Amid highly aggressive and provocative military drills by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—the military arm of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, 中國共產黨)—Taiwan finds itself in another period of tense calm, awaiting inevitable further aggression by its larger neighbor (see here and here). The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has recently escalated its position on “reunification” with Taiwan, including threats to use force if necessary. With no indication of any change in China’s position on Taiwan, these escalating developments in Taiwan’s security environment highlight the urgency of strengthening its defense posture. However, a comprehensive strategy for Taiwan must take into account its facing a larger and better-equipped adversary, and must draw lessons from recent conflicts where smaller nations have successfully resisted more powerful nations.
The Evolving State of Modern Warfare
The dynamics of warfare between Taiwan and the PRC are fundamentally different from those between great powers. With great powers touting their nuclear arsenals and massive conventional militaries, open warfare between such nations is generally deterred by the concept of mutually assured destruction. However, Taiwan—which does not have any nuclear weapons and has a much smaller conventional military capacity compared to the PRC—must rely upon asymmetric warfare capabilities, defensive alliances, and innovative technology to counter its adversary.
The war in Ukraine serves as a perfect case study in this regard. Ukraine’s strategies, which have allowed it to successfully resist the Russian invasion despite being outclassed in manpower and firepower, highlight the need to study asymmetric warfare under a modern context. Furthermore, fundamental aspects of the war in Ukraine also demonstrate the rapidly changing environment of modern war: to include the advent of drones, widespread electronic warfare, and the importance of adaptability.
Drones
Although drones have been around for many years, militaries have typically relied on advanced, high-cost models like the MQ-9 Reaper, which can cost up to USD $56 million each. Use of smaller commercial drones, such as quadcopters, were mainly confined to civilian use. However, as Ukraine faced significant firepower disadvantages, new uses for these small drones were unexpectedly applied, and these commercial drones began to be deployed en masse for strikes. Priced at around USD $1,000 per unit, Ukraine is losing up to 10,000 drones per month—an expense that adds up. Yet, commercial drones are relatively easy to produce and operate; and whether repurposed for surveillance, logistics, or direct strikes, they are quick to replace. This adaptability in sourcing munitions has helped Ukraine hold out in what has increasingly become a war of attrition, and helped to overcome a significant Russian advantage in resources.
Although the invasion of Ukraine was not a complete surprise due to satellite imagery indicating military buildup, by using any types of munitions available, Ukraine was able to blunt the Russian momentum and buy time to better organize its defense. The initial stages of any invasion, when concerning asymmetric conflict, is extremely important. Blunting the enemy’s momentum should be a key goal for Taiwan in terms of calibrating a forceful response.
Drones have several advantages to which Taiwan should be attentive. Most notable is the fact that current air defense systems are extremely susceptible to drones. As Ukraine carries out cross border strikes on Russia with drones, modern air defenses have struggled to counter them. Even the Israel Missile Defense Organization (IMDO), which employs the advanced Iron Dome and other integrated air defense systems, are struggling against drones. One drone, launched by Hezbollah, slipped past Israeli detection and hit the private residence of Prime Minister Netanyahu. This capability, along with the favorable production costs of a drone, makes it particularly appealing to nations that face opponents with robust air defense systems. Applying rudimentary stealth capabilities to counter the early stage of an invasion can be important. By deploying drones en masse, striking the enemy in staging areas despite their illusion of a secured airspace can hurt the adversary’s morale and blunt his momentum. Taiwan can similarly exploit this characteristic during any amphibious landing by striking landing sites.
Another advantage that drones bring is their suitability to Taiwan’s maritime environment. Given that Taiwan is an island, in the event of an invasion, a naval blockade would almost certainly be implemented by the adversary. With China regularly staging drills that simulate a blockade, Taiwan must adopt strategies to respond. However, Taiwan’s current stated strategies against such a blockade are to stock up food, and dedicate more farmland for cultivation. Taiwan, however, should adopt a more offensive approach to this question: instead of just coping, Taiwan should aim to break the blockade. Anti-ship drones, especially when launched in swarms, can help with that goal. Tested on the field in Ukraine, anti-ship drones—such as the “Sea Baby” unmanned surface vehicle (USV)—have successfully denied Russia full control of the Black Sea, and have disabled or sunk ships that could have been used as a staging platform for missiles. Effective use of USVs by Taiwan can help keep the island nation’s economy functioning with the continuation of imports and exports (albeit at reduced numbers), and create an overall cushion for its economy in the face of a naval blockade.
When not being used for surveillance or to conduct strikes, commercial drones can be used to play an integral part in information warfare. With drone operators in Ukraine capturing brutal and accessible imagery from the front lines, these footages are used as propaganda to disrupt the narrative that the adversary may be pushing. These videos may damage the morale of the other side, but most importantly, these videos can influence public opinion—whether it be by garnering support for one side or to discredit the accomplishments of another side. With this type of footage abounding on platforms such as Telegram, social media amplifies the propaganda effect that these drone footages may create.
Caveats
This edge in drone warfare that Ukraine once had was quickly erased. Russia caught on extremely quickly and is ramping up its own drone production. Russian news agency TASS has reported that Russia is aiming to produce up to 32,000 drones per year. China, is no doubt, also observing this war and taking notes. With China learning lessons about asymmetrical warfare from Ukraine, it may be possible that China is more prepared for an invasion of Taiwan than Russia was for Ukraine. However, this doesn’t take away from the effectiveness of drones in asymmetrical warfare. If Taiwan has a strong capability when it comes to drones, it may be able to blunt any aggression by China and calibrate a suitable and informed response.
Cyber Warfare
In addition to the use of drones, cyberspace operations represents an increasingly critical and dynamic frontier of modern warfare. Malicious cyber operations are more and more integrated and coordinated with active military movement on the ground.
Figure 1: A graphic outlining how Russian cyber operations have coincided with military activities on the ground. (Figure source: Canadian Centre for Cybersecurity.)
Russian cyber operations during the early stages of its invasion of Ukraine were strategically coordinated to disrupt critical infrastructure, as well as to manipulate information. Intended to create confusion, disarray, and vulnerability within Ukraine, cyber operations have proven to be a valuable asset in any early stage of an invasion. These attacks on critical infrastructure can create an atmosphere of insecurity, and undermine the confidence of the population and government in their ability to maintain control and to respond adequately.
In the context of Taiwan and the PRC, a similar situation is emerging. The PRC, with its advanced cyber capabilities, is increasingly leveraging those capabilities to undermine Taiwan’s security. The PRC has already conducted malicious cyber operations targeted at educational, religious, and governmental structures. Furthermore, the PRC has even leveraged its cyber capabilities against other great powers such as the United States, with attempts to compromise US communications. Given the growing sophistication and brazenness of these cyber threats, it is crucial for Taiwan to prioritize resilience against such attacks. Because of the PRC’s advanced capabilities, resilience is the best bet to buy time in the face of potential invasion.
Adaptation in the Bureaucracy
Flexibility in state structures is also critical to adapt and respond to any invasion. Ukraine provides another valuable case study in this sense. With the relatively novel appearance of widespread commercial drones on the battlefield, Ukraine, although under heavy Russian pressure, was able to mobilize its industry into producing drones. This was expedited by the creation of a branch of the Ukrainian military dedicated to drone warfare. Flexibility to adapt to and embrace new technologies and tactics on the battlefield as they emerge has proven to be a big factor in the success of Ukraine’s ability to head off the brunt of Russia’s invasion. Taiwan should recognize the importance of strategically adopting new innovations in warfare with that full endorsement of the state, rather than being overly cautious and risking the loss of critical opportunities.
Furthermore, Ukraine has demonstrated heightened capabilities as a direct result of cooperating with the United States. With the CIA being a major secret partner of Ukraine, battlefield data and logistical support has been critical for Ukraine to pull off offensives and other operations. From this, Taiwan should try to similarly cooperate and partner with US spy agencies to allow for better preparedness and coordination in the face of conflict. Because the United States does not maintain official relations with Taiwan, any of this cooperation must happen cautiously. (Other nations are also actively trying to learn these strategies by sending representatives to glean lessons: North Korea, for example, has directly sent soldiers to participate in the war in Ukraine.) Taiwan should also create some sort of delegation to be integrated into the Ukrainian military. However, because this may invite wrath from Russia and condemnation or provocations from the PRC, any actions like this must be taken cautiously.
Recommendations for Enhancing Taiwan’s Readiness for Modern Warfare
There is no doubt that military planners in Taiwan know about the situation they are facing. However, despite a six percent increase in defense spending, conservatism and cultural differences have hindered the effective use of the budget and Taiwan’s asymmetric capabilities are being eroded by the PRC’s preparations. Therefore, in order to bolster this capability, Taiwan should overhaul the Ministry of National Defense (MND, 國防部) in order to implement strategies that would be more effective in fending off Chinese assaults. Here are some key recommendations:
- Drones: Recently, Taiwan has agreed to a US arms sale of 1,000 drones to bolster its drone capabilities. However, compared with the usage of drones in Ukraine, 1,000 will hardly prepare Taiwan in the face of a full onslaught by the PRC. While Taiwan defense officials and contractors have met with US officials to discuss collaboration in the drone industry, more renewed urgency should be placed on the production base of drone manufacturing. Furthermore, it is important to take into account that the drone industry is dominated by corporations largely under the jurisdiction of the PRC, such as drone manufacturer DJI. As a result, Taiwan should boost its domestic drone production base with the usage of both subsidies for startups and tariffs for foreign civilian drones. In this way, in the event of a blockade or cutoff of foreign drone production, Taiwan would be able to keep producing drones to keep an edge in surveillance and propaganda throughout a conflict.
- Cyber: As Taiwan faces increasingly sophisticated threats from the PRC, its cyber defense capabilities must be significantly enhanced. An essential component of Taiwan’s cyber defense should include the establishment of a comprehensive cyber warfare deterrence doctrine. With a definitive doctrine, cyber strategies could be pursued much more effectively. Taiwan should also and bolster cooperation with allies, and foster stronger partnerships with the private sector, to integrate both government and private networks into a resilient, nationwide defense system. This would allow greater civic engagement in defense as well as the potential for unexpected innovation from the private sector that could be more easily integrated into defense. Furthermore, these partnerships should be domestic, as reliance on foreign technology—especially tech associated with the PRC—could be compromised.
Drawing lessons from Ukraine, Taiwan must actively follow and apply new developments from the battlefield in Europe to its own military with increasing urgency. Taiwan must adapt its defense structure to incorporate innovative, resilient, and adaptable strategies capable of withstanding a larger adversary. By fortifying its domestic drone production, enhancing domestic cybersecurity with a clear deterrence doctrine, and establishing robust partnerships with private industry and international allies, Taiwan can build a more secure, responsive defense posture. Preparedness, adaptability, and strategic innovation are Taiwan’s best assets to maintain its sovereignty and stability amidst increasing threats.
The main point: Taiwan must urgently adapt its defense strategy to address the growing threat from the PRC by focusing on asymmetric warfare, technological innovation, and institutional flexibility. By learning from Ukraine’s resilience against a larger adversary, Taiwan can leverage the cost-effective benefits of drones, protect against the impacts of cyber operations by the PRC, and mobilize the state and all its instruments to bolster the island’s defense.
