Since the adoption of the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific by the European Union in 2021, several member-states have also published their own strategy documents. However, some could easily argue that Central and Eastern European (CEE) states—such as Poland—are too small, and their global impact is too limited, to design their Indo-Pacific strategies singlehandedly.
Nonetheless, Poland is the fifth most populous member of the EU and its sixth largest economy. Additionally, two other neighboring countries of Poland, Czechia and Lithuania, published their own Indo-Pacific strategy documents in 2022 and 2023. In this light, why has Warsaw not yet produced its own Indo-Pacific strategy? And, if Poland were to formulate its own policy, what could it include—especially with regard to China (People’s Republic of China, PRC) and Taiwan (Republic of China, ROC)?
EU and NATO Indo-Pacific Strategies—and What They Mean for Poland
As a member of the EU since 2004, Poland is naturally expected to follow the guidelines set out by Brussels. The most important document to date, the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific of September 2021, described India and Japan as the EU’s “connectivity partners” and highlighted the role of ASEAN. Only then did Brussels recommend increasing collaboration with other partners such as Australia and the Republic of Korea. Moreover, the EU’s priority is to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific. While the EU clarified its approach to China as non-confrontational, it also declared its readiness to pursue a deep trade and investment relationship with Taiwan.
In October 2021, the European Parliament Recommendation of 21 October 2021 further elaborated on the European Union’s stance on Taiwan. The document encouraged EU members to intensify their political contacts with Taipei—even though they do not have official diplomatic relations. As a follow-up, the EU Parliament concluded in a Resolution of 28 February 2024 that “only Taiwan’s democratically elected government can represent the Taiwanese people on the international stage.” It was an expression of the European Union’s unprecedented support for Taiwan as the European community indirectly rejected China’s narratives about United Nations Resolution 2758 (passed in 1971) and Beijing’s claims that it has the right to speak and act on behalf of the Taiwanese people.
The Indo-Pacific strategy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), of which Poland has been a member since 1999, is of equal importance to Warsaw. The key takeaways of this strategy were included in the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept adopted in June at the NATO Summit in Madrid. The document underscores that China’s ambitions and coercive policies pose a challenge to EU interests, security, and values. It is also straightforward about the threat of China’s “malicious hybrid and cyber operations and its confrontational rhetoric and disinformation,” which aim to “subvert the rules-based international order, including in the space, cyber and maritime domains.” During the first debate dedicated to Taiwan in September 2022, NATO openly recognized the rising threat of China to the democratic island-nation.
Notwithstanding, to what extent can a middle power like Poland actually follow these guidelines? And, could Warsaw develop its own Indo-Pacific strategy like some other EU member-states?
China: The Elephant in the Room
In recent years, China has become a somewhat puzzling case for Polish policymakers. On the one hand, there is a common conviction that Beijing cannot be simply ignored, and that Poland should not antagonize it. The example of neighboring Lithuania, which has experienced severe retaliations from China after opening the Taiwanese Representative Office—instead of a Taipei Representative Office—in Vilnius, surely did not go unnoticed in Warsaw.
On the other hand, trade relations with China are highly unfavorable to Poland. Whereas the level of trade has been growing in absolute numbers, Poland has been suffering from one of the world’s largest trade deficits with China. Moreover, it appears that the Polish connection to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, formerly known as “One Belt, One Road,” 一帶一路), which Poland was one of the first European countries to join, went off half-cocked and did not fulfill Polish people’s expectations. Finally, the ongoing foreign capital exodus from China is another source of discouragement for the Polish business community.
The situation got even more complicated in February 2022. Acting as a neutral country and a prospective peace broker, China has been accused of quietly supporting Russia in its invasion of Ukraine. Moreover, Beijing has been developing an all-weather friendship with Minsk—most recently cemented by Belarusian accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In July 2024, China and Belarus carried out joint military exercises barely a few kilometers from the Polish border—which also serves as the eastern border of both NATO and the European Union.
Furthermore, Belarus has been responsible for manufacturing a border crisis with Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia since 2021, as it coordinated an influx of immigrants from North Africa and the Middle East who then attempted to illegally cross the border with the EU. However, Bloomberg News recently claimed that during his official visit to China in June 2024, Polish President Andrzej Duda threatened to block a key Polish border crossing—and, by default, paralyze the main cargo train connection from China to the European Union. Bloomberg suggested that Duda’s pressure on Beijing did work, as it was later confirmed that the number of attempted border crossings from Belarus to Poland dropped by 70 percent over one month.
The Taiwan Issue: Will Poland Follow Czechia and Lithuania?
Poland’s national security and territorial integrity depends primarily on the strength of NATO—and the American involvement in global affairs in particular. If negotiations on the future of Ukraine were to take place in the near future, Warsaw’s desired endgame would be to keep Russian troops as far away as possible from the Polish borders and to secure Ukrainian sovereignty and democratic governance.
From a global perspective, the preservation of the current liberal world order, including peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, is what allows Poland to thrive. It would be a very challenging situation for Poland if its powerful American ally became involved in yet another crisis in addition to those in Ukraine and the Middle East—or if Washington was to withdraw from supporting Kyiv without giving security guarantees for the entire CEE region.
It is no coincidence that Czechia and Lithuania published their own Indo-Pacific strategy documents after their pro-Taiwanese shift and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The first factor is reflected in the above-mentioned documents—which, when contrasted with other Indo-Pacific agendas published across Europe, seem more eager to openly describe Taiwan as a partner. Lithuania, living in the shadow of Russia, might have additionally wanted to send a crystal clear—though indirect—message to Moscow that it would not succumb to the autocratic practices of its giant neighbor.
Although the “China factor” is always to be considered, Taiwan has a lot to offer to Poland in various dimensions. Despite the absence of official diplomatic relations, Poland and Taiwan have been developing a host of mutual connections between academic and scientific communities, including in the field of semiconductors. In addition, Poland has also benefited from Taiwan’s health diplomacy as it received a donation of 500,000 masks (later raised to one million) in April 2020 when the demand for this item sky-rocketed worldwide. As a gesture of solidarity, Poland later donated 400,000 doses of the AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccine to Taiwan, becoming the third largest vaccine donor to the ROC at that time. Presumably under Chinese pressure, two days after the Polish donation arrived in Taiwan, then-Foreign Minister Zbigniew Rau clarified that Poland recognizes a “One China Policy” and does not maintain diplomatic relations with Taipei.
This episode illustrates Poland’s attempts to carefully navigate the dangerous waters of diplomacy. However, dark clouds seem to be now accumulating over both NATO and the EU, which may have a direct—and decisive—impact on Warsaw.
Poland amidst the Turbulence in NATO and the EU
Former President Donald Trump’s upcoming return to the White House in January 2025 has prompted many observers to question the US commitment to NATO and its support for Ukraine. Trump famously remarked that if NATO allies failed to meet their defense spending obligations, he will “encourage” Russia “to do whatever the hell they want.” However, Poland has already passed this test with flying colors—spending more than 4 percent of its GDP (USD $35 billion) on defense. In 2024, this made Poland the alliance’s highest spender in relative GDP terms, and the fifth highest contributor in absolute terms.
At the same time, the EU has been undergoing an internal crisis. One of the most serious challenges has been the lack of unanimity to support Ukraine. The future of the European community appears to be a little hazy in light of Germany’s lukewarm approach toward military support for Ukraine, and unconcealed admiration for Russia and China among the leaders of Hungary and (more recently) Slovakia.
Against this backdrop, Warsaw has begun to look for alternatives. Most recently, Poland participated as a special guest in a Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8) summit. The photographs of Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson rowing a boat with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk went viral. On the serious side, the Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) and the Nordic states (including Sweden and Finland, which have recently joined NATO) have all been highly concerned about Russia’s growing involvement in the Baltic Sea. The NB8 may be a significant group that could voice a common opinion not only concerning the Russian threat, but also about the Taiwan issue and the China challenge. The latter has been reflected in the mysterious yet most likely deliberate cutting of two undersea cables in the Baltic Sea by a Chinese ship in mid-November. However, the motives behind this incident remain unclear, as China has denied its role in a reported “sabotage.”
Does Poland Really Need Its Own Indo-Pacific Strategy?
In the ensuing years, the dynamics of NATO under the leadership of President Trump and the internal commotion within the EU will surely impact on Poland’s role in Europe and transatlantic relations—and, possibly, policy towards the Indo-Pacific region, as well. In January 2025, Poland will assume the six-month presidency of the Council of the European Union, which might not only give it a stronger voice on the international stage, but also an additional push for expanding its own foreign policy agenda.
In the first place, however, Poland seems to be occupied with its own internal dynamics as it is preparing for the presidential election that is scheduled to take place in May 2025. For the centrist Civic Platform, in power for a year now, it is a “to be or not to be” question: a victory by the conservative Law and Justice Party candidate could continue the practices of current President Duda: vetoing all key legislation, and obstructing the appointments of ambassadors. However, a victory by the Civic Platform candidate in the election could increase the confidence of the Polish leadership to formulate strategies beyond Europe and transatlantic relations.
Indeed, there are a host of issues in the Indo-Pacific region that the Polish government may wish to address, irrespective of the broader NATO and EU frameworks. For example, Warsaw could learn from and share its experiences with like-minded partners, such as Japan, in the field of cybersecurity. After all, Poland itself has become a target of cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns conducted mainly by Russia and Belarus. Second, Poland could make some additional efforts to attract more tourists—and, given the declining birthrate, students from the Indo-Pacific region. Finally, the Polish authorities could outline a long term strategy with regard to its diplomatic posts. In addition to supporting the currently understaffed diplomatic offices abroad, Warsaw could plan opening new ones, as needed—for example, in countries like Sri Lanka, where the number of Polish tourists has been dynamically increasing.
Conclusion
Without a doubt, Poland is too small to become a key player in the Indo-Pacific region, in either the military or economic domains. However, Poland is definitely big enough to play a significant role in developing multi-platform partnerships with like-minded countries. With its increasing position on the international stage, Poland may finally consider clarifying its goals in the Indo-Pacific—not just to implement the Indo-Pacific strategies of the European Union and NATO, but also to promote its own national policy initiatives.
The main point: Poland has been an increasingly important and influential member of the European Union and NATO—both because of its economic growth, and its involvement in supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression. Unlike neighboring Czechia and Lithuania, Poland has not yet published its own Indo-Pacific strategy document. However, Poland might consider clarifying its national priorities in the Indo-Pacific with regard to trade, security, and people-to-people exchanges in the near future. Despite being a middle power, Poland can significantly contribute to the protection of the liberal world order—which includes strengthening cooperation with like-minded democratic countries, as well as keeping peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
