On July 22, the Republic of China (ROC) armed forces kicked off the live maneuver phase of the 40th iteration of the Han Kuang military exercise (漢光演習), an annual event held since 1984 that is intended to simulate efforts to resist an invasion by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). (Following traditional practice, the exercise was divided into two phases: an earlier virtual phase, involving computer simulations and tabletop exercises, was held from April 19-26—and reportedly involved a scenario in which a Chinese military exercise was used as cover for an actual attack on Taiwan.) The annual Han Kuang exercise is the largest training event on the annual calendar for the ROC armed forces, and accordingly provides an opportunity to view evolving trends in Taiwan’s defense posture. However, previous iterations of Han Kuang have been the subject of criticism on grounds that the exercise is overly scripted, characterized by rigid top-down command structures, and conducted largely for public relations value—and that the exercise therefore provides limited training value in terms of preparing military personnel for the chaos of actual battlefield environments. [1]
Prior to this year’s exercise, Ministry of National Defense (MND, 國防部) officials consistently stressed a message that this year’s Han Kuang would be less scripted, and would incorporate increased latitude for decentralized decision-making on the part of lower-echelon units. For example, Major General Tung Chi-hsing (董冀星), Director of the Joint Operations Planning Division at MND, declared in an early April press conference that: “The Han Kuang exercise will practice different scenarios and mission-oriented command… [we will] implement decentralized command mechanisms, and demonstrate [the military’s] capability to conduct its own independent defense operations.”
This message was further reinforced by Defense Minister Wellington Koo (顧立雄) and Chief of the General Staff Admiral Mei Chia-shu (梅家樹) in an appearance before the Legislative Yuan on June 26. In his statements to the legislature, Admiral Mei reiterated the message that this year’s exercise would be less scripted, and would emphasize greater initiative on the part of lower-echelon units. Of note, other messaging from defense officials further indicated that the live-fire components of the exercise would be shifted to outlying islands and away from the main island of Taiwan, and that this year there would not be designated aggressor units intended to take on the role of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) personnel—both steps likely taken out of caution to reduce the possibility of live fire accidents in more unscripted scenarios.
In addition to the promised less-scripted approach, MND messaging prior to the exercise also emphasized two additional points of interest. First, the MND announced that the exercise would, for the first time, test revised guidelines and rules of engagement for defensive counter-strikes against an attacking force. Second, Taiwan government sources had indicated that the exercise would emphasize testing the ability of military and civilian agencies to coordinate their efforts in keeping supply lines open and transportation assets functioning in the face of a blockade scenario.
In light of these signaled changes, this year’s Han Kuang promised to be of particular interest. As events played out, the latter half of this year’s Han Kuang exercise was canceled due to Typhoon Gaemi – thereby severely curtailing both the scope of the exercise, and the ability of observers to make judgments about it. However, an abortive schedule of events was held during the first three days, as detailed in the selected highlights below.
Image: Troops of the ROC Army 109th Brigade take part in a simulated operation to suppress enemy fifth column agents during a scenario in New Taipei City during the Han Kuang exercise (July 23, 2024). (Image source: ROC Ministry of Defense)
Highlights of Han Kuang 2024
July 22 (Monday)
Preparatory to the exercise, the ROC Navy deployed assets—including at least two Kuang Hua VI (光華六號)-class missile boats, and vehicle-mounted anti-ship missile launchers—to the vicinity of Taitung (southeastern Taiwan) for training evolutions during the exercise.
In a common pattern for Han Kuang exercises in recent years, the first day of the exercise saw dispersal drills by naval and air force platforms, simulating movement by these assets to avoid PLA missile attacks on their ports and airfields. Unspecified ROC naval units sortied from port to operating locations off the coast. ROC Air Force aircraft flew from airfields along the western coast of Taiwan (facing the Taiwan Strait) to airfields in Hualian and Taitung (along the east coast), the locations of hardened shelters for fighter aircraft.
ROC Army personnel conducted a drill to place naval mines and nets in the Tamsui River (淡水河) north of Taipei to guard against enemy infiltration or landing operations. (The Tamsui River has long been viewed as a potential landing area for an invasion force, and has accordingly been a traditional site for counter-amphibious landing scenarios—as was the case with drills in New Taipei City’s northwestern Bali District [八里] during Han Kuang 2023.) Personnel of the ROC Army’s 53rd Engineering Group also assembled oil tanks, cables, and other materials to create floating obstacles on the river.
Reservists reported to multiple locations around Taiwan for temporary mobilization and training during the exercise—including reservists who reported to a training center in Taoyuan for a planned period of 5-7 days of refresher training, and a scenario involving the defense of Taoyuan International Airport. This continues a pattern first started during the 2022 Han Kuang exercise of increased participation by reserve force personnel.
The 47th iteration of the annual Wan-An civil defense exercise (萬安47號演習)—a concurrent event with Han Kuang each year—commenced in central Taiwan. In the drill, air raid sirens sounded from 1:30PM to 2PM local time, with residents required either to remain indoors, or to clear the streets and take refuge in designated shelters.
July 23 (Tuesday)
President Lai Cheng-te (賴清德) and Defense Minister Wellington Koo flew to Hualien Air Force Base to inspect exercise activities at the base, to include simulated trauma care at a field hospital, and the opening of an emergency runway after the main runway was deemed damaged by missile strikes.
The Wan-An air raid drills were conducted in the northern area of Taiwan (to include Taipei City).
ROC Army personnel conducted a “nighttime counter-infiltration drill” (夜間反滲透演練) in An-ping Harbor, Tainan City (see image below).
Image: Troops of the ROC Army 137th Brigade conduct a “nighttime counter-infiltration drill” in An-ping Harbor (Tainan) during the Han Kuang exercise, July 23. (Image source: Military News Agency)
July 24 (Wednesday)
Military personnel assigned to the Penghu Islands held counter-amphibious landing drills, featuring live firings of Stinger anti-aircraft and Javelin anti-armor missiles, as well as artillery and mortars. As originally planned, these drills were to include participation by air force and naval units, but this was canceled due to the approach of Typhoon Gaemi. Similar live-fire exercises were also held in Matsu. Planned live-fire drills in Kinmen were canceled due to the presence of merchant vessels sheltering in Liaoluo Port (料羅港) ahead of the approaching typhoon.
Typhoon Gaemi swept through Taiwan on July 24—with the center of the storm making landfall on the east coast, and crossing through northern Taiwan—causing severe flooding, property damage, and disruptions to travel throughout the island.
The Wan-An drills planned for eastern Taiwan, and Taiwan’s outlying islands, were canceled due to the weather.
Image: Army personnel on Matsu conducting an artillery live-fire drill, July 24. This was the last day of training activities before the Han Kuang exercise was canceled due to Typhoon Gaemi. (Image source: Matsu Defense Command / OCAC)
July 25 (Thursday)
The Wan-An drills planned for southern Taiwan were canceled due to the weather.
As a result of Typhoon Gaemi, all exercise activities were officially canceled effective at noon on July 25, with military personnel shifting to island-wide rescue and relief operations.
Conclusions
This year’s Han Kuang, as laid out in MND messaging prior to the exercise, promised to be a significant event that would test out a number of new practices for the ROC military. Foremost among these was to have been a less-scripted and more spontaneous approach to the annual exercise—and such a move would indeed be a worthwhile and welcome shift in both the training practices and the traditionally rigid, top-down command structure of the ROC armed forces. (The restriction of live-fire exercises to Taiwan’s outlying islands—where better-trained, volunteer forces are located—was likely done in order to reduce the prospect for accidents in less-scripted scenarios involving reservists and other personnel with less rigorous training.)
The promised emphasis on counter-blockade operations to ensure the continued flow of necessary supplies was also intriguing—and reflects a key defense concern for Taiwan in the face of what is arguably the most likely crisis scenario involving major PRC military operations against the island. And, while few details were made available, the issue of simulated counter-strikes against the PRC—a controversial aspect of Taiwan defense policy dating back to the Chen Shui-bian Administration, and a significant component of defense strategy as laid out in the 2021 Quadrennial Defense Review—would also be a significant element to watch out for in Taiwan’s military exercises.
Unfortunately, due to the combination of limited public information about specific exercise scenarios, and the abortive nature of this year’s exercise, it is difficult to judge the extent to which these concepts have been incorporated in a meaningful way into the training of the ROC military. As this is now the second consecutive Han Kuang impacted by a major storm (portions of the 2023 Han Kuang were canceled due to Typhoon Doksuri), some defense commentators in Taiwan have called for re-scheduling the annual exercise away from the summer typhoon season.
The 2024 Han Kuang exercise had promised—at least in MND publicity messages—to be a significant training event, which would incorporate innovative practices into what had long been criticized as an overly scripted, pro forma exercise. On these grounds, it is particularly disappointing that the exercise was canceled due to severe weather—and will make Han Kuang all the more worthy of close attention in 2025.
The main point: The live-maneuver portion of Taiwan’s annual Han Kuang military exercise was scheduled to take place from July 22-26. Prior to the exercise, defense officials had promised a more decentralized command structure and less-scripted approach for the exercise. However, the early cancellation of this year’s exercise due to Typhoon Gaemi makes it difficult to assess how meaningful these planned changes actually were.
[1] The author has himself been critical of past iterations of Han Kuang on these grounds. See:
- John Dotson, “The Highlights of Taiwan’s 2022 Han Kuang Military Exercise,” Global Taiwan Brief, August 10, 2022, https://globaltaiwan.org/2022/08/the-highlights-of-taiwans-2022-han-kuang-military-exercise/;
- John Dotson, “An Overview of Taiwan’s 2023 Han Kuang Military Exercise,” Global Taiwan Brief, August 9, 2023, https://globaltaiwan.org/2023/08/an-overview-of-taiwans-2023-emhan-kuang-em-military-exercise/.
