Following the Taiwanese government’s announcement that any nationals holding a People’s Republic of China (PRC)-issued identity (ID) card or settlement certificate will have their citizenship revoked, some Taiwanese appear to be continuing to quietly pursue these documents with the help of intermediaries and other unofficial channels. According to Pa Chiung (八炯), a Taiwanese YouTuber who revealed this united front work in his December 2024 documentary, there are approximately 200,000 Taiwanese who have already obtained PRC passports. In the Chinese-language information space, an informal network—composed of various accounts with similar messaging and cross-platform presence—includes actors who provide free consultation services and detailed information on application procedures for Taiwanese who are interested in obtaining PRC ID cards and passports. Not only are these gray zone activities potentially illegal under Taiwanese law, but they also support PRC influence operations and hybrid warfare strategies that aim to drive Taiwanese people toward the PRC’s goal of social integration and eventual “reunification.” In essence, Beijing could utilize Taiwanese acquisition of PRC IDs as the legal basis and proof of “evidence” that the majority of the Taiwanese population supports Beijing’s narrative of cross-strait unity—conceivably, justifying its coercive actions and even potential invasion of the island as part of its hybrid warfare strategies, which includes lawfare and public opinion warfare.
An Accumulated Result of the PRC’s Long-Term Hybrid Warfare Targeting Taiwan
Regardless of its precise accuracy, Pa Chiung’s revelation that 200,000 Taiwanese have obtained PRC passports reflects the alarming fact that the current situation is not constituted by a single operation or isolated incident—rather, it is an accumulated result of the PRC’s long-term hybrid warfare strategies targeting the Taiwanese people. First of all, PRC influence operations seek to gradually shape a more favorable image of China, which motivates not only leisure travel but also the pursuit of career development and other business opportunities across the strait. For instance, a recent study conducted by the Taiwan Information Environment Research Center (IORG), found that Taiwanese who are TikTok users have a more favorable opinion of China and are more pessimistic regarding Taiwan’s economic prospects compared to non-TikTok users.
Secondly, this behavior is further exacerbated by the perception of gaining travel benefits linked to various PRC residential statuses, and financial incentives such as the PRC government’s generous subsidies and monetary rewards for entrepreneurs starting up businesses in China. Stating the obvious, these political and economic policies—accompanied and reinforced by online and offline influence operations—serve as a part of Beijing’s broader hybrid warfare strategies for cross-Strait “integration,” and ultimately “reunification.”
PRC Strategies: A “Tier System” for PRC-issued IDs for Taiwanese
Under Taiwan’s Cross-Strait Act, Taiwanese nationals are prohibited from establishing household registration in mainland China. The following figure illustrates the progression of PRC-issued identity documents for Taiwan residents: how certain documents serve as prerequisites for obtaining subsequent ones, and which stages are considered in violation of Taiwan’s legal framework.
Figure: How PRC influence operations target Taiwanese to drive them closer to its “reunification” goal in terms of legal status and cognitive alignment. (Figure source: Created by the author.)
In the political sphere, PRC policies targeting Taiwanese citizens deliberately create gaps between different PRC-issued identification holders. This asymmetry can be conceptualized into a “tier system”—from PRC travel permits and residential permits, to settlement certificates and PRC ID cards. Higher tier level holders enjoy greater access to travel, entertainment, socio-economic benefits, and legal status in China.
For instance, a PRC Residence Permit for Taiwan Residents (台灣居民居住證) allows enhanced access to entertainment, including identity verification for opening social media accounts like Douyin, while allowing fewer restrictions when travelling within mainland China, such as fast track boarding of high-speed rail and eligibility to stay at hotels accepting residents from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. In contrast, those holding a Mainland Travel Permit for Taiwan Residents (台灣居民來往大陸通行證) can only pass through the manually-operated ticket counters and stay in hotels officially designated for foreign guests (涉外旅館). Moreover, a PRC ID card holder enjoys advanced access and more simplified bureaucratic procedures when opening banking accounts, applying for loans, establishing certain types of companies, and purchasing property.
In addition to verifiable benefits, there is also no lack of disinformation and unverifiable claims on social media regarding the benefits of certain PRC ID documents, such as posts stating that a PRC settlement certificate can enable individuals to “borrow amounts of up to several million from the bank and purchase property without restrictions.” Regardless of the authenticity of these claims, a Taiwanese citizen’s level of convenience in China increases as holders obtain higher “tiers” of PRC identity documents. Such differential treatment motivates Taiwanese to obtain higher-tier identification documents—gradually progressing to a more integrated residential status in the PRC.
Some local government policies, such as those implemented by Fujian Province in December 2023, have even relaxed eligibility requirements and now allow Taiwanese to apply for permanent settlement (“PRC Settlement Certificate for Taiwan Residents” [台灣居民定居證]) without renouncing their citizenship. Reinforced by influence operations on social media, these policy initiatives constitute a comprehensive approach to inducing Taiwanese to move closer towards a pro-China stance.
PRC Economic Policies Promote Cross-Strait Unity and Reinforce its Social Integration Goal
On the economic front, Beijing has evolved its united front strategies targeting Taiwan with the launch of “One Generation, One Stratum” (一代一線) in 2017. By specifically targeting Taiwanese youth and those at the grassroots stratum with the “resident treatment” (居民待遇)—special treatments similar to those enjoyed by Chinese citizens—Beijing attempts to transform pre-existing cultural and business exchanges into real “social integration.”
In particular, coastal provinces with a large Taiwanese community presence have implemented various subsidy programs that target Taiwanese youth (by their definition, those aged between 18 to 45). The Fujian provincial government, for instance, claims that it awarded a total of RMB 4.5 million (roughly USD 625,000) for start-ups since the launch of its “101 Taiwan Youth Entrepreneurship Support Program” (101台湾青年创业扶持计划) in 2015. PRC municipal governments also provide active support for such policy initiatives, with the Xiamen municipal government offering subsidies for business start-ups, office and housing rentals, as well as financial rewards for Taiwanese youth businesses who meet certain conditions for up to RMB 200,000 (about USD 27,600). Taiwanese youth are also encouraged to participate in PRC internships—merely after being in an internship position for over a month will they be qualified to receive an additional monthly subsidy during their subsequent internship, while first-time applicants are also eligible for another RMB 1,000 (about USD 140) as a “transportation subsidy.”
These generous government subsidies and monetary rewards for Taiwanese entrepreneurs in China are often featured in the Chinese-language information space along with posts and videos stressing the convenience of obtaining PRC-issued identity documents—thus further motivating Taiwanese entrepreneurs and youth to integrate into the PRC goals—both in terms of legal status and cognitive alignment.
Images: (Left): Screenshot of a March 2025 Xiaohongshu post titled “Maximum reward RMB 100,000 (about USD 13,900)! Don’t miss it!” which provides information on provincial-level entrepreneurship funding programs for Taiwanese. (Right): Screenshot of a November 2024 Xiaohongshu post listing “Subsidies for individuals with Taiwanese national status.” (Images source: Xiaohongshu)
PRC Influence Operations that Exploit the Taiwan Identity Question & Low Public Awareness
In the information space, many PRC influence operations (IOs) also leverage shared elements of ethnicity, history, and culture to promote Chinese national identity while suppressing and diluting Taiwanese nationalism. By emphasizing the perks of gaining the documents that qualify one as a “Chinese national,” this propaganda portrays a more positive image of China with its “compassionate support” for Taiwanese people—likely aiming to increase Taiwanese citizens’ sense of belonging to China. From the perspective of influence operations, the greatest problem lies in the amplification of PRC narratives by Taiwanese individuals themselves. This PRC strategy—namely, “using Taiwanese to influence Taiwanese” (以台引台)—relies on local actors to influence Taiwanese perceptions of China. In fact, key opinion leaders (KOLs), particularly those with ties to Taiwan, dissidents, and Taiwanese collaborators, are among the primary actors leveraged to promote PRC identification documents on social media.
For instance, Taiwanese citizen Xu Chen-rui (許辰瑞) published a video on Douyin featuring the process of obtaining the PRC Residence Permit on October 31, 2020. He also emphasized “Taiwan is a part of China” and that “Taiwanese is Chinese.” Xu regularly publishes videos that align with PRC narratives and has worked with PRC state media Kantaihai (看台海) and China Central Television (CCTV), including participating in a documentary filmed by the latter.
Another Taiwanese influencer, Lee Yi-hsiu (李易修), published a TikTok video to his account, Historybro, illustrating “the benefits of obtaining the PRC ID card.” Lee listed benefits including eligibility to apply for a PRC passport (allowing costless, visa-free access to certain destinations). Lee’s use of traditional characters implies that he is likely targeting Taiwanese users. It is also noteworthy that Lee maintains ties with the PRC-affiliated state media channel Phoenix Television (鳳凰衛視), serving as the host for their program Taiwan Bandeng Kuan (台灣板凳寬) in 2022.
Image: A Screenshot of Lee Yi-hsiu’s January 2025 TikTok video titled “Why can Taiwanese people obtain a ‘Chinese (Mainland) ID card’? Are there many benefits?” (Image source: Tiktok)
These IOs, which promote Chinese nationalism while diluting Taiwan’s national identity, facilitate the acceptance of PRC-issued identification documents, followed by Chinese citizenship, and ultimately contribute to the consolidation of a Chinese national identity.
The Effectiveness of Taiwan’s Latest Countermeasures – Policy Gaps & Vulnerabilities
Following Taiwan President Lai Ching-te’s (賴清德) designation of China as a “hostile external force” (境外敵對勢力), the National Immigration Agency (NIA, 內政部移民署) initiated a third round of crackdowns on Taiwanese who illegally hold PRC identity documents in early April. The major targets of this effort are Chinese spouses of Taiwanese nationals who obtained Taiwanese citizenship before 2004 and their PRC-born children. Under this crackdown, the NIA has asked approximately 12,000 individuals to submit proof of their renunciation of household registration in China. The agency warned that failure to comply within three months would result in the revocation of these individuals’ Taiwanese household registration.
While the policy seeks to identify Taiwanese nationals holding Chinese citizenship, its implementation has brought about considerable challenges that may undermine its effectiveness. Reports from the local media, such as The Reporter, have highlighted targeted individuals’ difficulties in obtaining official proof of household deregistration from the PRC. In some cases, applicants were informed that such proof cannot be reissued as their deregistration process had been completed years ago.
The Taiwanese government’s simultaneous failures in strategic communication generate confusion and controversies amongst the Taiwan population. These are vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the PRC via its influence operations to further induce distrust and magnify division in democratic societies—such as framing the policy as discriminatory and politically-motivated, or an example of “green terror” (綠色恐怖) from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民進黨) administration.
In particular, this verification crackdown includes second-generation citizens who were born in China but had returned to Taiwan before the age of seven. Many of these individuals may have never registered in China and grew up in Taiwan, while maintaining a strong sense of belonging to the island. Reinforced by Beijing’s disinformation campaigns, the Taiwanese government’s imperfect measures and inadequate strategic communication could foster a feeling of alienation amongst these groups, leaving them more vulnerable to PRC integration and influence operation efforts. Meanwhile, if those currently holding Taiwanese citizenship are indeed colluding with or serving as intelligence operatives for the PRC Ministry of State Security (MSS, 國家安全部), Ministry of Public Security (MPS, 國安部), or People’s Liberation Army (PLA), it would be a cake walk for them to obtain that piece of paper to “prove” their deregistered status.
Those who have already obtained Chinese citizenship, but have not yet declared it, could also become the next targets for exploitation by the PRC. Given that the data is in the hands of the Chinese authorities, the PRC could use it to induce or coerce individuals into conducting influence operations on behalf of Beijing. The PRC authorities could threaten to expose these dual-registered Taiwanese citizens, which would trigger the revocation of their Taiwanese citizenship under current Taiwanese law.
Policy Recommendations
As the real problem of PRC IDs lies in its relationships to cross-domain operations directed at Taiwanese, Taipei needs a more comprehensive framework to provide clear definitions and standards for investigation, as well as to foster better strategic communication. For instance, the current and past behaviors of Taiwanese investigative targets would be good indications for assessment. This includes but is not limited to: (i) alleged ties with the PRC state and state-affiliated entities, (ii) participation in Cross-Strait Forums and/or Cross-Strait Youth Summits, (iii) involvement in assisting or coordinating Beijing’s online and offline influence operations, and (iv) other suspicious behaviors such as photo shooting at key infrastructure and military bases.
Another recommendation is to establish a more robust reporting mechanism. Currently, the public is able to report Taiwanese nationals possessing PRC ID cards to the NIA. According to the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau (MJIB, 法務部調查局), one can also report these individuals to the MJIB or the police. However, information regarding the reporting procedures is often unclear and fragmented—complicated by disinformation and rumors including incorrect phone numbers and false claims such as “a NT$200,000 reward for informants.”
As a part of its countermeasures, the Taiwanese government could utilize the power of crowdsourcing and open source intelligence (OSINT) to formulate a collaborative social media platform where ordinary citizens can easily report illegal activities and united front operations in real-time. Such a platform would resemble Cofacts’ LINE chatbot, which collects crowdsourced fact checks for online media. Indeed, the author was able to personally uncover several Taiwanese nationals who had obtained PRC settlement certificates along with the research for this article. This initiative, if successfully established, may be particularly effective in Taiwan—given that the island already possesses a strong decentralized network of OSINT researchers.
The PRC leverages a variety of state and non-state actors for its cross-domain operations. In response, a whole-of-society approach to countering PRC infiltration efforts will enhance Taiwan’s resilience while safeguarding its democratic norms.
The main point: Despite being illegal for Taiwanese citizens to obtain a PRC ID card or settlement certificate, Beijing’s cross-domain operations that advertise the political benefits of holding higher “tiers” of PRC-identification, economic programs that target Taiwanese youth and entrepreneurs, and Taiwanese influencers that parrot CCP narratives continue to entice Taiwanese people to become more socially integrated into the PRC and legally and cognitively align with its “reunification” goals. To counter this, Taipei should adopt a more comprehensive framework, foster better strategic communication, and establish a more robust reporting mechanism that could also utilize Taiwan’s open-source intelligence community.
