The problem of espionage has once again been front-and-center in Taiwan’s news headlines during the first quarter of 2025. In January, a startling report from the usually secretive National Security Bureau (NSB, 國家安全局) highlighted the increasing efforts by People’s Republic of China (PRC) intelligence and united front organizations to foster subversion throughout Taiwan society, including the efforts to build a fifth column of saboteurs and assassins by leveraging organized crime groups. This was followed later that month by the indictment of Kao An-kuo (高安國), a retired Republic of China (ROC) Army lieutenant general, and five associated individuals on charges of allegedly forming an “armed organization” for the purpose of conducting sabotage on behalf of PRC forces in the event of an invasion.
Further revelations came in the month of March. On March 12, prosecutors publicly revealed an indictment issued in late 2024, regarding alleged espionage conducted by two Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) personnel. Per the charges, a retired ROCAF major named Shih Chun-cheng (史濬程), who had been recruited by PRC intelligence officers after his retirement, had himself recruited a serving ROCAF airman named Hsu Chan-cheng (許展誠). The classified material allegedly passed by Hsu included data on Taiwan’s indigenously-designed Hsiung Feng-3 (雄風3, HF-3) anti-ship missile, as well as information on the responses made by Taiwan’s armed forces to PRC military operations around Taiwan.
An even more startling case saw its conclusion on March 26, when a court in Taipei handed down prison sentences to four military security personnel: Lai Chung-yu (賴重宇), Lee Yu-hsi (黎育璽), and Lin Yu-kai (林裕凱), who served in the 211th Military Police (憲兵) Battalion that guards the presidential office complex; and Chen Wen-hao (陳文豪), who had been assigned to the Ministry of National Defense’s Information, Communications and Electronic Force Command (國防部資通電軍指揮部). Allegedly recruited in 2021 and 2022, Lai and Chen recruited the other men, who took pictures of classified documents from their workplaces before passing them on to their contacts for payment.
Espionage conducted by military and other government personnel on behalf of the PRC remains a critical national security problem in Taiwan, severely threatening the capacity of Taiwan’s government and society to resist the PRC’s escalating pressures for annexation. (For a comprehensive overview of this issue, and illustrative case studies, see GTI’s recent research report, Chinese Communist Party Covert Operations Against Taiwan.) In the past, this issue has been seemingly downplayed by Taiwan’s government (and this author has himself been critical of the light sentences handed down to spies), perhaps due in part to a reluctance to air dirty laundry in the national security establishment.
However, a platform of policy initiatives unveiled in March indicated an increasing willingness on the part of the government to finally begin acknowledging and engaging more seriously with Taiwan’s espionage and united front subversion problem. This platform of proposed measures is summarized in the section below.
President Lai’s March 13th Policy Speech
On March 13, following what the president’s office described as a “high-level security meeting,” Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) made a major policy speech that promised more rigorous efforts to crack down on PRC-directed espionage and infiltration in Taiwan. In the introduction of the speech, Lai stated that “China has been taking advantage of democratic Taiwan’s freedom, diversity, and openness to recruit gangs, the media, commentators, political parties, and even active-duty and retired members of the armed forces and police to carry out actions to divide, destroy, and subvert us from within.” Lai further stated that:
[M]embers of the military, both active-duty and retired, have been bought out by China, sold intelligence, or even organized armed forces with plans to harm their own nation and its citizens. […] [E]ntertainers [have] willingly followed instructions from Beijing […] all for the sake of personal career interests. […] [and] [M]essaging used by Chinese state media to stir up internal opposition in Taiwan [has been] spread by specific channels. There have even been individuals making careers out of helping Chinese state media record united front content, spreading a message that democracy is useless and promoting skepticism toward the United States and the military to sow division and opposition.
Lai concluded that the PRC therefore “satisfie[d] the definition of a ‘foreign hostile force’” [境外敵對勢力], per the terms of the Anti-Infiltration Act (反滲透法) passed by the Legislative Yuan in 2019. [1] Lai then laid out a series of proposed measures, in five broad areas: upholding national sovereignty; combatting infiltration and espionage activities in the military; pushing back on efforts to “obscure the national identity” of Taiwan’s people; countering united front infiltration into Taiwanese society through cross-strait exchanges; and exposing “integrated development” economic incentives used to cultivate Taiwanese businesspeople and young adults.
Image: Taiwan President Lai Ching-te making a policy speech on March 13, in which he vowed more stringent measures to combat espionage and united front operations directed at Taiwan by the PRC. (Source: ROC Presidential Office)
The 17 Provisions of Lai’s Speech
The five areas of concern identified in Lai’s speech were in turn subdivided into a series of 17 total action items, as summarized below:
I. Responding to China’s Threats to National Sovereignty
(1) The National Security Council (NSC, 國家安全會議) and Ministry of National Defense (國防部, MND) were directed to promote the “Four Pillars of Peace Plan” (和平四大支柱行動方案) action plan to oppose China’s efforts to annex Taiwan. [2]
(2) The NSC and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA, 外交部) were directed to draft an action plan “to convey to the world our national will and broad social consensus in opposing annexation of Taiwan by China and in countering China’s efforts to erase Taiwan from the international community and downgrade Taiwan’s sovereignty.”
II. Responding to Infiltration and Espionage Activities Targeting the Military
(3) The MND was directed to undertake required administration and legislative steps to restore the use of military tribunals to try criminal cases involving active-duty military personnel.
(4) The MND was directed to establish a personnel management system for military judges, military courts, and military prosecutors’ offices.
(5) The MND was directed to propose amendments to the Criminal Code of the Armed Forces regarding penalties for expressions of loyalty to the enemy [i.e., the PRC], and to revise the regulations for military personnel and their families receiving retirement benefits [a clear threat to cancel the retirement benefits for retired personnel involved with pro-PRC united front and propaganda efforts].
III. Responding to China’s Threats that “Obscure the National Identity” of Taiwan’s People
(6) The Ministry of the Interior (MOI, 內政部), Mainland Affairs Council (MAC, 大陸委員會), and other relevant agencies were directed to carry out inspections and management of the official documents (passports, ID cards, permanent residence certificates, etc.) that Taiwanese citizens might apply for in the PRC—especially when the applicants are military personnel or civil servants.
(7) More rigorous national security screening was directed for naturalization of persons from China, Hong Kong, and Macau: (A) PRC nationals applying for permanent residency in Taiwan must relinquish their existing household registration and passport, and may not hold dual identity status; and (B) individuals from Hong Kong or Macau applying for residency or permanent residency in Taiwan must meet “additional provisions for long-term residency to meet practical needs” (not otherwise defined).
IV. Responding to United Front Infiltration through Cross-Strait Exchanges
(8) Relevant agencies were directed to “raise public awareness [and] implement various registration systems to reduce the potential for accidents and the risks associated with traveling to China.”
(9) Government agencies were directed to implement a “disclosure system for exchanges with China,” to apply to both local and central government officials, and social welfare non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
(10) Relevant agencies were directed to manage the risks associated with individuals from China engaging in such exchanges: (A) such exchanges are to be “limited to normal cross-strait exchanges and official interactions under the principles of parity and dignity,” with “changes in the cross-strait situation […] taken into consideration;” and (B) PRC individuals associated with united front activity will be barred from entry.
(11) Cross-strait exchanges (religious, cultural, academic, and education exchanges specifically mentioned) are to be evaluated for “political interference from China and the resulting risks to national security.”
(12) The Executive Yuan was asked to explore measures to better promote Taiwan’s cultural industries, in order to reduce avenues for PRC financial pressure on cultural figures.
(13) Better guidance (not otherwise defined) was to be given to Taiwanese entertainers working or performing in China, in order to prevent them from making “statements or act[ing] in ways that endanger national dignity.”
(14) Relevant agencies were directed to develop more effective measures to improve cyber security, and to prevent “cognitive warfare” online.
(15) Relevant agencies were directed to undertake comprehensive reviews of administrative measures and laws for enforcement purposes.
V. Responding to “Integrated Development” Incentives to Attract Taiwanese Businesspeople and Youth
(16) The NSC and other government agencies were directed to “carry out strategic structural adjustments to the economic and trade relations between Taiwan and China” in regards to cross-Strait trade and investment.
(17) The Ministry of Education, MAC, Ministry of Economic Affairs, and other agencies were directed to “comprehensively strengthen young students’ literacy education on China,” and to promote better avenues for employment and entrepreneurship for young adults.
Conclusions
Taiwan’s dual crisis—both espionage and infiltration of the government, and united front infiltration of society—at the hands of compromised pro-PRC actors is a severe one, and one that calls out for serious and sustained government action. In this light, Lai’s announced series of measures is long overdue—particularly in regards to combatting espionage within the military and civil government, a problem that the government has long treated with kid gloves. The increased attention to this problem, and the harsher sentences more recently imposed by Taiwan’s courts in espionage cases, should hopefully provide a more effective deterrent to military personnel and others who might be tempted by the profitability of treachery.
The other side of the equation—united front penetration in Taiwan’s society—is more complex. It is striking that Lai’s speech devoted so much of its attention (the two sections of “Responding to United Front Infiltration through Cross-Strait Exchanges” and “Responding to ‘Integrated Development’,” with 10 out of 17 proposed measures) to issues that fall broadly within the social and cultural domain. This set of issues will be far trickier, and will involve much more complex discussions regarding the rights of free speech and association held by private citizens—as well as the limits of government authority to regulate these things in the name of national security.
Lai’s proposed series of measures (many of them broad and vague) will require further specifics in order to enact them. Many of the provisions—such as the restoration of military tribunals, and measures to restrict PRC-sponsored cross-Strait exchanges—are also certain to be challenged by critics on grounds that they threaten individual rights. It is incumbent on the government to take resolute action to combat the very real problem of PRC subversion—just as it is incumbent on those concerned with civil liberties to take the government to task if they feel it has overstepped its due authority. In this sense, the debates sure to play out in Taiwan will be worth watching in every country attempting to balance, on the one hand, the need for security in the face of authoritarian political warfare—and the rights of the citizen on the other.
[1] It has been widely reported in international press that Lai referred to the PRC as a “hostile foreign force”—thereby asserting that China and Taiwan are different countries. Lai’s chosen language (“境外敵對勢力”—literally “outside the borders hostile force,” or “external hostile force”)—was actually a bit more ambiguous. The 境外 could be taken to mean foreign, but it could also be taken to mean outside the state borders—e.g., the effective state borders of the ROC.
[2] The “Four Pillars of Peace” plan, as articulated by the Lai Administration, are: strengthened national defense; improved economic security; stable and principled cross-strait leadership; and values-based diplomacy. See: William Lai, “My Plan to Preserve Peace in the Taiwan Strait,” Wall Street Journal, July 4, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/opinion/my-plan-to-preserve-peace-between-china-and-taiwan-candidate-election-race-war-7046ee00.
