On May 20, Lai Ching-te (賴清德) of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民進黨) took office as Taiwan’s new president. 2024 not only marks the first time that a party has secured a third consecutive presidential term in Taiwan, but it is also the 45th anniversary of the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and a decade following the Sunflower Movement—all of which represent both external support and internal efforts for preserving Taiwan’s autonomy in the face of the threats posed by China’s deep-seated desire to “reunify” with Taiwan.
The TRA represents the United States’ special commitments to supporting Taiwan’s security within the framework of its “One-China Policy.” Since the United States’ promise to provide Taiwan with defensive arms is conditional on the understanding that Taiwan will not contravene the interests of the United States in protecting human rights, the TRA brought Taiwan to a pivotal moment in its democratization—as exemplified by the Kaohsiung Incident at the end of 1979, which called for freedom, democracy, and the lifting of martial law.
Despite the fact that Taiwan appears to be secured by the TRA amidst its tense relationship with China, it has also long endured US strategic ambiguity in its foreign policy, which intends to dissuade China from attempting to “reunify” with Taiwan and discourages Taiwan from declaring independence—for now.
Not only the TRA, but also the US-Taiwan relationship as a whole, reflects the United States’ strategic ambiguity in foreign policy. Statistics show that there has been an increase in US officials visiting Taiwan in recent years, with five delegations and 32 US lawmakers visiting Taiwan in total in 2023. Despite an increase in high-level visits by US officials, Taiwan still faces challenges in deepening its ties with the United States. The US-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade, launched in 2022, was allegedly a compensation for Taiwan’s exclusion from the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, aiming to ensure cooperation between the United States and Taiwan in different sectors—however, without granting waiver tariffs, which are key in bilateral and multilateral trade agreements.
As US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in his congratulatory message to Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te, the United States looks forward to advancing their “longstanding unofficial relationship, consistent with the US One-China Policy,” but the ongoing symbolic support for Taiwan from the United States may continue falling short of Taiwan’s expectations.
The United States’ strategically ambiguous stance also leads to oscillations in its rhetoric. It was nothing new when the White House reiterated that its policy towards Taiwan remained unchanged following US President Joseph Biden’s blunt public statements and commitments on Taiwan’s defense.
Even though in January US President Biden said that Washington does not support Taiwan independence, on March 7 he toughened his language in the State of the Union address by stressing that Washington stands up for peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits. Professor Li Da-jung (李大中) of Tamkang University’s (淡江大學) Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies said that this reflects US President Biden’s desire to urge Beijing not to act recklessly by shifting towards clearer statements within the framework of strategic ambiguity.
Some experts believe that it is time for the United States to introduce a policy of strategic clarity as the status quo across the Taiwan Straits changes—which is evident as China becomes increasingly assertive, and Taiwanese identity becomes more consolidated.
China has demonstrated its assertiveness by building up gray zone pressure through subtle maneuvers, such as a 75 percent increase in its Air Defense Identification Zone violations to Taiwan in 2023 compared to 2021, along with its growing defense budget—which increased by 7.2 percent in 2024, reaching RMB $1.67 trillion (USD $231 billion). As for Taiwan, with its identity becoming increasingly consolidated, its economic and foreign policy typically is moving away from, or opposing, the society that the nation increasingly defines as the “other.” [1]
For Taiwan, not only the changing status quo, but also the dynamics of cooperation and conflicts between the United States and China, all raise concerns about its capacity to preserve its autonomy. For instance, even though on March 11 the United States announced a historic 2025 investment in Taiwan’s security assistance—allocating USD $100 million as a specific line item for the first time—this followed positive talks at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference on November 15, 2023.
The fluctuating attitude of the United States towards China makes the United States an unreliable partner for Taiwan, and even for its alliances in the Western Pacific. Therefore, as the United States reconsiders whether strategic ambiguity might be an outdated strategy, Taiwan should actively find a way to extricate itself from the trap of an ambiguous attitude and oscillating rhetoric from the United States in the context of the Chinese threat to Taiwan, both by leveraging its techno-diplomacy externally and bolstering its resilience internally.
Taiwan’s flourishing semiconductor industry has been known as a “silicon shield,” as former Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) explicitly said in her article in Foreign Affairs in 2021, “Our semiconductor industry is especially significant: a ‘silicon shield’ that allows Taiwan to protect itself and others from aggressive attempts by authoritarian regimes to disrupt global supply chain.” However, given Taiwan’s equivalent vulnerabilities in both natural disasters and geopolitical risks, the United States has been reshaping the global semiconductor industry to secure its own supply chain, as demonstrated by the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s (TSMC, 台灣積體電路製造股份有限公司) Arizona plant.
Given the global efforts in addressing geopolitical concerns, Taiwan should, in addition to seeking external support by leveraging its techno-diplomacy, focus on internal efforts to empower itself to maintain equilibrium amidst geopolitical risks, particularly by enhancing its resilience.
David Arase, a senior fellow at the Center for Asia-Pacific Resilience and Integration (CAPRI), said in March that Taiwan’s composure in enduring unprecedented military intimidation, economic coercion, and political warfare waged by China demonstrates its resilience. However, Taiwan’s resilience may be jeopardized due to constraints in devising effective policy responses, stemming from a structural issue wherein its political dynamics limit the choices of its policy—as Richard Bush, a senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, has pointed out. [2] The situation may become more serious as Taiwan is currently experiencing a divided government following the January elections, with the DPP retaining its presidency for a third consecutive term and the Kuomintang (KMT, 國民黨) holding the reins of the legislature.
On May 3, the KMT and Taiwan People’s Party (民眾黨) voted against amendments proposed by the DPP caucus in the legislature that require elected officials to file reports before visiting China. As a result, the proposal stands no chances of being discussed at the committee meetings in the Legislative Yuan (立法院). This exemplifies a typical political situation in Taiwan where—even concerning security issues—without a party’s monopoly over policymaking, bills may take longer to pass, and policies may be challenging to reach a consensus. Nevertheless, these challenges in policymaking may lead to an increasingly ineffective democracy, potentially undermining Taiwan’s resilience and leaving it more vulnerable to geopolitical risks.
Consequently, it is crucial for Taiwan to recognize the necessity of deconstructing the phenomenon wherein political ideology often overrides its policymaking. The divided government should cooperate and consolidate a strong political will to create a more resilient environment for Taiwan, possibly beginning by diversifying Taiwan’s domestic economy or addressing pressing domestic issues such as unaffordable housing, stagnating wages, energy concerns, aging population, and more.
With the changing status quo across the Taiwan Straits, the United States should revive the confidence of its alliances in the Western Pacific by eschewing ambiguity on the Taiwan issue, thereby narrowing the gap between its commitments and capabilities. As for Taiwan, given the United States’ ambiguous attitude and oscillating rhetoric, the new government should externally leverage Taiwan’s techno-diplomacy and internally empower the nation’s resilience to adapt to the dynamics of geopolitical challenges. This strategic approach could bolster the preservation of Taiwan’s autonomy and position it as a vital partner on the global stage.
The main point: Parties under the new Taiwanese government should collaborate and leverage its techno-diplomacy and resilience to confront unforeseen challenges amidst Taiwan’s serious geopolitical risks.
[1] Syaru Shirley Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma (Stanford, California: Standard University Press, 2016). Page 26.
[2] Richard Bush, Difficult Choices: Taiwan’s Quest for Security and the Good Life (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2021). Page 318-344.
