Since the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023 and Israel’s subsequent bombardment of Gaza, Taipei has maintained a position generally supportive of Israel. Following the October 1 launch by Iran of over 100 ballistic missiles against Israel, Taiwan’s foreign ministry condemned the attack as “seriously damaging regional and global peace and stability,” and stated that “Taiwan and all peace-loving democratic partners around the world together condemn [Iran’s] use of force, and call for the relevant parties to exercise restraint and resolve the conflicts through diplomacy and communication to prevent the crisis from expanding.” By contrast, Taiwan’s government has been silent on the issue of Israel’s bombing campaign in Gaza.
In an op-ed published by Taipei Times on November 8, Israel’s representative to Taiwan Maya Yaron wrote of the “close cooperation” between Taiwan and Israel, and a “unique bond” based on “shared values.” Praising Taiwan’s government for its unambiguous stance in condemning Iran’s missile attack, she stressed that Israel’s need to defend itself was well understood by Taipei.
The comments followed the October signing of a bilateral agreement on artistic and cultural exchanges between the two countries, and the visit of a delegation of scholars from Israel’s Hebrew University’s East Asian Studies program in September to Taiwan’s Institute for National Policy Research (INPR) (a private, multidisciplinary think-tank established by the late Chang Yung-fa, founder of the Evergreen Group conglomerate). Speaking at the event, INPR President Tien Hung-mao (田弘茂), a former foreign minister, expressed hopes of “establishing a framework for ongoing exchanges to explore issues of mutual concern,” which could include security cooperation. Also present was Yaron, who criticized “unfair” depictions of Israel’s “counterattacks” by Western media.
Image: Then-ROC President Tsai Ing-wen speaking with Israeli Knesset Member Boaz Toporovsky, the leader of a delegation from the “Knesset Taiwan Friendship Group” visiting Taipei (April 15, 2024). In the meeting, Tsai thanked the delegation “for demonstrating your support for Taiwan,” and for promoting cooperation in areas such as education, public health, and tourism. (Image source: ROC Presidential Office)
Taiwan’s Historical Ties with Israel
The roots of Taiwan’s ties with Israel are long and tangled—and in some instances, problematic. At crucial stages in the development of both states, Israel and the martial law-era Republic of China (ROC) regime were both cultivated by American support during the Cold War as anti-communist states. As described by the South African political scientist Peter Vale, Taiwan, Israel, and South Africa were united by mutual characteristics found in “pariah states”—including rule by immigrants or their descendants, and the surpassing of regional rivals in economic and political development.
Because of their pariah status, this “alliance of the shunned” (or “fourth world”) stuck together on issues such as nuclear weapons development: From the late 1970s, a triangular relationship emerged between Taiwan, Israel, and South Africa, with Pretoria providing uranium, Taiwanese scientists enriching it to weapons-grade levels, and Israeli engineers offering rocket technology. [1]
The martial law-era ROC and Israel were also linked by arms sales, with the United States as an intermediary. “Obviously it was easier for them to operate as outcasts, but for Israel it was really practical,” says Mor Sobol, an Israeli associate professor in the Department of Diplomacy and International Relations at Tamkang University in New Taipei City. “In the 60s and 70s, Israel sold weapons to anyone who moved. It wasn’t really bothered who the client was.”
Sobol also points out that Israel’s strategy of using arms deals to advance political goals contrasts with the approach of most state actors, who generally do the opposite—starting with diplomacy before moving on to “the sensitive issues.” Sobol further emphasizes that Israel and Taiwan share a pragmatism that allows them to work with whoever can help them achieve their goals—and that this, more than shared experiences as threatened states, is what connects the countries. [2]
Taiwan’s More Recent Diplomatic Posture Towards Israel
Sobol has also noted that, in a break from its traditionally cautious approach to international defense cooperation, Taiwan has become increasingly forthright in discussing its strategic partnerships. He gives the example of Taiwan Foreign Minister Joseph Wu’s interview with the Jerusalem Post in 2022, noting that Wu’s tough talk on China was “problematic” for Israeli officials—who, despite Chinese support for Palestine, remain wary of incurring Beijing’s wrath. “Diplomats in Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs now have a much longer leash to say and do things that would have been unthinkable a couple of years ago,” says Sobol. [3]
In regard to the Israel–Palestine issue, geopolitical considerations have historically influenced Taiwan’s reticence to speak out, according to Tuvia Gering, a researcher with the Diane & Guilford Glazer Foundation Israel-China Policy Center at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). Foremost among these are fears that upsetting the Arab world could harm access to energy. Gering believes that the Abraham Accords of 2020, under which the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain recognized Israeli sovereignty, played a role in Taiwan’s new-found boldness.
This more active diplomatic posture has been exemplified by the efforts of Taiwan’s “very competent” representative to Israel, Abby Lee. “She has been extremely active at using this window of opportunity where the fissure between Israel and China is at its widest and mutual trust is at its lowest point in recent memory,” says Gering. He highlights Taiwanese humanitarian assistance and capacity-building projects in kibbutzim in the south of Israel and Druze communities in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights region of Syria. “They’ve been all over the place, backing rhetorical support with action, while the Chinese were nowhere to be seen,” he says. [4]
Dissenting Voices on Taiwan’s Israel-Palestine Policies
Taiwan’s generally pro-Israel policies—and commentary such as the November 8 Taipei Times op-ed in particular—have been received with incredulity by some observers in Taiwan. “Yaron’s piece is a good example of hasbara,” says Aurora Chang, referring to the Hebrew term for Israel’s public diplomacy efforts—which translates literally as “explanation,” but has connotations of propaganda. A human rights activist, Chang is involved in coordinating the Palestine solidarity movement in Taiwan.
Calling the parallels that Yaron drew between Taiwan and Israel “disingenuous,” Chang quotes from the text of the Israeli representative’s article, ridiculing the clam that Israel has pushed for peace and attempted to minimize causalities. “Israel’s ‘efforts to advance the peace process’ in the region have seen them attacking Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iran,” she says. “Their attempts to ‘prioritize the sanctity of life’ have led them to slaughter over 40,000 Palestinians in Gaza, many of whom were civilians.” While Yaron emphasizes the importance of freedom to both Taiwan and Israel, “it is Israel who tramples on the freedom of the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination, reminiscent of what China continually threatens to inflict on Taiwan,” says Chang. [5]
There is little public understanding in Taiwan regarding the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the issues at stake, though some see signs of change in this regard. “Taiwan’s strong identification with Israel as a democracy facing external threats, particularly in contrast to China’s backing of Palestine, complicates the situation,” says Hazem Almassry, a Palestinian research fellow at National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University in Hsinchu. “Nevertheless, I remain hopeful that increased awareness of humanitarian issues in Gaza may shift perspectives over time.” In stark contrast to Yaron’s comments, Almassry has publicly lamented what he describes as Israeli propaganda in Western media coverage of the war in Gaza. After making this point in an interview posted to social media, there were responses calling for NYCU to fire him. [6]
As for Taiwan’s media, Palestine solidarity activists bemoan the lack of local coverage. At a protest that saw around 200 demonstrators march through Taipei’s busy Ximending area in October to mark a year of war in Gaza, activists noted the absence of reporters from local news networks. “We’ve had more than ten events—protests, press conferences—and sent out invites each time, but they never show up,” says Lala Lau, a Hong Kong-born organizer with Taiwan Alliance for a Free Palestine (TWAFP), an umbrella organization for pro-Palestine groups in Taiwan. “It’s like we’re invisible.” [7]
Felix Chechien Brender-Wong, a Taiwanese interpreter and security consultant with Israeli heritage, characterizes Taiwan’s reaction to the October 7 Hamas attacks as intuitive. “The immediate alignment with Israel tells you a lot,” says Brender-Wong, who is currently undertaking PhD research on China’s relations with the Sudans at the London School of Economics. “Taiwan knows what it’s like to have a neighbor which doesn’t accept you exist.” He believes the more radical pro-Palestine activists in Taiwan do not represent the majority. “They tend to take the same narratives you would get in similar circles in, say, the US and translate them into spaces and contexts where it doesn’t make sense for Taiwanese.” [8]
Yet, for others, Taiwanese community with Palestinians makes perfect sense. “In at least one vital way, Taiwanese have more in common with Palestinians than with Israeli Jews,” said Kerim Friedman, an American-born anthropology professor at National Dong Hwa University in Hualian, during a speech at October’s demonstration. Arguing that the “colonial project” to kick Palestinians off their land could not have proceeded without the erasure of Palestinians as a people, Friedman said this was accompanied by “the deliberate undermining of Palestinian aspirations for statehood”—an act of politicide. “I think this is something that Taiwanese can easily relate to,” said Friedman. “Taiwan has long been a victim of Chinese efforts at politicide.” [9]
Acknowledging “a shared struggle for self-determination” could be key to fostering empathy for Palestine among Taiwanese, says Almassry. He finds it hard to witness “limited support” for his homeland in the country he now lives in and admires. “Highlighting these similarities could encourage Taiwanese to see the Palestinian cause not just through geopolitical lenses, but as a shared fight for freedom and dignity,” he says.
Taiwan’s Connection to the Explosive Pagers Incident
One incident that local media could not ignore was the use of thousands of pagers bearing the logo of a Taiwanese manufacturer in attacks against Hezbollah, the Lebanese Islamist political party and militant group. Although no one has claimed responsibility for the targeted killings, which claimed a reported 42 lives in Lebanon and Syria, Israel is widely assumed to have masterminded them.
Gold Apollo, the Taiwanese pager company, denied producing the devices, explaining that their branding had been licensed by a Hungarian firm. Taipei confirmed that none of the components had been produced in Taiwan. Asked whether he had consulted Yaron about the incident, Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung simply answered, “No.”
These assurances should not be doubted—it is inconceivable that Taiwan was involved in the attacks. Yet, at October’s demonstration, protestors appeared to suggest otherwise. Reporting on the event, the activism- and youth politics-focused New Bloom Magazine misleadingly described “Taiwanese pager company Gold Apollo” as “being used for the pager attacks.”
Such ambiguity has spawned wild claims about secret agreements. “You’ve already got conspiracy theories about the parliamentary delegation [that visited in April] setting the scene, which—to be honest—is complete bullshit,” says Sobol. “You’re talking about parliamentarians with zero power, who are completely disconnected from the security establishment.” [10]
These ideas are perhaps understandable, given the TWAFP’s demands for Taiwan’s government to enforce supply-chain transparency from Taiwanese manufacturers whose components are suspected to have been used in Israeli military equipment. At the TWAFP protest, a spokesperson for Amnesty International Taiwan urged the government to require Taiwanese high-tech companies to guarantee their products would not be used for military purposes in Israel. This, the speaker stressed, would respect a draft resolution by the United Nations Human Rights Council in April 2024, calling on all states “to cease the sale, transfer and diversion of arms, munitions and other military equipment to Israel.”
The main point: Since the beginning of the Israel-Gaza war in October 2023, Taiwan has maintained a generally pro-Israel set of policies, with the government and much of population seeing common cause with Israel as a state threatened by its neighbors. However, significant voices in Taiwan’s civil society have remained critical of Israel’s military response in Gaza.
[1] Israel’s nuclear cooperation with Taiwan began in the early 1960s, when Professor Ernst David Bergmann—the first chairman of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission—visited Taipei, where he developed a close relationship with Chiang Kai-shek. While it is unclear whether Israel’s authorities approved of Bergmann’s activities, he came to be regarded as “a prominent player in Taiwan’s defense modernization and one of the forefathers of its nuclear program.” It was not until the late 1980s, when Taiwan was reportedly on the verge of completing a deliverable weapon, that Washington pressured Taipei into stopping the project.
[2] Author’s interview, conducted online on September 19, 2024.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Author’s interview, conducted online on September 23, 2024.
[5] Author’s interview, conducted online on November 8, 2024.
[6] Author’s interview, conducted online on September 22, 2024.
[7] Author’s interview, conducted in person on October 13, 2024.
[8] Author’s interview, conducted online on September 22, 2024.
[9] Part of a speech delivered on October 13, 2024.
[10] Author’s interview, conducted online on September 19, 2024.
