Meeting with Vladimir Putin in Moscow in March 2023, Xi Jinping (習近平) told him that “Right now there are changes—the likes of which we haven’t seen for 100 years—and we are the ones driving these changes together.” President-elect Donald Trump will be in office as some of those changes come to fruition. In 2021, Admiral Phil Davidson told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the Chinese threat to Taiwan “is manifest during this decade, in fact in the next six years.” Two years later, Central Intelligence Agency Director Bill Burns publicly confirmed the so-called “Davidson window” by stating: “President Xi has instructed the PLA [People’s Liberation Army], the Chinese military leadership to be ready by 2027 to invade Taiwan.” Should the PLA meet that deadline, which will come halfway through President-elect Donald Trump’s next term in office, cross-Strait dynamics could rapidly devolve.
Although the 2027 deadline is not indicative of a scheduled invasion of Taiwan, Taiwan will face a new reality in a world in which the PLA assesses invasion to be a feasible option. In only two years’ time, Xi Jinping may have new options available to him for dealing with Taipei, and doors that have long been closed may be open. This does not mean that use of force is inevitable in the coming years. However, it does mean that Beijing will have more viable options on the escalation ladder, that it will be less likely to back down in an escalating crisis, and that Xi will be more tempted to settle the cross-Strait dispute once and for all.
Taiwan should spend the next two years preparing for this shift. A second Trump presidency should provide opportunities for President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) to do so.
First, a more normal—though not diplomatically normalized—relationship may be possible during a second Trump presidency. During his prior term, President Trump and his administration did not feel bound by the strictures that had long limited bilateral engagement. The “One-China Policy” was not seen as a restraining factor as it was during the Obama Administration. During the administration’s closing days in early 2021, then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo even rescinded the Taiwan contact guidelines, which set the terms under which government officials and service members could engage with their Taiwanese counterparts.
Antony Blinken reinstated guidelines, but it would not be surprising to see Marco Rubio, should he be confirmed as secretary of state, loosen or once again lift them. Fewer restrictions on bilateral engagement would benefit the relationship, allowing for more regular, direct meetings of diplomats at all levels. Those engagements are beneficial.
During the first administration, senior government officials traveled to Taiwan on a number of occasions. It is reasonable to expect those visits to resume. Such travel sends an important political signal to Beijing: Washington is committed to its relationship with Taiwan, despite PRC objections.
In-person meetings, especially between senior-ranking officials, also have practical import. Such engagements are useful in mobilizing bureaucracies in both countries, to prepare for the meetings and to act on their outcomes.
It is also important that senior leaders get to know each other on a personal level. American men and women may one day be sent into harm’s way to defend Taiwan’s independence. Under such circumstances, sacrifices can be minimized and success made more likely if US and Taiwanese leaders have already established habits of cooperation, understand how each other think, and communicate well. Demonstrating these ties, moreover, contributes to the deterrence of Chinese aggression. If Beijing sees the United States and Taiwan as a cohesive unit, rather than as awkward partners to be picked apart, Xi is more likely to shy from a fight.
While such cohesiveness starts at the top, it is important for both countries to invest in it at the operational level as well. The military-to-military relationship began to blossom during the first Trump presidency. In October 2021, the Wall Street Journal reported that “a US special-operations unit and a contingent of Marines have been secretly operating in Taiwan to train military forces there…for at least a year.” But there is far more that can and should be done. Flag officers and their staffs should be engaged in combined contingency planning and conversations about roles and responsibilities. And US and Taiwanese forces should be training together regularly—at sea, in the air, and on the ground.
In short, the new Trump Administration may present opportunities for Taiwan to pursue much closer political and military ties with the United States. Those ties, in turn, can contribute to transforming the US-Taiwan security partnership into a far more formidable bloc, just as the PLA thinks it is putting the finishing touches on its invasion capability. While the Trump team is still coming together, early signs suggest that it will be amenable to new and deeper forms of cooperation.
The new Asia team will likely not only be open to new engagement, but to new arms sales as well. Taiwan knows well that arms sales may be an important way to President Trump’s heart. The Financial Times reported earlier this month that Taiwan is putting together a big arms sales request, possibly including F-35 fighter jets, E-2D Advanced Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft, and Aegis destroyers. These deals may not all come to fruition, but Taipei is clearly prepared to spend big. It may not get everything it wants, but it will get a lot. Done wisely, such investments will have four effects. They will provide a potent symbol of US political commitment; impose a political cost on China for its escalating pressure on Taiwan; ingratiate Taiwan with Trump (who loves a good deal) and reassure those Americans in the national security community that believe Taiwan is not serious about its own defense; and, most importantly, enhance Taiwan’s self-defense capability at a time of rising PLA self-confidence.
Unfortunately, Trump’s second presidency presents substantial risks for Taiwan as well. He may build an Asia policy team that wants to be more aggressive in supporting Taiwan, but the president-elect has also expressed skepticism about Taiwan’s importance to the United States and about the prospect of defending Taiwan. According to John Bolton, the national security advisor for parts of 2018 and 2019, during his presidency, Trump would often compare Taiwan to the tip of a Sharpie and China to the Resolute Desk. “So much for American commitments and obligations to another democratic ally,” Bolton wrote.
More recently, when Bloomberg asked him directly if he would defend Taiwan, President-elect Trump first complained that Taiwan “did take about 100% of our chip business,” then argued that “Taiwan should pay us for defense,” and concluded by claiming it would be easy for China to take Taiwan with military force. “They’re immensely wealthy. And I don’t think we’re any different from an insurance policy. Why? Why are we doing this?” Nothing here should inspire confidence in Taiwan that it has a powerful backer in Donald Trump.
Indeed, it is not at all clear that President-elect Trump thinks about China and Taiwan in fundamentally different terms. “I give them credit,” he said of Taiwan’s supposed theft of America’s chip industry. “That’s because stupid people were running the country. We should have never let that happen.” He often discusses China in the same way.
For the once and future president, it may be the case that he looks at both China and Taiwan primarily as economic competitors, each out to take advantage of the United States. Certainly, there is little evidence that President-elect Trump looks at Taiwan through a strategic lens, or that he sees its geographic location and democratic system as having much bearing on US interests.
The biggest question pertaining to the next Trump presidency is what, if anything, he wants from China. He spent much of his first term seeking an economic deal that would shrink the bilateral trade imbalance. If he is similarly consumed the second time around, he may be susceptible to PRC requests to curtail American support for Taiwan. If, on the other hand, President-elect Trump has truly embraced the view, which his first administration popularized, that the United States is engaged in a long-term strategic competition with China—and if he is serious about winning it—he will work to make sure that Taiwan is secure through 2027 and beyond. Only time will tell.
The main point: Trump’s prior comments on Taiwan do not indicate that he is a staunch Taiwan ally—instead, his approach towards Taiwan will likely be influenced by his views on US-China and US-Taiwan economic competition, and Taipei will need to prepare to spend big on defense.
