The Global Taiwan Brief Volume 3, Issue 19
Fortnightly Review
By: Russell Hsiao
Prospects of Chinese Naval Access to El Salvador and Taiwan’s Diplomatic Space
By: David An
Taiwan’s Defense and Prospects for US-Taiwan Security Cooperation
By: Shirley Kan
Taiwan’s Military Reforms: Look to Ronald Reagan
By: Grant Newsham
An Organizational Assessment of Taiwan’s Ocean Affairs Council: Uncharted Waters
By: Crystal Tu
Fortnightly Review
Russell Hsiao is the executive director of the Global Taiwan Institute and the editor-in-chief of the Global Taiwan Brief.
Trump Administration’s National Cyber Strategy Highlights International Cooperation
On September 20, 2018, the Trump Administration released its “National Cyber Strategy of the United States” (hereafter “Cyber Strategy”). Cybersecurity experts have long called for a comprehensive national strategy, compelled by the rising threats posed by cyber-intrusions for economic prosperity and national security, which have grown as nation-state, non-state, and criminal actors increasingly exploit cyber vulnerabilities for malign purposes. Specifically, the Cyber Strategy called out China for its “cyber-enabled economic espionage and trillions of dollars of intellectual property theft.” In the 40-page document, President Trump laid out his administration’s strategic guidance founded on four pillars—with a strong emphasis on international cooperation.
The four pillars are:
(1) defend the homeland by protecting networks, systems, functions, and data; (2) promote American prosperity by nurturing a secure, thriving digital economy and fostering strong domestic innovation; (3) preserve peace and security by strengthening the United States’ ability in concert with allies and partners—to deter and if necessary punish those who use cyber tools for malicious purposes; and (4) expand American influence abroad to extend the key tenets of an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet.
Most notably, the Cyber Strategy underscores the importance of robust international cooperation and coalition building—which have clear potential applications to Taiwan. Indeed, the Cyber Strategy calls for working “with like-minded partners to attribute and deter malicious cyber activities.” According to Dmitri Alperovitch, co-founder and CTO of CrowdStrike, this has been a “key and necessary step that has been lacking in US cyber policy for many years.” Under the new strategy, the United States will launch an international Cyber Deterrence Initiative through which coalition members will “coordinate and support each other’s responses to significant malicious cyber incidents, including through intelligence sharing, buttressing of attribution claims, public statements of support for responsive actions taken, and joint imposition of consequences against malign actors.”
The release of the Cyber Strategy follows President Trump’s Executive Order 13800 from March 2017 on “Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure,” which builds out the initial steps that began during the second Obama administration with the issuing of the Executive Order on “Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities.” The latter order, an initiative that followed a persistent increase of cyber-espionage incidents attributable to Chinese-state actors, led to the “US-China Cyber Agreement” in September 2015. Yet, the success of the Agreement—which the Trump administration reaffirmed in 2017—has been mixed, and many cybersecurity experts believe that it did not do enough to deter the PRC’s aggressive cyber activities. Indeed, despite an apparent drop in economic espionage cyberattacks on US firms originating from Chinese actors during the first year following the agreement, in a testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2018, former commander of USCYBERCOM and director of the National Security Agency Admiral Mike Rogers revealed:
For example, Presidents Obama and Xi committed in 2015 that our two countries would not conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property for commercial gain. Subsequent evidence, however, suggests that hackers based in China sustained [emp. added] cyber espionage that exploited the business secrets and intellectual property of American businesses, universities, and defense industries.
The new Cyber Strategy appears to recognize the limitations posed by a bilateral, patchwork, and ad hoc approach to dealing with cyber-threats. Specifically, the Third Pillar of the new Cyber Strategy emphasizes the need for the United States to “formalize and make routine [emp. added] how we [the United States] work with like-minded partners to attribute and deter malicious cyber activities with integrated strategies that impose swift, costly, and transparent consequences when malicious actors harm the United States or our partners.” As “priority actions,” the Cyber Strategy sets out the following priorities: (1) more information sharing with key partners; (2) imposing consequences on malign actors; (3) imposing costs collectively in concert with like-minded allies and partners; and (4) working with allies and partners to identify, counter, and prevent the use of digital platforms for malign foreign influence operations while respecting civil rights and liberties.
Furthermore, the Cyber Strategy indicates how the interconnected nature of the cyber domain necessitates Internet governance, which is not only vital for economic security but also national security, and required international cooperation because of the challenge posed by the rise of revisionist authoritarian powers. Consequently, the Fourth Pillar calls for collaboration with allies and partners to collectively assure that cross-border communications, content creation, and commerce generated by the open, interoperable, reliable, and secure architecture of the Internet. As a matter of US policy, the Cyber Strategy states:
We will work to ensure that our approach to an open Internet is the international standard. We will also work to prevent authoritarian states that view the open Internet as a political threat from transforming the free and open Internet into an authoritarian web under their control, under the guise of security or countering terrorism.
In unambiguous terms, the Cyber Strategy asserts that the United States will, through capacity-building initiatives, form “strategic partnerships that promote cybersecurity best practices through a common vision of an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet that encourages investment and opens new economic markets.” Moreover, that “The United States will work to strengthen the capacity and interoperability of those allies and partners to improve our ability to optimize our combined skills, resources, capabilities, and perspectives against shared threats.”
In the preliminary analysis, the Trump Administration’s Cyber Strategy represents a strong first step in the US government’s long overdue whole-of-government approach to cybersecurity. In particular, the Cyber Strategy’s strong emphasis on robust international cooperation and its recognition of the need for coalition building with like-minded allies and partners present an important opportunity to deepen US-Taiwan cooperation in cyberspace. As a vigorous democracy with a robust economy and a front-line security partner of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, Taiwan has a unique role to play in the US Cyber Deterrence Initiative, especially in countering China’s cyber-aggression and supporting international rules and norms for Internet governance.
The main point: The National Cyber Strategy’s strong emphasis on robust international cooperation and its recognition of the need for coalition building with like-minded allies and partners present an important opportunity to deepen US-Taiwan cooperation in cyberspace.
US-Taiwan Strengthens Agricultural Cooperation as Trade War Simmers
Washington and Taipei are steadily strengthening cooperation on multiple fronts including in agriculture in the midst of growing tensions between the United States and China. On September 27, trade officials and business leaders from Taiwan signed a letter of intent to purchase up to 3.9 million metric tons of soybeans worth US$1.56 billion from US farmers over the next two years. The delegation was the 12th “Agricultural Trade Goodwill Mission” from Taiwan in the past 10 years. The purchase ceremony was attended by 12 members of the US Congress: Senator Joni Ernst (R-IA), Rep. Rod Blum (R-IA), Rep. Kevin Cramer (R-ND), Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart (R-FL), Rep. Glenn Grothman (R-WI), Rep. Steve King (R-IA), Rep. Aumua Amata Coleman Radewagen (R-AS), Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Rep. Albio Sires (D-NJ), Rep. Ted Yoho (R-FL), Rep. Roger Marshall (R-KS), Rep. Greg Harper (R-MS).
Taiwan is the eight largest overseas markets for US agricultural exports at the value of around US$3.3 billion. US export growth of agricultural products to Taiwan increased 7 percent between 2007 to 2017. Around a quarter of Taiwan’s annual total imports of agricultural products came from the United States. From 1998 to 2017, Taiwanese importers reportedly purchased US$32 billion worth of US grains products. The deal from this year’s goodwill mission with additional purchases of US soybeans is timely in light of China’s retaliatory tariffs on $34 billion worth of US goods, which include agriculture products such as soybeans. The United States’ agricultural sector was hit particularly hard by China’s retaliatory tariffs since soybean has been the United States top agricultural exports to China—with cotton at a distant second. In 2017, US soybean exports were nearly $22 billion and China accounted for 57.3 percent of US exports. Consequently, the US-China trade war has been a sensitive political issue for President Trump.
In his opening statement during the United Nations Security Council meeting on September 20, President Trump asserted: “Regrettably, we’ve found that China has been attempting to interfere in our upcoming 2018 election coming up in November against my administration. They do not want me or us to win because I am the first president to ever challenge China on trade, and we are winning on trade.” The White House reportedly gave a background briefing following Trump’s remarks in which a senior administration official claimed “that China had targeted farmers and workers in districts that make up part of Trump’s base.” In an apparent reference to his earlier charge, President Trump later tweeted an image of a China Daily insert in the Des Moines Register with the quote: “China is actually placing propaganda ads in the Des Moines Register and other papers, made to look like news. That’s because we are beating them on Trade, opening markets, and the farmers will make a fortune when this is over!”
Against the backdrop of growing trade tensions between the United States and China, Taiwan’s imports of agricultural products from the United States have increased with US soybean imports surging 80 percent above the average for 2013-17 in the first seven months to 1.2 million tons. The new purchases by Taiwanese companies will mean a 30 percent increase from the 2017 pledge of soybean purchases. The recently signed purchases follow last year’s mission in which Taiwan’s grains importers signed a Letter of Intent with three American grain associations for around 370 million bushels (or 10.2 million metric tons) of grains, worth nearly US$3 billion, which included the purchase of soybeans, corn and wheat.
Writing in an opinion-editorial for the Washington Times in the lead-up to the 2017 goodwill mission, Taiwan’s top diplomat to the United States, Ambassador Stanely Kao, stated:
This robust and steadily growing trade and investment partnership has laid a solid foundation for a free, fair, high-standard and reciprocal bilateral agreement in the future that would cover agricultural products and elevate our economic relations to a higher level, increasing our trade volume, supporting more jobs in the US, and benefiting more American citizens.
Indeed, against the backdrop of growing trade tensions between the United States and China, Washington and Taipei appear to be steadily strengthening cooperation and building a broader economic foundation in the bilateral relationship.
The main point: Against the backdrop of growing trade tensions between the United States and China, Washington and Taipei are steadily strengthening cooperation in agriculture.
Prospects of Chinese Naval Access to El Salvador and Taiwan’s Diplomatic Space
David An is a senior research fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute and was previously a political-military officer at the US Department of State.
When El Salvador broke ties with Taiwan to establish formal diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), US Ambassador to El Salvador Jean Manes remarked that China is “trying to find weak spots in the region, where they can make these kinds of arrangements […] we are concerned it is not only investment in a port, but then they want to do something with their military and they want to expand Chinese influence in the region.” What kinds of arrangements was Ambassador Manes referring to? What would China want to do with its military in a place as far away from China as Central America?
While the media attention of this defection has been focused on its impact to Taiwan’s diplomatic space, there is another element relating to China’s strategic intentions in the Western Hemisphere that also warrants concerns. For El Salvador, China would be interested in its civilian port La Unión, which it could possibly revive by implementing terms of agreement favorable to Beijing such as a long-term lease. Civilian access to the port could turn into military access over time. Therefore, as Taiwan had recently lost El Salvador as its diplomatic ally, China could take the opportunity to expand its military access there as an entry into Latin America, which would lead to new and growing security concerns for the United States in its own hemisphere.
El Salvador’s security value to China
Up until two decades ago, China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy, or PLAN) was a regional military force that was constrained to its periphery, but it started to take on more distant missions centered on China’s participation in counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden east of Africa. Multinational cooperation and burden sharing was the political basis of China’s naval expansion in what is often called China’s “string of pearls” of military access to ports throughout Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East.
After establishing military access to foreign ports, China started going beyond its counter-piracy mission by regularly sailing the PLA Navy far beyond the Gulf of Aden into the Mediterranean and throughout more distant areas of Africa. This is the international context of China’s expanding naval influence for Ambassador Manes’ remarks about how China’s growing influence over El Salvador and how China “wants to do something with their military and they want to expand Chinese influence in the region.”
As China’s navy sails further from home, it needs to access new ports to refuel and resupply its naval vessels. China’s ability to refuel and resupply overseas is generally accomplished in three predominant ways: using tanker ships to refuel military vessels while at sea; leveraging foreign commercial ports for military purposes to refuel and resupply military vessels; and officially establish its own military bases. El Salvador would be valuable for the latter two, which are China’s growing global efforts to leverage commercial ports for military purposes, and to establish its own military bases overseas.
Economic to political to military leverage
To leverage foreign commercial ports for military purposes, China’s modus operandi is to use another country’s economic dependence on Beijing as leverage for military influence. China spends hundreds of millions of dollars to “help” other countries build large commercial ports and tie up the country in debt to the PRC’s state-controlled banks. When the country cannot service the debt, then China negotiates to take control of the port. It has been described as “debt-trap diplomacy,” which translates economic dependence into political leverage.
Sri Lanka is the archetype for this debt trap behavior since Chinese PLA Navy submarines have docked at a port in Colombo in the past. Furthermore, Sri Lanka has signed over a 99 year lease of its Hambantota civilian port to China in exchange for $1.1 billion US dollars, and there is a possibility that China will use its access to this civilian port for military purposes in the future.
Aside from leveraging commercial ports for military purposes, China is also starting to set up overseas military bases just in the past few years. It is a stark contrast from its past practice from even a decade ago of its policy foregoing overseas basing. In Southeast Asia, it is common knowledge by now that China has built and militarized islands in the South China Sea. Further away, China is building a new naval base and airfield in Jiwani near Gwadar, Pakistan.
The clearest conflict of interest between the United States and China is China’s new base in Djibouti, which is curious since China’s military base in Djibouti is just a few miles away from the US’ military base Camp Lemonnier also in Djibouti. Either the United States did not try to work with Djibouti to try to stop China from building a base there, or possibly tried and couldn not stop it. If this precedent repeats with El Salvador, then China might succeed in establishing a military base there even over US protests. There are two key reasons why this Djibouti precedent is less likely to repeat in El Salvador.
Special Western Hemisphere concerns
There is good reason to think that El Salvador would be an exception from what occurred in Djibouti and other places in South Asia, Middle East, and Africa. First, the United States views the Western Hemisphere with more sensitivity than the rest of the world, and has taken more measures to guard US interests throughout Central and South America since at least the time of the Monroe Doctrine.
Second, the United States views China differently in these past several years compared to five or ten years ago, and only recently have official documents such as the US’ National Security Strategy of 2017 called China a “revisionist” threat, and with US diplomatic statements calling China a “strategic competitor.” It means that the United States would likely be more cautious about expansion of China’s military bases now and into the future, especially if it relates to Central and South America, such as the El Salvador possibility.
Considering the US’ special attention and interest in its own region, Ambassador Manes added, “the US is analyzing El Salvador’s decision. It is worrying for many reasons, including the breaking of a relationship over more than 80 years with Taiwan. Without a doubt, this will impact our relationship with the government. We will continue to support the Salvadoran people.”
US Senator Marco Rubio reacted more strongly against El Salvador’s decision in a public tweet: “Would be terrible mistake for govt of #ElSalvador to switch diplomatic recognition from #Taiwan to #China. Maybe they think China $ will help governing party win elections in 2019. But will cause real harm to relationship with US including their role in #AllianceforProsperity.”
More generally, El Salvador’ switch away from formal diplomatic recognition with Taiwan toward China is part of a disconcerting trend of China poaching Taiwan’s formal diplomatic allies. It is serious because the number of Taiwan’s formal diplomatic allies has dropped below twenty and is steadily decreasing. I previously published a Global Taiwan Brief article about the danger of cross-Strait political instability as Taiwan approaches zero diplomatic allies. However, Taiwan maintains strong informal diplomatic relations through its TECRO educational and cultural resource officers in the United States, Europe, Latin America and throughout the world that function as de facto embassies and consulates; so Taiwan is still informally connected with almost all countries in the world to successfully perform diplomatic, economic, and security engagement with its diplomatic partners.
Soon after US Ambassador to El Salvador Jean Manes said that the United States is concerned that China actually wants to “expand Chinese influence in the region” starting with investing in a port in El Salvador, the United States recalled Ambassador Manes along with US ambassadors to the Dominican Republic and Panama. The reported reason is that Washington expressed concern over the rising number of countries that have cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favor of China. The United States could do more to encourage other countries to support Taiwan, do much more itself to support Taiwan on the global stage, and in the process ensure US security interests in the Western Hemisphere and around the world.
The main point: As Taiwan recently lost its diplomatic ally El Salvador, China could take steps toward gaining naval access there, which would lead to new security concerns for the United States in the Western Hemisphere. These are setbacks for both Taiwan and the United States.
Taiwan’s Defense and Prospects for US-Taiwan Security Cooperation
Shirley Kan is a retired Specialist in Asian Security Affairs who worked for Congress at the non-partisan Congressional Research Service (CRS) and a Member of GTI’s Advisory Board.
Taiwan is strengthening deterrence and defense against the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s threats of coercion and conflict. The prospects for US-Taiwan security cooperation are very good—the best in many years. However, the risks also are much greater if Taipei will not urgently reach results on asymmetric warfare and the two sides do not enhance and clarify communication to dispel misperceptions and promote mutual understanding. What are some options for Taipei and Washington with an opportunity of strong US support for Taiwan’s self-defense?
Debate over defense concept
Taiwan is undergoing critical debates at a historic juncture when the stars are aligned just right: stronger US support in the Congress, the Trump Administration, and the US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM); as well as new support in Taiwan for a realistic concept for asymmetric warfare to deter and defend against the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The Administration of President Tsai Ing-wen is requesting an increase of 5.6 percent in the 2019 defense budget with an amount of NT$346 billion (US$11.2 billion), or 2.1 percent of GDP.
Taiwan’s leadership is debating an Overall Defense Concept (ODC) for joint, survivable, innovative, and asymmetric warfare. The ODC redefines warfighting to focus on defense of the island and to prevent the PLA from occupying Taiwan. How can the ODC be implemented? How soon? How can it be reconciled with traditional concepts of warfare, such as acquiring advanced tanks, submarines, and fighters for the services? In short, how can Taiwan’s military survive?
Some Taiwanese officials raise the issue of not only how can Taiwan’s military survive, but how can Taiwan itself survive as a prosperous and democratic country free from the PRC’s coercion and aggression? Certain officials recognize the PRC’s urgent existential threat to Taiwan. Ultimately, some in Taiwan have a broader view to stress strategic sustainment of all elements of national power: what might be called DIME (diplomacy, information, military, and economy). They also emphasize the political implications of Taiwan’s defense policy.
Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy
In the United States and some allies, there is now recognition with a great sense of urgency and realism about the strategic competition with China to deal with its challenges. Gone is the old “business as usual,” whether to deal with threats from the regimes of China or North Korea.
Again, the stars are aligned: both the US and Taiwan are more realistic about China’s challenges.
Looking to the 40th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)’s enactment next April, it is time for much more than just planning events to mark the milestone. Action is required precisely because the stakes are so high. If honestly facing this situation, there would no longer be avoidance on decisions, or just “kicking the can down the road.”
Moreover, in the new sense of principled realism as articulated by the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, US policymakers might recognize that this unique bilateral relationship with restrictions in contacts with Taiwan’s officials is presenting more problems now than solutions in carrying out policy for almost 40 years under the TRA. Over the decades, the practice of implementing policy has imposed self-restrictions, not the policy itself. Contrary to the PRC’s or State Department’s objections to changing so-called “unofficial” contacts with Taiwan, the TRA does not specify the bilateral relationship as official or unofficial and does not discuss the “one-China” concept as part of policy on Taiwan.
If Washington stresses to Taipei the urgency of deterring the PLA’s threats now, then Washington also needs to engage with a new sense of urgency and actions. If the days of “business as usual” are gone, then what changes are needed now to help strengthen Taiwan’s defense? Fundamentally, the unavoidable issue asks: what is the strategic objective for Taiwan, if US policy is more about process than any resolution? Can Taiwan survive after a few years?
Options to Strengthen Practical Cooperation
While it has been beneficial that Taiwan’s military officers attend US military educational institutions and write academic papers, some other options might be emphasized to strengthen pragmatically Taiwan’s deterrence and reconcile differences in communication about US-Taiwan cooperation. Moreover, despite the overall declining trend in US arms sales to Taiwan, there is no longer a problem of repairing the process whereby notifications to Congress of arms sales were delayed in so-called “packages” or Taiwan’s Letters of Request were not accepted even for consideration. So, what are some other options to strengthen US-Taiwan security cooperation?
Option 1. While existing military-to-military (mil-to-mil) exchanges are robust, both sides could expand combined training and integrate them in a joint manner. Thus, mil-to-mil training would build upon service-to-service engagements.
Option 2. While thousands of US subject matter experts (SMEs) contribute to security assistance for Taiwan each year, Taipei could work with Washington on more defense SMEs going to Taiwan, particularly for practical training of its military officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) at various levels from bottom to top in areas such as these:
-Taiwan’s leadership decision-making
-Taiwan’s joint operational plans
-Taiwan’s joint doctrine
-Taiwan’s joint training
-Taiwan’s defense contracts, arms acquisitions, and industrial cooperation
-Taiwan’s security clearances and technology controls
-Taiwan’s critical infrastructure protection and cyber security
-Taiwan’s reserve force (stressed in the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act)
-Taiwan’s political warfare and public affairs officers (media outreach)
-Taiwan’s continuity of government and leadership succession
-Taiwan’s limits in recruiting and retaining a volunteer force
Option 3. While both sides engage in senior-level official talks on defense and security, Washington could send more retired and active-duty flag officers or general officers to engage in direct talks with Taiwan’s civilian and military leadership, particularly the president. Also, while senior official meetings are not unprecedented, Washington could send an Assistant Secretary of Defense and other senior Defense Department or National Security Council officials to Taipei. Such face-to-face talks are needed to dispel misperceptions and to clarify approaches. Taipei could ensure such meetings are substantive and reach results. Both sides could further reconcile different outlooks, for example, Washington looking more to the long-term while stressing the short-term and Taipei focusing more on the urgent current threat while looking to the future.
Option 4. Moreover, US policy in general (perhaps, with legislation) could authorize the Defense Department to decide (without the State Department’s required, written approval) whether to allow visits to Taiwan by flag or general officers (military personnel above the rank of O-6) and Assistant Secretaries of Defense or other senior officials (above the level of office director). The Defense Department could make its own decisions, regardless of the State Department’s Guidelines on Relations with Taiwan or other restrictions on contacts with Taiwan’s officials.
Option 5. The United States could welcome Taiwan’s minister of defense to visit in October, while attending the annual US-Taiwan defense industry conference to which he is invited. While US policy generally has allowed Taiwan’s defense minister to visit, the issue shifted largely to whether Taipei has been willing to send such an official to engage in direct talks in the United States. US policy also could change to remove the distinction of allowing Taiwan’s defense minister to visit the United States but not in the small area of the District of Columbia.
Option 6. After a four-year gap so far, Washington could send a Cabinet-rank official to Taiwan. Consideration might focus on the Secretary of Veterans Affairs.
Option 7. The Defense Department might upgrade one or both of the senior military representatives assigned in Taipei at the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) from the rank of colonel to rank of brigadier general.
The main point: President Tsai’s decisive leadership is needed to resolve Taiwan’s debate on the ODC, particularly given the Trump Administration’s support for the ODC and stronger US support for Taiwan’s defense. The prospects for security cooperation are promising, but the risks are great if Taiwan will fail to reach results and waste this opportunity to strengthen defense.
(This article is based on remarks at GTI’s 2018 Annual Symposium on September 12, 2018.)
Taiwan’s Military Reforms: Look to Ronald Reagan
Grant Newsham is a senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies in Tokyo with more than 25 years’ experience in Japan and elsewhere in Asia as a US diplomat, business executive, and US Marine Corps officer.
In early August, Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen announced plans to spend US$11.2 billion on defense in 2019. This is either too much or too little depending on whom you ask. In either case, it is clear that Taiwan will continue developing its own weapons—including impressive long-range missiles and other high-tech weaponry, and it is taking the first exploratory steps towards developing submarines. Moreover, the Trump Administration just approved US$330 million in arms sales to Taiwan covering parts for Taiwan’s F-16, C-130, F-5, Indigenous Defense Fighter, and other aircraft systems. In light of these acquisitions, one may get the impression that Taiwan’s defense is largely a matter of hardware.
Weapons and equipment are certainly part of the balance equation. Yet, the Tsai administration will do well to pay more attention to the people using the hardware. Simply put, Taipei needs to make serving in Taiwan’s military a respected profession. This is indispensable, and if unaddressed, it does not matter what weapons Taiwan has. Taiwan shifted towards an all-volunteer force a few years ago but is having trouble attracting enough recruits. This was predictable. Before the changeover, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) and military services asked the US military for advice on recruiting—as if particular slogans or appeals would do the trick. But appeals to patriotism and the promise of adventure only go so far—even in America. Military service has to be attractive to enough potential volunteers—and volunteers of a certain type. In Taiwan, it is not; but fortunately, it is not a complicated problem to fix.
Some advice to President Tsai
President Tsai spoke at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library during her recent visit to the United States. She may study how President Reagan rebuilt the US military in the early 1980s, making it into an attractive, and eventually, a highly respected profession.
Before the Reagan era, if someone were to mention that they were joining the military, even as an officer, it was often followed by an embarrassed silence or commiseration at having no better options—and signing up for a life of deprivation. And it was even worse for the enlisted ranks. Stories of troops and their families living in sub-standard quarters or on ‘food stamps’ were not apocryphal.
Yet, Reagan did more more than just throw money at the US military. The services also needed to be cleansed of serious drug and racial problems, and demoralization that grew from the Vietnam War, not to mention Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s ‘Project 100,000’—that forced the military to accept recruits who would otherwise have been rejected for service.
Compared to what Reagan faced, President Tsai’s challenge is in fact relatively easy.
While President Reagan had good ideas, the key to everything was first being willing to pay for them. It was not just buying new equipment. Rather, the essential thing was improving pay, housing, and other terms of service–including ‘post-service’ educational benefits and pensions. As importantly, the US military started paying attention to families, so married service members and their families could live comfortable lives–rather than in straitened circumstances.
The lesson is: To attract good people—and from a broader candidate pool that otherwise would not consider joining the military—you must spend money and treat them well. This shows that the nation values military service. President Reagan was a gifted orator whose respect for the military was genuine, but he also put his money where his mouth was. Both are necessary.
So what are the lessons for Taiwan?
The problem is widely understood in Taipei, although no administration to date has seemed interested in addressing it. In recent years the Taiwan Armed Forces (TAF) even lost a number of experienced, capable officers to early retirement out of concern that their pensions were at risk if they remained on active duty. Given China’s tightening pressure on Taiwan, the Tsai Administration may consider the following recommendations:
- Do what is necessary so young Taiwanese—both male and female—view military service as an advantageous career choice that compares favorably to the private sector. Make it well paying, offer decent living conditions (no more dilapidated, un-air-conditioned quarters), and look after military families.
- Focus on professional development for service members—both while in the service and afterwards.
- Implement the equivalent of America’s GI Bill providing lifelong benefits such as post-service education assistance, housing loans, healthcare, and decent, secure pensions for long serving personnel. Otherwise, slick promotions or advertisements will not lure enough people of the right sort into the Taiwan Armed Forces.
To paraphrase retired USMC Lt. Gen. Wallace ‘Chip’ Gregson: Do all this and you create a path of advancement for everyone who joins; attracting the right type of people and rewarding them in a way that feeds back into society positively. Yet, critics argue that this costs money. That’s true, but valuable things usually do. And Taiwan has the cash—being prepared to spend billions on submarines and F35s—to do it.
Return to conscription?
There is no doubt that there is a temptation in Taiwan to revert to a ‘draft’—or a partial version of it. However, that would not necessarily solve the underlying problem of too many Taiwanese citizens looking askance at military service.
So do, and spend, what’s necessary to change that mindset. It’s of course sometimes argued that an all-volunteer force is a ‘mercenary’ one. But, one recalls the American economist Milton Friedman’s response to General William Westmoreland’s suggestion that a force of well-paid volunteers (‘mercenaries’) is less patriotic or even reliable. Friedman’s reply: “Would you rather command an army of slaves?”
40 years of American experience have proved Milton Friedman right and General Westmoreland wrong.
Taiwan Armed Forces–highlighting a free society
Rather than viewing TAF as an unavoidable drain on national resources to be grudgingly supported and funded, Taiwan’s military highlights the profound difference between Taiwan and the PRC. A respected (and properly funded) Taiwan military bolsters the notion of individual freedom, liberty, and consensual rule as worth defending from a rapacious and resentful neighbor.
Taiwan’s armed forces exemplify how democratic societies behave differently than totalitarian ones. They allow flexibility, initiative, and independent action from the bottom up. This is a strength—beyond the brute force that comes of superior numbers and centralized control of everything by a government that doesn’t trust its citizens. One might even argue that Taiwan’s military is more like the free, independent Finns facing off against the Soviets in the late 1930’s, while the PLA resembles the Imperial Japanese Army of that era.
The United States can help
Service in Taiwan’s military will be more attractive if TAF can break out of the international isolation that creates a sort of ‘Galapagos effect’ –shutting off the professional enrichment that comes from exposure to other militaries and conducting overseas training and operations.
The US should take the lead and start serious joint training and exchanges with the Taiwan Armed Forces—on or around Taiwan, Guam, and in the United States. One way to kick start this effort is for USINDOPACOM (formerly PACOM) and DOD to move forward with a joint US-Taiwan ‘Central Pacific Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief Force’—headquartered in Taiwan that plans, practices for, and responds to real world HA/DR operations—and links both nations’ amphibious forces. And invite the Japanese and Australians, and their new amphibious forces to get involved.
Answering the ‘will Taiwan fight?’ question
Another substantial benefit of spending and doing what’s necessary to ‘fix’ Taiwan’s military is that it addresses a longstanding complaint from naysayers in Washington, DC. The criticism goes as follows: ‘Taiwan won’t defend itself –and won’t spend the money to do so—so why should we?” Meanwhile, in classic ‘chicken or the egg’ fashion, a defeatist strain of thinking in Taiwan frets, “since American support is uncertain, what’s the point of mounting (and paying for) a serious defense?”
Spend money and revitalize the defense profession with a committed, systematic effort to upgrade terms of service, and this unmistakable evidence of Taiwan ‘helping itself’ will be noticed in the United States. It is important to emphasize that this focus on ‘people’ is indispensable, but does not lessen the need to improve Taiwan Armed Forces’ capabilities by obtaining needed weaponry and spending on R&D, while also restructuring the military into a mobile force employing a range of asymmetric weapons that make Taiwan a ‘tough nut to crack.’
So consider how the Americans look after the troops, and copy or introduce modified versions of large parts of it. And get out the checkbook. Do that, and Taiwan will find that making the military a respected profession is the equivalent of a dozen submarines and a squadron of F-35s. It is not complicated, but it takes some will. Ronald Reagan had plenty of that when facing off against the Soviets. President Tsai will need as much for dealing with the PRC. America and the world’s free nations need to help.
The main point: For too long Taiwan’s leaders have over-focused on obtaining weapons and hardware and not paid enough attention to the troops who will actually defend Taiwan. Indeed, armed forces morale is shaky and Taiwan’s all-volunteer force is having trouble attracting enough recruits. President Tsai and her administration need to move quickly and improve terms of service for TAF personnel and make the Taiwan military a respected profession. Ronald Reagan’s efforts to revitalize the US military in the early 1980’s offer some useful guidance to President Tsai.
An Organizational Assessment of Taiwan’s Ocean Affairs Council: Uncharted Waters
Dr. Crystal Tu is co-founder of Oceansays.info, a community-based platform that aims at providing maritime news and commentaries to both academics and the general public. Her commentaries have also appeared in other media outlets such as Initium Media and CommonWealth Magazine.
After over a decade of drawn-out discussions and preparations, the Taiwan government’s Ocean Affairs Council (海洋委員會, OAC) was finally established on April 28, 2018. As part of ongoing reforms, the OAC integrates the planning, coordination, and implementation of maritime-related policy as well as other related affairs that were previously scattered among different agencies within the Executive Yuan. According to the OAC Organization Act (海洋委員會組織法), the newly-minted Council has three subordinate agencies: the Coast Guard Administration (海巡署, CGA), the Ocean Conservation Administration (海洋保育署, OCA), and the National Academy of Ocean Research (國家海洋研究院, NAOR). Currently, the OAC has two subordinate agencies: CGA and OCA; and the preparatory office for NAOR (國家海洋研究院籌備處) was established at the same time with the mandate to complete the formal transition process within 12 months.
Looking into the past and beyond for Ocean Affairs Council
The debate over the nature and level of the new agency responsible for maritime affairs has been raging on for more than a decade. Both the Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou governments teetered back-and-forth between whether the new organization should be a “council” or “ministry-level agency” for maritime affairs. The debate eventually settled on council, yet insiders within both major political parties still differ on the matter. The OAC was established, notwithstanding these differences.
Yet, the road ahead is not without challenges. The fact that key administrative matters, such as maritime transportation, fisheries, and maritime spatial planning remain in the original agencies (i.e., the Ministry of Transportation (交通部), the Fisheries Agency (漁業署) and the Ministry of Interior (內政部), respectively) may present jurisdictional challenges for the OAC. No one should expect that the new council can immediately solve all the cross-ministerial policy issues. Looking forward, the experience of OAC in the coordination and deliberation of ocean policies, such as drafting the Ocean Basic Law (海洋基本法) for the forthcoming session of Legislative Yuan, will be a critical benchmark for evaluating whether such “super-ministry” for maritime affairs may be necessary.
Additionally, OAC is the first cabinet-level, central government agency based in Kaohsiung City, in southern Taiwan. The notion of “southward relocation” of the central government away from Taipei is not new, as it was first proposed by former president Chen Shui-bian during his 2004 campaign. The Executive Yuan drafted several “southward relocation” plans for different agencies, but the only one ever to materialize is the Fisheries Agency -the subordinate agency in the Council of Agriculture (農委會). The Fisheries Agency moved to Chienchen Fishing Port (前鎮漁港) of Kaohsiung in 2007. Initially, this seemed to be a favorable move that brought the agency closer to the center of fishing industries. Yet, many of the Fisheries Agency’s officials soon found themselves spending the majority of their time traveling between Taipei and Kaohsiung. As the Legislative Yuan and all the other agencies of the Executive Yuan remain in northern Taiwan, the communication cost was tremendous. Group by group, the Fisheries Agency quietly moved back to its “Taipei Office” in 2008. Though the headquarter of the Fisheries Agency is officially still based in Chienchen Fishing Port, many of the divisions -including the office of director-general—are already in Taipei as of 2014.
The rather unsuccessful “southward relocation” of the Fisheries Agency may serve as a cautionary tale for OAC. Within the new agency, the core administrative units of CGA, including its headquarter (署本部), are still located in northern Taiwan. While teleconferencing may be a solution, this is not a common practice among governmental agencies in Taiwan. Distance limits the knowledge spillover that may create an unfavorable environment for policy discussion. It remains to be seen how OAC will overcome such limitations.
Restructuring and Reinforcing the Coast Guard Administration (CGA)
CGA is a pre-existing agency and has already undergone a series of restructuring. Following the restructuring, each Patrol Office (巡防局) previously under the Coastal Patrol Directorate General (海岸巡防總局) became an independent Branch (分署)—with a Northern, Central, Southern, Eastern, Kinmen-Matsu-Penghu (金馬澎) and Dongsha-Nansha (東南沙) branch. Other subordinate branches include the Fleet Branch (艦隊分署, formerly Maritime Patrol Directorate General (海洋巡防總局)), the Investigation Branch (偵防分署), which combines the Special Task Unit (特勤隊), and the Reconnaissance Brigades (查緝隊) from both of the former Directorate Generals and Education, Training & Testing Center (教育訓練與測考中心).
With its core mission as maritime law enforcement, maritime services, and maritime affairs, the “white-hulls” of CGA is often viewed as less escalatory than their “grey-hull” counterparts in the Taiwan Navy. While lacking the platform for dialogue and cooperation with other coast guards, CGA still finds room for maneuver to promote maritime security. As a member of the Western-Central Pacific Fisheries Commissions (WCPFC), CGA performs annual high-sea boarding and inspection mission on behalf of Taiwan. These missions also provide a unique channel for consolidating the friendship with Taiwan’s diplomatic allies in West-Central Pacific, such as the Marshall Islands, which signed an agreement on coast guard cooperation with Taiwan this July.
The main priority for CGA is capacity building to fulfill the mission demands. The Fleet Branch currently suffers the most from the lack of capacity. It has around 149 of patrol boats, ships, and cutters [1]. These vessels are assigned into 15 Offshore Flotillas (海巡隊), 4 Sector Flotillas (機動海巡隊, including North, Central, South and East) and 1 Fleet of Direct Access (直屬船隊). The Offshore Flotillas are responsible for patrol within 24 nautical miles (contiguous zone). Each Offshore Flotilla is usually equipped with 3 to 7 patrol boats of 20, 35, 50 to 100-ton class. The Sector Flotillas are responsible for patrol within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and are usually equipped with cutters above 500 tons. Finally, the Fleet of Direct Access is responsible for high sea and EEZ patrol and is equipped with 1,000-ton class patrol ship [2].
Nearly 15 years ago in 2003, the United Ship Design & Development Center (聯合船舶設計發展中心, now Ship and Ocean Industries R&D Center船舶暨海洋產業研發中心) carried out a study to estimate the ship and aircraft demand of CGA (海岸巡防署艦艇及航空器需求之研究). The study recommended that each Offshore Flotilla has at least 10 patrol boats for 3-shifts patrol everyday with acceptable vessel availability. In summary, they assessed that CGA needed around 19 cutters of 500-tons (or above) class, 197 patrol boats, 5 patrol ships of 3,500-ton class, and various specific purpose boats to fulfill its mission demands in the next 15 years. Comparing the suggested numbers with the size of the current fleet, CGA is seriously under-equipped.
Therefore, in 2015 CGA announced a shipbuilding program to add 4 cutters of 4,000-ton class, 6 cutters of 1,000-ton class, 12 cutters of 600-ton class, 17 patrol boats of 100-ton class, 52 patrol boats of 35-ton class, and 50 multi-function patrol boats after the establishment of OAC. Most tenders started in the summer of 2018 with expected delivery to begin from 2019 to 2027, except the turn-key bidding for 6 cutters of 1,000-ton class and construction bidding of 17 patrol boats of 100-ton class, which are scheduled for 2019.
The ongoing discussions on the CGA’s shipbuilding program mainly focus around 4,000-ton class and 600-ton class cutters; both are new ship classes with civil-mil transition (平戰轉換) expected to start the sea trial on 2020. The 4,000-ton class cutters will be the largest ever built by CGA, as a response to the increasing law enforcement mission demands in the East and South China Seas. The design reportedly will be based on a next generation frigate (also known as Project Cheng-Hai (震海計畫)) of the Taiwan Navy, and it will reserve space for operation and weapon system that can be rapidly installed during wartime. It will also include medical facility and personnel onboard for conducting humanitarian missions as “field hospital.” In accordance with the policy guideline of promoting indigenous shipbuilding (國艦國造), the NT$ 10.4 billion contract (US$ 347.9 million) of 4,000-ton class cutters has been awarded to CSBC Corporation (台灣國際造船) in July 2018.
The other new ship class, 600-ton class cutters, has been hotly debated since the program was announced. The design of these cutters will be based on Taiwan Navy’s 500-ton Tuo-Chiang class missile corvette (沱江艦), which has a catamaran design and is capable of maximum speed of 38 knots per hour. CGA values the corvette’s high speed for chasing smugglers and fast-attack capability when equipped with modular missile container bays for indigenous anti-ship missiles (i.e. HF-2 and HF-3).
The new design, however, appears to ignore the CGA’s previous development in ship design and experience in law enforcement and as such faces many criticisms internally and externally. The design of the current 700-ton class cutters, such as CG116 “Taipei” and CG112 “Nantou,” are modified from the Jin-Chiang corvette (錦江級) of the Taiwan Navy. This design could have been upgraded with years of actual deployment experience. On the other hand, the new ships’ seaworthiness under severe conditions and high freeboard (6 meter from the waterline to the upper deck level) unfavorable for boarding inspection has been questioned. As replies to these criticisms, CGA stressed that further modification in ship design would address these issues.
Besides finalizing details of ship design, this contract challenges the capabilities in financial and project management for the bidder with all 12 cutters bid at once with delivery of 1 to 2 cutters every year from 2020. To the surprise of many observers, this contract was finally awarded to Jong Shyn Shipbuilding (中信造船) in a rare 4th call for bid. The shipyard that built the prototype of Tuo-Chiang class, Lung Teh Shipbuilding (龍德造船), did not join the final bid. There is speculation that Lung Teh decided not to bid because of conflict in the schedule of the Tuo-Chiang class further production and the small profit margin for CGA’s project.
Perhaps even more critical is how will CGA fill the personnel gaps when these cutters and patrol boats are delivered. As identified by the National Audit Office (審計部) in the 2017 Performance Report (106年中央政府總決算報告), the shortage of Fleet Branch has reached 32.22 percent of its authorized complement. The increases in budget complement every year since 2002 is still unable to fill the gap and hiring externally has become the new normal. While many issues need to be solved, CGA is undoubtedly the primary administrative agency in Taiwan for enforcing maritime sovereignty and jurisdictional rights.
The main point: Taiwan’s Ocean Affairs Council will need several years for establishing its own policy planning capacity and the channels of coordination and deliberation with the other agencies.
[1] In the official document of CGA, the cutter is usually referred as “frigate.” I will use “cutter” as in US Coast Guard through the article to make the distinction for law enforcement usage.
[2] See the agenda related document of Legislative Yuan (立法院議案關係文書) No. 887: Governmental proposal No. 15100-378 (院總第887號 政府提案第15100號之378).
