The PLA’s Joint Sword 2024B Exercise: Continuing Political Warfare and Creeping Territorial Encroachment

On October 10, Republic of China (ROC) President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) delivered his first ROC National Day address in Taipei. Despite the speech’s content and tone—which upheld the ROC identity of Taiwan and offered broad continuity with past speeches offered on the occasion—People’s Republic of China (PRC) spokespersons and media outlets condemned the “separatist” content of the speech, and initiated another military exercise around Taiwan. This exercise, conducted on October 14, was designated Joint Sword-2024B (聯合利劍-2024B), and involved multi-service drills by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the sea and air spaces around Taiwan. This latest exercise was the second this year (and third overall) in what is likely emerging as a regular series of exercises surrounding Taiwan—with PRC propaganda claiming each time that the exercises are in reaction to political events connected to Taiwan’s political leadership.

Figure 1: A PLA media graphic depicting the declared operating areas for Joint Sword 2024B (in red). The image also depicts the operating areas for the May 2024 Joint Sword 2024A exercise (in yellow), and the unnamed August 2022 exercise (in blue). (Image source: China News Service)

Recent PLA Exercises Around Taiwan

The August 2022 PLA military exercises around Taiwan were the most provocative yet conducted—to  include missile firings over Taiwan and into Japan’s exclusive economic zone—and started the process of (at least nominal) blockade exercises that the PLA has conducted in the past two years (see previous articles here and here). The inaugural Joint Sword (聯合利劍) exercise was conducted in April 2023—per PRC narratives, in reaction to then-President Tsai’s meeting with then-US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy—and involved both a symbolic encirclement of Taiwan and a series of simulated strikes directed against key node targets on the island. The Joint Sword-2024A exercise was conducted on May 23-24 of this year—per PRC claims, in reaction to Lai’s inaugural address—and involved another symbolic encirclement of the island, as well as an increased role for patrols by the PRC Coast Guard (中國海警) (which operates under military authority, subject to the Communist Party Central Military Commission). 

Highlights of the Joint Sword-2024B Exercise

Naval Activity

Based on the limited data made available to the public, much remains unclear regarding the specific operations conducted by the PLA during Joint Sword-2024B. According to ROC Ministry of National Defense (MND, 國防部) information, on October 14 there were x14 PLA Navy vessels (not specified by class or individual ship) and “12 official ships” (公務船)—not otherwise explained, but likely meaning PRC Coast Guard vessels—operating in the vicinity of Taiwan. Per information disclosed by the Japanese Ministry of Defense, the PLA Navy vessels included the aircraft carrier Liaoning (遼寧), operating in a task group of at least four ships—including the Type-055 destroyer (NATO classification Renhai-class cruiser) Anshan (鞍山). [1] During Joint Sword-2024B the Liaoning was reported to be operating to the east-southeast of Taiwan, near the Bashi Channel, and the carrier and its supporting surface combatants likely account for the reported PLA flight operations east of Taiwan (see below).

Aviation Activity

Per ROC Defense Ministry information, the PLA conducted 153 aviation sorties around Taiwan on the day of the exercise, in six broad operating areas (see Figure 2, below), divided in three broad classifications of “main fighters” (主戰機), “support aircraft” (輔戰機), and helicopters. Per this data, the breakdown of the flights was as follows:

1. A total of x6 support aircraft (not otherwise identified, but likely patrol and/or airborne early warning aircraft) operated to the north-northeast of Taiwan.
2. A total of x47 support and fighter aircraft (not otherwise delineated) operated in the Taiwan Strait. Of these, x28 crossed the Strait centerline.
3. A total of x41 support and fighter aircraft (not otherwise delineated) operated to the southwest of Taiwan, in the southwest corner of Taiwan’s declared air defense identification zone (ADIZ). 
4. A total of x8 support and fighter aircraft (not otherwise delineated) operated further to the southwest of Taiwan, outside the ADIZ, in the Bashi Channel.
5. A total of x9 fighter aircraft and helicopters operated southeast of Taiwan, outside the ADIZ. This likely correlates with aircraft of the Liaoning aircraft carrier and its associated surface group.
6. A total of x42 fighter aircraft operated east of southern Taiwan, inside the ADIZ. This likely correlates with aircraft of the Liaoning aircraft carrier.

Figure 2: A graphic depicting operating areas for PLA aircraft during the Joint Sword-2024B exercise on October 14. (Image source: ROC Ministry of Defense)

Coast Guard Circumnavigation of Taiwan

As with Joint Sword-2024A in May, the exercise also featured an expanded role for the PRC Coast Guard, in both operational and propaganda terms. PRC state media boasted that PRC Coast Guard task groups (“formations,” 編隊) numbers 2901, 1305, 1303, and 2102 (specific vessels not identified) circumnavigated Taiwan on the day of the exercise: in a track proceeding through the Bashi Channel, northwards parallel to the east coast, and then turning west-southwest across the north of the island and into the Taiwan Strait. Attempting to depict the circumnavigation as an affectionate and protective maneuver, PRC state-sponsored social media posts declared that “[Our] patrols take the shape of loving you” (巡航都是愛你的形狀) (see images below). While ham-handed—and carrying a definite creepy stalker vibe—the messaging also connects with PRC propaganda in another sense: the increasing use of the coast guard for patrols closer to Taiwan’s coastline and outlying islands, in the effort to present PRC maritime operations as routine exercises of domestic law enforcement.

Image left: A PRC state media image depicting four PRC Coast Guard vessel formations circumnavigating Taiwan, in a track forming the image of a heart, on October 14. (Image source: China News Service)

Image right: A social media post made by the PRC Coast Guard declares that “[Our] patrols take the shape of loving you.” (Image source: PRC Coast Guard)

Key Takeaways from the Exercise

Overall, the October 14 exercise was noteworthy in continuing three general trends for the Joint Sword series. The first of these was that the single day Joint Sword-2024B exercise was relatively modest in scale, in terms of both duration and numbers of units involved, in comparison with its predecessors. This fits a pattern: the 2023 Joint Sword exercise was larger in scope than Joint Sword-2024A; and Joint Sword-2024A was larger than Joint Sword-2024B. (Joint Sword-2024B, however, did appear to involve more aviation sorties than its predecessor in May.) The reasons for this descending scale of the Joint Sword exercises remain unclear. 

Second, the exercise continued the encirclement and notional blockade scenarios established by its predecessors, with the air and naval operations apparently directed more towards this scenario than for an amphibious invasion. As stated by Su Tzu-yun (蘇紫雲), director of defense strategy and resources at the MND-affiliated Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR, 國防安全研究院), “This time there was a rather special component, the so-called quarantine or blockade, during which they practiced their blockading abilities.” 

The third noteworthy trend of the exercise—and arguably the most salient one—was the continuing creep of PRC military activity closer to both the main island of Taiwan, and Taiwan’s smaller outlying islands. The six declared exercise areas adjoined and/or crossed over into Taiwan’s contiguous zone (the zone of 12 to 24 nautical miles from the coast) (see here and here). This represents a significant escalation of the PRC’s military pressure directed against Taiwan’s territorial sovereignty—and another step forward in the steady creep closer to the 12 nautical mile line of territorial waters.

Narrative Framing

Following an established pattern, PRC messaging has repeatedly depicted the Joint Sword-2024B exercise to be a spontaneous expression of righteous anger at the “independence” content of President Lai’s October 10 address. In the speech, Lai maintained continuity with the overall policy direction of the previous Tsai Administration, and continued to uphold the ROC constitutional framework for Taiwan. However, most international coverage of the speech centered on Lai’s assertions of Taiwan’s de facto independence from PRC sovereignty: as in his assertions that “the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other,” that “the People’s Republic of China has no right to represent Taiwan,” and that “our determination to defend our national sovereignty […] [and] our efforts to maintain the status quo of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait remain unchanged.”

Such statements were predictably condemned by the PRC, as with the statement issued the same day by PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning (毛寧), who declared that:

“Lai Ching-te’s words attempt to sever the historical connections between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. He is again peddling various versions of [the] ‘Taiwan independence’ narrative, such as ‘China and Taiwan are not subordinate to each other’ and ‘Taiwan has sovereignty.’ It once again exposed that he is hell-bent on advancing ‘Taiwan independence’ and has the ill intention of heightening tensions in the Taiwan Strait for his selfish political interest.”

In a similar fashion to its reaction following Lai’s inauguration speech in May, when the PRC identified the “separatist” content of Lai’s speech as the justification for operation Joint Sword-2024A (聯合利劍-2024A), PRC outlets invoked the supposedly provocative content of Lai’s “Double Ten” speech to justify the military exercise. PRC state media touting the drills asserted that “strong intimidation of Taiwan independence forces on the path of promoting independence is a necessary action for defending national sovereignty and safeguarding national unification” (台獨分裂勢力謀獨行徑的強力震懾是捍衛國家主權維護國家統一的必要行動). 

Conclusion

The October 14, 2024 Joint Sword-2024B exercise represents another installment of what appears to be an emerging series of PLA military exercises intended to continue the PRC’s gradually intensifying coercive military pressure directed against Taiwan. Although the PRC has attempted to frame these as spontaneous reactions to actions or statements by Taiwan’s political leaders, they are better understood as carefully planned outbursts of indignation. These exercises align with—and may be subsuming—the spring and autumn aircraft carrier group training deployments conducted by the PLA Navy in recent years.

The political warfare element is key to understanding these and other recent PLA military exercises. The steadily gathering encroachment of PLA naval and aviation activity—a “boiling the frog” process of creeping in closer and closer, in measured stages—is intended to intimidate Taiwan’s population and its political leadership, and to erode the effective sovereignty that Taiwan’s government exercises over its territory. In this respect, the declaration of military operational areas that cross into Taiwan’s contiguous zone is a significant provocation: not an outright violation of territorial waters and airspace, but a violation of norms—and one that points ultimately in the former direction. 

The political warfare element is also clearly displayed in the narrative framing that Beijing places around these planned exercises: consistently portraying them as an aggrieved reaction to “Taiwan independence” moves undertaken by Taiwan’s leaders. This narrative framing has been remarkably successful in coloring international media coverage of these events, which often uncritically follows PRC messaging—and thereby (at least implicitly) paints Taiwan as the instigator, rather than identifying Beijing as the aggressor.

If this year’s pattern holds, we are likely to see the PLA conduct a Joint Sword-2025A in spring 2025 (following a manufactured pretext), and a Joint Sword-2025B in autumn 2025 (perhaps after the next “Double Ten” speech, or similar pretext). The PRC’s political posture is very unlikely to change, but the presumed future iterations of Joint Sword—whether under that name, or another—will be worth watching to see what additional incremental coercive measures the PRC leadership decides to direct against Taiwan. 

The main point: On October 14, the PLA conducted the Joint Sword-2024B multi-service exercise in the air and sea space around Taiwan. This exercise included operations by the aircraft carrier Liaoning and supporting ships east of Taiwan, as well as a circumnavigation of the island by PRC Coast Guard vessels. There was a significant political warfare element to the exercise, with PRC propaganda depicting it as a reaction to supposedly provocative statements made by Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te. This exercise may be part of an emerging series of exercises intended to place continued pressure on Taiwan, and to prepare PLA personnel for a potential future blockade or other major military scenario.

[1] PLA Navy aircraft carriers are accompanied by a task group of other surface vessels when conducting training deployments, and the autumn 2024 Liaoning carrier deployment likely included other vessels not identified in the Taiwan and Japanese official reporting. For example, in spring 2022 the Liaoning conducted a training deployment to the Philippine Sea (east of Taiwan) accompanied by five guided missile destroyers, a frigate, and a supply ship. See: John Dotson, “The PLA Navy Spring 2022 Aircraft Carrier Deployment ‘Beyond the Island Chain’ and Its Significance for Taiwan’s Security,” Global Taiwan Brief, June 15, 2022, https://globaltaiwan.org/2022/06/the-pla-navy-spring-2022-aircraft-carrier-deployment-beyond-the-island-chain-and-its-significance-for-taiwans-security/.