In the absence of official diplomatic ties with the United States, people-to-people diplomacy has been a major contributor to strengthening US-Taiwan relations. Kadir Jun Ayhan, an international relations scholar, defines people-to-people diplomacy as “intentional, political, and transboundary communication-based interactions between groups of people for public, rather than private interests that have or aim to have foreign policy implications.” Programs planned by the Taiwanese government, such as initiatives by the Overseas Community Affairs Council (OCAC, 中華民國僑務委員會), and those planned by non-state actors, such as scholarship exchanges, intend to enhance outside understanding of Taiwan through people-to-people diplomacy. Because US-Taiwan relations have heavily relied on unofficial interactions, the individuals who forge these interpersonal relationships deserve a closer examination.
“Mainstream America” has been the primary target of Taiwanese government and civic groups’ attempts to garner support. For example, when the Director-General of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Los Angeles published an opinion piece in the Beverly Press calling for US support for Taiwan’s membership to the United Nations, the World Journal (世界日報)—a widely circulated newspaper in Chinese characters—highlighted the Beverly Press as being “influential for having readers primarily from mainstream [emphasis added] American society”. The Beverly Press’s readership is mostly from the Beverly Hills and West Hollywood areas, in which approximately 70 percent of the residents are non-Hispanic White Americans. Similarly, the Director of the Cultural Center at Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) in Washington, DC advocated for the importance of cultivating Mandarin-speaking Taiwanese Americans who could become “the bridges between Taiwan and the mainstream [emphasis added] American society.” The Building Bridges program, a project under OCAC that aims to cultivate student cultural ambassadors, also highlights the young ambassadors’ achievements for being recognized by “overseas Taiwanese communities and mainstream [emphasis added] society” The Mandarin-language phrase “gaining support from mainstream America” (“爭取美國主流社會的支持”) is frequently used by many community leaders in Taiwanese American circles. Such an audience is undoubtedly important. However, much broader, sustained support for Taiwan is needed.
Risk 1: Framing Taiwan Strait Tension as A Domain for White America
The phrase “mainstream America” is frequently uttered yet rarely defined; it carries both a clear and vague image. To many Americans, mainstream America often refers to Americans who are White, Judeo-Christian, and middle- or upper-class. Researchers have found that many marginalized Americans view themselves as excluded from this designation. These Americans perceive “mainstream America” as White American, located in the north of the United States, with the power and resources to decide the fate for the rest of society. This perception is also absorbed by many Taiwanese who, as a consequence of US media influence, see America as White. The terms “mainstream America” and “White America” often become synonymous in the eyes of these observers.
A 2024 study based on a diverse sample by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs showed that only 36 percent of Americans believed that the United States should defend Taiwan if China invades. Taking this finding alongside the Carnegie Endowment’s 2023 American Statecraft Program Report regarding Black Americans’ attitudes toward US military support for Taiwan, it is clear that there is a pressing need to extend Taiwan’s outreach beyond “mainstream America.” In the Carnegie Endowment report, only two out of ten Black Americans support the United States playing an active role in response to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. A YouGov poll in August 2022 found that other racial minorities, such as Hispanics, also showed a low level of support or familiarity regarding whether the United States should help protect Taiwan militarily from China. In 2022, Hispanic/Latino Americans accounted for almost one-fifth of the US population. Black Americans made up 14.4 percent of the nation’s population, a 32 percent increase since 2000. As US population demographics are projected to become “majority minority” by 2044, rhetoric and practices that emphasize gaining support from primarily-White, “mainstream America” could unintentionally exclude a large and growing number of minority Americans.
Risk 2: Turning Taiwan’s Security into An Elite-Only Issue
A 2023 Pew report showed that Americans are increasingly concerned about China-Taiwan tensions. According to the report, concern is “up 4 percentage points since October 2022 and 19 points since February 2021.” The report simultaneously pointed out that Americans with more formal education are more likely to be worried about a Taiwan Strait conflict than less-educated Americans. In the Carnegie Endowment’s 2023 report, this trend is replicated among African Americans and immigrant Black communities—support for active US intervention overseas increases with levels of income and education. It is encouraging that Taiwan has directed more American attention toward China’s increasing aggression toward the island nation. However, if knowledge of Taiwan’s security and the willingness to offer it support is primarily found among more educated, higher-income Americans, there is a risk that Taiwan’s situation will become a concern only for Americans with more resources.
This risk could be further amplified by the fact that Taiwanese Americans, due to their educational achievements, tend to associate with middle- and upper-middle class Americans. According to USAFacts, 80 percent of Taiwanese Americans hold a bachelor’s degree. Meanwhile, 37.7 percent of the overall American population held a bachelor’s degrees in 2022. Furthermore, the median Taiwanese American household income is 67 percent higher than that of the median US household. These socioeconomic classifications undoubtedly impact Taiwanese Americans’ interpersonal relations and social circles. Researchers such as Hsiang-Shui Chen and Catherine Kai-Ping Lin have documented how community leaders and intellectuals with Taiwanese immigrant backgrounds successfully lobbied US politicians for their causes. [1] Instead of only strengthening Taiwanese Americans’ ties to more resourceful and powerful Americans, those who promote Taiwan need to expand their strategy to include a broader democratic constituency. In current US society where polarization is exacerbated by social class, the Taiwanese government and community leaders need to promote support for Taiwan beyond the selective social and professional networks surrounding most Taiwanese Americans.
Given President Donald Trump’s transactional policies toward Taiwan, including threats of increased tariffs and forceful demands towards Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC, 台灣積體電路製造股份有限公司)—a situation that Blanchette and DiPippo coined as “strategic anxiety”—it is urgent for all Taiwanese to expand their reach and establish deep, sustained interpersonal relationships beyond the American elite. Such people-to-people interactions would carry broad implications for the political atmosphere in the United States.
Policy Recommendations
As a two-pronged remedy in addressing the risks outlined above, the Taiwanese government should generate policy documents and practices to broaden outreach to more Americans. As a cabinet-level council of the Executive Yuan, the OCAC has service locations across Africa, Asia, Australasia, Europe and the Americas—including 14 cultural centers across the United States connecting overseas Taiwanese and their offspring to Taiwan. Working with local Taiwanese communities, the OCAC supports functions such as annual Lunar New Year celebrations and festive events during Taiwan American Heritage Week in May. In addition, it offers Mandarin and Taiwanese language classes aimed at second- and third-generation Taiwanese immigrants. The council also shares logistical information regarding overseas compatriot status and provides business consultations. Given that the OCAC is the primary agency for Taiwan’s people-to-people policy, and has a small budget (only 0.06 percent of the 2025 central government budget), it is prudent to combine on-the-ground activities with data-informed policy to bridge any gaps regarding outreach to communities in the United States that have little exposure to Taiwanese history and contributions.
First, the OCAC should create a mechanism to solicit, evaluate and implement suggestions for policy framing. A council of multidisciplinary researchers conducting scholarship that is mindful of US demographic and sociocultural trends—and rooted in local communities—can help identify long-term strategic plans for Taiwan’s people-to-people diplomacy in the United States. To avoid disruptive partisan politics, the term of this council should cross over Taiwan’s presidential election period to ensure the continuity of its work.
Second, the OCAC should better mobilize existing resources among local communities. As mentioned, Taiwanese American local communities host annual events with government support (i.e. OCAC, TECRO) to introduce Taiwan to the general public. Incentives encouraging strategic collaboration with non-Taiwanese civic organizations, including religious groups, would deepen Taiwan’s reach to broader demographics. For example, educational programming on the role that religious groups—such as the United States’ Black Church and the Taiwanese Presbyterian Church—have played in democratization and liberation could foster dialogue between Taiwanese Americans and other minority communities in the United States. Such programs also bridge multigenerational collective memory and experiences among Taiwanese Americans who have witnessed societal injustices in both Taiwan and the United States.
Third, unlike many European nations, the United States does not have policies to incorporate newcomers into its highly diverse social fabric. Taiwan is well-positioned to fill this void. OCAC education programs have successfully cultivated US-born Taiwanese American generations as cultural ambassadors for Taiwan. For example, up to 2010, more than 4,500 overseas compatriot students had completed leadership and community service training, readying them to advocate for Taiwan in various US and Canadian cities. This policy can be expanded to include initiatives that prepare recent Taiwanese emigrants of diverse backgrounds (i.e. varying occupations and identities) to learn about and adjust to US society. The early stage of settlement is the most challenging for newcomers. This effort will support Taiwanese immigrants and equip them with the knowledge and skills to engage in and influence their new social and work circles.
Lastly, Taiwanese government and community leaders should increase efforts to incorporate Taiwanese Americans in US historiography. The 2022 initiative to create a National Museum of Asian Pacific American History and Culture and the Smithsonian Asian Pacific American Center’s Keystone Initiative are two examples of opportunities to include people of Taiwanese descent in US historiography, so as to reach a wider range of Americans. State and local Asian American museums should also be part of this undertaking.
Conclusion
Policies that aim to strengthen US-Taiwan relations must consider the historical and present racial and class dynamics within the United States. Although robust, many Taiwanese American communities face generational gaps in bridging Taiwanese and US experiences. Cultural sensitivity toward various segments of the United States, and knowledge regarding the similarities and differences in the struggle for justice and collective autonomy throughout US and Taiwanese histories, will enhance Taiwanese Americans’ ability to build multiethnic, multiracial, and multiclass support for Taiwan’s interests.
The main point: Taiwanese American immigrants and their offspring are influential agents in strengthening US-Taiwan relations. As US society becomes more diverse and fragmented, Taiwanese government and community leaders should develop policies and practices to empower Taiwanese Americans with the cultural sensitivity and knowledge of US racial and class dynamics to reach all segments of US society.
[1] Chen, Hsiang-shui. Chinatown No More: Taiwan Immigrants in Contemporary New York. Cornell University Press, 1992; Lin, Catherine Kai-Ping. 2006. ‘Taiwan’s Overseas Opposition Movement and Grassroots Diplomacy in the United States: The Case of the Formosan Association for Public Affairs’. Journal of Contemporary China 15 (46): 133–59. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670560500331799.
