The Global Taiwan Brief Volume 4, Issue 17
Fortnightly Review
By: Russell Hsiao
Chinese and Indian Perceptions of Taiwan’s Place in Sino-Indian Geopolitics
By: I-wei Jennifer Chang
Proxy Organizations in Taiwan Align with Beijing’s Push for “One Country, Two Systems”
By: J. Michael Cole
What EU’s Next Foreign Policy Head May Mean for Taiwan
By: Amb. Michael Reilly (ret.)
Does Taiwan’s Overseas Community Affairs Council Have a Role in Countering China’s United Front “Active Measures” Operations?
By: John J. Tkacik, Jr.
[The PDF version of this issue can be downloaded here.]
Fortnightly Review
Russell Hsiao is the executive director of the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) and editor-in-chief of the Global Taiwan Brief.
Political Warfare Alert: Retired Generals Participate in Cross-Strait Forum on Sino-Japanese War
On August 20, the “Symposium on Passing on Chinese Anti-Japanese War History and Anti-War Spirit” (中華民族抗日戰爭史與抗戰精神傳承研討會) opened in Nanning city, in Guangxi province. Attendees of the two-day conference gathered in the historic Chinese city in southern China to commemorate one of the landmark battles of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). More than 500 participants reportedly attended the politically-tinged event, including retired generals, scholars, and youths from both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The event’s organizers were the China-based Academy of History of Chinese Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (中國抗日戰爭史學會) and the Taiwan-based Memorial Association for the Chinese People’s Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (台灣中華民族抗日戰爭紀念協會), and reportedly co-organized by the Guangxi Academy of Social Sciences (廣西社會科學院) and the Taiwan History Education ‘Three Self’ Movement Association (台灣歷史教育新三自運動協會). Another supporting organization might have included the Chinese Integration Association (兩岸統合學會) based in Taiwan.
The conference was attended by senior retired generals from both Taiwan and China. Participants from Taiwan included former deputy defense minister and retired Lieutenant General Wang Wen-hsieh (王文燮, b. 1932), former commander of the Republic Of China (ROC) Marines Corps General Chi Li-lien (季麟連, b. 1947), retired Lieutenant General Kao An-kuo (高安國, b. 1944), and former dean of the Army Command and Staff College at the National Defense University Huang Ping-lin (黃炳麟), among others. Huang concurrently serves as the chief supervisor of one of the event co-organizers, the Chinese Anti-Japanese War Memorial Association in Taiwan. Senior participants from China included the chairman of the Chinese Anti-Japanese History Association, Wang Jianlang (王建朗, b. 1956), and the former political commissar of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Nanjing Military Region, retired Lieutenant General Fang Zuyu (方祖岐, b. 1935), and the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office Deputy Director Long Mingbiao (龍明彪), among others.
This year’s meeting is the third iteration of this series. Previous conferences organized by the same hosts were held in Nanjing in 2017 and Wuhan in 2018—both places were also major battle sites in the Second Sino-Japanese War. For instance, to mark the 80th anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (also known as the July 7th Incident, 七七事變) in July 2017, the two main organizers held a similar event to commemorate the clash between a small regiment of the Nationalist Army and the Japanese Imperial Army from July 7-9, 1937, which many war historians believe sparked the Second Sino-Japanese War.
The Second Sino-Japanese War was a watershed event that historians generally agree materially led to the Nationalist government’s defeat in the second Chinese civil war (1946-1950) to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). These cross-Strait symposiums focused on revisiting the Second Sino-Japanese War, which have been occurring on a more high-profile and frequent basis after the mid-2000s, are part of a concerted effort by the CCP to reframe the country’s narrative on history, especially those events involving the Communist and Nationalist parties during the Republican period. This is ostensibly an effort to forge a common and united narrative between the two parties. Indeed, since as far back as 2005, the CCP has been trying to re-assimilate the Nationalist Party into its political narrative through various means, including political warfare. In 2015, CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping proposed for the Chinese people on the two sides to jointly revise anti-Japanese history (兩岸共修抗戰史) and Beijing has been actively promoting greater awareness and understanding of the history and spirit of the anti-Japanese war.
At the 2017 conference in Nanjing, the keynote speaker for the conference was the former premier of Taiwan and chief of general staff Hau Pei-tsun (郝柏村, b. 1919). In his keynote address, General Hau declared that the victory against the Japanese in World War II was the “shared glory” (共同光榮) of both the Nationalists and the Communists. With the express purpose to develop a common political narrative on modern Chinese history, Hau emphasized five principles that must guide studies on the history of the Sino-Japanese war. First, it must stand on the side of the Chinese nation; second, it must stand on the side of academic enlightenment, and not be influenced by any political sympathies; third, it must stand on a strategic level; fourth, it must stand as a neutral observer, and use the perspective of younger generations to understand the truth of history; and fifth, it must stand on the side of its influence on global human peace in understanding the relationship between the resistance to Japanese aggression and World War II.
This year’s conference location in Nanning was chosen to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the Battle of Kunlun Pass (崑崙關戰役) on December 18 in 1939. Speakers at the conference hoisted the battle as a symbol of the strength of Chinese unity, as the campaign was the first major victory of the Chinese army since the Battle of Wuhan. While it is a commonly accepted fact that the Nationalist Army suffered far more losses than the Communist Army during the Sino-Japanese wars, the CCP has until recently tried to downplay or dismiss the role of the KMT (Kuomintang, also known as the Nationalist Party) . As such, these events, which celebrate these historic events as joint efforts of the two sides, appear intended to promote a united front through a shared sense of sacrifice between both the Nationalist Party and Communist Party during the war.
The executive director of the Taiwan-based Chinese Integration Association, Cheng Chi-sheng (鄭旗生), stated that the reason why they were participating in the event now is because Taiwan is no longer talking about the anti-Japanese war. The Association is a non-governmental organization established in 2008 for promoting acceptance of “One-China” on both sides of the Taiwan Strait with the express purpose of advancing cross-Strait peaceful development. Most of the original members of the group came from the Democratic Action Alliance (民主行動聯盟), which is a non-governmental organization active in opposing US arms sales to Taiwan through the Anti-6108 Arms Sales Coalition (反6108軍購大聯盟). The current chairman of the organization is the 2019 KMT presidential primary candidate Chang Ya-chung (張亞中, b. 1954) with the secretary general as Hsieh Ta-Ning (謝大寧, b. 1957).
During his speech at this year’s conference, TAO’s Deputy Director Long criticized so-called “Taiwan independence forces,” specifically, he called out the ruling-Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) for promoting various “Taiwan independence activities to de-Sinicize [Taiwan],” which have blocked cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation, suppressed and threatened civil society groups and people engaged in cross-Strait exchanges. Long accused them of “even beautifying Japanese colonial rule […] and [being] anti-Chinese accomplices with Western countries seeking to contain China.” According to Long, Taiwan independence forces are “national scums, [and] like the traitors who sold the country for glory during the War of Resistance, will eventually be sent to criminal trial and historical courts.” He also mentioned that the purpose of the conference is to bring together friends from all walks of life and on both sides of the Strait to jointly carry forward and pass on the spirit of the war of resistance against Japan, unite and work together at the crucial moment of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” and safeguard the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations.
Wang—the former deputy defense minister and director of the Huang Fuhsing Bureau (黃復興黨部) within the KMT (Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party)—and a regular at this and other cross-Strait united front exchanges, pointed out that the resistance relied on the full cooperation between the Nationalist and the Communist Party; therefore, according to Wang, it is the “Chinese nation” who defeated Japan. He stated that the two sides must pursue the truth of history and let future generations know more about this past. Wang also waxed poetically and said that Xi Jinping’s “community of human destiny” represents the ideals of Taiwan’s founding father, Sun Yat-sen.
The main point: A series of cross-Strait forums organized on the history of the Sino-Japanese war since 2017 are part of a broader effort to reframe the historical narrative of the war to serve the CCP’s united front objectives.
Taipei Mayor Forms New Political Party: Taiwan People’s Party
With little more than five months until Taiwan’s next presidential and legislative elections in January 2020, Ko Wen-je (柯文哲, b. 1959)—the independent mayor of Taipei—formally launched a new political party on August 6 called the Taiwan People’s Party (台灣民眾黨黨). In a move that caught many political observers by surprise, the new political party will reportedly aim to field candidates to run in the upcoming legislative elections in January 2020 that will be held in tandem with the country’s presidential election. While many observers believe Ko will run in the upcoming presidential race, it is not clear how he would manage to effectively run a nationwide campaign or govern if he were to win. Currently without a reliable base of political support for his legislative agenda inside the Legislative Yuan, Ko’s decision to form a political party appears intended to support his run for president—if not in 2020, then very likely in 2024.
Even in a political system that has been dominated by two political parties for more than the past two decades, the creation of another political party is not in itself a material addition to the island’s democratic political landscape. Taiwan has competitive third parties—albeit to varying successes—for quite some time. Yet, what distinguishes the TPP to other political parties is the non-aligned orientation of the party and of Ko’s own popularity. Other smaller parties, such as the People’s First Party (PFP) and the more recently formed New Power Party (NPP), are associated with the two bigger political parties (the KMT and DPP) and generally aligned with the two dominant coalitions (for instance, the PFP is part of the pan-Blue coalition whereas the NPP is part of the pan-Green coalition). On the other hand, the TPP appears, at least on the surface, to be an independent party—not belonging to either coalition although drawing from moderate supporters of the two political parties, as well as independents.
A cursory survey of the TPP’s composition seems to indicate that Ko’s supporters draw from a broad mix of political stripes. This is perhaps an effort to strengthen his party’s image as a political party that is not tied to any of the existing coalitions. See below a non-exhaustive list of senior members of the TPP reported on in the local media outlets:
Central Committee (中央委員): Zhang Yiwei (張益贍), Zhou Zhongyu (周鐘麒), Lin Funan (林富男), Huang Weiwei (黃胤為)
Central Review Committee (中央評議委員): Lai Xiangwei (賴祥蔚), Cai Yilun (蔡易倫), Lai Junming (賴俊銘), Lai Zhenglong (賴正龍), Yang Xingchang (楊行昌)
Other party members (reported in the media): Li Wenzong (李文宗), Yu Jiazhe (余家哲), Zhang Zheyang (張哲揚), Chen Xuetai (陳學台), Lin Chongjie (林崇傑), Cai Bairu (蔡壁如), Li Yuying (李縉穎), Chen Jianwei (陳建璋), Liu Yiren (劉瀛仁), Liu Wei (劉奕霆), Ke Xiaoan (柯昱安), Huang Yuying (黃瀞瑩), Xie Hexian (謝和弦), Dong Dejun (董德堉)
Notably absent were any prominent politicians. Some of the politicians at the launch ceremony include former Tainan County commissioner Su Huang-chih, and former legislators Hsu Hsin-ying (徐欣瑩) of Hsinchu County, Lisa Huang (黃文玲) of Changhua County and Chi Kuo-tung (紀國棟) from Taichung.
By using the name “Taiwan People’s Party,” Ko is also drawing from the emotional appeal of Chiang Wei-shui (蒋渭水)—a Taiwanese revolutionary pre-1949 who established the first political party in the island by the same name during Japanese colonial rule in 1927. As the party’s first chairman, Ko stated as much in claiming that his new party will inherit Chiang’s legacy. It is interesting to note that Ko and Chiang share the same birthdate and the formal launch of the TPP was held on their birthday.
While some observers are dismissive of Ko’s self-professed “neutral line” and argue that the TPP will not appeal to the Taiwanese people who have strong party and identity consciousness, the potential impact of this new political party should not be readily dismissed and may be more significant than observers think in Taiwan’s current political environment. The ongoing rift between members in the opposition party for the presidential race may further splinter votes from the KMT. Rumors of potential independent runs by Terry Guo and Wang Jin-pyng, two heavyweights of the KMT, could open up a huge chasm in the party and encourage supporters to look for another party to vote for (not necessarily the DPP) in the upcoming elections. The TPP may just be that party. Similarly, the fraying of the NPP with the departure of several top leaders over an apparent internal split over whom to support in the upcoming presidential election could weaken voter support for the young political party in the legislative elections. There are public chatters about several smaller parties that may be formed from within the green coalition by deep green factions represented by the Formosa Alliance and also by former President Chen Shui-bian to compete in the upcoming legislative election, which would mean that there are more candidates for voters to choose from in the 2020 legislative elections.
According to the latest public opinion poll data from the National Chengchi University’s Election Study Center released in July 2019, a plurality of respondents identifies as independent or provided a non-response at 42.5 percent (down from 49.1 percent in 2018). Interestingly, party identification for both the ruling party (the DPP) and the opposition party (the KMT) increased with 24.5 percent identifying as DPP supporters (up from 20.1), and 27.6 percent of respondents identifying as KMT supporters (up from 25.4 percent). Moreover, 4.7 percent of respondents said they identify themselves as New Power Party (NPP) supporters (up from 4.0 percent), while other parties received less than 1 percent.
The main point: Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je launched the Taiwan People’s Party on August 6. His decision to form a political party appears intended to support his run for president—if not in 2020, then very likely in 2024.
Chinese and Indian Perceptions of Taiwan’s Place in Sino-Indian Geopolitics
I-wei Jennifer Chang is a research fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute.
India’s decision on August 5 to revoke Kashmir’s special status has led to heightened tensions with Pakistan and China in an already volatile geopolitical arena. After the Indian government downgraded Jammu and Kashmir’s statehood to “union territories” to be ruled by India’s central government, China opposed the Indian move, calling it “unacceptable” and an attempt to “undermine China’s territorial sovereignty.” Yet, China’s position on India’s latest Kashmir move could be tempered by its realization that India could cause trouble for Beijing on other fronts such as Taiwan. From Beijing’s perspective, India has many leverage points from which it can seek to undermine Chinese national interests, ranging from the South China Sea, Tibet, and Taiwan, as well as cozying up to the United States and Japan under the US Indo-Pacific Strategy.
Chinese analysts believe that the government of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been advised by Indian influencers to utilize the “Taiwan card” to exert pressure on Beijing. Chinese scholars have expressed their suspicion that India has used the Taiwan issue to hit back at Beijing for its USD $62-billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) with India’s archenemy Pakistan. A Global Times editorial states, “As the corridor passes through the disputed Kashmir, some Indian strategists have advised the Modi government to play the Taiwan card, using the commitment of the ‘One-China’ policy as leverage in exchange for China’s endorsement of ‘One India’.” It warned, “By challenging China over the Taiwan question, India is playing with fire.” Playing the “Taiwan card” would be extremely detrimental to Sino-Indian relations, another Global Times editorial argued.
Since 2010, the Indian government has refused to officially endorse the “One-China Principle”—not seemingly because it supports changing Taiwan’s legal status but rather because it perceives the lack of Chinese respect for India’s concerns over disputed territories with Pakistan and China. The Indian government last endorsed the “One-China Principle” in a 2008 joint statement. By contrast, the 2010 joint statement between Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh did not mention India’s affirmation of its “One-China” policy. New Delhi apparently withdrew its support after China issued stapled Chinese visas, instead of regular visas, to Jammu and Kashmir residents, angering the Indian government. In 2014, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj said, ahead of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) visit to India, “For India to agree to a ‘One-China’ policy, China should reaffirm a ‘One-India’ policy.” Indians have argued that if Beijing seeks New Delhi’s backing of Chinese claims over Tibet and Taiwan under the “One-China” framework, then the Chinese government also needs to reciprocate its support of “One India” and respect Indian sovereignty, such as by stopping CPEC projects in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Beijing also does not accept the Indian-administered, northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh as Indian territory, instead claiming it as part of southern Tibet. Meanwhile, India claims the Chinese-administered Aksai Chin, which borders Jammu and Kashmir.
Over the years, Beijing has become more sensitive about political exchanges between its two rivals, New Delhi and Taipei. After a three-member Taiwanese parliamentary delegation led by Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislator Kuan Bi-ling (管碧玲), who chairs the Taiwan-India Parliamentary Friendship Association, visited India in February 2017, the Chinese government protested and urged New Delhi to adhere to the “One-China Principle.” The Indian government brushed off the Chinese protests, stating, “There is nothing new or unusual about such visits, and political meanings should not be read into them.” Such informal visits by Taiwanese groups have also been taken to China, said India’s Ministry of External Affairs. China’s Foreign Ministry also criticized a plan to upgrade Taiwan’s representative office in New Delhi that was discussed during the Taiwanese delegation’s visit. “We are also opposed to the establishment of any official institutions,” said foreign ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang. China has urged the Indian government to stick to the “One-China Principle” on numerous occasions and said that doing so would greatly help enhance mutual trust between the two countries.
Indian analysts have debated the merits of hewing so strictly to Beijing’s hardline approach of restricting major forms of engagement with Taiwan that has caused New Delhi to traditionally neglect its relations with the island. C. Raja Mohan, director of the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore, wrote, “India […] has too many self-imposed constraints on its Taiwan policy. It is now time to lift many of them.” Mohan urges the Indian government to “replace its current incrementalism with a more ambitious policy” towards Taipei based on geopolitical and geoeconomic reasons. He argues Taiwan “holds the key to the geopolitics of East Asia,” which will, in turn, impact India’s “Act East Policy” and its role in the Indo-Pacific region. Taiwan could also potentially help Modi’s economic agenda of boosting manufacturing and creating new jobs in India, he said.
In view of Taiwan’s economic appeal to India, Chinese commentators have posited that India can reap more economic gains by joining the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, also known as “One Belt, One Road”) than from Taiwan’s economic investments in the South Asian country—which President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) administration is pursuing through the “New Southbound Policy” (新南向政策). A Global Times editorial acknowledged how growing Taiwanese investment in India is “important to Modi’s ‘Made in India’ campaign,” but said that “the best way for India to develop is by participating in the Belt and Road Initiative and attract more investments from the mainland.” The Chinese are also wary that President Tsai is “exploiting India’s vigilance and strategic suspicions against China” and urged Indians to be cautious of “Tsai’s political intentions.” The Chinese government has repeatedly invited India to participate in Xi’s grand connectivity plan, but India has refused to officially endorse the BRI, frustrating Chinese regional ambitions. Amid heightened cross-Strait tensions, China wants India to choose greater economic cooperation with Beijing in lieu of closer ties with Taipei.
However, the dynamics in the China-Taiwan-India triangular relationship do not revolve around India’s choice between China and Taiwan; Taiwan also has to decide on economic and geopolitical pathways towards India and/or China. As Taipei seeks to lessen its economic dependence on China, it is looking towards India, which also boasts a huge domestic market, as an alternate route for Taiwanese goods and foreign direct investment. The underlying rationale is that Taiwanese companies can utilize India to diversify its trade and investment portfolio and avoid the geoeconomic risks associated with hefty investments in China, particularly as the US-China trade war is yet unresolved and will continue into the near future.
Indeed, Taiwan and India share economic synergies between the former’s “New Southbound Policy” and the latter’s “Act East Policy” and “Made in India” initiative. Taiwanese businesses are stepping up their investments in India, while Taiwan’s technical know-how and potential to create jobs in India appeal to the Indian government. As of December 2017, more than 100 Taiwanese companies invested USD $1.5 billion in India, in sectors including information technology, shipping, shoe manufacturing, and financial industries. The Taiwan External Trade Development Council (TAITRA) said Taiwan is considering creating industrial parks in India as part of the “Make in India” Initiative. Additional areas of Taiwan-India collaboration include information technology, petrochemicals, food processing, electronic manufacturing, and electric vehicles. Taiwan’s expertise in information and communication technology, artificial intelligence, hardware manufacturing, and other sectors could play a positive role in the Indian government’s “Digital India,” “Skill India,” and “Smart Cities” initiatives, said Taiwan’s Representative to India Chung-kwang Tien (田中光).
As Taiwan seeks to strengthen economic, political, and people-to-people ties with South Asian countries, India, as a rising economic and regional power, democratic country, and important player in a free and open Indo-Pacific region, is a natural partner for Taiwan. Both sides have much to gain from enhanced economic and trade ties. After signing a bilateral investment agreement in 2002 and renewing it in 2018, Taiwan’s government is eager to discuss a possible Free Trade Agreement with India. As it pursues economic and other ties with India, Taipei needs to carefully navigate the Sino-Indian rivalry without becoming a card to be played by either Beijing or New Delhi. In a similar fashion, Taipei should also weigh the costs and benefits of using the India card to unnerve Beijing.
The main point: Taiwan remains one of several sticking points in Sino-Indian relations, particularly as India has refused to affirm the “One-China” policy and Taiwan and India have forged closer economic ties. Taipei should carefully navigate South Asian geopolitics and avoid becoming a pawn in the geopolitical game between the two rising Asian powers.
Proxy Organizations in Taiwan Align with Beijing’s Push for “One Country, Two Systems”
J. Michael Cole is a senior non-resident fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute.
Developments in Hong Kong since the Umbrella Movement in 2014, and further erosions of political liberties in the special administrative region this year culminating in the ongoing series of mass protests in the territory, have underscored the fact that, two decades after retrocession, the “one country, two systems” formula is a defunct policy that is not meeting the needs and expectations of the residents of the former British colony. The instability in Hong Kong has also sent shockwaves across Taiwan and appears to have been beneficial to President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), who will seek re-election in January 2020. The situation in Hong Kong, and the authorities’ response to it, have consolidated the belief in Taiwan that “one country, two systems”—the same failing formula that Beijing has insisted upon for the eventual unification of Taiwan—could not work in democratic Taiwan.
After Chinese Communist Party Secretary-General Xi Jinping (習近平) made it clear in his address to Taiwanese “compatriots” on January 2, 2019 that “one China,” another Beijing precondition, enshrines “one country, two systems,” even the opposition Kuomintang (KMT), regarded as more friendly towards China, felt it necessary to state that the formula was unacceptable to the Taiwanese. Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je (柯文哲), a potential third candidate in the January elections, who earlier this month formed a new “centrist” political party, has also stated his opposition to the formula for Taiwan. After initially ignoring the unrest in Hong Kong, the KMT’s presidential candidate, Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜), asserted that “one country, two systems” could only be implemented “over my dead body.” No doubt Han, who upon his victory in last November’s local elections in Kaohsiung embarked on a visit to Hong Kong, Macau, and Xiamen, where he interacted with officials from the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) and met with Carrie Lam, and who is backed by various organizations, such as the Huang Fu-hsing faction and the China Unification Promotion Party (CUPP), that are known to be ideologically close to China, made those remarks tactically, knowing that campaigning on a platform, which promotes “one country, two systems” would be abortive.
Still, some parties, such as the aforementioned CUPP and the New Party (NP), which have stated their support for the KMT’s Han in the upcoming elections, continue to actively and openly promote “one country, two systems” as the only solution for Taiwan. Speaking at a function on the 26th anniversary of the founding of the NP earlier this month, party chairman Yok Mu-ming (郁慕明) unveiled an eight-point “one country, two systems” policy. This policy includes: (1) the “peaceful reunification” of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and respect for their political and economic systems and lifestyles; (2) inclusion of Taiwanese representatives as part of the Chinese delegation to the United Nations; (3) the maintenance of Taiwan’s multi-party competition in elections but not allowing “Taiwan independence” or “separatist activities”; (4) an end to hostilities by the two sides, accompanied by a reduction in the size of the Taiwanese military and an end to arms purchases from the United States; (5) the continued promotion of a shared cross-Strait history in books and through the sharing of historical materials; (6) the objective representation of compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait; (7) contributions by both sides to the revival of the “glorious history” of the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation; and (8) restoration of the rights of retired military personnel.
In the same statement, Yok attributed growing tensions in the Taiwan Strait to the Tsai administration’s unwillingness to cooperate with Beijing, and did not offer one iota of criticism of the CCP or point out that Taiwan’s resistance to China’s excesses under Xi is part of a larger trend and not, as he claims, the fault of an unreasonable Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, President Tsai’s party). He also maintained that the “one China,” which would emerge after unification would be neither the Republic of China (Taiwan) or the People’s Republic of China (PRC), but rather, to paraphrase, the sum of its equal parts.
It is difficult to ascertain whether Yok, or other proponents of “one country, two systems” like the CUPP’s Chang An-le (張安樂), genuinely believe that the formula could apply to Taiwan or are instead providing a smokescreen for Beijing’s greater ambitions. It is also conceivable that the CUPP and the NP are simply reflecting Beijing’s wishes, despite the rapid erosion of the “one country, two systems” appeal amid the escalating protests. What is more certain is that the belief that Beijing would treat Taiwan, or the ROC, as an equal in this partnership is naive at best, and is bound to encounter resistance even within the KMT mainstream. Tensions between Yok’s vision and the KMT have already appeared. Last week, Yok deplored what he called the KMT’s aligning itself with President and Tsai in equating the “one country, two systems” proposed for Taiwan with that which has applied to Hong Kong and Macau. This war of words between Yok and the KMT chairman reflects an ongoing ideological battle within the blue camp. More pro-Beijing parties and factions, many of which operate on the peripheries of the core KMT, are actively trying to influence the party toward a more pro-Beijing stance, which the mainstream KMT knows would have little appeal in elections. (This also comes at a time when the KMT is seeking to reassure the United States that, should it return to power in 2020, the KMT would not bring Taiwan too close to China.)
Is there any legitimacy to Yok’s claim that “one country, two systems” as applied to Taiwan would be different from Hong Kong and Macau? Yok’s very first point undoubtedly whitewashes what has occurred in Hong Kong since 1997, which leaves no doubt that “two systems” will inevitably be accompanied by a gradual erosion of political rights and freedoms—possibly a more sudden one, as Beijing likely will have concluded from its troubles in Hong Kong that freedoms are a headache and will need to crack down more severely on a society, which has been proudly democratic for three decades and ruled independently from “the mainland” for more than a century. Efforts to pacify Taiwan would inevitably undermine any commitment to Yok’s first point.
Compounding all this is the strident ultranationalism that has buttressed the CCP’s legitimacy in the eyes of the Chinese since the events at Tiananmen Square in 1989. After Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) launched China on the road to economic growth, the CCP felt compelled to replace communist ideology with the cultivation of nationalism, starting in schools. We are experiencing decades of that nationalism now. With the exception of a handful of intellectuals and dissidents, many of them imprisoned, most of Chinese society’s disregard for the treatment of minorities in China—from Xinjiang’s Uyghurs to Tibet’s buddhists to underground Christians and many others—has been alimented and been channeling a vitriolic form of Han chauvinism that does not brook criticism or opposition. With critics silenced or detained, this wave has been exacerbated by the internet and is now being unleashed with full force on a global scale, as demonstrated by the mobilization of Chinese students and civil societies to intimidate, and on occasion physically assault, critics of the CCP.
While the CCP and its supporters maintain the claim that Hong Kong, or Xinjiang, or Tibet, are indivisible parts of China, they have had no compunction in allowing the regime to detain them by the thousands, or to use indiscriminate violence against the worst offenders. In other words, while the claims are territorial, the inhabitants of those supposedly Chinese territories are, when necessary, regarded as less than “Han” Chinese—a racialization that invites abuse. Comments by pro-CCP demonstrators during ostensibly coordinated mobilizations in capitals worldwide recently, including a young Chinese student telling a Hong Kong counterpart during rallies in Melbourne, Australia, that “You deserve the freedom we [China] give you [Hong Kong]” amid chants of “Traitors to the Han race!” or, in London, a Chinese waving a placard, which read “Kneel down and lick you master’s ass,” and the occasional attacks on pro-Hong Kong protesters in countries outside China, have taken China’s concept of Han hegemony to a global level.
With all these examples of excess and abuse, it is difficult to imagine how the CCP could treat Taiwan any differently. Through the lens of China’s ultranationalism, Taiwan is no different than Hong Kong or Xinjiang, a piece of real estate, which ought to belong to China. Its inhabitants and minorities will be accepted into the “Han” super race as long as they bow to Beijing’s will; those who refuse to do so are dispensable, traitors, and therefore subject to various controls. The idea that somehow Beijing would give more preferential treatment to Taiwan, allowing it, as Yok’s confabulations suggest, full retention of political freedoms and way of life, flies in the face of the CCP’s ideology. Giving more to the difficult Taiwanese would risk emboldening other minorities in other parts of China and thereby cause more trouble for the CCP. Thus, even if it wanted to, the CCP could not make Taiwan a better offer than it has for, say, Hong Kong. Consequently, erosion, and amid resistance, pacification, are the only logical outcomes to “peaceful unification” under “one country, two systems” or any other arrangement, for that matter, as long as China continues to be ruled by an authoritarian, Han chauvinist ideology.
In the coming months, the Taiwanese will have to pay particular attention to what their politicians—and not just the fringe ones like Yok and Chang—tell them, and to make sure that their China policy truly reflects their avowed refusal to accept “one country, two systems.” With Beijing showing no indication that it is willing to compromise on the issue, Taiwanese politicians who flirt with the idea of more closeness with China will need to be closely scrutinized and held to account. Represented by a candidate whose suspected ties with the CCP have raised concerns, the KMT is now once again flirting with the idea of reaching a “peace agreement” or engaging in supposedly inevitable “peace talks” with China—presumably after the holding of a referendum on the matter—the kind of proposal that, as per Beijing’s playbook, could very well be part of a slippery-slope strategy that lands Taiwan into “one country, two systems” dead-end.
The main point: Beijing’s “one country, two systems” offer for Taiwan is a terrible one, made all the more unappealing by rising Han ultranationalism and the example set in Hong Kong. Still, there are forces afoot in Taiwan which are trying to drag the country toward that destination—some openly, and others covertly.
What EU’s Next Foreign Policy Head May Mean for Taiwan
By: Amb. Michael Reilly (ret.)
Ambassador Michael Reilly (ret.) is a non-resident senior fellow of the Taiwan Studies Program in the Institute of Asia and Pacific Studies at the University of Nottingham and a member of GTI’s Advisory Board. His most recent book, “The Implications of Brexit for East Asia,” co-edited with David W. F. Huang, was published by Palgrave Macmillan in July 2018.
The European Union (EU) has traditionally taken a very cautious approach in its dealings with Taiwanese governments, irrespective of their political hue. Almost all member states follow the EU itself in maintaining an explicit “One-China” policy and engagement with Taiwanese ministers has been kept to a minimum, usually confined to trade matters. Given the difficulty of getting access to governments, Taiwanese missions in Europe have customarily sought to develop ties with politicians instead, notably within the European Parliament. So the Taiwanese government will have taken heart from a number of developments over the course of this year, the more so given relentless Chinese efforts to squeeze still further the country’s diminishing diplomatic space. Yet, the potential pick for the EU’s next foreign policy head may portend rougher waters ahead for Taipei.
The position of the EU’s top diplomat is not an insignificant role. The High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy is in effect the EU Foreign Minister and therefore directly responsible for EU foreign policy. As one example of the growing importance of the position, both the last two people in it were directly involved in the negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. Increasingly, on routine matters the member states are content to leave policy-making and policy statements to the HR. To take the example of China, in recent years, most European statements criticizing Chinese policy on human rights or in the S. China Sea have been issued by the HR. If member states make any statement, they usually do so only after the HR, that way they reduce the risk of China attacking them as they can say they are merely supporting EU policy.
In January 2019, Federica Mogherini, the EU’s outgoing High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy told members of the European Parliament of the EU’s interest in developing closer relations with Taiwan. Then in May, several EU member states including Germany and the UK publicly voiced support for Taiwanese participation in the World Health Assembly in Geneva, and at the end of June in an unprecedented step, Foreign Minister Joseph Wu attended the 2019 Copenhagen Democracy Summit in his official capacity. Collectively, these actions together with other steps send a signal of discreet but growing European support for Taiwan to be, in the words of Mogherini, an active player in international affairs.
But 2019 also sees the periodic five-yearly changeover of all the leading positions within the EU. Under this switch, Germany’s Ursula von der Leyen has already been approved as the next president of the European Commission and member states are negotiating among themselves as to who to nominate for the other key roles. Convention holds that no single member state should hold more than one key position at any one time but considerable horse-trading takes place between the member states, each of whom is anxious to ensure they have a voice within Brussels’ inner circle. Yet, in the same way that in the United States all senior appointments in an administration must be approved by Congress, so in Europe all the appointments are subject to the approval of the European Parliament. Like Congress, the parliament can vote against nominees but not put forward alternatives.
Few EU governments will be sorry to see Mogherini go. When she was appointed to the position, she was just 41 years old and her previous experience was limited to eight months as Italian foreign minister. She struggled to make an impac, former Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi describing her performance as “close to zero on almost all the most important dossiers.” Nor was Mogherini the first in this situation. She took over from the UK’s Baroness Ashton who had the position by virtue of it being offered to the UK in the expectation that the country’s then influential and dynamic foreign secretary David Miliband would take it. When he declined, the British government struggled to find an alternative before settling on Ashton.
While both Ashton and Mogherini deserve credit for their roles in the long and tortuous negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program, after two such low-key appointments, European governments will now be anxious to see someone with more experience and impact occupy the position, especially given growing international uncertainty and tensions.
As part of the process of new appointments, the Spanish government has nominated its acting foreign minister, 72-year-old Josep Borrell, to fill the seat. In contrast to Mogherini, Borrell is a seasoned politician with experience of handling several different ministries. He even once had ambitions of becoming prime minister. He has also spent time in the European Parliament. So, governments and European parliamentarians alike, anxious to see someone with more impact and political clout in the important foreign policy role, are likely to welcome his nomination. Although his nomination must still be approved by the European Parliament, the early indications are that this will be a formality.
Taiwan, however, will have good reason to be concerned, should his appointment be confirmed. Firstly, Spain has long been one of China’s most important allies within the EU. As one academic has explained: “No matter the party in power, Spanish authorities are […] among the most accommodating leaders in Europe with regard to Beijing’s policies on Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang.”
There are many examples of this accommodating stance: the Dalai Lama has visited Spain five times but has not once been received at official level, in contrast to his visits to France, Germany and the UK; the Taipei representative office in Spain receives less support from the local authorities than its counterparts in other major European capitals; Spanish universities have refused to host events promoting Taiwanese studies; and while other EU missions in Taipei have changed their names in recent years to reflect the range of issues with which they deal, variously being termed Office (Austria, France, UK) or Institute (Germany), Spain’s is still officially no more than a chamber of commerce.
Added to Spain’s official line is Borrell’s own position. For he is from Catalonia, the northeastern region of Spain that defied the central government by voting in favor of independence in a 2017 referendum denounced by the government in Madrid as illegal. In their determination to prevent Catalonia from splitting from Spain, successive Spanish governments have adopted an almost instinctive opposition to separatist movements generally, presumably out of fear of a contagion effect. For example, unlike other EU members, Spain refuses to recognize Kosovo as a state, complicating the EU’s efforts at diplomacy in the Balkans. Consistent with this hard-line approach, Borrell himself is firmly opposed to Catalonian separatism and this opposition extends to anything he considers to be a separatist movement elsewhere. Chinese officials are therefore likely to find him very receptive to their arguments about Taiwanese “splittism” and he is not likely to be too concerned that the circumstances of Taiwan and Catalonia are very different.
The government in Taipei can take some comfort from the fact that whoever is appointed as the next EU high representative will have their hands full dealing with problems closer to home, in Iran, Syria, and Libya, not to mention Russia. Officially, too, the high representative, like other appointees, is meant to act in the collective interests of the EU as a whole, not those of his or her own individual member state. But, while encouraging, Mogherini’s words of support for Taiwan in January and Foreign Minister Wu’s reception in Copenhagen were one-off acts—symbolic, not substantive. They were not based on any formal mechanism or agreement, so there is no certainty that they will be repeated. And the majority of EU states place business opportunities at the forefront of their relationships with China, so they are unlikely to be concerned if the next high representative appears to take a more sympathetic position towards the country.
The foreign ministry in Taipei would therefore be well advised to instruct its missions in European capitals to be urging the country’s friends and supporters in the European Parliament to grill Borrell hard on what his attitude towards Taiwan will be when he appears before them for his confirmation hearings.
The main point: The limited progress that has taken place in EU-Taiwan relations in recent years risks being undone under the likely next EU foreign policy head. Taiwan should be working with its European friends now to try to mitigate the potential challenge.
Does Taiwan’s Overseas Community Affairs Council Have a Role in Countering China’s United Front “Active Measures” Operations?
John J. Tkacik directs the Future Asia Project at the International Assessment and Strategy Center in Alexandria, Virginia. He is a retired US foreign service officer who served at US embassies in both Taipei and Beijing, consulates in Hong Kong and Guangzhou, and in the Department of State, where he was chief of China analysis in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). Tkacik is a member of GTI’s Advisory Board.
“The Republic of China” (ROC) is a nomenclature that insidiously engenders profound and universal diplomatic misunderstanding. For understandable reasons, most Taiwanese today are not enthusiastic about an “official” name that their country inherited from a war they had nothing to do with. And, for similar reasons, Taipei strives to eschew the words “China” and “Chinese” from its foreign policy lexicon. In 2006, the administration of former Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) changed the English name of the ROC’s cabinet-level “Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission” (僑務委員會) to “Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission” (OCAC) and limited its role to assisting Taiwanese who lived overseas and to persons of Chinese descent who “identified with” the ROC. No longer would the OCAC propagandize among overseas Chinese enclaves against the “Communist Bandits” or for the restoration of “Free China.”
Chen’s successor, former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), who welcomed the idea that Taiwan was part of “China,” changed the English name back to “Chinese”—all this despite the fact that the cabinet office’s name, in Mandarin, wasn’t changed at all. “Ch’iao” (僑) basically means “citizen living abroad,” and it always has. But it was difficult for President Ma to justify expending the money of Taiwan’s taxpayers for the aid and succor of Chinese from Shanghai living abroad. Or, for ethnic Chinese in third countries who had vague ties, if any, with Taiwan.
Any historian of Chinese diplomacy appreciates the overseas Chinese diaspora’s central role in Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s (孫逸仙) fundraising, political mobilization for Chinese nationalism against Manchu imperialism, and the success of the 1911 Revolution. [1] Virtually all of Sun’s support came from the Chinese diaspora and much of it was managed in discreet, covert secret societies through the Nationalist Party’s “Ch’iao Wu” (僑務) apparatus. Dr. Sun and his Chinese Nationalist Party bore a lifelong debt of gratitude to the world’s “Hua-ch’iao” communities whose low-keyed public profiles minimized frictions with host governments. The Nationalist Party and the ROC government built their decades of deep community-organizing among the diaspora into political and electoral leverage, which supported the Nationalists’ priorities across the globe.
Not to be outdone, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had, by the 1920s, mirrored the Nationalists’ underground political organizations abroad via Moscow’s in-place Communist International networks and successfully assembled underground “United Front” (統一戰線) networks throughout overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia.
During the nearly half-century of de-colonization after World War II, newly emerging states were urged to radicalize by Chinese Communist “United Front” work within their local Chinese populations. Malaya, Indonesia, and other governments worked with Taipei’s Kuomintang (KMT) “Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission” apparatus to counteract Beijing’s influence in often brutal or violent ways, but this cooperation was central to Taipei’s cooperation with its East Asian neighbors. In the 1980s and beyond, Beijing’s potent influence within the superwealth of Southeast Asia was perceived as an existential threat. Governments and militaries believed that Communist Chinese undergrounds in their cities could only be neutralized with the help of Taipei’s overseas mobilization work. In early 1994, President Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) was still able to make virtual “state visits” in Southeast Asia, golfing with the presidents of the Philippines and Indonesia, and dining with the king of Thailand, all of whom feared rising influxes of Chinese mainland migrants into their non-Chinese lands.
The late Ambassador Hisahiko Okazaki (岡崎 久彦), Japan’s envoy to Bangkok in the early 1990s, gathered vast intelligence on both Beijing’s and Taipei’s overseas Chinese work among Southeast Asian Hua-Ch’iao communities. In 2003, he made a persuasive case that, into the 1990s, Taiwan’s primary strategic importance to its Southeast Asian partners was Taipei’s uncanny ability to neutralize communist party influence in local Chinese communities. [2] Ambassador Okazaki bemoaned the fact that, as Taiwan’s own domestic politics had become estranged from a broad Chinese diaspora that never had ethnic, cultural, or economic ties to Taiwan, Taipei’s “Overseas Compatriot” work focused increasingly on Taiwan’s citizens abroad, and left the “Overseas Chinese” to Beijing.
With the field completely free to China, Mr. Okazaki warned, Asia’s Chinese diaspora—its wealthiest and most dynamic demographic segment—now identifies solely with Beijing and has forsaken the democratic principles, such as they were, of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.
The profound historical significance of overseas Chinese work in Asia simply cannot be overemphasized. Overseas Chinese enclaves have been a fact of life in Southeast Asia for a thousand years, and for almost as long, Chinese emperors and republics alike recognized the value of giving succor and support to these outposts. In 1293, Mongol fleets attempted to subdue kingdoms in the South and “Great Western Seas” and while not wholly successful, they did establish tributary alliances with local chieftains in need of imperial legitimation. In 1295, a legate of the Great Khan to Angkor remarked that several Chinese “men of the sea” had settled in the Cambodian city, possibly remnants of the Kublai Khan’s tribute wars in Java. Around a century later, the Ming Emperor welcomed tributary envoys from Southeast Asia, including, oddly, a Chinese “Pacification Commissioner” (宣慰使) representing not a foreign king, but the overseas Chinese community in Palembang, a southern Sumatran port city known in the Ming court as “Old Harbor” (Jiugang, 舊港). The “Commissioner,” elected by his compatriots in the Palembang enclave, had been commissioned by the Imperial Admiral Zheng He and conveyed to the Great Ming Empire for his investiture. Indeed, “Hua Ch’iao” communities have prospered in the Asia-Pacific region for a thousand years, and today are probably the single most dynamic, prosperous, and cosmopolitan forces for modernization in their ancestors’ adopted lands.
In fact, the Chinese diaspora was so fundamental to the 1911 revolution that the Republican government enshrined their care, support, and suffrage into the 1947 Constitution. Article 141 of the Constitution states that “The foreign policy of the Republic of China shall, […] protect the rights and interests of Chinese citizens residing abroad, promote international cooperation, advance international justice, and ensure world peace.” It gives overseas Chinese (僑居國外) voting rights, separate legislative and electoral representation, requires that the state shall “foster and protect the development of their economic enterprises,” and “give encouragement and subsidies” to “educational enterprises which have been operated with good record by Chinese citizens residing abroad.”
The Constitution of the People’s Republic mentions the state’s protection of Chinese nationals residing abroad and, because of the terrifying ordeals during the Great Leap and the Cultural Revolution suffered by those with “overseas connections” (海外關係), grudgingly admits that “family members [in China] of Chinese nationals residing abroad” also have “rights” (Article 50). It also obliges the national legislature to establish “an Overseas Chinese Committee” (Article 70), as necessary. [3] But it certainly does not afford “Overseas Chinese” the special status of the ROC Constitution.
That said, for the past 30 years, beginning with Jiang Zemin’s “Important Doctrine of the Three Represents” and culminating with Xi Jinping’s particular identification of “Overseas Chinese” as “patriotic” compatriots who share China’s “roots, soul, and dream” with Chinese at home, the diaspora is an essential pillar for Beijing’s foreign policy and national security strategy. [4]
Beijing’s version of “Overseas Chinese” affairs is the “United Front Work” and is the sole province of the Chinese Communist Party (a vestigial “Overseas Chinese Affairs Office,” misplaced for decades somewhere in the State Council, was stamped out in 2018). The United Front Work Department (統一戰線工作部) is now “China’s secret ‘magic weapon’ for worldwide influence.” “Like mushroom tendrils spreading unseen for miles beneath the forest floor,” the network of China’s recent emigrés abroad, students, engineers, researchers, and professors seeks not simply to shape the conversation about China in their foreign residences, but also to bring foreign technology and expertise back to China by any means necessary. “While the effort is driven by the Party, crucial to its implementation is an opaque and little-known Beijing-based agency known as the United Front Work Department.”
Throughout the Pacific, large migrations of Chinese emigrés have established retail hegemony in most of the Pacific islands’ tiny markets, freezing out native entrepreneurs and services while Chinese embassies, trade offices, investment officials, and military delegations suborn local governments. [5] The United States government has become so alarmed that it has taken the desperate move of calling on all friendly states that still maintain ties with the ROC, to keep them, and to resist Beijing’s blandishments to break with Taipei. In May, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Patrick Murphy went on record forcefully and repeatedly to encourage the Solomon Islands to “maintain the status quo” with Taiwan. [6]
This suggests, however, that Taipei itself has considerable diplomatic work to do, both directly in island nations targeted by Beijing, as well as with fellow Pacific democracies like the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. It also means that the “Overseas Community Affairs Commission” must reestablish its own outreach with whatever is left of the overseas Chinese diaspora that is not already fully within the discipline of the Chinese Communist Party’s UFWD organization.
Since Tiananmen in 1989, and now, more urgently, with the recent Hong Kong demonstrations, there surely must be profound uneasiness among the traditional “Waku” (“Hua Ch’iao” [華僑]) enclaves of the Pacific, which have for decades and centuries intermarried and integrated into their newly adopted lands. Taipei’s OCAC has the constitutional responsibility to foster renewed trust, friendship, and hope with all the resources it can muster. For the Asia-Pacific region’s democracies, it is a matter of resisting China’s hegemony; for the “Hua Ch’iao,” it is a matter of maintaining a heritage of freedom and democracy; and, for Taiwan it may be a matter of survival.
The main point: Over the years, Taipei has become estranged from a broad Chinese diaspora that have a played a pivotal role in the government’s history. There is unleveraged diplomatic potential in the overseas compatriots community.
[1] O. Edmund Clubb, Twentieth Century China (Columbia University Press, 1964), 34-37 et seq. [2] Japan’s former ambassador in Bangkok, Hisahiko Okazaki, made this case persuasively in an address entitled “The Strategic Value of Taiwan” delivered at The Heritage Foundation, July 31, 2003. [3] Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (Adopted 4 December 1982 by the 5th Session of the 5th National People’s Congress) https://www.track.unodc.org%2FLegalLibrary%2FLegalResources%2FChina%2Flaws%2FChina%2520Constitution%25201982%2520(As%2520Amended%25202004).pdf [4] For further reading see: Ren Guixiang (任貴祥), ed., Overseas Chinese and Ethnic Chinese Abroad and China’s Reform and Opening (海外華僑華人與中國改革開放) (Communist Party History Publications, Beijing 2009); Li Qirong (李其榮), What The Legacy and Innovations of Xi Jinping’s analyses of Overseas Chinese Affairs has had on the Compatriot-Work Thought of the Party’s and the Nation’s Leaders (習近平僑務論述對黨和國家領導人僑務思想的繼承與創新) (Lishui 麗水University, Zhejiang, 2017). [5] Most recently, an illuminating exposé by Nick Perry, “In China’s purse, strings for Tonga, Pacific nation faces debt, displacement as byproduct of aid,” The Associated Press, The Baltimore Sun, July 13, 2019, p. 31. [6] Murphy made the same general observation on March 22, 2019, in an interview with Voice of America. “China changing ‘status quo,’ US official warns,” Taipei Times, March 24, 2019, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2019/03/24/2003712071. The Author speculated privately that the impetus likely came from the National Security Council and was told in an email by an anonymous source, apparently not authorized to speak on the matter, that the “The impetus also comes from the 7th floor of HST.”
