The Russia-Ukraine War has vastly accelerated cooperation between the revisionist powers of Russia, North Korea, Iran, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). North Korea has provided Russia millions of artillery shells and several dozen ballistic missiles for use against Ukraine; in return, Russia has provided food, economic aid, parts for weapons manufacturing, and advanced technology for North Korean spy satellites. Iran has given Russia thousands of Shahed-131/136 loitering munitions, an unknown number of the Mohajer-6 multi-role unmanned aerial vehicles, and even helped Russia establish its own factory to make more sophisticated Shahed clones. In return, Iran is seeking to acquire Russian attack helicopters, Su-35 fighters, and the S-400 air defense system.
Underpinning the economics of this vast effort is the PRC. The PRC purchased USD $60 billion worth of Russian oil in 2023, with PRC shipping and insurance companies covering for the withdrawal of Western companies following the 2022 invasion. (The PRC has done the same with Iran, as well: Iran has used a global “dark fleet” to clandestinely sell 90 percent of its total oil exports to PRC refineries.) Russia has used its petrochemical windfall to ramp up purchases of Chinese dual-use items. Overall trade surged 23 percent to USD $240 billion from 2022 to 2023, with sharp spikes of PRC sales in dual-use items such as electronics, heavy trucks, excavators, as well as military optics, nitrocellulose for ammunition, and machine tools.
While this cooperation does not rise to the level of a formal military alliance between these states, it does demonstrate how autocracies can leverage their control over levers of power to provide rapid mutual support. Taiwan and its partners must consider the very real risk that the PRC will similarly leverage this support group in any aggressive action in the Pacific. Unfortunately, the current day Indo-Pacific security architecture is not well-suited to provide similarly rapid multilateral support. The PRC’s pressure campaign against multilateralism in the Pacific and the region’s history means that a NATO-like military alliance is not a realistic option to deter PRC coercion against Taiwan. Instead, many countries have opted for “minilateralism”: smaller, flexible groupings to collaborate on relatively narrow areas of shared interest. Examples of this include the Quad and AUKUS, which build long-term defense and institutional capabilities between member states—but are not optimized to provide rapid support during a contingency, or even day-to-day gray zone coercion.
To remedy this, Taiwan and her partners should consider another mode of multilateral cooperation, modeled on the Ukraine Defense Contact Group.
The Limits of Minilateralism for Taiwan
The Quad and AUKUS provide good examples of the strengths and limitations of the minilateral model. The Quad was founded in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami to coordinate and provide disaster relief aid from the United States, Japan, India, and Australia—but foundered shortly afterwards amidst Chinese pressure and reticence by the member states to transition the discussion from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to security challenges. In 2017, it was revived following the PRC’s escalating campaign of maritime coercion, with a new conceptual basis from Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s idea of a “democratic security diamond.” The Quad now meets regularly, under the banner of delivering “tangible benefits” to the Indo-Pacific—as the member-states strive for a “region that is free, open, inclusive, healthy, anchored by democratic values, and unconstrained by coercion.”
However, the revived Quad discussions on security center on long-term capacity building efforts: maritime surveillance capability, freedom of navigation, cybersecurity, and supply chain safety. The July meeting of the Quad Foreign Ministers in Tokyo covered everything from the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), militarization of the South China Sea, North Korea, Myanmar, the Middle East, to the Pacific Islands—but not a single mention of Taiwan.
Image: North Korean missiles being used against Ukraine, January 2024. Autocratic military cooperation focuses on rapidly providing capabilities, with no restraints on usage. Western cooperation, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, focuses on long-term capacity-building – and tends to studiously avoid the mention of Taiwan. (Image source: US Defense Intelligence Agency)
AUKUS, while more narrowly focused on military cooperation, is also a long-term capacity-building project. This grouping aims to strengthen the collective defense capabilities of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Pillar 1 of AUKUS focuses on Australia’s acquisition of 3 Virginia-class, conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines in the 2030s, to be followed by the design and fielding of a future “SSN-AUKUS” in the 2040s. Pillar 2 centers on collaboration in developing advanced military capabilities in AI, quantum technologies, cyber security, hypersonic capabilities, electronic warfare, and information sharing. The connective tissue between these two pillars is the shared commitment to improving the trilateral defense industrial base through defense trade integration.
This provides the three countries a more credible counter against the sheer scale of the PRC military-industrial complex. Like the revived Quad, though, the provided security effects for Taiwan are secondary and long-term. Minilateral institutions serve a vital role in bringing together a more cohesive security architecture in the Indo-Pacific, but are not suited for handling a fast-moving crisis. Instead, an organized multilateral grouping focused solely on the defense of Taiwan is needed.
The Ukraine Defense Contact Group Model…
The aftermath of Russia’s shocking invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 revealed serious deficiencies in the West’s ability to support a democratic power against aggression. Despite intelligence that warned of Russian invasion plans months in advance, European and even Ukrainian leaders either did not believe the warnings, or else were hesitant to act. Several weeks before the invasion, Germany infamously offered Ukraine a donation of 5,000 helmets. The United States, despite providing several billion dollars’ worth of aid since the beginning of Russian aggression in 2014, would repeatedly freeze assistance across both Republican and Democratic administrations—even shortly before the invasion. Moreover, US deliveries of lethal assistance only started in 2017, and for the most part consisted of small arms, surveillance equipment, and portable anti-tank weapons (Javelins).
Image: Ukrainian service members unloading US-provided munitions, February 11, 2022. The United States and United Kingdom rushed hundreds of anti-tank missiles to Ukraine just prior to the start of the war in late February; by early March, as other NATO allies joined the effort, some 17,000 anti-tank weapons were flooded into the battlefield. However, the Russians had already begun to shift to artillery fires to support their invasion. The reactive nature of urgent aid, internal escalation management debates, and the logistical difficulties of dealing with a mishmash of platforms, necessitated a strategic-level organization to optimize future aid to Ukraine. (Image source: US Embassy Ukraine / Wikimedia Commons)
With the start of the war, the flow of Western weapons into Ukraine became a chaotic flood. The US European Command was hard-pressed to control the logistics of shipments, let alone validate what was required on the battlefield. The US Department of Defense started the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG) in April 2022 as an attempt to organize the assistance, with 40 countries participating. Since then, the UDCG has played a crucial coordinating role in supporting Ukraine’s defense by organizing coherent military assistance, providing diverse military equipment and training to Ukrainian forces, sharing intelligence, and maintaining international pressure on Russia.
Eight “capability coalitions” were established around identified Ukraine defense needs: the Air Force Coalition, Artillery Coalition, Ground-Based Air Defense Coalition, Armor Coalition, Maritime Security Coalition, Demining Coalition, Information Technology Coalition, and Drone Coalition. These coalitions encompass high-level political and strategic cooperation between nations to not just fulfill immediate wartime requirements, but to build out medium-term logistics and maintenance support. Most importantly, they create long-term deterrence through projects to transform Ukraine’s future force, as well as to expand both Ukraine and NATO’s defense industrial base. As an additional benefit, NATO member participation in these coalitions will assist Ukraine in fulfilling the interoperability conditions for NATO ascension.
…Adapted for Taiwan
The Ukraine Defense Contact Group’s strength is its ability to unite varying nations towards a common goal: providing coordinated short-term and long-term security assistance for Ukraine against Russian aggression. It fosters collaboration without requiring ideological alignment, with the inclusion of not just NATO allies but also non-NATO partners.
This is an ability that is sorely needed in the Indo-Pacific. Currently, Western countries apply a scattershot array of methods to assist Taiwan and deter the PRC from aggression. These efforts are not well-coordinated, given the enormous effort the PRC expends at preventing collective action—and the end result is hesitant, individual country action that elevates symbolism over practical effect, such as the recent debate regarding a potential German Navy Taiwan Strait transit. Even basic communication on defense issues between Taiwan and her neighbors is relatively limited, given the conspicuous lack of military representation by Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and South Korea in Taipei.
A “Taiwan Defense Contact Group,” then, would start with a framework for multilateral understanding. Given that the United States is Taiwan’s closest security partner, a US-led collaborative framework would allow other key allies and partners to access pre-existing contacts, speeding up the process of establishing regular communication and evaluating Taiwan’s defense issues in their own national context. Issues to be addressed could include cooperative deterrent activities to deter the adversary; development of a consensus on responses to escalating coercion; and when and how noncombatant evacuations would be conducted. Taiwan, in turn, could gain a better understanding of the differing national political thresholds at stake, and potential timelines for action.
The TDCG’s objectives would be threefold. The first would be to bolster Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities by providing essential military equipment, training, and intelligence support—in particular, weaponry or specialties that the United States is not best suited to provide. The second would be to organize and coordinate regional security activities so that the PRC cannot divide and conquer through gray-zone coercion. The third would be to signal to the PRC that attempts to isolate Taiwan from the international community will backfire.
China would likely perceive the TDCG as a direct challenge to its interests, and would likely react with economic coercion and military intimidation targeted against its members. To forestall this, a TDCG could be first established as a track 1.5 dialogue or an unofficial organization—on such grounds, simply establishing regular modes of communication would pay high dividends. If gray zone coercion continues to escalate or a crisis emerges, then this would provide the foundation for a transition into a formal organization.
The Russia-Ukraine War has driven autocratic cooperation in diplomacy, economics, propaganda, sanctions evasion, and military support. However the war ends, this will become an enduring feature of the international arena. Taiwan and her partners must adapt accordingly.
The main point: Autocratic powers are increasingly coordinating their military efforts across the globe. While Western countries are coordinating for the defense of Ukraine via the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, there is no similar organization for the Indo-Pacific region. As such, the UDCG serves as a model for potential future collaboration for both the defense of Taiwan and regional stability in the Indo-Pacific.
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