Global Taiwan Brief – Volume 2, Issue 6
The PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Meeting on Taiwan Policy
By: Russell Hsiao
Forging Strong Informal Diplomatic Partnerships: Why it Matters that Taiwan Lost Sao Tome and Principe and The Gambia—and Why it Doesn’t
By: David An
Tsai Ing-wen Appeals to Pope Francis’ “Style of Politics for Peace”
By: Anna Scott Bell
KMT Chairperson Elections: Turning Over a New Leaf?
By: Lauren Dickey
The PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Meeting on Taiwan Policy
Russell Hsiao is the Executive Director of the Global Taiwan Institute and the Editor-in-Chief of the Global Taiwan Brief.
Only days before the beginning of the lunar new year—a major festival celebrated on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and across Asia—senior leaders from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) met for an annual Taiwan affairs conference (對台工作會議) comprised of central and local cadres working on Taiwan-related affairs.
Present at the meeting was the fourth-ranking CCP Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) Member Yu Zhengsheng (俞正聲). Yu, who serves in several functional capacities as chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and as deputy director of the party-led Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group (TALSG), attended the January 20 conclave to discuss the previous year’s work report and the Party-State’s policy markers for 2017.
As a member of PBSC, Yu is among seven of the most senior cadres in charge of the most powerful decision-making organ within the CCP. The CPPCC serves an advisory role to the CCP-led state; and as deputy director of the TALSG, Yu is second only to CCP General Secretary and PRC President Xi Jinping in the pecking order for setting Beijing’s Taiwan policy.
Reinforcing similar remarks made recently by other Chinese officials, Yu observed that the cross-Strait environment would grow “more complex and grim” in 2017. Doubling down on the so-called “1992 consensus,” a statement reportedly issued after the meeting stated that the Party must “unite all Taiwanese parties, groups and organizations that uphold the one-China principle to protect the political foundation of the 1992 Consensus.”
Not surprisingly, the Chinese state media interpreted Yu’s remarks as an affirmation of the CCP Central Committee’s Taiwan Affairs Office’s (中共中央對國台辦) work on Taiwan. The state-sanctioned accolades come on the heel of rumors that the director of the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), Zhang Zhijun (張志軍), may be stepping down, perhaps due to growing discontent among the senior leadership because of the perceived failure of its Taiwan policy. As head of the State Council’s TAO, Zhang is dual-hatted, also serving as head of the CCP Central Committee’s Taiwan Affairs Office.
Party cadres and government officials across the central government and local provinces responsible for implementing the Party’s policy towards Taiwan attended the meeting. Apparatchiks were called upon to deepen their understanding of Xi’s philosophy on Taiwan policy. According to the official Xinhua News Agency, “efforts will be made to continue non-official exchanges and cooperation, promote economic and social integration, as well as to let the public better participate in and benefit from cross-strait exchanges. More policies will be adopted to facilitate Taiwanese compatriots in studying, working, starting a business and living in the mainland and to support Taiwanese enterprises in accomplishing better development.”
In a political culture fixated on rank, hierarchy, and nomenclature, it is interesting to note the senior cadres missing from the stage at this year’s meeting. Notably absent from pictures was the head of the CCP Central Committee’s United Front Work Department Sun Chunlan (孫春蘭). Sun, a current member of the Politburo, had appeared in previous years meeting and considered a possible replacement for Yu. It is not known why Sun was not at the meeting and raises an interesting question of who might take Yu’s place when he steps down after the 19th National Congress.
Consistent with past practices, the meeting was presided over by State Councilor Yang Jiechi (楊潔篪)—who served as the previous PRC Ambassador to the United States—and currently the secretary-general for the CCP Central Committee’s Leading Small Group on Foreign Policy and of the TALSG.
Despite little apparent change, in terms of the meeting’s substance, the backdrop for this year’s confab stands out from previous years for several reasons. First, the last meeting was held in early February 2016, just weeks after Tsai Ing-wen was elected as president of Taiwan. Second, President Tsai has now been in office since May 2016, and her tenure has included the unprecedented December 2016 phone call between herself and president-elect Trump. . Third, China watchers consider 2017 a sensitive year, since the 19th National Congress is seen as a test of Xi’s power.
Yu (b. 1945), along with five other members of the PBSC are slated to step down after the 19th National Congress later this year. This sea change at the upper echelons of power will usher in a new cabinet of senior cadres under Xi—including a new Chairman for the CPPCC who will also serve as the Deputy Director of the TALSG. While it is not known who will take over Yu’s role as CPPCC Chairman and thus ostensibly become Xi’s spokesperson on Taiwan policy within the TALSG, the meeting appears to reflect a desire in Beijing for more continuity than change—at least for the time being.
The main point: While it is not known who will take over Yu’s role as CPPCC Chairman and thus ostensibly become Xi’s spokesperson on Taiwan policy within the TALSG, the meeting appears to reflect a desire in Beijing for more continuity than change—at least for the time being.
Forging Strong Informal Diplomatic Partnerships: Why it Matters that Taiwan Lost Sao Tome and Principe and The Gambia—and Why it Doesn’t
David An is a Senior Research Fellow at Global Taiwan Institute, and he was previously a political military officer at the US State Department.
Taiwan lost two formal diplomatic partners in 2016. This drops its list of diplomatic allies from 23 to 21 after the PRC recognized Gambia in March 2016 and São Tomé and Principe in December 2016. Taiwan media reports suggest that São Tomé and Principe asked Taiwan for $200 million dollars, ostensibly in exchange for maintaining formal diplomatic relations (Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs declined to officially confirm this number). Taiwan apparently refused São Tomé’s sum and subsequently both sides ended their formal relationship. This is just a case of one diplomatic partner among 20 other partners that expect Taiwan to make monetary contributions. Though Taiwan’s list of official diplomatic partners has shrunk, it has cultivated strong and abundant informal diplomatic relations for decades. What does Taiwan gain from cultivating diplomatic ties, considering what it spends on the relationships?
At face value, Taiwan’s loss of The Gambia seems insignificant when measured by Gambia’s relative population size and economy. Gambia’s population is 2 million people compared to Taiwan’s 23 million, and The Gambia’s GDP is around $1 billion compared to Taiwan’s GDP of $500 billion. The Gambia’s entire population adds up to the size of Taiwan’s sixth largest city Tainan. It was a lopsided partnership to begin with, but looking at population and GDP numbers alone misses the point.
By these same measures, the significance of São Tomé and Principe is even more questionable with its 200,000 population size and $400 million GDP. The Taiwan – São Tomé and Principe relationship was extremely asymmetrical. Its economy is half the size of The Gambia’s and its population is ten times smaller. For São Tomé and Principe to allegedly request $200 million dollars from Taiwan to continue their formal diplomatic relations is an astronomical number. The numbers look miniscule by global population and economic standards, but these countries are important by other measures.
Though Taiwan’s diplomatic partners do not count among the major powers of the world, they are nonetheless critical to Taiwan’s geopolitical interests, and therefore Taiwan has carefully cultivated these relationships by contributing to each ally’s public health, education, agricultural development, and more. Taiwan’s health workers in São Tomé have brought the incidence of malaria from 50 percent in 2003 down to 1 percent today—basically eradicating it—and the locals are aware and appreciative of Taiwan’s efforts. Taiwan built an advanced medical facility in Burkina Faso, as well as helped with local rice production, drinking water projects, vocational training, among other aid projects. Taiwan provides development assistance to its diplomatic partners, and for the most part its grassroots approach benefits the majority of people within the partner country, rather than just a small minority of political elites. However, is the cost of sustaining Taiwan’s diplomatic partnerships worth the benefit? Yes, for at least two reasons:
First, Taiwan’s diplomatic partners are priceless because they speak up for Taiwan and defend Taiwan’s interests in the United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Support in these multilateral forums is vital. As China continues to press its claim that Taiwan is part of the PRC’s territory and squeeze Taiwan’s international space, it is increasingly important for Taiwan to have formal diplomatic partners to speak on its behalf. Without voices to counter the PRC in the UN and other IGOs, then the PRC’s assertive claims gain more legitimacy and broader recognition, even if they are contrary to the will of the large majority of people in Taiwan, which violates political self-determination, and is incongruent with official US policy toward China and Taiwan.
Second, it is difficult to argue rational calculation when considering identity politics. Can there be a cost-benefit analysis when it comes to giving up on one’s identity or self determination, or abandoning a struggle for international recognition? Political scientists would question even the application of such a rationalist calculation to a constructivist, existentialist, question.
In light of current diplomatic circumstances, Taiwan’s informal diplomatic relations with the world are a promising alternative to its dwindling number of formal diplomatic partners. Taiwan maintains strong unofficial diplomatic relations with many more countries in the world than its formal relations reflect. Approximately 50 countries operate representative offices in Taiwan. In addition, Taiwan operates representative offices in over 60 countries. Taiwan has additional diplomatic offices in each its closest informal partners, such as 13 economic and cultural offices within the United States, six in Japan, four in Germany, and four in Australia. Taiwan’s representative offices are simply called trade, cultural or economic resource offices, though they function as de facto embassies, and include consular sections that issue visas, defense attaché sections, cultural sections, and economic sections.
The United States is probably the most important partner to Taiwan despite the lack of a formal diplomatic relationship. Diplomatic relations between the two ceased on January 1, 1979, but subsequent presidents have reiterated the United States’ resolve to protect Taiwan, such as in the Six Assurances toward Taiwan, and the US Congress’s Taiwan Relations Act. These show that there is much cooperation and mutual engagement even when relations are informal.
Furthermore, Taiwan still maintains meaningful relationships with countries despite a lack of formal diplomatic partnerships. It still provides help to countries that do not share formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, such as by sending medical missions to Fiji, although Fiji formally recognizes the PRC. In addition, Taiwan can sign bilateral trade agreements with countries that do not formally recognize it, such as with New Zealand and Singapore, both signed in 2013. The prospect of signing additional bilateral trade agreements, especially among ASEAN countries—regardless of which officially recognize China or Taiwan—are especially important to Taiwan’s economic future.
Taiwan’s loss of The Gambia and São Tomé and Principe has dropped its list of 20 plus formal diplomatic partners down by 10 percent. Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic partners are critical because they give Taiwan a voice in international forums, welcome Taiwan for state visits, and in general support Taiwan’s way forward in its political self-determination. Taiwan has likewise loyally assisted each of its diplomatic partners in a range of public health, education, and agricultural projects—often in robust relationships spanning decades. Beyond Taiwan’s formal relations, it hosts over 50 foreign informal diplomatic missions within Taiwan, and has over 70 Taiwanese offices abroad in over 60 countries; Taiwan has cooperative relationships with each of them.
The main point: Though Taiwan has recently lost Gambia and São Tomé and Principe as formal diplomatic partners, Taiwan still benefits from a strong network of informal diplomatic partnerships with over 70 offices that span more than 60 countries around the world.
Tsai Ing-wen Appeals to Pope Francis’ “Style of Politics for Peace”
Anna Scott Bell is the Program Associate at the Global Taiwan Institute and Staff Editor of the Global Taiwan Brief.
In December 2016, President Tsai Ing-wen made the “call heard around the world” to then President-elect Donald Trump, and in January, she sent a letter to Pope Francis, the popular head of the Roman Catholic Church. With these overtures to two significant world leaders of the moment, Tsai demonstrated her grasp of the geopolitical dynamics shaping Taiwan’s future, which consist of both realist and ideological dimensions. While her call to the US President understandably garnered more attention than her subsequent letter to the Roman Pontiff and diplomatic ally of Taiwan, it is no less illustrative of Tsai’s objective: to maintain Taiwan’s de facto autonomy and expand its international space in a peaceful way.
In her letter, dated January 20, 2017, President Tsai indicated that she was responding to Pope Francis’ message for the 50th World Day of Peace, in which he exhorted world leaders to be active peacemakers, rather than merely refraining from war. Specifically, she outlined what he dubbed a “style of politics for peace.” President Tsai’s letter focused on two areas: nonviolence and shared values.
First, she reasserted her commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflict, even and especially in the Taiwan Strait. To this end, she echoed the Holy See’s global call for nonproliferation and disarmament. Addressing cross-Strait tensions directly, Tsai pointed out that the relationship between Taiwan and the PRC need not be understood as binary or as a zero-sum game, but instead should be seen as an opportunity to create surplus value for both sovereign entities. Second, she methodically identified the shared values held by Taiwan and the Vatican, noting Taiwan’s rich and pluralistic religious culture, as well as her administration’s emphasis on human rights, and the island’s longstanding commitment to relief and development work. Finally, she approvingly noted Francis’ contention that women are often at the forefront of peacemaking efforts, citing her own experience and achievement as an example.
The letter’s dual emphases illustrate that Taiwan’s president understands her task vis-à-vis Pope Francis to be twofold: she must acknowledge the dragon in the room—the PRC and its multitudes of potential Catholics—but must also remind a possibly wavering ally of common interests beyond the security and trade benefits of conventional diplomacy. In this case, the most significant interests are the shared values of religious freedom, the common good, care for the poor and marginalized, and a commitment to a “politics for peace.” At a time when the PRC has responded to Tsai’s election and her communications with then President-elect Trump by going after Taiwan’s allies in Africa and Latin America, it is not surprising to see President Tsai reach out to her country’s lone European ally.
Just as Tsai Ing-wen’s letter was not written in a vacuum, so Pope Francis’ forceful address on a “politics for peace” follows a year of rumblings from the Vatican. Many have speculated that Pope Francis is considering a reevaluation of the venerable “just war” tradition, which stipulates the conditions under which it is morally acceptable for a state to enter into or initiate armed conflict. These rumblings were fueled by a conference held at the Vatican in April, co-sponsored by the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, and the Catholic pacifist group Pax Christi, and endorsed by Pope Francis. The conference roundly rejected just war theory, encouraging Francis to write an encyclical doing the same. Indeed, the head of the Pontifical Council, Cardinal Peter Turkson, stated publicly that Francis might issue “a new encyclical letter focused on reorienting the Catholic [C]hurch’s teachings on violence, following a period of dialogue and debate on the matter.”
Another important contextual factor behind Francis’ World Day of Peace address and its application to cross-Strait tensions is his repeated use of the phrase “piecemeal third world war” over the last several years, when addressing local wars and conflicts. Essentially, he believes that we are already engaged in a third world war, but in piecemeal fashion, all over the world. In 2014, he said, “This great war is happening everywhere on a smaller scale, a bit under the radar… So many die for a piece of land, for some ambition, out of hatred, or racial animus.” Geographer Justin Tse, an expert in Asian religion believes that Pope Francis’ concept of “piecemeal third world war” stems from his understanding of the Korean War, and especially the fact of its continuity and of Korea’s institutionalized division. In this way, we see the apparently never-ending simmer of cross-Strait hostilities as another iteration of the “piecemeal third world war” that Francis decries so vehemently, especially when it is fought over a “piece of land.”
It has been reported that Pope Francis and his secretary of state, Pietro Parolin, have been aggressively pursuing what could amount to a game-changing deal with the People’s Republic of China, in which China would undoubtedly insist the Vatican sever its ties with Taiwan. However, if the PRC continues to leverage its economic and military heft around the world, in an effort to isolate its democratic neighbor—a neighbor that primarily desires to continue functioning as the vibrant, multicultural, pluralist, progressive society that it has become—Pope Francis may want to reconsider his readiness to sacrifice David in favor of Goliath. If the Taiwan Strait constitutes a theatre for the “piecemeal third world war,” active peacemaking will not look like a highly problematic deal with China, presently engaged in an especially acute campaign of domestic religious persecution, but instead will take the form of solidarity with an embattled and bullied Taiwan.
President Tsai Ing-wen’s letter to Pope Francis, then, should not be dismissed as a series of platitudes about peace but seen for what it is: a call for Pope Francis to recognize–in Taiwan, and in her administration—a like-minded state and an important ally. Taiwan’s importance to the Holy See does not lie in its massive population, as China’s perceived importance does, but in its shared values, the same values that Francis has elevated throughout his papacy. Tsai Ing-wen knows that in “piecemeal” wars that fly under the world’s radar, it is good to cultivate like-minded friends, and she has sought to do so here. In her letter to Francis, she has appealed to a unique and strategically important ally on his own terms, in order that he might join her in building a “politics for peace” in the Taiwan Strait.
The main point: Observers of cross-Strait and East Asian politics and security should not overlook Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s letter to Pope Francis on “a style of politics for peace.” In the letter, Tsai makes an astute appeal to Francis on his own terms: to support Taiwan out of a sense of shared values and according to his own emphasis on ending “piecemeal third world wars.”
KMT Chairperson Elections: Turning Over a New Leaf?
Lauren Dickey is a PhD candidate in War Studies at King’s College London and the National University of Singapore, where her research focuses on Chinese strategy and cross-Strait relations. She is also a member of the Pacific Forum Young Leaders program at CSIS.
In the final days of 2016, Taiwan’s opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT), pushed through a motion to reschedule elections for the party’s chairmanship. Accompanying the motion was possible action on one of the KMT’s staunchest pro-China branches, the Huang Fu-hsing (黃復興) military veterans branch. While the latter reform has since fallen flat, the KMT now faces a revised timeline for intra-party elections in 2017—one that stands to have a significant impact upon the future of the island’s domestic politics.
According to Article 17 of the KMT’s Charter, the chairperson election should be held three months before the party’s National Congress in the year the current chair’s term is set to expire (“主席之選舉應於任滿當年應召開之全國代表大會舉行之三個月前，與全國代表大會代表之選舉同時辦理”).[1] In the last decade, the KMT has not observed the three-month window between the chairperson election and the opening of the party’s National Congress—as can be seen in the cases of Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) in 2007 and 2013. The one near exception to this trend occurred in 2009, when Ma Ying-jeou was elected unopposed to the chairmanship in July and sworn-in in mid-October, ten days shy of three full months.
Under Chairwoman Hung Hsiu-chu (洪秀柱), it seems that the KMT is seeking to play by party rules. Nevertheless, in Hung’s haste to set an election date, she broke another important regulation requiring a minimum number for a quorum in the party’s policy committee (政策委員會). According to reports, Hung cited regulations from the Ministry of the Interior to change quorum requirements by excluding members on a leave of absence from the total number of members. Of the forty eligible participants, a quorum of at least twenty votes was far from attainable with only five members in attendance. Hung’s negligence suggests an intentional oversight of democratic processes within the KMT, perhaps aimed at increasing her own chances at re-election. Her ability to reclaim the chairmanship will be challenged, however, by the candidacies of former Vice President Wu Den-yih (吳敦義), current KMT Vice-Chairman Hau Lung-bin (郝龍斌), former KMT Vice-Chairman Steve Chan (詹启贤), and businessman Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜).
While the motion to schedule the KMT’s chairperson election for May 20th—two months earlier than originally planned—has held despite the absence of quorum, efforts to change the voting status of the Huang Fu-hsing (or “Old Soldiers”) have been deferred. The proposed action would have removed the special voting rights given to the KMT’s deep blue, pro-China members. Presently, the Old Soldiers comprise roughly 190,000 people, approximately one-third of the KMT’s membership. Given the extent of the Old Soldiers’ political clout, they have been given a separate voting status within the party to limit their influence: of the 1,147 total KMT elected representatives, 102 (or 8.8 percent) are directly elected by the Old Soldiers. Should Hung’s motion pass, rather than creating greater equality in representation, the Old Soldiers would gain even more influence in local KMT chapter elections with an ability to vote for around 340 representatives (or 29.6 percent). This would arguably work in Hung’s favor, given the staunch support base she receives from the Old Soldiers. Even though the verdict on the Old Soldiers has been postponed, their impact upon the KMT will undoubtedly continue.
Meanwhile, alongside Hung in the crowded race for KMT chair are current frontrunners Wu Den-yih and Hau Lung-bin. Wu has sought to appeal to the centrist faction of the KMT, urging support of the 1992 Consensus in managing Taipei’s relationship with Beijing and suggesting an opposition to the legalization of same-sex marriage. Hau, a former Taipei mayor, has shelved presidential ambitions with a campaign pledge to make the KMT’s survival his top priority. Like Hung, Hau stands to benefit from votes cast by the Old Soldiers as the son of former premier and general Hau Pei-Tsun (郝柏村). Steve Chan and Han Kuo-yu are the dark horses in the race. Seeking to heal a divided Taiwan, Chan is thought to be a proxy for Foxconn chairman Terry Gou (郭台銘), who is rumored to be considering his own run for president in 2020. Little is known about Han Kuo-yu’s political ambitions, aside from his brief stint as a KMT party caucus leader and literal embrace of public opinion—as represented by heads of lettuce—since declaring his candidacy. The common denominator in the chairperson race to date is the absence of a clear vision for the party’s future. Each candidate must obtain approximately 9,000 signatures from KMT members by March 31st to validate their bid; in the interim, it would further behoove the candidates to elucidate the tangible steps they would take to revitalize a fragmented KMT.
For the KMT, the year ahead already looks to be a bumpy one. While the election of a new chairperson offers an opportunity for course correction, divides between the party’s caucus and headquarters in Taipei will likely persist. The KMT’s unanticipated move to reschedule the chairperson election illuminates the damage caused when a small minority of party leadership acts—irrespective of legislative processes—on behalf of the majority. After a new chairperson is elected on May 20, elections will be held in July for the party’s Central Committee and Central Standing Committee membership in advance of the National Congress on August 20. If the new chairperson is not able to slow the party’s gradual implosion and rejuvenate the KMT’s brand amongst Taiwanese voters, the KMT’s fate may have already been decided.
The main point: The Kuomintang will elect a new chairperson on May 20, 2017, but absent a leader capable of forging middle ground between the KMT’s light and deep blue branches, political infighting and uncertainty will remain a threat to the party’s long-term sustainability.
[1] Per the KMT’s charter, an individual is also not permitted to hold the chairmanship for longer than two four year terms (“主席之任期為四年，連選得連任一次”).
