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Minehunters and Taiwan’s Mine Warfare Strategies

Minehunters and Taiwan’s Mine Warfare Strategies

Minehunters and Taiwan’s Mine Warfare Strategies

Dr. Huan-Kai Tseng received a Ph.D. in political science with a focus on political economy and applied quantitative methods from the George Washington University.

On February 12, Taiwanese prosecutors indicted the chairman and vice chairman of the Ching Fu Shipbuilding Co. (CFS) for loan fraud. This is two months after the country’s largest private shipbuilder was alleged to have syndicated loan fraud and suspicious money transfers to China associated with the now scandal-ridden minehunter contract. In December 2017, Taiwan’s Navy decided to seize the CFS’s NT$1.69 billion bonds deposited at Kaohsiung branch of the First Commercial Bank (第一銀行) as a pretext for rescission. Meanwhile, as the newly cast hull of the first of this 700-ton minehunter is awaiting installation at the Intermarine shipyard in Italy, Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan has made a somber determination to disappropriate the budget earmarked for the minehunter program for the 2018 fiscal year. The pilot program of the Tsai administration’s indigenous naval shipbuilding policy (國艦國造) appears as if stranded on a distant shore.

While the crux of the attention continues to be on the CFS’s murky investment in China, an “emerging wisdom” among Taiwan’s defense community is that minehunter is a weapon system of the past. Instead of sustaining the scandal-ridden minehunter program, one needs to have “innovative thinking” (新思維) toward building Taiwan’s maritime mine countermeasures capability. Some went even further by recommending aerial mining as a much more cost-effective sea denial strategy than minehunting, which is more defensive in nature. This commentary will not discuss the legal and political implications of the CFS case, as that has been noted by GTI adviser Shirley Kan in a previous GTB issue. Instead, this article seeks to do two things: first, clarify the erroneous logic of aerial mining being a substitute for minehunting in maritime defense; and second, evaluate the availability, as well as effectiveness, of alternative mine countermeasure systems, and make recommendation for the Navy’s countermine warfare. Though ridden with scandals at the moment, minehunting assets remain the most technologically mature and procurable countermine asset to safeguard Taiwan’s maritime security in the near future.

The Lessons of History: The cost of aerial mining and the price of blockade

Perceiving the coming collapse of the minehunter program amidst heightened political tension and media frenzy, the Minister of National Defense Feng Shih-Kuan (馮世寬) expressed his concerns about the feasibility of sustaining the minehunter program. Feng was quoted saying, “[the minehunter program] is not necessarily worth reviewing or implementing,” due to it being formulated more than 10 years ago, and it is no longer compatible with the Tsai administration’s “multi-domain deterrence” (重層嚇阻) defense doctrine and the concept of “asymmetrical warfare.” Some pundits argue in favor of developing aerial mining capability as a more cost-effective substitute for minehunting, because aerial mines are cheaper to produce and can be easily integrated to Taiwan’s current fleet of P-3C maritime patrol aircrafts and F-16 fighters.

Indeed, compared to minehunters, aerial mines are a relatively inexpensive sea denial (or, alternatively, counter-sea denial) weapon system. It only requires slight modification to turn air-dropped bombs into bottom-influence mines and they can be employed in large numbers to disrupt a particular sea lane. The Mk 62/63 “Quickstrike” air-dropped mines currently in the US Navy inventory are modified from Mk 82/83 general-purpose bombs; and recent advances in sensor technology even allows for transforming conventional mines into precision-guided “smart mines.” In fact, Taiwan’s Air Force is exploring ways to empower their P-3Cs with such capability and has demonstrated this potential in a recent video.

However, to say that minelaying substitutes minehunting in maritime defense because it is cheaper and more effective, completely misses the mark. To begin with, aerial mining is not cheap, the execution of aerial mining requires dozen (and even hundreds) of carefully-planned sorties and ten times as many mines to disrupt traffic in a pre-defined sea zone. During its mining campaign against Nazi Germany between 1940-45, the British Royal Air Force launched 19,917 sorties but only sunk 638 vessels.[1] In the last six months of WWII, “Operation Starvation” achieved greater success by sinking 431 Japanese vessels with 1,150 sorties, however it only destroyed 15 aircrafts with the deployment of 12,000 mines.[2]

Quantity and density of mines are the keys to successful mining campaigns, but they are luxuries that Taiwan could ill-afford in wartime. In the scramble for air superiority against the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), Taiwan’s limited inventory of combat aircrafts may get overstretched for aerial mining operation. Moreover, in the absence of escort sorties, aerial mining operation becomes dangerous and futile. At the outbreak of WWII, the Luftwaffe utilized its innovative Luftmine (parachute mine) to augment Kriegsmarine’s naval blockade campaign on Britain, but as the balance of air superiority tilted toward the Allies, the Luftwaffe could no longer pose much threat to British sea-lanes. The same line of reasoning also explains the sweeping success of “Operation Starvation” – the operation was the culmination, rather than the tipping point, of the US air-sea supremacy in the Western Pacific.[3] Hence, we need to factor in the overall offense-defense balance in possible war scenarios in the Taiwan Strait when evaluating the ‘cost’ of aerial mining as a sea denial strategy.

Finally, and largely as a consequence of these previous reasons, a strong minehunting capability should be a vital part of Taiwan’s military strategy to counter China’s anti-access and area denial  (A2/AD) challenges.[4],[5],[6] In the event of military conflicts between Taiwan and China, China could deploy large amount of sea mines to choke off Taiwan’s economic lifeblood and deny possible US naval intervention with minimum investment and risk.[7] Thus, the importance of maintaining sufficient amount of advanced minehunting assets to clear the obstacles that will threaten Taiwan and its allies’ safety of passage along critical sea lanes cannot be overstated, and is not functionally equivalent to developing an aerial mining capability. One need look no further than Japan, where the bitter legacy of WWII impelled the country to develop one of the most sophisticated mine-clearing and minehunting technologies in contemporary navies.[8] For countries as trade dependent as Taiwan, minehunting may be an inefficient but indispensable operational capability to maintain.[9]

Beyond Minehunters: Countermine warfare for a new age

While minehunting is crucial to Taiwan’s maritime security, this function can also be performed by modular shipborne systems in lieu of tailor-made “minehunters.” For example, the USS Independence-class Littoral Combat Ship (LCS-2) can be fitted with Mine Countermeasures Mission Package (MCM MP), consisting of Remote Minehunting Systems (RMS) and AN/AQS-20A advanced minehunting sonar that are modular in design, which can be operated from a distance or uninstalled when minehunting operation is not called for. Major US-based defense contractors like Lockheed Martin, Textron, and General Dynamics also market a variety of remotely-controlled unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) and unmanned surface vehicles (USV) of similar capacity, which can plausibly be carried and launched from small surface combatants such as Taiwan’s Tuo River-class corvette. However, it is uncertain if Taiwan could obtain export licenses for these modules in the short-run or develop its own in the long-run.

As with aerial mining, helicopters’ ability to scan a large area of water at visual range with relative high speed makes them an ideal platform for carrying out minehunting operation. The US Navy utilizes a range of helicopter-borne minehunting systems. The Northrop Grumman’s AN/AES-1 Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) and Raytheon-BAE Systems’ AN/ASQ-235 Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS) can be carried under the sub wings of the Navy’s standard SH/MH-60 Seahawk helicopters to optically detect, identify, and destroy a wide array of floating, near-surface, and bottom mines. The retired MH-53E heavy transport helicopter employed a combination of towed devices – the Mk 105 minesweeping sled, the AN/AQS-14 side scan sonar, and the Mk 103 mechanical minesweeping system – for minehunting operation. An upgraded high-resolution variant of the AN/AQS-14, the AN/AQS-24A, is in service with the MCH-101 helicopter of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). It should be noted, however, that the S-70C series helicopters (the export version of SH/MH-60 Seahawk) currently operated by Taiwan’s Navy do not support the aforementioned helicopter-borne systems and lack the ship-to-helicopter datalink necessary for synchronized target motion analysis (TMA) with the mothership. In 2016, Taiwan intended to acquire 10 MH-60Rs with such datalink capability but the request eventually fell through due to budgetary constraint. Furthermore, both MH-53E and MCH-101 have 10-ton payload to support towed minehunting systems, but Taiwan’s military has yet to acquire this class of heavy utility helicopters. Thus, it is unclear if Taiwan’s current naval aviation assets can support helicopter-borne minehunting operation without major upgrades or new acquisition.

Conclusion

Anticipating CFS’s potential default, Taiwan’s defense community has raised important insights on developing alternative mine warfare strategies, namely: 1) prioritizing aerial mining over minehunting, and 2) seeking new minehunting technologies that can be operated from other platforms. However, upon closer scrutiny, one needs to take into account the overall offense-defense balance across the Taiwan Strait that enables the use of aerial mining against China’s invading fleet and the deadly consequence of downplaying the necessity of minehunting. Also, although newer minehunting technologies may displace the need for minehunters, acquiring these new systems along with their carriers could cause delay on Taiwan’s current military acquisition programs.

The main point: Albeit scandal-ridden, minehunter remains the most technologically mature and procurable countermine asset to safeguard Taiwan’s maritime security in the short-run.

The Global Taiwan Brief Volume 3, Issue 4

The Fortnightly Review
By: Russell Hsiao

Military and Safety Implications of China’s Northbound Flight Route M-503
By: David An

A Preliminary Assessment of CMC membership and PLA personnel changes
following the 19th CCP Congress
By: Ying Yu Lin  

Minehunters and Taiwan’s Mine Warfare Strategies
By: Huan-Kai Tseng


The Fortnightly Review

By: Russell Hsiao

Russell Hsiao is the executive director of the Global Taiwan Institute and the editor-in-chief of the Global Taiwan Brief.

CCP Central Committee’s 2018 Taiwan Affairs Meeting Affirms Xi’s “Soft-Hard” Approach

On February 2-3, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held its annual Taiwan policy conclave in Beijing. The CCP Central Committee’s Taiwan Affairs Meeting (中共中央對台工作會議)—chaired by State Councilor and freshly minted CCP Politburo member Yang Jiechi (楊潔篪)—was attended by the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Director Zhang Zhijun (張志軍), Deputy Director Liu Jieyi (劉結一), and other senior members of the Party’s Taiwan-policy making apparatus. Most notably, PBSC member and Vice Premier Wang Yang made his debut in the meeting and gave the opening remark. Wang’s appearance at the event further underscores his position as the successor to outgoing Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) Yu Zhengsheng (俞正聲). In the same role as head of the advisory body CPPCC, Yu served as deputy to General Secretary Xi Jinping in the policy-setting CCP Central Committee’s Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group (TALSG), and had attended all the previous CCP Central Committee Taiwan Affairs Meetings since 2013 (after his predecessor Jia Qinglin (賈慶林) retired).

The CCP Central Committee’s Taiwan Affairs Meeting of early February, is the first held event since the 19th CCP National Congress last October, where senior Party cadres of the 19th CCP Congress were first unveiled. The meeting is an important indicator of how the Party will implement the guidance laid out by Xi during his epic three-hours long speech. In his opening remarks at the Taiwan Affairs meeting, PBSC member Wang affirmed the continuation of Beijing’s two-pronged “soft-hard” strategy of using both hard and soft measures against Taiwan. Following the monotone drub of other Chinese officials, Wang pointed out how the situation in the Taiwan Strait is becoming more complex and severe and that the Party’s Taiwan work, now and for a period of time, faces challenges and risks.

For the ‘hard’ component of the “soft-hard” strategy, Wang insisted that the CCP must uphold the “One-China principle” and the so-called “1992 consensus,” and resolutely oppose and contain any form of Taiwan secession. Specifically, Wang reportedly stated that, “[w]e [CCP] should remain true to our original aspiration, keep our mission firmly in mind, and fully implement the CCP Central Committee’s decisions and plans [for Taiwan affairs] in a spirit of time and tide wait for no man; seize the day, seize the hour[emphasis added].” According to Taiwan’s former Straits Exchange Foundation chairman under the first DPP administration, Hong Chi-chang (洪奇昌), the meaning of Wang’s statements indicates that, “[a]part from firm opposition to and deterrence of Taiwanese independence, China can be expected to focus more on its unilateral initiatives when pushing for unification.”

For the ‘soft’ element of the “soft-hard” strategy,  Wang stated Beijing’s intention to expand cross-Strait economic and cultural cooperation; continue to deepen the development of cross-Strait economic and social integration; gradually give equal treatment to Taiwan nationals studying, starting businesses, working, and living in the People’s Republic of China (PRC); and encourage people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to promote Chinese culture and their “spiritual affinity.” According to Chao Chun-Shan (趙春山), former chairman of the Foundation on Asia-Pacific Peace Studies (亞太和平研究基金會) under Ma Ying-jeou, the policy focus of this year’s Taiwan Affairs meeting may be summarized as: “oppose independence; promote unification; do many things at once; push harder and be softer” (反獨促統、齊頭並進、硬的更硬、軟的更軟). Furthermore, Chao added that following personnel changes in the PRC’s Taiwan policy apparatus in March, it is unlikely that there will any dramatic changes in cross-Strait relations for the near term. The key, according to Chao, is for Beijing to maintain the current cross-Strait condition of “competition but not fracture” (鬥而不破) relation with Taiwan, which entails pushing as hard as it can without letting relations break down, while also being soft without losing its leverage. Chao explained that since this is an election year in Taiwan, neither side will want to have surprises that will influence the election or succession arrangements, therefore cross-Strait relations will be in a state of “cold peace”  (冷和平) and neither Beijing nor Taipei will want to raise it to a state of “hot conflict” (熱衝突).

Consistent with prior analysis about the trend in Beijing’s policy towards the Tsai government, the meeting does not indicate a change in the CCP’s approach, much less its policy towards Taiwan. It is clear now that Beijing will continue its “soft-hard” approach against Taiwan, which will be a combination of enticing Taiwanese youths, businesses, and aligned-political actors, while continuing to diminish Taiwan’s international space and maintaining its coercive military activities. More troubling for the future of cross-Strait relations is that the Xi administration appears increasingly bent on simply waiting out the administration of Tsai Ing-wen. In the near term, however, given that it is an election year, Beijing may be unwilling to take any further drastic measures to upset the delicate relation with Taiwan. All the while, the Tsai administration has steadfastly maintained its commitment to preserve the “status quo,” so the possibility of a major break in cross-Strait relations will be unlikely in 2018, barring further actions from Beijing.

The main point: The CCP Central Committee’s 2018 Taiwan Affairs Meeting confirms that Beijing will continue its “soft-hard” approach against Taiwan, which will likely include a combination of enticing Taiwanese youths, businesses, and aligned-political actors,  while continuing to diminish Taiwan’s international space and intensifying its coercive military activities.

Taiwan Quietly Enhances International Space with Military Veteran Diplomacy

While China continues to squeeze Taiwan’s international space with its coercive pressure campaign, Taipei is quietly enhancing the country’s international presence by alternate means. One of these methods is through military veteran diplomacy. Indeed, the current minister of Taiwan’s Veterans Affairs Council (VAC, 國軍退除役官兵輔導委員會)—a cabinet-level organization under the Executive Yuan, similar to the US Department of Veterans Affairs—made an unprecedented visit to Japan and Indonesia in December 2017.

VAC Minister Lee Hsiang-chou’s (李翔宙), who served as the director of the National Security Bureau (NSB) under Ma Ying-jeou, visited Japan and Indonesia between December 20 and 27. Lee’s trip to Japan was at the invitation of the Self-Defense Force Friendship Association (隊友會), a non-governmental organization with an influential members-based group composed of many retired senior Japanese military officers. The chairman of the organization is General (ret.) Yuji Fujinawa (藤繩祐爾) and its president is General (ret.) Hajime Massaki (先崎一)—both four-star generals. It is worth noting that Fujinawa served as Chairman of the Joint Staff Council of the Japan Self-Defense Forces from 1999-2001, and Massaki was the 28th Chief of Staff of the Ground Self-Defense Force. While in Japan, Minister Lee reportedly had other meetings, but those were kept relatively low-key to avoid China’s interference. Lee’s quiet diplomacy was aimed ostensibly to ‘test the waters’ for a possible increase of dialogue and exchanges between veteran organizations of the two countries.

Besides the VAC minister’s meeting with the SDF Friendship Association, Lee also visited the ROC Veterans Association in Japan (日本榮光聯誼會). Established in 1974, ROC Veterans Associations (榮光聯誼會) are located worldwide to provide a platform for its military veterans who have settled abroad, and give them access to services and benefits provided by the government. According to the VAC’s website, there are currently 43 veteran associations worldwide (20 chapters are in the United States) with an estimate of 7,125 members. Minister Lee’s visit to the chapter in Japan, the first one ever established by the VAC, is the first time that a current minister of the council visited the organization since its creation.  A less sensitive affair, the VAC minister’s also visited the ROC Veterans Association in Indonesia (印尼榮光聯誼會) where he gave a public speech about the Tsai administration’s New Southbound Policy.

Revelation of Minister Lee’s unprecedented visit to Japan and Indonesia follows other international engagements between the VAC and military veteran groups of other countries, particularly the United States, that highlight the multi-pronged efforts of the Tsai administration to bolster the country’s international space in the face of Beijing’s pressure campaign. As a result of China’s intensifying strategy against Taiwan, these efforts to increase Taiwan’s international presence are complemented by the US government’s initiative to remove some self-imposed restrictions on high-level contacts between US and Taiwan officials, such as through the Taiwan Travel Act, among others. At the same time, Japan has also made similar moves, by lifting self-imposed restrictions on its contacts with Taiwan.

Yet, in more sensitive areas of cooperation, “non-official” channels of dialogue through Track II channels will still be necessary to avoid China’s political interference. As noted by Yuki Tatsumi, director of the Japan Program at the Stimson Center, at a Global Taiwan Institute’s public seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, retired military officers between the United States, Japan, Australia, and Taiwan could provide a channel for an exchange on matters such as multilateral military cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief that would otherwise be too sensitive to undertake in an official setting.

To be clear, Lee’s visit to Japan and Indonesia are  not his first foreign visits as VAC minister. It took place after a similar visit that the Minister made to the United States last July for the Veterans of Foreign War’s (VFW) national convention in New Orleans. The VFW is a US non-profit veteran service organization comprised of eligible veterans and military service members from the active duty, National Guard, and reserve forces. In his speech at the VFW convention, Minister Lee extolled the relationship between VAC and VFW of 37 years, and expressed appreciation for the VFW’s support for Taiwan. The Minister’s July visit to the US was followed by a meeting in September, held in Taipei, of the Asia-Pacific Steering Committee for the international non-profit and non-governmental World Veteran Federation, which since 1951 has consultative status with the United Nations. Japan reportedly expressed an interest in how Taiwan has treated its veterans and as a result invited Minister Lee to Japan.

The main point: As China continues to squeeze Taiwan’s international space with its coercive pressure campaign, Taipei is quietly enhancing the country’s international role through military veteran diplomacy.

Military and Safety Implications of China’s Northbound Flight Route M-503

By: David An

David An is a senior research fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute and was previously a political military officer at the US Department of State.

“Recent unilateral actions by #China—including M-503 flight route & increased military exercises—are destabilizing & should be avoided,” Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen wrote on January 5, 2018. Her tweet was in response to China’s establishment of a new northbound M-503 flight route for commercial passenger airliners along the centerline of the Taiwan Strait the day before. How can a commercial airline flight route be tied together with “military exercises” and “stability” all within one sentence? Or within 140 characters of the same tweet?

This commercial passenger airline matter is important enough to spur a back and forth series of flight cancellations between China and Taiwan, affecting tens of thousands of passengers and costing airline companies millions of dollars. Two major PRC airline companies, China Eastern Airways and Xiamen Airlines, said they cancelled flights to and from Taiwan during the Lunar New Year, for a total of 176 round trip flights, because Taiwan refused to approve them. Taiwan’s Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) estimates that up to 50,000 passengers could have been affected. China Eastern Airlines released a statement stating that Taiwan’s failure to approve the flights, “seriously infringed upon the common interests of our company and customers, and severely violated the humanitarian needs of thousands of passengers and families.” The stakes are surprisingly high over a new passenger airline route.

Unilateral action and geographical concerns

Taiwan said it was not consulted over the routes the flights would take, and considering that China took unilateral action, Taiwan therefore withheld approvals for China Eastern Airways and Xiamen Airlines because both had used the disputed air routes. Taiwan’s Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) reports that over 20 flights, which are operated by Chinese airlines, use the new routes every day. Taiwan’s CAA confirmed that it provisionally delayed approval of applications of these two China based airlines to operate additional cross-Strait flights during the Lunar New Year holiday in protest against China’s decision to implement the northbound M-503 route.

Essentially, the importance of the M-503 flight route is exactly because it is located along the centerline of the Taiwan Strait. M-503 northbound is one among four new flight routes that China opened on January 4, with aircraft using these routes that same day. Taiwan has protested the opening of the routes precisely due to the unilateral nature of China’s announcement and the location of the routes. M-503 northbound is merely 4.2 nautical miles west of the centerline, with a real possibility that aircraft could cross over to the other side; and I wrote a previous Global Taiwan Brief article about the longstanding norm for China and Taiwan to stay to their own sides of the centerline along the Strait. In addition, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council Minister Katherine Chang (張小月) demanded an immediate end to the M-503 north route the same day it was established. Essentially, the geography of M-503 combines several sensitivities within this one issue: airline flight safety, and even many military strategy concerns.

Commercial airline flight route safety concerns

Taiwan has raised concerns that the new flight routes are too close to existing routes that connect its airports to two groups of Taiwan controlled islands located close to China, and are therefore a threat to flight safety. Among the four new routes, three new Chinese east to west extension routes designated as W121, W122, and W123 now overlap with Taiwan’s W6, W8, and W2 flight routes connecting Taiwan with its islands, Kinmen and Matsu. However, a spokesman for China’s Taiwan Affairs Office countered that a distance of 14 miles separates these routes, so he claims that they are considered safe according to International Civil Aviation Organization standards. Nonetheless, Mainland Affairs Council Deputy Minister Chiu Chui-cheng (邱垂正), urged China to negotiate with Taiwan about the new flight routes, and that “aviation safety is the core issue and people’s lives must not be put at risk.”

The Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) said, “[t]he rapid growth of flights in western Taiwan Strait airspace in recent years has caused increasingly serious delays,” and that the new flight paths therefore alleviate congestion. However, even China’s official state-sponsored China Daily newspaper notes that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force has a tight grip on China’s airspace. It cited an aviation expert who stated that less than 30 percent of China’s airspace could be used by civilian airlines, which is in contrast with the United States 85 percent airspace for civilian use. According to some estimates, China’s PLA controls up to four fifths of China’s air space. In this sense, any flight congestion is China’s own doing, and it could have opened up more PLA airspace rather than unilaterally opening up a politically sensitive northbound M-503 route.

Military strategic concerns

Referring to the M-503 issue, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council stated, “[t]his is purposefully using civilian aviation as a cover for improper intentions regarding Taiwan politics and even military affairs.” Several military strategic concerns come to mind. First, there is a possibility that China could fly its reconnaissance or other military aircraft along this same route as if they were passenger or cargo planes, to then collect intelligence on Taiwan’s air bases, defense deployments, and infrastructure along Taiwan’s west coast. Taiwan also fears that Chinese military aircraft could evade radar detection by staying close behind civilian jets.

Second, not only do these four new routes run along the centerline of the Taiwan Strait, but they are also close to Taiwan’s air-defense identification zone, which Taiwan uses to monitor possible military incursions into its airspace. Referencing the M-503 situation in an evening broadcast on January 22, President Tsai raised the possibility of a Chinese attack on the island.

Third, according to Research Fellow Ian Easton at the Project 2049 Institute, the new M-503 air route makes it easier for China to launch a first strike. Easton notes that, “given the close-in nature of the standoff, early warning time is vital for stability,” and “it’s being further constricted.” Indeed, Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense said that the military will intercept, warn, and repel if necessary, any aircraft that crosses into Taiwanese airspace and puts the island’s security in jeopardy.

Fourth, additional flights along the centerline of the Taiwan Strait could muddle the “target picture” or “target environment” in a potential conflict scenario. An academic thesis paper for the US Naval Postgraduate School describes how radars become strained when tracking a large collection of targets, and should then hand off targets between radars. It essentially explains the basis for why sending additional passenger aircraft in areas as sensitive as the middle of the Taiwan Strait will make it hard for Taiwan to perform “identification friend or foe” (IFF).

If all signs show that China is planning military aggression toward Taiwan, and if Taiwan accidentally shot down a civilian passenger aircraft in the midst of other military targets, the result would be disastrous. It is puzzling that Taiwan and China reached an agreement in 2015 to even allow southbound flights along the M-503 flight path, but additional northbound flights would make the matter even more risky. Such security concerns may have seemed to be farfetched in 2015, which was the last time China and Taiwan discussed the M-503 flight path. However, these concerns are increasingly realistic in today’s context, and in light of the new features emerging in the past two to three years, such as the case of China’s Liaoning aircraft carrier recently passing through the Taiwan Strait, and China’s military aircraft flights encircling Taiwan.

It is not unthinkable that Taiwan could accidentally shoot down a civilian aircraft, considering that the Taiwan Navy accidentally launched an indigenously produced Hsiung Feng III missile during a drill that reportedly hit a fishing boat, killing one person and injuring three. If Taiwan had hit a Chinese PLA Navy vessel instead, there may have been dangerous escalation of violence.

Rather than basing M-503 on safety or security concerns, Wang Hailiang—Taiwan Studies researcher at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences—believes that the Tsai Administration is seizing the M-503 situation, considering that China has cut off official channels with Taiwan since Tsai’s election into office in 2016. China claims that President Tsai Ing-wen does not recognize the “1992 Consensus.” With no formal mechanism to negotiate the air routes, Taiwan must either make compromises that are not in its interests, or block the airlines altogether. Tsai has criticized China for creating the situation in couched terms: “Even if Taiwan makes an unnecessary compromise over the question of new air routes, it cannot secure chances of dialogue with China.”

Considering that Taiwan’s president tweeted about the security concerns of a new northbound M-503 flight path, it is worth parsing out the various factors and perspectives inherent in this controversy. The heated rhetoric between Taiwan and China, and cancelled flights, have not been for nothing— northbound M-503 does pose a series of potential flight safety and military strategy risks for Taiwan. Although both sides agreed upon a southbound M-503 route in 2015, it does not negate the concerns that come with adding more flights along such a sensitive route.

The main point: A pre-existing southbound M-503 route negotiated in 2015 does not justify a new northbound M-503 route that China unilaterally implemented on January 4. Flying additional aircraft along this new northbound M-503 route risks the possibility that China could fly military surveillance aircraft along the same route, edge closer to Taiwan’s air defense identification zone, more easily launch a first strike against Taiwan, and clutter the “target environment” that Taiwan faces in a potential conflict scenario.

A Preliminary Assessment of CMC membership and PLA personnel changes following the 19th CCP Congress

By: Ying Yu Lin

Dr. Ying Yu Lin is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of Strategic and International Affairs, National Chung Cheng University.

The list of new members of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was made public after the 19th National Congress of the CCP last Fall. As expected, General Secretary Xi Jinxing (習近平) won a second term as CMC Chairman. While Xu Qiliang (許其亮) kept his same position, Zhang Youxia (張又俠) was appointed vice-chairman in replacement of Fang Changlong (范長龍), who retired as expected. Other new members of the CMC include former People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force Commander Wei Fenghe (魏鳳和), CMC Joint Staff Department (JSD) Chief Li Zhocheng(李作成), CMC Political Work Department Chief Miao Hua (苗華), and CMC Commission for Discipline Inspection Secretary Zhang Shengmin (張升民). While a lot has already been written about the 19th CCP Politburo during Xi’s second-term, what insights might we gain from the new CMC membership for the Xi administration?

The total number of CMC members was reduced from 11 to seven. Prior speculation about an increase of CMC vice chairmen from two to four did not take place. A possible reason why the number of chairman was not increased to four, could be that with four chairmen then the CMC would just resemble the way it was before its reorganization. In the significant military reform that began in 2016, the four general departments were re-organized into 15 agencies. As a leader bent on reforming the military and on promoting the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, Xi is not likely to backtrack on his stated effort which aims at completing military modernization by 2035, and establishing a world-class military by 2050.

It was not surprising to see that Xu remained one of the two vice chairmen, while the other position was occupied by Zhang (this latter is also called “crown prince”—a term specifically referred to descendants of the founding members of CCP). CMC member Wei, who had commanded the PLA Rocket Force (previously known as the Second Artillery) since 2012, may become the next defense minister at the upcoming conclave for the National People’s Congress in March. In the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), grade is more important than rank. Wei and Li are three-star generals, while Miao is a three-star admiral. They are all on a grade commensurate with their positions in the CMC. Which is also why Commission for Discipline Inspection Secretary Zhang, a three-star general, was picked for the position as the graft buster in the military, as a signal of Xi’s determination to continue tackling corruption within the military. Indeed, the recent reshuffle of the PLA leadership may be characterized as breaking away from past conventions. It also appears to be an attempt to uproot medium-and high-ranked officers promoted one way or another by the two-downfallen former CMC vice chairmen, Xu Caihou (徐才厚) and Guo Boxiong (郭伯雄).

The composition of the CMC membership covers all the services: Li and Zhang are from the army; Xu and Wei come from the air force and rocket force respectively; and Miao had been the political commissar of the navy. From the perspective of balance of power between the services, the CMC membership arrangement meets the requirement. The decrease of CMC members to seven also represents a concentration of power, an issue that emerges in the wake of the military reform and accompanying restructuring of the military. During the military restructuring, there had been much speculation about newly formed units and their grades. Now that the new CMC leadership has taken shape, and candidates for service and theater command  leadership positions have been finalized following the 19th CCP National Congress, there will be no unfounded speculation about the PLA restructuring. It also shows that Xi lays much emphasis on putting the military under his control.

The former General Staff Department (GSD), currently the CMC Joint Staff Department (JSD),was often referred to as the No. 1 agency because it was in charge of military operations, intelligence, electronic reconnaissance and countermeasures, informatization affairs, and it was also in direct control  of the seven military regions. Following the military reform which began in 2016, some of the GSD’s functions and responsibilities have been partially shifted to other units, including newly-established combat ones, according to the guiding principle: “the CMC takes command, the theater commands take responsibility for operations, and each service focuses its efforts on building combat strength.”[1] However, by giving operations’ guidance and enabling cooperation of operations, the JSD is still quite influential in working in sync with the joint operations command center of the CMC.. Against the backdrop that the PLA keeps emphasizing the need to break the “army-centric” tradition, Li was able to be appointed as chief of the JSD mainly because the army still plays a vital role in protecting government leadership and executing land defense missions.

Xi’s selection of military leaders marks a departure from past rules. Navy commander Shen Jinlong, Air Force Commander Ding Laihang, Army Commander Han Weiguo, and Rocket Force Commander Zhou Yaning have one thing in common: they all did not have previous work experience in the JSD. In the past, a service commander required to have work experience as a deputy chief of general staff, mainly because he needed to familiarize with joint operations and senior staff work. However, since now theater and service commands have been assigned different roles, service commanders will naturally deal with missions and tasks that are different from those in the past, hence, they don’t need to have the same qualifications as their predecessors. The trend that is emerging points towards having service commanders receive sufficient training as theater commanders first, before taking control of their respective services.

Another feature that generals promoted by Xi have in common is that they have remarkable educational backgrounds. For instance, PLA Navy (PLAN) Commander Shen Jinlong (沈金龍) was President of the PLA Dalian Naval Academy. PLAAF Commander Ding Laihang (丁來杭) was the President of the PLAAF Command Academy. Song Puxuan (宋普選), newly-appointed head of the Logistic Support Department of the CMC, was previously the President of National Defense University. PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) Commander Gao Jin (高津) was the President of the Academy of Military Sciences. During their tours of duty at the academic institutions, these generals pursued in-depth research into joint operations. For instance, recently-appointed PLA Army (PLAA) Commander Han Weiguo (韓衛國), during his studies at National Defense University in 1956, focused his attention on the subject of joint campaign command. As an army group commander, Wu pushed for the establishment of a command-level joint duty system as a starting point for the theater command joint staff system. With a clear emphasis on jointness, the above-mentioned generals appear to be the kind of senior officers with the expertise that Xi thinks is needed for the future development of the PLA.

Perhaps most relevant in the Taiwan context is the rise of a new generation of generals born between 1955 and 1960. Many of these generals, that Xi has promoted, have served in the 31st Army Group. They include CMC Training Management Department director Major General Li Huofei (黎火輝), Admiral Miao Hua, newly-appointed 82nd Army Group Commander Major General Lin Xiangyang (林向陽), 80th Army Group Commander Major General Wang Xiubin (王秀斌), National Defense University President Zheng He (鄭和), and People’s Armed Police Commander General Wang Ning (王寧). Service experience within the 31st Army Group is now a shortcut to higher positions within the military, partly because Xi had served for many years in Fujian and the army group has been a major force to be used against Taiwan. It remains to be seen whether Xi’s promotion of these generals with experience in preparing for a Taiwan contingency reveals an underlying intention toward Taiwan. Yet, it is clear that the PLA is in the process of replacing generals from an older generation, with younger generals. If the older generation generals could be called a “Vietnam War group” because of their war experience in Vietnam, the rising younger generation of generals may be described as a “Taiwan Strait group” because of their involvement in the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. This newer generation of military leaders are likely to become the PLA’s future stars.

The main point: PLA personnel changes following the 19th CCP Congress highlight the rise of a new generation of generals who have served in the 31st Army Group. The young generals could be described as the “Taiwan Strait group” because of their involvement in the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis.


[1] “Opinions of CMC on Deepening the Reform of the National Defense and the Armed Forces”(中央軍委關於深化國防和軍隊改革的意見) ,XinHua net, January.1,2016.
https://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-01/01/c_1117646695.htm

Minehunters and Taiwan’s Mine Warfare Strategies

By: Huan-Kai Tseng

Dr. Huan-Kai Tseng received a Ph.D. in political science with a focus on political economy and applied quantitative methods from the George Washington University.

On February 12, Taiwanese prosecutors indicted the chairman and vice chairman of the Ching Fu Shipbuilding Co. (CFS) for loan fraud. This is two months after the country’s largest private shipbuilder was alleged to have syndicated loan fraud and suspicious money transfers to China associated with the now scandal-ridden minehunter contract. In December 2017, Taiwan’s Navy decided to seize the CFS’s NT$1.69 billion bonds deposited at Kaohsiung branch of the First Commercial Bank (第一銀行) as a pretext for rescission. Meanwhile, as the newly cast hull of the first of this 700-ton minehunter is awaiting installation at the Intermarine shipyard in Italy, Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan has made a somber determination to disappropriate the budget earmarked for the minehunter program for the 2018 fiscal year. The pilot program of the Tsai administration’s indigenous naval shipbuilding policy (國艦國造) appears as if stranded on a distant shore.

While the crux of the attention continues to be on the CFS’s murky investment in China, an “emerging wisdom” among Taiwan’s defense community is that minehunter is a weapon system of the past. Instead of sustaining the scandal-ridden minehunter program, one needs to have “innovative thinking” (新思維) toward building Taiwan’s maritime mine countermeasures capability. Some went even further by recommending aerial mining as a much more cost-effective sea denial strategy than minehunting, which is more defensive in nature. This commentary will not discuss the legal and political implications of the CFS case, as that has been noted by GTI adviser Shirley Kan in a previous GTB issue. Instead, this article seeks to do two things: first, clarify the erroneous logic of aerial mining being a substitute for minehunting in maritime defense; and second, evaluate the availability, as well as effectiveness, of alternative mine countermeasure systems, and make recommendation for the Navy’s countermine warfare. Though ridden with scandals at the moment, minehunting assets remain the most technologically mature and procurable countermine asset to safeguard Taiwan’s maritime security in the near future.

The Lessons of History: The cost of aerial mining and the price of blockade

Perceiving the coming collapse of the minehunter program amidst heightened political tension and media frenzy, the Minister of National Defense Feng Shih-Kuan (馮世寬) expressed his concerns about the feasibility of sustaining the minehunter program. Feng was quoted saying, “[the minehunter program] is not necessarily worth reviewing or implementing,” due to it being formulated more than 10 years ago, and it is no longer compatible with the Tsai administration’s “multi-domain deterrence” (重層嚇阻) defense doctrine and the concept of “asymmetrical warfare.” Some pundits argue in favor of developing aerial mining capability as a more cost-effective substitute for minehunting, because aerial mines are cheaper to produce and can be easily integrated to Taiwan’s current fleet of P-3C maritime patrol aircrafts and F-16 fighters.

Indeed, compared to minehunters, aerial mines are a relatively inexpensive sea denial (or, alternatively, counter-sea denial) weapon system. It only requires slight modification to turn air-dropped bombs into bottom-influence mines and they can be employed in large numbers to disrupt a particular sea lane. The Mk 62/63 “Quickstrike” air-dropped mines currently in the US Navy inventory are modified from Mk 82/83 general-purpose bombs; and recent advances in sensor technology even allows for transforming conventional mines into precision-guided “smart mines.” In fact, Taiwan’s Air Force is exploring ways to empower their P-3Cs with such capability and has demonstrated this potential in a recent video.

However, to say that minelaying substitutes minehunting in maritime defense because it is cheaper and more effective, completely misses the mark. To begin with, aerial mining is not cheap, the execution of aerial mining requires dozen (and even hundreds) of carefully-planned sorties and ten times as many mines to disrupt traffic in a pre-defined sea zone. During its mining campaign against Nazi Germany between 1940-45, the British Royal Air Force launched 19,917 sorties but only sunk 638 vessels.[1] In the last six months of WWII, “Operation Starvation” achieved greater success by sinking 431 Japanese vessels with 1,150 sorties, however it only destroyed 15 aircrafts with the deployment of 12,000 mines.[2]

Quantity and density of mines are the keys to successful mining campaigns, but they are luxuries that Taiwan could ill-afford in wartime. In the scramble for air superiority against the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), Taiwan’s limited inventory of combat aircrafts may get overstretched for aerial mining operation. Moreover, in the absence of escort sorties, aerial mining operation becomes dangerous and futile. At the outbreak of WWII, the Luftwaffe utilized its innovative Luftmine (parachute mine) to augment Kriegsmarine’s naval blockade campaign on Britain, but as the balance of air superiority tilted toward the Allies, the Luftwaffe could no longer pose much threat to British sea-lanes. The same line of reasoning also explains the sweeping success of “Operation Starvation” – the operation was the culmination, rather than the tipping point, of the US air-sea supremacy in the Western Pacific.[3] Hence, we need to factor in the overall offense-defense balance in possible war scenarios in the Taiwan Strait when evaluating the ‘cost’ of aerial mining as a sea denial strategy.

Finally, and largely as a consequence of these previous reasons, a strong minehunting capability should be a vital part of Taiwan’s military strategy to counter China’s anti-access and area denial  (A2/AD) challenges.[4],[5],[6] In the event of military conflicts between Taiwan and China, China could deploy large amount of sea mines to choke off Taiwan’s economic lifeblood and deny possible US naval intervention with minimum investment and risk.[7] Thus, the importance of maintaining sufficient amount of advanced minehunting assets to clear the obstacles that will threaten Taiwan and its allies’ safety of passage along critical sea lanes cannot be overstated, and is not functionally equivalent to developing an aerial mining capability. One need look no further than Japan, where the bitter legacy of WWII impelled the country to develop one of the most sophisticated mine-clearing and minehunting technologies in contemporary navies.[8] For countries as trade dependent as Taiwan, minehunting may be an inefficient but indispensable operational capability to maintain.[9]

Beyond Minehunters: Countermine warfare for a new age

While minehunting is crucial to Taiwan’s maritime security, this function can also be performed by modular shipborne systems in lieu of tailor-made “minehunters.” For example, the USS Independence-class Littoral Combat Ship (LCS-2) can be fitted with Mine Countermeasures Mission Package (MCM MP), consisting of Remote Minehunting Systems (RMS) and AN/AQS-20A advanced minehunting sonar that are modular in design, which can be operated from a distance or uninstalled when minehunting operation is not called for. Major US-based defense contractors like Lockheed Martin, Textron, and General Dynamics also market a variety of remotely-controlled unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) and unmanned surface vehicles (USV) of similar capacity, which can plausibly be carried and launched from small surface combatants such as Taiwan’s Tuo River-class corvette. However, it is uncertain if Taiwan could obtain export licenses for these modules in the short-run or develop its own in the long-run.

As with aerial mining, helicopters’ ability to scan a large area of water at visual range with relative high speed makes them an ideal platform for carrying out minehunting operation. The US Navy utilizes a range of helicopter-borne minehunting systems. The Northrop Grumman’s AN/AES-1 Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) and Raytheon-BAE Systems’ AN/ASQ-235 Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS) can be carried under the sub wings of the Navy’s standard SH/MH-60 Seahawk helicopters to optically detect, identify, and destroy a wide array of floating, near-surface, and bottom mines. The retired MH-53E heavy transport helicopter employed a combination of towed devices – the Mk 105 minesweeping sled, the AN/AQS-14 side scan sonar, and the Mk 103 mechanical minesweeping system – for minehunting operation. An upgraded high-resolution variant of the AN/AQS-14, the AN/AQS-24A, is in service with the MCH-101 helicopter of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). It should be noted, however, that the S-70C series helicopters (the export version of SH/MH-60 Seahawk) currently operated by Taiwan’s Navy do not support the aforementioned helicopter-borne systems and lack the ship-to-helicopter datalink necessary for synchronized target motion analysis (TMA) with the mothership. In 2016, Taiwan intended to acquire 10 MH-60Rs with such datalink capability but the request eventually fell through due to budgetary constraint. Furthermore, both MH-53E and MCH-101 have 10-ton payload to support towed minehunting systems, but Taiwan’s military has yet to acquire this class of heavy utility helicopters. Thus, it is unclear if Taiwan’s current naval aviation assets can support helicopter-borne minehunting operation without major upgrades or new acquisition.

Conclusion

Anticipating CFS’s potential default, Taiwan’s defense community has raised important insights on developing alternative mine warfare strategies, namely: 1) prioritizing aerial mining over minehunting, and 2) seeking new minehunting technologies that can be operated from other platforms. However, upon closer scrutiny, one needs to take into account the overall offense-defense balance across the Taiwan Strait that enables the use of aerial mining against China’s invading fleet and the deadly consequence of downplaying the necessity of minehunting. Also, although newer minehunting technologies may displace the need for minehunters, acquiring these new systems along with their carriers could cause delay on Taiwan’s current military acquisition programs.

The main point: Albeit scandal-ridden, minehunter remains the most technologically mature and procurable countermine asset to safeguard Taiwan’s maritime security in the short-run.


[1] Christina J. M. Goulter, Offensive: Royal Air Force Coastal Command’s Anti-Shipping Campaign 1940-1945 (London, UK: Routledge, 1995), 297.

[2] Frederick M. Sallagar, Lessons from Aerial Mining Campaign (Operation “Starvation”) (Washington, DC: RAND Corporation), 41-71.

[3] Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945 (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press, 1991).

[4] David W. Jr. Kearn, “Air-Sea Battle and China’s Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenge,” Orbis Vol. 58, Issue 1 (Winter 2014): 132-46.

[5] James R. Holmes, “Defeating China’s Fortress Fleet and A2/AD Strategy: Lessons for the United States and Her Allies,” The Diplomat, (June 20, 2016).

[6] Andrew S. Erickson et al. “Correspondence: How Good Are China’s Antiaccess/Area-Denial Capabilities?” International Security Vol. 41, Issue 4 (Spring 2017): 202-13.

[7] Scott C. Truver, “Chinese Mines Pose Taiwan Blockade Threat,” Naval War College Review Vol. 65, Issue 2 (Spring 2012): 30-66.

[8] Alessio Patalano, Post-war Japan as a Sea Power: Imperial Legacy, Wartime Experience and the Making of a Navy (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), Ch. 4&6.

[9] Trade dependence is measured as the ratio of total amount of import and export to GDP. As of 2017 Q3, Taiwan’s trade dependence is 102%. Source: Stock-ai  https://stock-ai.com/eom-99-twDDTT.php

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