Thursday, January 22, 2026 from 10:00AM – 11:30AM (ET)
In-person and Webcast
Event Summary:
On January 22, 2026, the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) hosted a seminar entitled “Looking Ahead for Taiwan Policy in 2026”. The discussion featured three speakers: Ann E. Kowalewski, senior non-resident fellow at GTI, Riley Walters, Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute, and John Dotson, GTI Director. The event was moderated by Zoë Weaver-Lee, GTI’s non-resident adjunct fellow.
Ann E. Kowalewski argued that the global geopolitical environment in 2026 is highly volatile, particularly due to escalating US-PRC tensions, frequent diplomatic touchpoints, and the risk of rapid military or economic escalation. However, she indicated that the US-Taiwan relationship would likely remain relatively stable. She emphasized that structural risks persist, including the PRC’s military buildup ahead of its 2027 capability targets, and disruptions to global trade and security systems. Nevertheless, she also highlighted opportunities for Taiwan to strengthen independent ties with third countries that are wary of both the US and the PRC. Despite the uncertainty, Kowalewski is “cautiously optimistic”, noting continuing economic cooperation between the US and Taiwan, a more respectful narrative from the Trump administration toward Taiwan, as well as sustained US defense attention in the Indo-Pacific region. Overall, she believes that in 2026 US-Taiwan relations are resilient enough to absorb geopolitical shocks without major ruptures.
Riley Walters outlined important variables for Taiwan’s economy in the upcoming year, including details of the US-Taiwan trade deal, Taiwan’s domestic economy, and political implications. Notably, he described how the recently announced trade deal would address tariffs that impact 80 percent of exports from Taiwan, and enact a new quota system to implement USD 500 billion in chip-building investments in the United States. The deal is partially intended to mitigate concerns over the US-Taiwan trade deficit which doubled last year. Walters also outlined factors driving Taiwan’s economic growth, including trade with the United States and ASEAN partners (noting that the United States overtook the PRC as Taiwan’s top export destination), moderate inflation, and increases in earnings, performance based compensation, consumption, and government spending. Walters described the political implications of these economic factors in an election year, including Lai Administration efforts to address trade deal concerns and potentially passing tariff reductions through the Legislative Yuan, as well as continued efforts to address affordable housing and inflation-aligned wage increases.
John Dotson stated that Taiwan’s national security challenges have to be understood holistically, beyond headlines of PLA military exercises, to include routine military pressure, coast guard operations, cyber intrusions, and political warfare. He highlighted that the PRC is steadily normalizing more aggressive behavior, such as operating closer to Taiwanese territory, eroding the Taiwan Strait Centerline, and increasingly using the coast guard as a less provocative way of coercion and propaganda. Moreover, Dotson argued that non-traditional threats, such as cyber attacks, disinformation, and cognitive warfare, may pose greater risks by targeting Taiwanese critical infrastructure and social cohesion. Looking ahead to 2026, he predicts continuity rather than a dramatic change: sustained military pressure from the PRC, along with intensifying gray-zone tactics, amid a divided domestic political landscape in Taiwan. Finally, he anticipated that key defense measures, such as the stalled defense budget, would eventually pass, which reflects the constrained nature of Taiwan’s security and political challenges.