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China’s long-term objective of achieving “reunification” with Taiwan has been deeply embedded in its foreign policy and external propaganda strategy, and continues to evolve in response to changing global political landscapes. Turbulence in global energy markets triggered by the war in Iran has reinvigorated People’s Republic of China (PRC) propaganda campaigns concerning Taiwan’s energy security. Such narratives have emerged as an influential domain through which China attempts to advance its propaganda campaign and advance its reunification agenda.
Taiwan’s dependence on imported fuels for 97 percent of its energy needs is widely regarded as a major risk to its national security. The current global energy crisis, with oil and gas shipments through the Strait of Hormuz almost entirely frozen, has led to some voices within Taiwan warning of an energy shortage if gas stockpiles are used up. Taiwan’s government downplayed this speculation, reassuring the public that liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments have been secured through April, with coal-fired generation a “last resort” option and state-owned energy companies absorbing the majority of fuel price increases.
The PRC has capitalized on these energy security concerns as an opportunity to promote the benefits of “reunification.” Speaking on March 18, a spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council (TAO, 中共中央台湾工作办公室) said China stood ready to provide Taiwan with reliable energy supplies that would address Taiwan’s alleged shortages once peaceful “reunification” is achieved.
While the offer made international headlines and was branded by the Taiwanese government as a feature of the PRC’s cognitive warfare, this “carrot-and-stick” approach that manipulates narratives and public opinion is nothing new.
In recent years, one of the ways the Chinese government has intensified its use of gray zone tactics to pressure Taiwan toward reunification is through cognitive warfare centered on energy security—aimed at influencing actors at both the governmental and grassroots levels. As energy security has become central to Taiwan’s national security debate, the carrot-and-stick approach has been deployed with increasing frequency.
Through cognitive warfare, the PRC has repeatedly positioned itself as both the biggest threat to Taiwan’s energy security, and also Taiwan’s potential savior. Taiwan-focused energy propaganda illustrates how Chinese influence operations have constructed a multi-layered ecosystem of engaged actors. This includes Chinese state media, WeChat and Weibo bloggers, and Douyin (TikTok) influencers, as well as certain Taiwanese politicians, media outlets, and political commentators—all of whom can be utilized at short notice.
The Carrot: Taiwan’s Energy Savior
Prior to the recent energy reunification offer, Xi Jinping’s January 2019 speech on the 40th anniversary of the “Issuance of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan” (告台湾同胞书) called for advancing cross-strait “connectivity” through energy and resource development. Xi further suggested that such cooperation could begin with the provision of electricity and natural gas to Kinmen and Mazu from Fujian province.
In recent years, narratives emphasizing the energy benefits of reunification have been repeatedly circulated through Chinese state media, reinforcing the claim that the “motherland” can provide Taiwan with a more secure energy supply. These narratives are further amplified and elaborated within the Chinese social media ecosystem, where they provide discursive scaffolding that reinforces claims made in state media. These examples can be seen across WeChat, Baidu blogs, as well as Douyin (TikTok) videos, where reunification is framed as “the golden key to solving Taiwan’s energy dilemma.”
Generally, this content follows a similar argumentative pattern. First, it establishes that Taiwan is facing an “energy crisis” that is undermining industrial production and economic prosperity. In the past, Chinese blogs used blackouts, such as those in 2021 and 2022, as evidence of Taiwan’s power supply crisis. More recently, following disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, Chinese propaganda has described Taiwanese citizens as anxiously facing a “countdown crisis,” with only seven or eight days of LNG reserves remaining. In reality, while the Taiwanese government currently only mandates an 11-day gas reserve, these stockpiles are far from depletion; Taiwan has also already secured the majority of required gas shipments to reduce any risk of imminent energy shortage, and has additional emergency coal-fired generation capacity available as a backup if needed. Taiwanese experts say price volatility, rather than supply sufficiency, is the primary concern.
Chinese narratives then attribute this energy crisis to energy policy mismanagement by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民主進步黨), the party which has governed Taiwan since 2016. Examples of these alleged “erroneous” energy policies include nuclear power plant decommissioning (which saw Taiwan become nuclear free in May 2025, although plans to restart two plants are currently being considered), a lackluster rollout of renewable energy, and continued over-reliance on energy imports. The DPP is characterized as being helpless in the face of the so-called energy crisis, with their actions leading to higher electricity prices for the Taiwanese public, and thereby jeopardizing Taiwan’s energy security.
However, Taiwan’s delayed renewable energy rollout has been driven by widespread public opposition to solar and wind projects, rather than failed policy implementation by the DPP. This opposition has been intensified by mis- and dis-information circulated online, often by accounts associated with opposition parties. In November of 2025, opposition legislators even passed a series of amendments to tighten the Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA, 環境影響評估) for solar projects, which some industry insiders deemed the “straw that broke the camel’s back” for the beleaguered sector.
Blog posts about Taiwan’s “energy crisis” on Chinese sites often proceed to draw a comparison to China’s energy policy, characterizing China as possessing abundant domestic energy resources and world-leading renewable and nuclear energy technologies, and perfectly positioned to assist Taiwan in solving its energy dilemma. Proposed solutions for Taiwan’s energy crisis after “reunification” include integration with the Chinese grid via undersea interconnectors (presented as a much more economical choice than the proposed Taiwan-Philippines undersea power cable), alongside the deployment of Chinese nuclear, renewable, and grid technologies.
Within Taiwan, domestic pro-opposition and pro-China voices have echoed both the scaremongering about a looming LNG shortage in recent weeks, as well as longer-term criticisms of DPP energy policy. Legitimate concerns about electricity prices, the pace of the energy transition, and energy security, alongside questions over whether current energy policy can meet supply-and-demand needs, have been exploited by pro-China actors—suggesting a potential connected, broader influence campaign.
The Stick: an Energy Blockade
Another strand of China’s energy-related cognitive warfare against Taiwan is far more overtly coercive. PRC navy and coast guard maritime drills in the Taiwan Strait over the past four years have simulated how China could blockade or even strike critical elements of Taiwan’s energy infrastructure, including its three LNG import terminals. Chinese state media presents these drills as conclusively demonstrating Beijing’s ability to blockade Taiwan’s imports, effectively cutting off energy supply.
In reality, whether or not an energy quarantine or blockade in the Taiwan Strait would be effective is not so clear-cut. China Petroleum Corporation (CPC, 台灣中油), Taiwan’s state-owned oil and gas supplier, has already diversified its LNG and oil supply chain, and now sources from more than 10 countries. In March, Minister of Economic Affairs Kung Ming-hsin (龔明鑫) announced that imports of American LNG are expected to increase to 25 percent by 2029. CPC has since signed a long-term agreement with Cheniere to purchase up to 1.2 million tons per year of LNG from 2026 to 2050. The Taiwan Energy Security and Anti-Embargo Act of 2026, currently working its way through the US Congress, could further strengthen US-Taiwan collaboration on energy security—including the possibility that future LNG shipments, including from a proposed Alaska LNG project, could be escorted by the US Navy.
Energy-Related Cognitive Warfare is Not Just Taiwan’s Problem
Energy is fast emerging as a new frontier in China’s cognitive warfare against Taiwan. Countering these efforts must become a regional priority. Energy security across the Indo-Pacific is being tested, as governments grapple to secure sufficient energy supplies, creating vulnerabilities China could exploit. Taiwan, on the frontlines of this pressure, is also at the cutting-edge of responses to cognitive warfare—including debunking initiatives led by both civil society and government—and its experiences offer valuable lessons for the wider region.
Critically, any disruption in the Taiwan Strait, one of the world’s busiest shipping corridors, would send shockwaves through global trade, with consequences comparable to those resulting from instability in the Strait of Hormuz. China’s threats to take any such action should be met with rapid and unequivocal international censure.
Understanding, exposing, and countering cognitive warfare narratives requires coordinated action between Taiwan and its partners. The priority of these efforts should be making the stark contradiction inherent in China’s messaging visible to both domestic and Taiwanese audiences: China is positioning itself as the guarantor of Taiwan’s energy stability, while simultaneously generating the very risks—the threat of a blockade or quarantine—that undermine it.
The main point: Energy is fast emerging as a new frontier in China’s cognitive warfare against Taiwan. China has consistently employed a carrot-and-stick strategy: positioning itself as an energy “savior” while simultaneously threatening an energy blockade to pressure Taiwan into yielding to coercion. As such, not only should the Taiwanese government recognize the importance of countering this emerging trend, but regional partners should also prioritize taking collective action to respond to energy-related coercion.
