From May 23-24, 2024, three days after the inauguration of Taiwan’s new president William Lai Ching-te (賴清德), China’s Eastern Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) carried out military drills code-named Joint Sword-2024A, involving the army, navy, air force, and rocket force. Exercise activity occurred in the Taiwan Strait and around Kinmen, Matsu, Wuqiu, and Dongyin Islands, and operations were comprised of:
“[S]ea assaults, land strikes, air defense and anti-submarine [operations] in the airspace and waters to the north and south of Taiwan Island, in a bid to test the multi-domain coordination and joint strike capabilities of the theater command’s troops.”
PLA Navy Senior Captain Li Xi, the spokesperson of the Theater Command, stated that the drills served as a “strong punishment for the separatist acts of ‘Taiwan independence’ forces and a stern warning against the interference and provocation by external forces.”
This military drill is an expected outcome of Xi Jinping’s (習近平) directives in July 2023—when, while inspecting the Eastern Theater Command, Xi called for:
“[V]igilance against potential dangers and all-out efforts to fulfill the duty of combat tasked with theater commands and enhancing the planning of war and combat, strengthening the command system for joint operations, and stepping up training under real combat conditions to raise the forces’ capabilities to fight and win.”
Citing an unpublished Taiwanese estimate, Reuters reported that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) spent about USD $15 billion, or 7 percent of its defense budget, on exercises in the Western Pacific in 2023. This demonstrates that investment in military activities in and around Taiwan is a priority in China’s military spending (as also evident from Table 1, below). In 2024, the PRC announced an annual defense budget of $1.67 trillion yuan (about USD $231.36 billion), a 7.2 percent increase from 2023.
Table 1: China’s Military Exercises around Taiwan (2018-2024)
Time | Drill Name (if applicable) | Type of Exercise | Key Features | Context | Strategic Purpose |
March 2018 | Live-fire drills | Naval and air force; live ammunition | Simulated amphibious landings and blockades | Following the signing of the US Taiwan Travel Act that allowed official visits | Signaled opposition to US-Taiwan relations |
July 2019 | Joint sea and air drills | Air and sea Maneuvers | Joint air and naval operations near Taiwan | Part of the PLA’s annual training cycle | To demonstrate PLA’s joint operational capabilities |
August 2020 | Live-fire exercises | Naval and air force; live ammunition | Simulated attack on Taiwan; missile tests | Heightened US-Taiwan relations during the Trump administration | Psychological pressure on Taiwan |
April 2021 | Joint landing exercises | Amphibious assault training | Practiced beach landings, and assault operations | Days after the US Navy’s transit of the Taiwan Strait | Show of strength and warning to Taiwan and the United States |
August 2022 | Largest-ever drills | Full-scale military exercise | Simulated blockade, missile launches over Taiwan; and cyber warfare | Response to US Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan | Comprehensive readiness for Taiwan invasion scenario |
October 2022 | Military training flights | Air force sorties | Multiple fighter jets and bombers circled Taiwan | Ongoing post-Pelosi tensions and US military presence | Intimidation, test Taiwan’s air defense |
April 2023 | “United Sharp Sword”/ “Allied Sword” drills | Multi-branch exercises | Simulated encirclement of Taiwan, missile tests, joint naval and air operations | In response to Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s meeting with US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy | To demonstrate the PLA’s ability to surround and isolate Taiwan |
July 2023 | Night time Drills | Air and Naval Drills | Conducted night time combat drills | Increased US military support for Taiwan | Enhance combat readiness, show night-ops capabilities |
August 2023 | Drills | Air and naval exercise | Combat drills with aircraft, naval ships and land-based missile systems | Response to Vice President Lai Ching-te’s visit to the United States | Focused on ship-aircraft coordination to test seizing control of air and sea space, and to test combat capabilities |
May 2024 | Joint Sword-2024A drills | Full-scale military exercise | Focus on joint precision strikes, missile tests, and drone operations. First time Chinese Coast Guard joined the drills | Response to the inauguration Speech of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te | Joint sea-air combat readiness, precision strikes, and integrated operations to test real combat capabilities |
Source: Compiled by the author
Noteworthy Trends in PLA Exercises Around Taiwan
Given the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP, 民進黨) traditional pro-independence outlook, its political control over Taiwan goes against Beijing’s goal of “reunification.” In this regard, since the DPP took power in 2016, there have been significant developments in China’s military drills around Taiwan. These key trends and patterns are noted below.
The Frequency and Scale of Military Exercises
The first key trend is an increase in the frequency and scale of military exercises, as noted (Table 1, above). This dramatic increase in the PLA’s military exercises has been evident especially since the DPP came to power under Tsai Ing-wen. Beginning in 2018, China conducted military drills around Taiwan with increasing frequency in order to exert pressure on Taiwan’s DPP-led government, which China views as being pro-independence. These exercises have served to test the PLA’s joint real combat capabilities in the potential operating areas of a future Taiwan crisis.
The Sophistication of Military Operations
Second, the depth and sophistication of the PLA’s military exercises have increased, combining both military drills and joint exercises. This has involved live fire exercises; the involvement of all branches of the military, as well as a wide variety of military assets for greater jointness, coordination and operational preparedness; and simulating more realistic combat scenarios such as blockade and amphibious assault. For instance, in the Joint Sword-2024A exercise, the China Coast Guard (CCG) practiced joint operations for the first time with the PLA. In the 2022 exercises, even Chinese aircraft carriers, the Liaoning and the Shandong, were involved—along with a Type 75 amphibious assault ship, at least one Type 55 cruiser, and several Type 54 frigates and others. As part of the May 2024 exercise, China deployed 111 aircraft and 46 naval vessels to areas around Taiwan, and 82 Chinese military aircraft crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait—with some approaching close to the 24 nautical mile line that Taiwan uses to define its contiguous zone. Platforms such as the J-20 and J-16 fighter jets, Type 052D destroyers, and Dong Feng ballistic missiles were also prominently featured.
The Increasing Use of High Technology
Third, the PLA’s exercises have increasingly showcased advancements in military technology—including the use of drones, cyber warfare capabilities, and missile systems—indicating a shift towards modern warfare tactics. For instance, in early August 2024, Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense reported that a total of 31 Chinese military aircraft—including several drones—and 12 Chinese warships were detected operating in and near the Taiwan Strait over a 24 hour period.
Achieving PLA Narrative Objectives
Fourth, the military drills and exercises are aimed towards fulfilling key narrative objectives: both as a psychological tactic to intimidate Taiwan, as well as to signal its capabilities to the international community—particularly to the United States and Japan—regarding a potential Taiwan crisis. The PLA’s military exercises increasingly coincide with significant political events related to Taiwan, such as visits by foreign dignitaries to Taiwan or statements from Taiwan’s government that Beijing views as provocative—to include then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022, or President Lai’s inauguration in May 2024. For instance, in his inauguration speech Lai called on Beijing to end its “political and military intimidation against Taiwan” and emphasized that Beijing needs to recognize “the reality of the Republic of China’s existence”—statements that were met with Beijing’s military response.
Conclusions
Given the evolving nature of China’s military exercises, some analysts take the view that these exercises by China are aimed at blockading the island, instead of submitting it to a full-scale attack. Due to the heavy cost involved, an all-out war is generally ruled out of Beijing’s calculus. Therefore, on one end, these military exercises exemplify China’s growing frustration with the lack of progress towards “reunification” on Beijing’s terms. On the other end, these military exercises are critical in shaping the dynamics of the Taiwan Strait and influencing the region’s geopolitical stability.
As China aims to bolster its claim to Taiwan and to ward off any Western involvement, military exercises are expected to continue in this pattern. What is apparent is that China’s military drills surrounding Taiwan follow a pattern that is indicative of a larger strategy of intimidation and conflict preparedness. These exercises are probably going to change as tensions grow, with a greater focus on contemporary warfare capabilities and coordinated actions amongst various military branches. The geopolitical landscape is still changing, and the effects can be felt across the Taiwan Strait. What is certain is that China’s military exercises around Taiwan pose a significant threat to regional peace and stability, as they carry the potential to escalate tensions and increase the risk of accidental conflict.
The main point: Since the Democratic Progressive Party took power in Taiwan under Tsai Ing-wen, China has increasingly combined its aggressive rhetoric with ramped-up military exercises around the Taiwan Strait, with Chinese vessels operating increasingly close to the island. These drills involve live-fire exercises, air sorties, naval deployments, and ballistic missile launches. China’s military drills exhibit a clear trend of being “frequent, intense, large-scale and multi-domain” in nature—with a twin objective of demonstrating China’s ability to blockade and isolate the island, and expressing Beijing’s displeasure with any perceived moves towards Taiwan’s independence.
