In this rapidly evolving world, great powers are increasingly dictating terms. This presents middle powers with a stark choice: unite or be marginalized. Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, neatly summarized this sentiment during his speech at the January 2026 World Economic Forum: “Middle powers must act together because if we’re not at the table, we’re on the menu.” This statement rings loudly in the Indo-Pacific, with countries such as Japan, Australia, India, and some ASEAN members diversifying partnerships and enhancing self-reliance alongside escalating Sino-US tensions. Because of the fears triggered by the aggression of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, these realignments are giving Taiwan a strategic window between 2026 and 2030 to reorient itself in a changing order. During the coming half-decade, Taipei has an opportunity to capitalize on strategic realignment to expand its economic strength, develop its deterrence power, and establish deeper diplomatic relationships.
Mapping Evolving Strategic Choices and Implications for Taiwan
Although there is abundant literature to understand the dynamics of bipolarity between Washington and Beijing, a more subtle and polycentric approach is deconstructing the ways middle powers are transforming regional security and economic environments. Indo-Pacific middle powers have sought to balance alliances with the United States with their own independent capabilities, and to conduct selective engagement with the PRC to hedge against risk. These strategies reflect the understanding that overreliance on a great power is a threat to sovereignty. In the Taiwan context, collaboration with allies forms a distributed support network that signals U.S. commitment through diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation, thereby discouraging coercion without direct escalation.
Japan
One example of shifting strategy is Japan’s choice to clearly tie the security of Taiwan to its own national security priorities. At first glance, this statement appears to show Japan moving into closer alignment with the United States. However, its importance lies in Japan’s independent framing of Taiwan as a direct national security concern. Tokyo is signaling that a crisis in the Taiwan Strait would threaten Japan’s own economic and strategic interests, not just those of the United States. This shifts deterrence from a purely U.S.–China issue to a shared regional stake, reducing the sense that Taiwan’s defense depends solely on American action. In this way, Japan is not simply aligning with Washington but helping create a broader network of actors with their own incentives to resist coercion. The 2022 National Security Strategy of Japan focused doctrinally on proactive deterrence and unofficial intelligence exchange with Taiwan. A clearer example of growing Japan–Taiwan security cooperation is Japan’s decision to quietly deepen defense ties, including appointing a serving government official as its de facto defense attaché in Taiwan. Although low-profile, this step signals a gradual normalization of security coordination. It shows that Japan is incrementally expanding practical cooperation with Taiwan while avoiding overt escalation, reinforcing the broader pattern of indirect but strengthening deterrence.
Australia
Australia’s strategic alignment is predicated on an intense focus on contingencies regarding Taiwan, under a so-called “strategy of denial.” The 2024 National Defence Strategy of Australia envisions operational preparedness for a high intensity conflict by 2027, encompassing both sea and air domains. Canberra has repeatedly opposed unilateral changes to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and has publicly criticized large-scale People’s Liberation Army exercises around Taiwan through official statements, joint declarations with allies, and regional security cooperation. These actions signal Australia’s support for stability in the Strait and its willingness to speak out against coercive behavior. The AUKUS partnership, consisting of Australia, the UK, and the United States, is aimed at joint development of hypersonic missile and submarine technologies. Besides this, Australia’s use of P-8 maritime surveillance aircraft near Taiwan also aligns with Taipei’s strategic imperative to monitor the PRC’s gray zone activities.
India
While maintaining its One-China Policy, India is also trying to strengthen its informal relations with Taiwan. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) focuses on preserving “free and open” maritime and economic trade routes in the Indo-Pacific. In recent years, the Quad has sought to boost the resilience of the semiconductor supply-chain and leverage the niche competence of Taiwan in this area. Nonetheless, India is constrained from greater direct involvement in Taiwan’s defense, due to its preoccupation with border conflicts with the PRC in the Himalayan region. Thus, it emphasizes collaboration with Taiwan in non-traditional security areas, such as supply chain resilience. For example, Australia has joined Taiwan in semiconductor and critical minerals supply-chain discussions through industry and policy dialogues aimed at reducing dependency on concentrated production hubs. Taiwan has the potential to collaborate with India on security-adjacent industries such as biotechnology, rare-earth minerals, and artificial intelligence (AI).
South Korea
In recent years, South Korea has assigned greater importance to the stability of the Taiwan Strait, even if the current President Lee Jae-myung is less supportive than his predecessor. South Korea’s trilateral relations with the United States and Japan have led to commitments to prevent provocations and to secure sea lines of communication in East Asia. In scenarios involving a US defense of Taiwan, the South Korean military may offer rear area support to American forces. Meanwhile, Taiwan and South Korea are pursuing cooperation in shipbuilding. Although historical sensitivities with Japan are a hurdle to deeper integration in a US-led security architecture, partnerships with Taiwan on semiconductor research and development may improve bilateral Korea-Taiwan ties.
ASEAN States
The behavior of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members is varied, with the Philippines playing a leading role in interactions with Taiwan amid conflict with Beijing over sovereignty in the South China Sea. The Philippines’ defense cooperation and patrols with the United States challenge the PRC’s claims, which results in indirect maritime security benefits for Taiwan. Meanwhile, Vietnam seeks diversification away from the PRC, with better relations with the United States and Japan to strengthen its coast guard capabilities.
Indonesia’s neutral foreign policy stance allows it to engage in maritime security cooperation in the Malacca Strait without being seen as formally aligning against any major power, particularly China. In practice, these patrols involve coordination with regional partners such as Malaysia and Singapore under existing trilateral arrangements focused on anti-piracy and maritime safety. At the same time, Indonesia’s growing interest in Taiwan’s experience reflects increasing concern over undersea cable vulnerabilities, where Taiwan has developed practical expertise in monitoring and rapid repair due to repeated disruptions in its surrounding waters.
Shifting strategies may create strategic windows for Taiwan to enter into previously inaccessible ASEAN frameworks on non-traditional security issues such as public health and disaster relief. One such example is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a multilateral security dialogue platform that includes ASEAN members plus external partners such as major Indo-Pacific powers. Taiwan is not a formal member, but shifting regional dynamics and minilateral cooperation patterns create indirect entry points for functional participation through track-two diplomacy and partner engagement.
Plausible Regional Trajectories Through 2030
Given these shifting geopolitical dynamics, there are three possible trajectories for the Indo-Pacific region in the coming half-decade.
First, a trajectory of continued escalation that would bring increased militarization, with the PRC achieving its stated 2027 goal of readiness for a Taiwan conflict. Under such a scenario, middle powers would react with their own rearmament programs. For instance, Japan and Australia would continue to raise defense spending, and India would fortify its Andaman Command. An arms race will accelerate, with heavily focus on hypersonic missiles and artificial intelligence technologies. Any crisis involving Taiwan could disintegrate security coalitions and could bring about a ten percent decline in global gross domestic product, due to disruption in semiconductors and energy trade. Disunity within ASEAN, as members side with the PRC or Taiwan and the United States, could terminally damage the grouping.
Second, a trajectory of managed competition envisages stabilization via polycentric mechanisms, including the Quad, AUKUS, and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. Managed competition would be enabled by de-risking strategies and projected regional defense expenditures of USD 600 billion by 2030. Initiatives to foster “non-Red” supply chains would reduce countries’ vulnerabilities to PRC coercion, although states would have to engage in confidence-building exercises with Beijing to reduce gray zone activities in cyber and paramilitary domains. Under such a scenario, Taiwan would be integral to technology alliances, even as the island would suffer from strains caused by decoupling in cross-Strait trade.
Third, there is a potential trajectory towards de-escalation. Given confirmed rivalries, the probability of de-escalation may be low. However, a possible truce between the United States and the PRC could place limits on armament. Demographic shifts (aging populations in Japan and the PRC as well as greater urbanization in ASEAN nations) could have a restraining impact on militarization by 2030, leading to dialogues on common imperatives.
Practical Entry Points for Taiwan
In order to capitalize on shifting strategic dynamics, there are four strategic areas upon which Taiwan should focus: semiconductor collaboration, maritime domain awareness, non-Red supply chains, and critical mineral partnerships. Through these pathways, Taipei can integrate itself into polycentric Indo-Pacific networks to strengthen deterrence and economic stability. These entry points are anchored in Taiwan’s comparative advantages in high-tech production, its geography, diplomatic flexibility, and preexisting alignment with middle powers.
In this first strategic area of semiconductor collaboration, Taiwan can further capitalize on pre-existing frameworks. The Chip 4 Alliance, encompassing the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, has brought about coordination on research and development (R&D), subsidies, and export controls. By 2025, joint ventures in advanced logic and memory chips had already leveraged Taiwan’s dominant global semiconductor position, weakening PRC influence over the industry. Additionally, Taiwan’s engagement with allied working groups on artificial intelligence and cybersecurity broadens the scope of its role beyond hardware and into digital governance. Initiatives between Taiwan and India in semiconductor training and intellectual property cooperation aim to strengthen workforce resilience through skills development and diversification of talent pipelines, while also indirectly supporting cybersecurity capacity in sensitive technology sectors.
Second, maritime domain awareness (MDA) partnerships provide Taiwan with improved intelligence regarding PRC gray zone activities, even without alliance commitments. Australia–Philippines maritime exercises strengthen regional surveillance in the South China Sea, while Taiwan’s limited coast guard and security dialogues indicate emerging, indirect functional linkages rather than formal operational cooperation. Taiwan’s satellite capabilities, such as its Beyond 5G program, will allow Taiwan to share data with its partners in the region, especially in the areas of maritime security, climate monitoring and disaster relief. Under MDA partnerships, Taiwan can work with neighbors such as Vietnam: with the assistance of the United States and Japan, Hanoi is growing its coastal radar network. Such capabilities could complement Taiwan’s desire to secure sea lines of communication in an atmosphere of increasing regional contestation.
Third, the development of non-Red supply chains is essential to Taiwan’s strategic autonomy. By strengthening cooperation with India, Southeast Asia and Australia, Taipei’s New Southbound Policy (NSP) continues to diversify economic linkages away from the PRC. Taiwan’s investments in electronics production in India, and energy security arrangements with Australia—Taiwan’s largest supplier of liquefied natural gas—minimize coercive disruptions. In the creation of non-Red supply chains, the interests of Taiwan and partners in the Indo-Pacific clearly converge.
Finally, critical-mineral partnerships elevate Taiwan’s long-term industrial security. Joint ventures with India and Australia in rare earths, lithium, and battery supply chains, supplemented by diversification through Indonesia, anchor Taiwan within the US-led Mineral Security Partnership. Emphasizing sustainable processing and environmental standards separates Taiwan from the refining networks dominated by the PRC.
Collectively, these four entry points can entrench Taiwan in durable and overlapping networks to preserve its centrality in an increasingly fragmented regional order.
The main point: In the next five years, a strategic shift by the middle powers of the Indo-Pacific provides a window for Taiwan to strengthen its technology-security cooperation, maritime domain awareness, supply-chain resilience, and critical minerals domains. Amid Sino-US rivalry, it necessitates agile policies to build resilience and enhance deterrence.
