Under Xi Jinping, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has sped up military modernization while intensifying military, economic, and cognitive pressure campaigns against Taiwan. Meanwhile, President Donald Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy has generated concerns in Taiwan regarding the consistency and predictability of the US commitments. Furthermore, a divided government has complicated the efforts of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) to formulate and implement long-term security policies—as seen when the Kuomintang (KMT)-led opposition blocked Lai’s USD 40 billion special defense budget six times before a reduced USD 26 billion version passed in May 2026. Taiwan’s security challenge is a question of deterrence, political identity, and policymaking. But measures to strengthen Taiwan’s security will likely intensify domestic polarization or increase the risk of escalation. Therefore, Taiwan needs to increase its resilience and strength without triggering conflict.
In this regard, three mutually reinforcing efforts shape Taiwan’s security resilience: (1) institutionalizing asymmetric deterrence; (2) diversifying security partnerships; and (3) rebuilding domestic political consensus.
Institutionalizing Asymmetric Deterrence
Given the PRC’s superior military capabilities, Taiwan cannot compete in a conventional manner. Therefore, through the strategy of asymmetric deterrence, Taiwan should seek to exploit the vulnerabilities of a superior adversary through dispersed, survivable, and cost-effective capabilities. This concept is not new. In 2008, William Murray first proposed the “Porcupine Strategy”—whereby Taiwan should make an invasion prohibitively costly rather than match the PRC weapon-for-weapon. This was adopted and formalized in Taiwan’s 2017 National Defense Report. Additionally, Taiwan’s then-Chief of the General Staff, Admiral Lee Hsi-ming (李喜明), introduced in 2018 the “Overall Defense Concept” (ODC)—which divided Taiwan’s forces into two components: a smaller conventional force of major weapons platforms, such as fighter jets, warships and tanks for homeland defense, and a larger asymmetric force of low-cost, mobile and dispersed systems including missile launchers, sea mines and fast-attack craft designed to survive an initial PRC strike and sustain continuous attrition. In doing so, the ODC reframed deterrence as denial, which makes an invasion prohibitively difficult and costly to execute. At the Yushan Forum this year, President Lai reaffirmed that Taiwan would accelerate the development of asymmetric capabilities.
Despite the recognized importance of developing asymmetric capabilities, internal disagreements continue among Taiwanese policymakers: chiefly between military traditionalists who favor prestige conventional platforms and reform-minded officials who champion asymmetric systems. This has hindered major steps forward. Moreover, the long reliance on large warships and heavy weaponry has prevented the military’s transformation into a flexible and decentralized asymmetric model, with continuing considerable resistance from internal disagreements.
The events in May demonstrate this challenge: After months of legislative gridlock, the Legislative Yuan (立法院, LY) passed a special defense budget of USD 26 billion, which occupied around 65 percent of the USD 40 billion that the Lai administration originally proposed. The approved package concentrated funding on weapons that were approved for sale by the United States; that is, systems cleared through Washington’s Foreign Military Sales process, under which the State Department and Congress must sign off before American-made arms can be transferred to a foreign government. However, the budget cut allocations for domestic systems, such as indigenous drone production.
The outcome reveals Taiwan’s legislative constraints: lawmakers gravitated toward external platforms over decentralized and made-in-Taiwan asymmetric systems, as had been envisioned by Admiral Lee.
To address this issue, the Ministry of National Defense (國防部, MND) should make the case for asymmetric procurement in terms that the LY can evaluate on their own merits, rather than relying on doctrine. For example, the MND can publish comparisons showing how many mobile anti-ship missile batteries or naval mines, priced per unit, could be procured for the cost of a single frigate or fighter jet, alongside estimates of how many PRC vessels or aircraft each option could plausibly deter or destroy. This could shift the debate from abstract doctrine to a metric that every legislator, regardless of party affiliation, can evaluate.
Expanding the Network of Security Partners for Deterrence
The uncertainty surrounding Trump’s commitments to support Taiwan, and China’s expanding military strength, urges Taiwan to pursue a calibrated strategy of security diversification. This approach could improve intelligence sharing, enhance interoperability in contingency planning, and complicate the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) operational calculations. Furthermore, a broader network of stakeholders interested in cross-Strait stability can increase the political and diplomatic costs of aggression against Taiwan, strengthen deterrence, and reduce the island’s isolation.
The urgency of this diversification was underscored when Acting Secretary of the US Navy Hung Cao confirmed in May 2026 that Washington had partially suspended pending arms deliveries to Taiwan. Unlike the September 2025 suspension, which critics attributed to Trump’s trade-off approach toward Beijing, this was cited as a shortage of ammunition following prolonged US military operations against Iran. The lesson for Taiwan remains the same: Washington’s arms deliveries to Taipei depend not only on the island’s political will, but also on the US’s own strategic calculations.
In this regard, cooperation with regional middle powers such as Japan, Australia, and the Philippines should be prioritized, as they share an interest in maintaining stability across the Indo-Pacific.
(I) Japan
Japan’s current Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has been vocal in forging ties with Taiwan, focusing on defense commitments. As a large portion of Japan’s energy, resources, and maritime traffic transit through the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan’s security is, in essence, closely tied to Japan’s national security. In addition to hardware, military education exchanges—from the cadet to senior-officer level—could diminish Taiwan’s shortfalls in human capital, particularly the shortage of volunteer personnel and retention of skilled pilots. This would build shared professional vocabulary and mutual understanding of operational procedures.
Furthermore, both sides need to strengthen coordination in countering China’s grey zone activities through real-time intelligence sharing and analysis, and improve interoperability in missile defense and aerial response, facilitating effective crisis management.
(II) The Philippines
Taiwan’s security cooperation with the Philippines has gradually become more salient. Notable activities include joint patrols in the Bashi Strait and Taiwan’s deployment of observers to the Kamandag military exercise, involving the US and other partners.
Strikingly, the current government of the Philippines has not hidden its desire to collaborate. In July 2025, Philippine Defense Minister Gilbert Teodoro Jr. said that “it would be hiding from the obvious to say that Taiwan’s security will not affect us.” Moreover, in May, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. underlined that the Philippines has “no choice” but to be drawn into a Taiwan contingency, expressly stating Manila’s stake in cross-Strait stability .
In late 2025, Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (海洋委員會海巡署) and the Philippine Coast Guard held a meeting to explore intelligence sharing and capacity building, although lacking a formal and binding framework. Hence, the Lai administration should focus on concrete mechanisms: such as a memorandum of understanding on maritime information sharing, a regular yearly patrol schedule, and an exclusive communication channel during crises.
As America’s close ally, the Philippines has been willing to facilitate US support in a Taiwan contingency. In 2023, under the terms of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), Marcos decided to increase American military access to strategic bases in the north of the archipelago, particularly in the Cagayan region. Manila also permitted the US Typhon mid-range missile system to be deployed in Ilocos Norte, which is only 350 km from Taiwan.
(III) Australia
Taiwan’s defense cooperation with Australia is more challenging than cooperation with Japan and the Philippines, mainly due to Australia’s caution regarding China’s reaction: Australia’s 2026 National Defence Strategy devotes extensive attention to China’s military buildup, yet avoids naming Taiwan.
However, as the PLA expands its operational capabilities and exerts pressure on Australia’s own forces, Canberra should proactively support Taiwan’s deterrence capabilities. The 2026 strategy prioritizes long-range strike, missile defense, and undersea warfare—thus, a Taiwan-Australia technical dialogue would find more traction if framed around these specific capability areas. In addition, Taiwan could enhance engagement by proposing informal security dialogues (Track II), cooperating on low-sensitivity dual-use technologies, or establishing direct communication channels with the Australian Department of Defence.
If successful, Taiwan could build a regional defense partnership network stretching from Japan to Australia, thereby enhancing its resilience against Beijing’s pressure and Washington’s uncertainty. In this context, Japan should be the first priority, as its defense capabilities can provide greater assistance. Additionally, the Takaichi Administration’s stance toward China should be used as leverage to strengthen ties with Taiwan. The Philippines should follow next, since Manila has locked in maritime friction with China and is likely willing to enhance security cooperation with Taiwan. As the third priority, Taiwan could pursue cooperation with Australia at a slow and gradual pace.
Restoring Domestic Political Consensus for National Resilience
The salient issue currently plaguing Taiwanese politics is that political parties engage in mutual hostility, resulting in a highly confrontational, “zero-sum” political landscape. Parties must build a minimum level of consensus so that Taiwan can respond more effectively to security challenges. History proves that it is not impossible: During the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, Taiwanese leaders quickly formed a relatively unified front, prioritizing the outbreak as a security issue and implementing a whole-of-society approach.
Such a consensus should re-emerge regarding the defense budget. Currently, the DPP advocates for a greater increase in defense spending to build a comprehensive deterrent. Conversely, the KMT argues that the budget should be allocated to welfare initiatives. In November 2025, the debate intensified when Lai announced a special USD 40 billion defense package spanning eight years. The KMT blocked the budget six times before it entered the National Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee for discussion.
The deadlock was partially resolved in May 2026, when the Legislative Yuan passed a special defense budget worth approximately USD26 billion. This reflects the KMT-TPP bloc securing significant cuts to domestic development programs and accompanying oversight provisions, while the DPP agreed to a reduced budget to keep the process advancing.
Despite resolving the legislative deadlock, a question remains unanswered: How to ensure that the budget is allocated in a way that enhances Taiwan’s asymmetric deterrence capabilities. Hence, the Lai Administration should push for the establishment of a Cross-Party Defense Oversight Committee, structured as a standing sub-committee under the Legislative Yuan existing Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee. This committee would have access to quarterly technical and financial reports on procurement progress. The committee’s mandate would be to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of asymmetric platforms versus conventional ones, based on comparative data released by the MND. In this way, oversight serves as both a concession to the KMT and as a mechanism to protect the DPP’s procurement priorities.
The main point: At the core of debates on Taiwan’s security are mounting pressure from the PRC, the Trump Administration’s tenuous security commitments, and internal political turbulence that hinders an effective response. To navigate this turmoil, the Lai Administration should beef up asymmetric deterrence, broaden a network of like-minded security partners, and cultivate an internal political ecosystem built on mutual understanding, constructive participation, and accountability.
