’s importance in Beijing’s Taiwan policies is likely to grow.
 David Shambaugh. “China’s ‘Quiet Diplomacy’: The International Department of the Chinese Communist Party.” China: An International Journal 5, no. 1 (March 2007): 26-54.
 Ibid, 44.
 Li Chengren. “Work Report Delivered at the 9th Meeting of the Chinese Association for International Understanding.” International Understanding, no. 3 (2003): 4-11.
Spy Games in Taiwan Strait: Taipei’s Unenviable Espionage Problem
Peter Mattis is a Fellow in the China Program at The Jamestown Foundation and author of Analyzing the Chinese Military (2015). He is currently completing two book manuscripts on Chinese intelligence operations.
In terms of exposed spy cases, this year probably has been the quietest year in the cross-Strait intelligence “war without gunfire” in the last decade. The most notable events have been Taiwan’s High Court upholding the sentences for the members of a spy ring run by Zhen Xiaojiang (鎮小江) and the hacking of the Democratic Progressive Party’s website to infect the computers of those who visited. Over the last decade, however, Taiwan suffered tremendous losses that damaged the island’s reputation and sowed doubt about its integrity in the face of Beijing’s relentless pressure.
Ten years ago, Chinese intelligence kidnapped two senior Taiwanese military intelligence officers, Colonel Chu Kung-hsun (朱恭訓) and Colonel Hsu Chang-kuo (徐章國), who oversaw operations against the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for the Military Intelligence Bureau, after luring them to Vietnam. Their abduction came amid the capture of a number of Taiwanese spy networks within the PRC, including several senior officers at the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force Command College. The setback for Taiwanese intelligence forced a near operational stand down for clandestine agent operations inside the PRC, severely restricting the kind of information Taipei could collect.
Taiwanese security authorities also proved the old counterintelligence adage that there is no good time to catch a spy. From 2006 to the present, more than 40 Taiwanese citizens were prosecuted for espionage and espionage-related crimes involving China, including serving and retired officials, military officers, and businesspeople. One might interpret these events as indicating that Taiwanese counterintelligence performed well in capturing so many spies, but it more likely reflects the tip of the iceberg, in terms of the relentless pressure applied by China’s intelligence operations in Taiwan. No part of the Taiwan government has been exempt, including the Office of the President, the National Security Bureau, the Ministry of Justice, and the military. Among those prosecuted are the highest-ranking spies since Deputy Defense Minister Wu Shi, who was executed in 1950.
- Brigadier General Lo Hsien-che (Army): At the time of General Lo’s arrest in February 2011, he was the director of Army electronic information. Chinese military intelligence recruited him in the early 2000s when he served in Taiwan’s military attaché office in Thailand. Beijing’s spies reportedly paid the general several hundred thousand dollars for his information over the years. This case is one of the few known cases against Taiwan or any other country that took place entirely outside China.
- Major General Hsu Nai-chuan (Army): General Hsu is the highest-ranking Taiwanese military officer to have committed treason, and the High Court earlier this year reduced his jail term to less than three years. He helped a retired PLA officer, Zhen Xiaojiang, expand his spy network by approaching old friends and colleagues, and it is presumably in these attempts that someone turned him into the authorities.
- Vice Admiral Ko Cheng-sheng (Navy): Admiral Ko, a retired deputy commander of the Navy, was recruited by Chinese military intelligence through an intermediary, a Taiwanese-Australian businessman named Shen Ping-kang. The Chinese Communist Party’s United Front Work Department and the Liaison Department of the former PLA General Political Department approached Shen in 1998 as a channel to the admiral, and both agencies recruited Ko well before he retired in 2003. Ko also tried to recruit fellow naval officers to build a network of sub-sources that would continue to provide intelligence to China after he retired.
- Lieutenant General Chen Chu-fan: General Chen was the deputy commander of the Military Police Command. He was an influential figure in the Kuomintang (KMT), having served as the party’s deputy director of the Taipei chapter as well as in a variety of other liaison roles. Chen’s sentence from 2014 was overturned in May 2016, despite evidence that presented in his prosecution that linked him to senior Shanghai State Security Bureau officers during regular travel to China since 2004.
These higher level recruitments may have been more useful as political sources and propaganda victories, but several other sources, such as retired Military Intelligence Bureau officer Major Chen Shu-lung, did much to damage Taiwan’s intelligence and counterintelligence efforts. These turncoats identified Taiwanese intelligence officers at home and abroad, which provides two benefits for Beijing:
- First, the Chinese security services can monitor these individuals to identify leads to PRC traitors and disrupt Taiwanese operations.
- Second, Chinese intelligence gained targeting lists for future attempts to recruit Taiwanese officials. Continually updating the database of Taiwanese names and their family, school, military, and government connections is what allows China’s intelligence services to find channels to people like Admiral Ko. Some of China’s computer network exploitation against the island has focused explicitly on Taiwan’s local government databases to support this kind of work.
The return of Colonels Chu and Hsu late last year hopefully closed a dark decade for Taiwan in the “war without gunfire.” The cost was not just to Taiwan’s national security, but to its reputation for integrity and probably the willingness of foreign partners to collaborate in addressing shared intelligence and counterintelligence concerns related to China.
Ultimately, Taipei has no way—short of accepting unification—to stop Beijing’s human and technical intelligence operations. Taiwanese people will continue to do business in the PRC, and despite the recent slowdown in Chinese tourists, Chinese from the mainland will continue to travel to and from the island. Managing risks, conducting investigations, and making incremental improvements to security should be pursued as a matter of policy under President Tsai Ing-wen, whichthe Ma Ying-jeou administration failed to do for most of this past decade. Transparency about the damage with Taipei’s closest security partners, such as the United States, may prove a necessary if unpalatable step toward ensuring trusted relationships with genuine potential rather than cautious operational cooperation or intrinsically limited analytic exchanges.
The “dark decade” for Taiwan also revealed the island’s long-term strength. The changing demographics of Taiwan, the growing reluctance of Taiwanese to conceive of a future tied to the PRC, and the emergence of a distinct Taiwanese identity, all militate against the human vulnerabilities that Beijing exploited. One of the most common ways in which Taiwan’s traitors have been uncovered is younger officers and officials turning in senior officers like Admiral Ko and General Chen.
This year’s relative quiet can be interpreted in several ways. The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence and the PRC’s intelligence services may be performing very well and avoiding detection, or they may be performing quite poorly against Taiwan and there are no cases to be discovered. Alternatively, Taiwan’s counterintelligence effort may be functioning once again at a high level and effectively countering China’s efforts before they can bear fruit. None of these interpretations should be surprising.
The main point: Long-term trends—changing demographics, views of the PRC, and Taiwanese identity—strengthen Taiwan’s integrity in the face of Beijing’s relentless intelligence efforts, but President Tsai Ing-wen still needs to ensure Taiwan’s counterintelligence remain vigorous and the island’s partners confident in the island’s security.
 Author’s Interviews, June and July 2012, October 2014.
 Number based on author’s database, see e.g. Mattis, Peter, “China’s Espionage Against Taiwan: Analysis of Recent Operations,” China Brief 14, no. 21 (November 7, 2014).
 Author’s Interview, June 2016.