Global Taiwan Brief – Volume 1, Issue 10
Taiwan Navy Announces Budget and Timeline for Design Phase of Indigenous Submarine Program
By: Russell Hsiao
Taiwan’s Energy Mix: A Future with Renewable Energy
By: Ting-yuan Chen
Green Energy in Taiwan’s Economic Security
By: Luke Cheng
The Implications of the Three Warfares for Taiwan: Strategic Thinking and Campaigns (Part 2)
By: Elsa B. Kania
Taiwan Navy Announces Budget and Timeline for Design Phase of Indigenous Submarine Program
Russell Hsiao is the Executive Director of the Global Taiwan Institute and Chief Editor of the Global Taiwan Brief.
On November 17, chief of staff of the Taiwan (ROC) Navy, Vice Admiral Mei Jia-shu (梅家樹), announced at a Legislative Yuan (LY) hearing—Taiwan’s parliament—that open tender for the Navy’s long-awaited indigenous submarine (IDS) program is beginning this week (November 22) with plans to award the IDS contract before the end of 2016.
According to Vice Admiral Mei, the primary contractor will be a domestic manufacturer and be required to submit a plan for the selection and provision of primary and essential equipment requirements nine months after being awarded the IDS contract. After which, the Navy will conduct a review, specifically to assess export licensing requirements. The Navy plans to complete the assessment and equipment selection within 15 months after the contract has been effective, with the possibility that the contract design phase would be complete in 2017.
Towards this end, the Taiwan Navy announced that it has allocated US $92.6 million (NT$2.97 billion) in 2016 towards the design phase of the IDS contract and US $24.6 million (NT $790 million) in 2017, for an estimated total of US $117.2 million. The announced budget tracks with reports earlier this year that CSBC Corporation (台灣國際造船), which established a Submarine Development Center (SDC) in August, will produce a design for the IDS under a budget of $95 million by the end of 2016. Although there are multiple contractors reportedly vying for the IDS contract, some indicators point to CSBC Corp. as the presumptive primary contractor for Taiwan’s IDS.
Two submarine models were on display at the First Annual Kaohsiung International Maritime & Defense exhibit held in the southern port city in September, leading to speculation that the model for the IDS may be similar to the Zwaardvis-class submarines developed by the Netherlands and currently deployed by the ROC Navy. With a displacement of 2,600 tons, the possible decision to go with this known design may be influenced by the desire to minimize production risks. Also on display was a model for a 350-ton submarine that is capable of being equipped with two torpedoes, and which has a depth rating of over 100 meters (328 feet). This model is similar in tonnage to Iran’s Nahang-class submarines used most effectively to lay mines.
Taiwan has tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to acquire new submarines to replace its aging fleet for decades. Following the unprecedented arms package worth US $18 billion offered by President George W. Bush in 2001, which included a US commitment to assist Taiwan in its acquisition of diesel-electric submarines, Taipei’s efforts to procure submarines have languished due to political gridlock and bureaucratic roadblocks. The Taiwan Relations Act (1979), Third Joint Communique (1982), and the Six Assurances (1982) serve as the framework for US arms sales to Taiwan. Against the backdrop of the People’s Liberation Army’s military modernization, which has increased its lethality and scale over the past 15 years, continued arms sales to Taiwan is arguably justified and in fact necessary to maintain the military balance in the Taiwan Strait in both quantitative and qualitative terms.
The IDS design phase is a critical period in which requirements for Taiwan’s future indigenous submarines will be set. The TRA requires the United States to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability” and such decisions should be based on military rather than political considerations.
Given the extensive R&D costs associated with developing and providing for all requirements indigenously, in order for IDS to be viable Taipei would necessarily need to acquire intellectual property, selected technologies, and engineering consulting from abroad. Speaking at the annual US-Taiwan Business Council conference in October, David Helvey, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, observed: “the US government does not own much of the technology Taiwan seeks for its domestic industry, necessitating close cooperation between Taiwan and US defense contractors to establish new relationships and new lines of collaboration.” Indeed, as it has reportedly done with Taiwan’s submarine life extension program for submarine combat systems and other submarine-related work, Washington could and should offer the necessary export licenses and technical assistance to support Taipei’s IDS program.
The main point: The Taiwan Navy plans to complete the assessment and equipment selection for the IDS program within 15 months from when the contract is awarded, with the possibility that the contract design phase would be complete in 2017. Washington could and should offer the necessary export licenses and technical assistance to support Taipei’s IDS program.
Taiwan’s Energy Mix: A Future with Renewable Energy
Ting-Yuan “Chris” Chen received two LL.M. degrees from American University Washington College of Law. He previously worked on Taiwan’s Environment, health and safety (EHS) regulations for Enhesa, Inc.
The 22nd Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, COP22) held in Marrakesh, Morocco just concluded. COP22’s purpose is to discuss “action items in order to achieve the priorities of the Paris Agreement.” The landmark climate agreement, adopted on December 2015, and entering into force on November 4, 2016 sent a clear message that all the nations of the world are working together in order to overcome the threat of climate change in this century.
Despite the fact that Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations or legally bound by any international agreement related to Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions, Taiwan acts as a responsible stakeholder by continually reforming domestic policy to implement international standards. Its international isolation is because of political pressure from China, but this does not affect Taiwan’s pursuit of becoming a sustainable, low-carbon society.
In 2015, Taiwan passed the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Act (溫室氣體減量及管理法) in order to address climate change. This Act also set a long-term goal to reduce GHG emissions in the nation to 50 percent of 2005 levels by 2050. In 2016, President Tsai Ing-wen vowed to play a more active role in promoting renewable energy, reducing GHG emissions, and moving toward a “nuclear free home (非核家園)” by 2025.
Moreover, the Tsai administration has set a clear goal of increasing renewable energy dependence from 4.5 percent to 20 percent by 2025. This 20 percent of power will reportedly be supplied by a planned 20GW of solar power and 3GW of offshore wind power. In addition, the Tsai administration also plans to amend the Electricity Act (電業法) in two stages: diversification then liberalization. The first stage of the amendment’s implementation will focus on diversifying the energy mix to include more renewable energy and establishing the required regulatory mechanisms over the electricity market. Once the first stage is completed, the second stage will be launched, in order to liberalize the power market for traditional energy suppliers.
In early July 2016, the Tsai administration issued the first draft of the amendment to the Electricity Act (電業法修正草案). Under the first stage amendment, the government will liberalize the power market to prioritize renewable energy suppliers within the electricity market. Renewable energy suppliers will be able to generate and sell renewable energy directly to public users. Currently, renewable energy suppliers will only be able to sell their energy to Taiwan Power Co. (台灣電力公司, Taipower), which is a state-owned company. Moreover, the Tsai government indicated that it will restructure Taipower after six to nine years during the first-phase of the amendment’s implementation. Taipower has long been criticized for monopolizing the electricity market, since it was established by the government. Under the first stage of the restructuring, Taipower will reportedly be converted into a holding company that has one subsidiary in charge of power generation, and another in charge of electricity transmission, distribution and sale. The government believes that this first stage will induce growth in the renewable energy industry, along with “stabilizing power supply, developing green energy capabilities, establishing power transmission,” and more. Once this happens, the second stage of the restructuring will focus on liberalizing the power market for traditional energy suppliers. The traditional energy suppliers will be required to satisfy the obligations of renewable portfolio standard (能源配比) and reserve margin (備用容量). The second stage of the amendment will only be launch when renewable energy is reaching a certain level of electricity consumption.
Besides the amendment to the Electricity Act, the Tsai administration also issued the amended Guideline on Energy Development (能源發展綱領修正草案). Under the amended guideline, the Tsai administration set several goals: achieve energy safety, a green economy, sustainable development, and social justice. In order to achieve the above-mentioned goals, the Tsai administration launched the Green Energy Innovation Industrial Park Project (沙崙綠能科學城) in the Shalun area of Tainan City. This project will create a renewable energy research and development center and testing site (綠能科技示範場域) to integrate all renewable energy resources from both the public and private sectors, such as the development of solar, offshore wind, biomass power technology, energy storage technology, and energy conservation technology, among others. In addition, the project will provide research and development subsidies to renewable energy industry in order to target emerging and high-growth sectors of the global green economy. By doing so, Taiwan will have the capacity to export its renewable energy technology into international markets.
The impact of climate change will not be isolated to regions or countries. Climate change is a challenge facing all of humanity. However, it is not too late to act to mediate the effects of climate change. Due to its geography and geology as a subtropical island, Taiwan is even more vulnerable to the impact of climate change and therefore the Tsai administration has prioritized green energy policies. Although Taiwan is not a member of the Paris Agreement, other signatories can learn from Taiwan’s example of laying out a regulatory gal framework for combatting climate change.
The main point: Despite not being a member to the Paris Agreement, Taiwan has already taken several steps to amend its domestic regulations to comply with international standards.
Green Energy in Taiwan’s Economic Security
Luke Cheng formerly worked as the Director of the Energy & Carbon Reduction Office in Taiwan’s Executive Yuan.
Providing sufficient and low-priced energy to support industries is a top priority for governments throughout the world. Taiwan is no exception. The price of electricity on the island has been ranked the second cheapest in Asia, despite the fact that over 97 percent of its energy supply depends on imports. Low energy prices may be the cause for the large amount of energy consumption on the island. The average volume of carbon emissions per person amounts to 11 tons in Taiwan, almost equal to three times the world’s average. While the Tsai administration appears committed to building a ‘nuclear free homeland’ (非核家園), it must also devise carbon emission reduction policies that strike a careful balance between energy security, economic development, and environmental sustainability.
Nuclear power is not panacea to Taiwan’s electricity problems
There are currently three operational nuclear power plants in Taiwan, with a total capacity of 5.144GW. Taiwan—like Japan—is located on the Pacific Rim seismic zone and frequently experiences earthquakes and faces the risk of nuclear accidents similar to Japan’s devastating 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. From a risk perspective, Taiwan cannot afford to depend on nuclear power given how frequently earthquakes strike the island each year. According to one government estimate: “The annual average number of earthquakes recorded from 1991 to 2004 increased to 18,649 (monthly average was approximately 1,554), of which approximately 1,047 were felt.”
Taiwan is a densely populated island and nuclear waste disposal is a controversial issue. The costs of cleaning a nuclear waste spill are beyond estimation. Nuclear power accounted for 14.13 percent of total power supply in 2015; thus, removing nuclear power from the energy mix will not necessarily lead to a critical deficit in the country’s electricity supply.
With the procurement of more efficient thermal generators as well as gas-fired generating units, there are reasons to believe that Taiwan can expect a stable supply of electricity as it phases out nuclear power by 2025. Summer, with its high temperatures, is a time when electricity supply capacity is stressed and can cause power shortages. To prevent potential power shortages, authorities have to focus on two components: one is to enhance power supply capacity during peak time; the other is to improve peak-load management.
To replace nuclear power with other clean energy in the coming decade, Taiwan’s government will reportedly tap into green energy. In so doing, Taiwan can raise its degree of energy self-reliance, diversify the portfolio of the national energy supply, lower its dependence on thermal power, and actively respond to the call to reduce carbon emissions.
Taiwan should accelerate the development of green energy
Taiwan currently possesses advantages in the development of solar power and wind power. First, in regard to solar power, Taiwan enjoys long hours of sunlight and small solar declination. Moreover, Taiwan is the second largest solar cell manufacturing country worldwide and has a complete solar industry supply chain. These advantages provide a solid foundation for solar power development in Taiwan.
Secondly, Taiwan ranks high on the Global Offshore Wind Speed Rankings reported by 4C Offshore, an environmental consulting firm. Among the 20 best places for wind farms, 16 of them are located along the Taiwan Strait on the West Coast of Taiwan. Industrial Technology Research Institute’s report revealed that the development potential for the 36 preferred offshore blocks (from Northern to Southern Taiwan) was 1.2 GW at water depths of 5–20 m, 5 GW at 20–50 m, and 9 GW at 50–100 m. Considering cost-efficiency, technical maturity and the promise of future development, Taiwan should concentrate on developing solar and wind power.
As the supply of green energy rises and energy-storing technology improves, Taiwan should utilize green energy in the transport sector, such as electrical or fuel cell vehicles. This will lower both carbon emission and reliance on imported oil. In the long run, green energy is the better way to satisfy our energy demands.
Constructing new energy policies
Developing green energy is not only be the solution to increasing Taiwan’s energy self-sufficiency, but also to increasing its security. Further, it is in line with the government’s effort to develop future industries.
With renewable clean energy attracting international attention, Taiwan will join other nations in creating balanced green energy policies based on Taiwan’s unique climatic conditions and natural resources. These policies could, in turn, encourage private investment in the research and development of renewable energy, promising greener future generations.
New energy policies that guarantee energy security, environmental sustainability, and economic stability are essential for Taiwan’s future.
The main point: Taiwan is committed to fostering green energy as part of its efforts to transform the island into a nuclear-free homeland. Developing green energy can also fuel investment and employment that will help contribute to economic security.
The Implications of the Three Warfares for Taiwan: Strategic Thinking and Campaigns (Part 2)
Elsa Kania is a recent graduate of Harvard College and currently works as an analyst at the Long Term Strategy Group.
Under the aegis of “wartime political work,” the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has developed a systematic framework (see part 1) for the “Three Warfares” that builds upon foundational principles, including notably the concept of “disintegrating enemy forces” (瓦解敵軍). Recent writings by Chinese strategists from influential PLA institutions build upon this traditional framework in attempts to articulate a highly integrated approach to public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare that has increasingly emphasized their employment in conflict scenarios. Indeed, the available PLA writings on the Three Warfares reflect their integration into the PLA’s science of political work and high-level thinking on military strategy. In addition, the PLA’s incorporation of the Three Warfares into its approach to joint campaigns (聯合戰役), including scenarios involving Taiwan, indicates their perceived utility as critical aspects of the PLA’s approach to targeting Taiwan during a potential conflict scenario.
The Three Warfares in Strategy
As the PLA’s strategic thinking on the topic has progressed, the Three Warfares have also been integrated into recent military academic works and textbooks, including those produced by the Academy of Military Science (AMS) and National Defense University (NDU), which highlight the relevance of this approach in modern warfare. Notably, the 2013 AMS textbook, The Science of Military Strategy (SMS), introduced the concept of huayuquan (話語權), perhaps best translated as “discursive power,”[1] which involves the use of information, belief, and mentality (信息一信仰一心智).[2] To achieve and sustain such discursive power requires the integrated usage of public opinion warfare, legal warfare, and psychological warfare, which are seen as critical force multipliers for military operations. In particular, three warfare operations have the potential to exert a strong “psychological frightening force” (心理震懾力) against an adversary.
Similarly, a 2014 NDU text, Introduction to Public Opinion Warfare, Psychological Warfare, and Legal Warfare, illustrates the NDU’s sustained efforts to develop a “Science of the Three Warfares” (“三戰”學), which are considered a major innovation in the PLA’s political work.[3] As the form of warfare has evolved toward greater “informationization” (信息化), the Three Warfares, which involve the utilization of particular information and media as weapons, are seen to have achieved unprecedented breakthroughs, becoming an “organic” aspect of strategy and warfare.[4] In particular, this text highlights the importance of rapidly taking advantage of the “decisive opportunity” (先機), emphasizing the offensive while concurrently engaging in defense, and the integration of peace and war (平戰結合) through a peacetime preparation of the perceptual battlefield.[5]
The Three Warfares in Campaigns
Beyond these strategic principles, how might the PLA seek to employ aspects of the Three Warfares in an operational scenario, against Taiwan or another potential adversary?
The second edition of the AMS Science of Joint Campaigns Textbook (聯合戰役學教程), published in 2012, indicates that the Three Warfares have been conceptualized as integral aspects of the PLA’s approach to joint campaign scenarios, which include the island blockade campaign (島嶼封鎖戰役) and island assault campaign (島嶼進攻戰役), scenarios that would, in all likelihood, be directed against Taiwan.[6]
In particular, during efforts to “create pre-war momentum” (戰前造勢), public opinion warfare and psychological warfare would be employed as the primary content of efforts to disintegrate enemy forces and “consolidate” (鞏固) oneself.[7] Through these and related efforts—such as reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, as well as cyber offensives and defensives—the PLA would seek to seize the initiative and create a favorable situation for a joint offensive (進攻) campaign.[8]
In the midst of a joint offensive campaign, in order to “expand” upon combat success (戰果) and further develop the assault, the campaign commander would seek to undermine the adversary’s will to resist and intensify its chaos, including through the implementation of public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare.[9] This would involve aiming, through this combination of firepower strikes and psychological attacks (攻心), to “rapidly disintegrate the enemy forces’ psychology and morale.”
Winning Without Fighting?
Although the Three Warfares remain highly derivative of traditional aspects of the PLA’s approach to wartime political work, this conceptual framework has enabled an intensified emphasis on the integrated, coordinated utilization of public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare methods in wartime scenarios, including potential joint campaigns against Taiwan.
Indeed, while the PLA’s considerable conventional military capabilities have received justified attention, this dimension of the PLA’s approach to military strategy and operational art is an integral aspect of the PLA’s approach to such contingencies. As the deputy director of the CMC Political Work Department, Wu Changde (吳昌德) highlighted in a recent commentary, the PLA seeks to utilize political psychological attacks in order to disintegrate the enemy forces’ will to fight (鬥志), and achieve “winning without fighting” (不戰而勝) or a success through a “small war, large victory” (小戰大勝).[10]
The main point: The PLA’s continued efforts to target Taiwan and other potential adversaries will remain informed by traditional principles of political warfare and an intensified focus on their application in modern informationized warfare.
[1] John Costello and Peter Mattis, “Electronic Warfare and the Renaissance of Chinese Information Operations,” in Joe McReynolds, ed., China’s Evolving Military Strategy, (Washington, D.C.: Jamestown Foundation, 2016).
[2] Junshi kexueyuan junshi zhanlue yanjiubu 軍事科學院軍事戰略研究部 [Academy of Military Science Military Strategy Research Department],ed., Zhanlue xue 戰略學 [The Science of Military Strategy] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chuban she 軍事科學出版社 [Military Science Press], 2013), 131.
[3] Wu, Jieming 吴杰明 and Liu, Zhifu 刘志富, Yulun zhan xinli zhan falü zhan gailun 輿論戰心理戰法律戰概論 [An Introduction to Public Opinion Warfare, Psychological Warfare, [and] Legal Warfare] (National Defense University Press, 2014), 1.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid, 121-132.
[6] Li Yousheng 李有升, ed., Lianhe zhanyi xue jiaocheng 聯合戰役學教程 [The Science of Joint Campaigns Textbook] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chuban she 軍事科學出版社 [Military Science Press], 2012), 203.
[7] Ibid, 212.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid, 231.
[10] Thank you to Mark Stokes for mentioning this article to me.
