Much of the international community regarded the November 5 elections in the United States with some trepidation. Given the impact that any US presidential election can have on American foreign policy for the next four years, it is normal for countries to feel a little jittery about the outcome. That sense of apprehension is particularly felt in countries—like Taiwan, South Korea and Israel—that regard themselves as facing an existential threat from an outside opponent and consequently rely heavily on American support for their security. For them, every US election raises fears of abandonment should an incoming administration turn isolationist, show itself less inclined to interventionism, or otherwise indicate a different set of priorities. Over the years, Taipei has gone through this process with the prospect of both Democratic and Republican administrations coming to power.
The 2024 elections were no different. While a victory by the Democrats suggested continuity in a US policy toward Taiwan and China that has been largely beneficial to Taiwan, others maintained that a return of the Republicans to the White House would prove even more advantageous to Taipei. Still, questions remained. Would Kamala Harris, the Democratic candidate and current vice president, completely embrace President Joseph Biden’s policies toward Taiwan and China, or would she adopt a more cautious, and perhaps less confrontational stance, on China? Conversely, while Republican candidate Donald J. Trump was regarded by many as tough on China and likely to surround himself with China “hawks,” doubts remained with regards to his transactional style and whether he would consider trading Taiwan for the sake of a good deal with China on the longstanding trade dispute between China and the United States. Such fears, moreover, were exacerbated by some comments Donald Trump made while on the campaign trail, such as the (false) claim that Taiwan somehow “stole” the US chip industry, or that Taiwan should pay for US defense assistance.
The results of the vote on November 5 were known surprisingly quickly, with President-elect Trump scoring a resounding victory against his opponent. The big question of who Taipei would have to work with for the next four years was thereby resolved. And yet, many more questions had yet to find an answer, including the two main ones: which version of Trump would occupy the White House, and who would be the key officials in his national security apparatus? Those two questions are bound to have a major impact on how the Lai Ching-te (賴清德) Administration handles its relationship with the United States.
Navigating a Different Washington, DC
Although President-elect Donald Trump has yet to complete the list of key appointees to his cabinet, it is now becoming increasingly clear that the future president clearly intends to act on his promise to overturn the business of governing the United States. Many of the appointments announced thus far suggest that it will be anything but business as usual in Washington, DC. With disrupting forces in charge, countries will initially find navigating their interactions with the Trump Administration rather challenging—perhaps even more so than during the first months of the first Trump Administration, which, unlike this time around, tended to be marred by disorganization. It won’t be so disorganized this time around, but it certainly will be atypical and unlike anything that has been seen in the US capital before.
This will be a particular challenge for Taiwan, which under former President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) successfully improved its international image on a liberal-democratic platform that largely coincided with the Biden Administration’s worldview and policies. Already, some staunch Trump supporters, including the Chinese dissident Yu Jie (余杰), have lashed at Tsai and her Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民進黨) with accusations that their “leftist” liberal outlook had threatened, among other things, traditional families and Taiwan’s very security. It is undeniable that Trump’s re-election on November 5 tapped into a conservative pushback against the liberalism of the Biden and Obama Administrations. Consequently, and as seems to be suggested by Trump’s picks for key government positions, some of the policy areas that in recent years provided convenient platforms for a deepening of relations between Taipei and Washington, DC—such as LGBTQI rights and green energy, to name just two—will likely fritter away. It will therefore be tempting for the government of Taiwan (and others worldwide) to de-emphasize such policies in its interactions with the Trump Administration. Taipei will need to find the right balance between the desire not to offend the conservative Trump Administration and not abandoning the values and policies that underpin Taiwan’s great success as a modern, democratic nation-state.
The Tsai Administration successfully managed the transition from Obama to Trump, and then from Trump to Biden, ensuring that Taiwan’s relations with the United States not only remained solid but in fact flourished. Much of this success can be attributed to the career diplomats, political advisers and government heads at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA, 外交部), the National Security Council (NSC, 國際安全會議) and other key offices. Over eight years under President Tsai, those officials established solid connections with their American counterparts, fostering trust and predictability through healthy communication channels. There were differences of opinion, and sometimes the two sides vehemently disagreed, but they were able to do so in ways that did not derail bilateral ties—and which made it possible for the two governments to turn highly sensitive policies, such as the August 2022 visit to Taiwan by then US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, successful. Whether the Lai Administration can successfully handle the highly challenging environment that will be Washington, DC under the second Trump Administration will largely depend on his willingness to retain some of the key officials at MOFA and the NSC who were responsible for that success under President Tsai—this, despite potential pressure to replace them.
The Defense Thing
One of the top challenges in the US-Taiwan relationship is related to national defense. There, too, Taiwan will face levels of pressure that likely would not have materialized had Harris been elected president. The principal reason for this is Trump’s more zero-sum approach to US military support for US allies and partners. It is clear that Trump expects potential recipients of US security largesse to demonstrate that they are prepared to do more for their own security. Advisers close to him, who will presumably occupy important positions at the Department of Defense or the NSC, have repeatedly signaled that Taiwan needs to prove that it is willing to invest more in its national defense, a request whose yardstick has often been the share of Taiwan’s GDP spent on national defense. (Trump has said Taiwan should spend 10 percent of its GDP on defense.) Others, meanwhile, have called on Taiwan to invest even more than it already is in asymmetrical capabilities, and to properly reform and train its reserve forces.
Although the case could be made that US security assistance should not be treated as a transactional matter (e.g., Taiwan paying the United States) and that it is in fact a reflection of the US national interest, there will nevertheless be immense pressure on Taipei to demonstrate that it is indeed undertaking the necessary reforms and making the needed investments to bolster is defense against China—all this in the context of an opposition-controlled Legislative Yuan that will likely seek to prevent such investments. Besides dollars invested and improved training, Taipei will also need to develop a clear public relations strategy to convince Trump Administration officials, and the American public, that it is doing what is necessary.
Hedging against Uncertainty
And yet, because of the unpredictable nature of the Trump Administration, it would be advisable for Taipei to strengthen its ability to go it alone and thereby lessen its reliance on the United States for its security. In addition to greater focus on its indigenous defense industry, Taipei should redouble its efforts to convince other countries in the region, chief among them Japan and the Philippines, to join forces in building a deterrent against Chinese military and paramilitary aggression. (Like Taiwan, those countries must also factor in the potential lack of enthusiasm by the Trump Administration to come to their defense unless they spend more, and do enough to convince Trump officials that they are “worthy” of US assistance.)
The need to deepen defense preparedness and to form regional coalitions that can act without direct US involvement is all the more needed given the current geopolitical context. While Trump has vowed to quickly end the war in Ukraine (as early as by Inauguration Day, as he has claimed), which could conceivably free up US military capabilities for deployment in the Indo Pacific, other, more intractable conflicts—such as that in the Middle East—will likely continue to require deployments at the expense of other theaters. The Trump Administration, like others before it, will continue to stand by its ally Israel in its conflict with neighboring states and local groups. Israel’s response to the deadly October 7, 2023, terrorist attack by the Palestinian group Hamas—targeting Gaza, Lebanon and Iran—has all but ensured that, in its devastating disproportionality, future generations of people in the region will grow up with the kind of resentment towards Israel that can only but result in future terror attacks and armed conflict.
With that conflict nowhere near being resolved, with Russian revanchism unlikely to be appeased by modest gains obtained through “peace” negotiations facilitated by Trump, and with other revisionist regimes like that in Pyongyang becoming increasingly destabilizing, even if future President Trump wants to avoid involvement in other people’s wars, the US military and American diplomats will continue to be called upon to preserve a world order that benefits the United States. In such an uncertain world, and with Trump in the White House, Taipei cannot bank on the United States having the willingness, or sufficient capabilities, to intervene everywhere, anytime. It must therefore do more to prepare to go it alone, and much more to ensure that other powers in its region understand the necessity of ensuring Taiwan’s sovereignty.
The main point: Like other states that are heavily reliant on the United States for their security, Taiwan faces tough challenges navigating the unpredictability of the future Trump Administration in times of geopolitical instability.
